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Where does our modern world belong — to exhaustion or ascent? 
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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the symptomatology of fatigue based on interviews conducted with 
seven people who are diagnosed with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic 
Encephalomyelitis. The thesis starts by examining how a biomedical view of fatigue — the 
dominant perspective in contemporary Western society — is underpinned by aporetic 
divisions, such as mind/body and individual/society. In pursuit of a more rigorous approach 
to fatigue, which explores rather than disavows division, the interview transcripts are 
analysed through the lens of Lacanian theory. The analysis commences with an exploration 
of the onset of the participants’ conditions, drawing on Lacan’s notion of alienation. This 
brings to light a common experience of a confrontation with the capitalistic demand to ‘keep 
going’, as well as experience of facing contradictory demands. Lacan’s notion of separation 
allows us to appreciate the emergence of fatigue as one way of unconsciously refusing these 
demands. This refusal consists of two intertwined but contradictory forces: the drive (which 
articulates to pain/tension and signals presence) and a defensive desire (which articulates to 
fatigue itself and signals disappearance). This allows us to understand a complex of 
phenomena related to the experience of fatigue, ranging from anorexia to mourning. The 
thesis then turns to the relation between the onset events and the participants’ responses to 
them. Here Lacan’s theory of the clinical structures is utilised in order to illuminate details 
around the function and structure of fatigue. This returns us to the conventional separation of 
the mind and body, showing how current medical and psychological approaches are unable 
to adequately account for the current findings. The thesis concludes by elucidating how the 
main points are situated within a larger sociocultural context, arguing for a view of the mind-
body relation which moves beyond the aporia while refusing any reduction to either pole. 
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Chapter 1: Challenging a Biomedical Approach to Fatigue 
 
 
The biomedical perspective has become one of the most dominant lenses through which we 
view ourselves in contemporary society. Indeed, the term ‘diagnosis’ comes from the Greek 
word ‘diagignoskein’ and means ‘to discern’ and ‘to know thoroughly’ (Harper, 2011). The 
modern view of fatigue is no exception as it is largely moulded on the principles inherent in 
medicine. The medical model makes a diagnosis in relation to an established knowledge as 
a way of differentiating between health and illness, thereby recognising a generalisable 
syndrome (Verhaeghe, 2004: 4-5). But when a body of knowledge is not fully established, 
the diagnostic category and the condition to which it refers become questionable and 
mysterious — such is the case for fatigue, diagnosed as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) 
and/or Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME).  
The modern conceptualisation of fatigue/CFS/ME has engendered a vexing debate 
and a number of competing viewpoints regarding its nature, aetiology and treatment amongst 
patients, carers, practitioners, researchers and the public. Explanations range from the 
biological, such as viral infections or neurological dysfunctions in the immune system, to the 
psychological, such as depression and/or anxiety (Prins, van der Meer & Bleijenberg, 2006: 
348). However, any uniform finding in research has been with a low number of participants 
or has been inconsistent in subsequent findings (Afari & Buchwald, 2003, passime; Prins et 
al: 348), rendering a conclusive explanation impossible. Despite a dearth of knowledge and 
evidence, two opposing views resembling a mind/body dichotomy have emerged as mirrored 
in the co-existence of the two names CFS and ME: Chronic Fatigue Syndrome denotes a 
psychological/psychiatric nature and aetiology, whereas Myalgic Encephalomyelitis is 
suggestive of a neurological manifestation and cause. Accordingly, the question haunting the 
area of fatigue is: is it biological or psychological? A headline in The Guardian (Cox, 2016) 
reads ‘Is Chronic Fatigue Syndrome finally being taken seriously?’ and explores the 
biological evidence with enthusiasm that new research shows great promise of finding a 
physiological cause. Another more recent article in The Guardian (Ludlam, 2018) has the 
subtitle ‘As researchers close in on the genetic origins of ME/CFS, it’s time to say to those 
suffering they are not forgotten’; thus indicating that what does not fit into the biomedical 
model — with its focus on physical evidence — is considered not serious and not ‘real’ or 
existing. Because how can we possibly take seriously a condition without a biological 
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underpinning? Most media depiction alongside research and lay and expert opinions on 
CFS/ME make it clear that the modern discourse around the condition is constitutive of a 
divide between the psychological and biological, with the body and the mind in exclusive 
opposition to one another. Associations with the mind delegitimises the condition, while 
evidence of a biomarker for the condition legitimises and authenticates it. Needless to say 
that this divide, which stems from a lack of a definition of it, has led to an uncertainty in 
health professionals’ approach to diagnosis and treatment, and a questioning of the very 
existence of the illness (Bowen et al, 2005; Deale & Wesseley, 2001; Page & Wessely, 2003). 
Consequently, and not so strangely, patients are negatively impacted and dissatisfied with 
their clinical encounters (Deale & Wessley, 2001; Dickson, Knudsen & Flowers, 2007; Page 
& Wessely, 2003; Prins et al, 2006, The ME Association, 2010). There are therefore good 
reasons to thoroughly investigate the nature and potential influences of fatigue. 
 However, it is clear that past and current investigations have introduced more 
divisions and questions rather than answers to the area of fatigue. The majority of research 
stems from a positivistic, empirical scientific framework upon which the biomedical 
approach is built, thus meeting the demand for evidence-based results. The evidence-based 
focus omnipresent today, where the measurable and the tangible have priority, feeds the 
mind-body divide found within both science and biomedicine. The area of fatigue, probably 
more than any other, illustrates how such a mind-body divide leads to a deadlock in the 
acquisition of knowledge, and even leads to harming patients. There is thus a timely need to 
question the underlying assumptions of the biomedical approach and explore fatigue from an 
alternative perspective. This chapter, by outlining the ways in which the biomedical works 
— or in this case, does not work — will highlight the gaps needing to be addressed. The 
perception of the body in relation to the mind is of central importance to such a critique. By 
tracing this in-depth, the necessity to adopt another approach, one able to generate novel 
knowledge and advance the approach to fatigue, will become evident. More precisely, I argue 
that it is the adoption of a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective in relation to first-person 
accounts of fatigue which has the capacity to do so as the theory goes beyond the mind-body 
deadlock and has a view of the mind-body relation which accounts for its complexity in its 
wider social, cultural and political context. Therefore, this project seeks to contribute insight 
into the area of fatigue, in terms of the individual and cultural influences on its formation, 
manifestation and development, through an appeal to Lacanian psychoanalysis.  
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The Rise of the Biomedical Model  
 
Medicine as a social institution with its social rules, codes and knowledge moulds 
characteristics inherent in modern society (Turner, 2004: xiii), including the view of the 
mind-body relation, which has come to greatly influence our sense of identity. Historically, 
medicine was built on a mind-body divide where the two were considered radically different 
— following a structure and a belief which has impacted the perception of and approach to 
fatigue. 
 The pivotal breakthrough in Western medicine is considered to date back to the 19th 
century in France, when the dissection of dead corpses started taking place in order to 
discover the cause of bodily symptoms (Loose, 2014). It was consent from the Christian 
orthodoxy which allowed the initiation of dissecting bodies; a permission stemming from the 
viewpoint that the body was a mere transport vessel to a better world, while the mind was 
equivalent to the soul and belonged to God. Hence, the mind became excluded from physical 
investigations (Ibid.). Medical scientists then founded the biomedical model in the 1850’s 
(Jennings, 1986:865) on scientific principles involving the development of a taxonomic 
system in order to understand, treat and prevent diseases. Classificatory medicine became 
concerned with localising a cause in the form of the smallest component at the level of bio-
chemistry — in the absence of which a symptom was not considered to be part of an 
underlying ‘disease’ (Engel, 1977: 131). This gave rise to the distinction between ‘disease’ 
and ‘illness’: disease came to signify the presence of an observable, bio-chemical cause 
which was independent of patients’ reports and actions, and illness had to do with subjective 
experiences; that which was communicated and complained about in the absence of any 
demonstrable cause (Jennings, 1986: 866).  
 The foundation of the biomedical line of reasoning stems from philosophical 
assumptions found within science at the start of its establishment. Verhaeghe (2004: 38) 
argues that Western science began with an interpretation of Plato: there was a search for 
invariant, observable objects, separated from the subject, which could be categorised in 
accordance to their ontological essence. However, the introduction of modern empirical 
rationalism (Turner, 2004: 95), and modern subjectivity on which a large part of positivistic 
science came to be built, started with René Descartes. With his famous utterance ‘I think, 
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therefore I am’, and his work ‘Meditations on First Philosophy in which the Existence of God 
and the Immortality of the Soul are Demonstrated’ (Descartes, 2002/1641), he developed the 
idea of the isolated individual by giving primacy to the self — one associated with the 
conscious mind and separated from the body and society. The Cartesian cogito is a self-
sufficient (Parker et al, 1995: 13), fully self-conscious being reduced to internal states which 
are able to be controlled. Descartes postulated that cognising proves the existence of the self, 
and thus a desire for certainty accompanies the modern subject (Neill, 2014: 16-7). Cartesian 
rationalism was then conflated with Newtonian logic in order to discover mathematical 
calculations considered in control of the body (Turner, 2004: 96) — thoughts which prevail 
in contemporary science: the individual is at the centre with the measurable body belonging 
to the medical sciences and the mind belonging to the human sciences. However, the mind is 
becoming increasingly excluded even from the latter. 
 
Biomedical Hegemony: The Body as Machine 
 
While medicine has since its inception advanced the knowledge and treatment of diseases, 
the application of the biomedical framework to the area of mental health, as well as what is 
considered ‘psychosomatic’ as the two are considered related, has a different outlook. The 
failure of such an implementation was evident early on as, first of all, no consistent organic 
lesions were found, and is further evident today in a continued absence of biomarkers. 
Nevertheless, this does not hinder the appeal and use of a biomedical approach to mental 
health/psychosomatics due to the hegemonic status of it. Looking at how and why the 
biomedical approach has been adopted within psychiatry, an area with which fatigue is 
associated, will be useful in discerning the sociocultural and political atmosphere under 
which CFS/ME as a diagnosis emerged and has been developed. 
 The Statistical Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) was created out of a 
need to provide more accurate descriptions than what was outlined in previous mental health 
manuals, since they did not match the suffering of the soldiers returning from World War II 
(Vanheule, 2014: 6). This was thought to be achieved through an a-theoretical compilation 
of disorders based on observation and empirical affirmation (Verhaeghe, 2004: 42). Prior to 
the DSM-III and from the beginning of psychiatry, diagnoses followed a prototypical 
approach in which clinical realities acted as templates. This approach is found in Pinel’s work 
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in the early 1800’s, inspired by Sydenham’s proposition that diseases could be examined the 
way in which plants are by the botanist (Vanheule, 2014: 3). In a prototype-based approach, 
a set of characteristics in the form of narrative descriptions make up a clinical reality with 
the aim to provide a ‘basic type’ describing the typical patterns and prognosis (Ibid.: 3-4). 
With the creation of the DSM-III, however, there was a diagnostic shift from prototypes to a 
check-list based approach. In the latter, separate and disconnected symptoms add up to 
correspond to an underlying condition, thus suggesting that a greater quantity of symptoms 
resemble a more severe condition (Ibid.: 4). This rearrangement arose from the attempt to 
pull psychiatry out of its crisis which took place in the 1960’s and 1970’s due to criticism 
pertaining to its validity and reliability. Consequently, an endeavour to re-conceptualise 
psychiatric conditions along the lines of the biomedical framework was made through the 
DSM-III by a group at Washington University consisting of young psychiatrists who desired 
to find biological markers for the observable symptoms (Ibid.: 30-32). The conflation of 
biomedicine, science and taxonomy inherent in botany was turned into a legitimate way of 
diagnosing and discerning mental health and psychosomatic illnesses, as it satisfied a desire 
for standardisation which would supposedly increase validity and reliability. This occurred 
during a time when there was an aspiration to quantify human behaviour with the use of 
statistics, akin to what the World Health Organization (WHO) had done for medical illnesses 
by elaborating a taxonomic list which became the International Classification of Disease 
(ICD) (Ibid.: 6-8).  
The quantification of the mind and human behaviour was made desirable and 
allegedly possible through the emergence and development of medical technology and 
laboratories, which aided the diagnostic processes within medicine from the 1850s and 
onwards. In turn, less emphasis was placed on patients’ descriptions of symptoms (Berger, 
1999: 5), since it was now thought that reliable instruments provided a more direct 
relationship with the body. This gave rise to one of the most dominant metaphors within 
Western medicine, ‘the body as a machine’ (Turner, 2003), constituting an ideological shift 
where the body is now considered a somatic entity capable of being measured mathematically 
(Turner, 2004: 97-9). More accurately however, the metaphor ‘the body as machine’ has been 
around for a long(er) time, evident through works such as ‘Man a Machine’ written by Julien 
Offroy de la Mettri in the 18th century. We can instead claim that contemporary society, as it 
operates under late capitalism and in which technology has advanced tremendously in all 
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areas, brings full force to this metaphor as the body is more than ever thought to correspond 
to a measurable machine. Our phones or gadgets are considered to be an extension of 
ourselves, acting as our memory and producing social lives which are available immediately 
and 24/7. This gives rise to the experience of constantly being present, and together with 
medical practices, gives birth to the idea that all parts of human life can be rendered visible 
(either online or through biomedical equipment). Relatedly, the body is considered capable 
of constant productivity and of extending itself to multiple activities simultaneously akin to 
that of a machine, as further shaped by the ideologies of late capitalism. The former is not 
only inclusive of the activity of work but of all kinds of activities such as enjoying, learning 
and consuming — something we should preferably engage in all at once. In other words, 
what is distinctive of contemporary society is that the ideas and aspirational goals of constant 
productivity and presence/visibility is not confined to the practices of capitalism and science 
where it guides the production of goods and medical procedures, but in its widespread reach 
it spills over to all areas of life and now also acts as a guide for human behaviour. Jonathan 
Crary (2013: 9), in his book 24/7 — Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep claims that while 
many institutions in the developed world have operated on a 24/7 basis for a while, it is only 
recently that this idea of an ‘uninterrupted operation’ has impregnated the area of social and 
personal identity1. The presence of this cultural idea ‘the body as machine’ within the field 
of medicine and vice versa represents for Foucault a biomedicalisation resulting from 
scientific, economic and political forces, or what he refers to as ‘biopolitics’ (Kirshner, 2009: 
96, 99).  
 This brief historical account outlined above illustrates that the biomedical approach 
is thought to represent a legitimate, objective measuring tool able to explain all conditions, 
and that this is strongly linked to the ideologies and practices of late capitalism. However, 
there is currently an increase in criticism of the biomedical model and consequently an 
increase in alternative health approaches (Turner, 2004: 89-91). Even the germ theory, on 
which the medical model is built, is limited when it comes to certain physical disorders and 
especially chronic illnesses (Ibid.: 118-9). The reality is that we experience our bodies as 
 
1 For an account of how the ideologies and practices of late capitalism in which we find ourselves today are 
shaping this idea of the human capable of constant machine-like productivity, see Jonathan Crary (2013). In 
relation to fatigue specifically and for a historical account of this, see the extensive work of Rabinbach (1992). 
This section focuses on the biomedical view of ‘the body as machine’. Related to the ideologies of capitalism 
is Mark Fisher’s (2007) book ‘Capitalist Realism — Is There no Alternative?’. 
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more than mere objects (shown in cases of mastectomy) (Ibid.: 80), and that the reflexive 
mind eludes mathematical calculations. These shortcomings of the biomedical approach have 
to do with limits inherent in its structural composition, and is especially evident in the 
approach to fatigue, which follows the presuppositions therein. 
 
CFS/ME: The Biomedical Language of Fatigue 
 
The inclusion of CFS/ME in the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1992 classifies the 
condition as a medical one (Prins et al, 2006: 347). The process inherent in medicine of 
gathering isolated symptoms to form a generalisable syndrome through observation and 
systematic ordering (Verhaeghe, 2004: 5, 79) is part of the check-list based approach. While 
this method is viewed as objective and rigorous, its implementation on fatigue suggests 
otherwise. 
Historically, outbreaks of illnesses for which no aetiology was found and in which 
chronic fatigue was the main symptom have been reported since the 1930s (Briggs & Levine, 
1994). But it was not until the early 1980s that interest in fatigued conditions increased (Prins 
et al, 2006: 346) and the terms CFS and ME were subsequently coined. The name ME first 
appeared at the Royal Free Hospital in London thirty years earlier as an epidemic broke out 
among staff, who presented with neurological symptoms and chronic fatigue (Prins et al, 
2006: 346) that were suggestive of an inflammation of the brain and spinal cord. Hence the 
name Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, which literally means inflammation of the brain and the 
spinal cord. Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, on the other hand, was coined by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of the United States, which advanced a case definition 
of fatigue with the goal of standardising its research population (Afari & Buchwald, 2003; 
Holmes et al, 1988). The origins of the names already reflect a division between 
medicine/practice and research, hinting at a mind-body divide. From then onwards, the 
following factors have been explored as possible causes to CFS/ME: immune dysfunctions, 
viral infections (such as Epstein-Barr), sleep disruptions, central nervous system 
dysfunctions, neuroendocrine responses, exercise ability, personality, genetics, and 
‘(neuro)psychological processes’ (Prins et al, 2006: 348). 
 Today the diagnosis of CFS/ME is typically arrived at by excluding illnesses, which 
makes CFS/ME a diagnosis based on a lack of disorders, or what is most commonly referred 
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to as unexplained fatigue (Banks & Prior, 2001; Hart & Grace, 2000; Ward, 2015), also 
categorised under the name Medically Unexplained Symptoms (MUS). It is generally agreed 
that the hallmark of CFS/ME is a profound and persistent fatigue distinguished from 
everyday tiredness and is typically accompanied by a number of bodily and cognitive/mental 
symptoms which impair everyday functioning (Afari & Buchwald, 2003; Bazelmans et al, 
1999; Fukuda et al, 1994; Ward, 2015). While the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE, 2007) guidelines to CFS/ME acknowledge that there is a ‘great variability 
in the symptoms different people experience’ (p 4), there is a recognition that the same type 
of fatigue and muscle pain occurs in Fibromyalgia (Ward, 2015: 28). Fibromyalgia is 
distinguished from CFS/ME in terms of an emphasis on muscle pain as opposed to fatigue. 
For instance, the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP, 2002) in their guidelines 
to CFS/ME highlight this overlap with fibromyalgia as well as Irritable-Bowel Syndrome 
(IBS), but state that the diagnosis should be based on the most ‘dominant and disabling’ 
symptoms (p. 23). Schur et al (2007), and Vandenbergen et al (2009) also acknowledge the 
overlap and subsequently question the separation of CFS/ME from the two latter conditions, 
both of which also lack organic evidence and are grouped under MUS and/or ‘functional 
somatic syndrome’ (Wessely, Nimnuan & Sharpe, 1999). This suggests that the 
categorisation of CFS/ME is not straightforward and that a diagnosis is based on a focus on 
bodily form. That is, the symptom of fatigue is considered in a neat fashion to reflect a 
disorder, CFS/ME, and is categorically distinct from the condition of Fibromyalgia, for 
which muscular pain is the representative symptom. The symptomatic form is taken as proof 
for the existence of a separate condition for which a symptom directly represents a disorder. 
Further, it reflects a modern tendency to reduce a condition to its smallest component. 
 In such a categorisation, interest lies in the presence of symptoms — a focus shaped 
by the implementation of arbitrary and abstract rules used to define a category (Parker et al, 
1995: 62). For instance, in the diagnostic criteria for CFS/ME set out in the NICE (2007) 
guidelines, fatigue must be accompanied by one other symptom. In comparison to the criteria 
of the American Centers for Disease Control (CDC), four symptoms in addition to fatigue 
are required. The former criteria would exclude those with a very debilitating fatigue who 
did not portray any other symptoms (Ward, 2015: 27-8), and the latter, those who portray 
three very debilitating symptoms in addition to fatigue. In line with Vanheule’s (2014: 61) 
criticism of the DSM’s outlined mental health disorders, we can argue that an exclusive focus 
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on quantity ignores quality: the explorations of how symptoms are experienced, under what 
conditions, and the meanings created around them are excluded. The quantitative yardsticks 
are accordingly not based on any experience or knowledge — evidenced in the fact that the 
sets of criteria differ from country to country — but instead act as arbitrary cut-off points. 
Their generalisability bars the existence of unique, ever-changing personal situations, such 
as the experience of incapacitating fatigue on and off for say three months at a time which 
significantly disrupts one’s life routines, which would fail to meet the criterion requiring 
fatigue to be present for at least four or six months. The existence of these sets of rules 
suggests that the classifying system is not based on theoretical knowledge (Verhaeghe, 2004: 
44) deduced from the lived difficulties experienced by people, which are complex and 
varying in nature, but represents a pre-arranged, closed model into which people’s isolated 
body parts are slotted. The complexity of experiences and the failure to integrate these into a 
category is evident in the current co-morbidity of CFS/ME with Fibromyalgia and IBS, in 
that patients often meet the criteria of all three categories (Schur et al, 2007; Wessely, et al, 
1999). In this sense, the diagnostic categorisation erases individual, rich experience and 
variations (Foucault, 1973: 102) as it follows a fragmented, a-theoretical and quantitative 
procedure (Verhaeghe, 2004: 42). 
 
Language and Diagnosis: Symptoms as Signs  
 
While the constitution of the criteria for the CFS/ME diagnosis across governmental reports 
differs, the common ground is that they all follow a medical classification structure. Within 
such a system, symptoms are treated as signs (Foucault, 1973/1976: 90; Lose, 2014; 
Vanheule, 2014: 61; Verhaeghe, 2004: 5). A sign is something which ‘can be linked to a 
fixed referent’ (Vanheule, 2014: 61) and has a stable meaning, for example a red traffic light 
unambiguously means to stop (Verhaeghe, 2004: 5). When diagnosing CFS/ME, it is thought 
that symptoms correspond to a particular reality reflected in the name, and follow a cause-
and-effect relation: a condition causes the appearance of symptoms (Vanheule, 2014: 61). 
Even if the presence of the same biological process was to be uncovered in most patients 
displaying symptoms of fatigue, the assumption that this process is the cause of fatigue 
cannot be maintained insofar as it could merely represent another symptom, not to mention 
that the same symptom (fatigue) can and does have different and multiple causes for various 
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people. That is, when does the cause of the cause of the cause come to an end? It is further 
believed that this cause-and-effect structure is of a natural kind, governed by laws inherent 
in nature akin to those governing plants and animals (Foucault, 1973: 7), and that these laws 
reside outside of the researcher or clinician who merely discovers the thing existing prior to 
its naming (Loose, 2002: 264; Vanheule; 2014: 84; Verhaeghe, 2004: 47). Within such a 
structure, the interaction and inextricability between different biological processes are often 
ignored, and so is the mind-body interaction. 
 The transformation of symptoms into signs is made possible with the use of language 
(Foucault, 1973: 114). A diagnostic name within the biomedical classification system is 
turned into a fixed material reality thought to control the mind and the body (Vanheule, 2014: 
22) which functions as a ‘scientific mirror-image of reality’ (Verhaeghe, 2004: 47). Foucault 
(1973) observes the existence of this process through elaborating on what he terms the 
‘medical gaze’, a gaze which observes the immediately visible, natural manifestations 
(symptoms) and in turn signals the essence of the disorder through space (localisation) and 
time (onset, duration). That which is invisible becomes visible (Ibid.: 90-92). The gaze is 
thought to be pure in the sense that imagination and theoretical reasoning are considered 
separate from it and from doctors’ observations (Ibid.: 107) and descriptions, and that the 
essence of a disease is transparent in language — a line of thought which collapses 
observation, essence, symptoms and linguistic signs into a totality (Ibid.: 94-6). Foucault 
calls this the ‘speaking eye’ (Ibid.: 114). It leaves out any reflection on the relationship 
between a description, the nosological category (idealism/nominalism), and its clinical reality 
(materialism/realism), which induces the question: to what extent does a name match its 
concept? (Verhaeghe, 2004: 45-46). Symptoms as signs are believed to be unequivocal 
(Foucault, 1973: 94). However, this is no more than an epistemological myth (Ibid.: 117) as 
is seen in relation to fatigue since different sets of criteria constitute multiple and various 
clinical realities — not just one fixed reality.  
 In treating symptoms as signs, the biomedical approach endorses the belief that 
language is neutral and free from ambiguity and subjective involvement. Between a patient 
and a clinician there is an assumption that objectivity exists, firstly, in the descriptions 
elaborated by a patient assumedly self-conscious enough to accurately describe the body/a 
situation — resonating with the self-conscious, all-knowing Cartesian subject — and 
secondly, in the reception of these descriptions by the clinician. It overlooks the fact that 
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communication fails: our intentionality does not always align with the way a message is 
received (Verhaeghe, 2004: 33), and that clinicians are not mere objective observers 
following a straightforward code, but need to subjectively evaluate, not only patients’ words 
but also the criteria used in relation to their descriptions. An example of the latter would be 
the requirement of fatigue, as outlined in the NICE (2007: 13) guidelines, to have ‘resulted 
in a substantial reduction in activity level’. A diagnostician might not consider the 
discontinuation of a hobby to be substantial enough, however the patient might put more time 
and meaning into a hobby than work. The clinician would have to judge based on social-
cultural norms, which he or she is forced to adopt in the absence of a theoretical framework, 
and which is intertwined with their personal experiences, opinions, prejudices and 
imaginations. Loose (2014) criticises diagnoses made in relation to the DSM-V on this basis 
and highlights how it constitutes a paradoxical situation: a patient’s subjective element is 
excluded, being thus subsequently confronted with the subjectivity of the clinician in what 
he calls a ‘return of the subjectivity via the clinician’. The reality is that language does not 
consist of (obvious) meanings independent of speakers and listeners (Neill, 2013: 336), but 
multiple meanings exist, and therefore someone needs to receive and interpret language. 
Neglecting the subjective and constructive nature of language results in the externalisation 
of symptoms and the viewpoint that a condition is separate to a person who is thought to be 
merely a carrier of symptoms and onto whom a disorder is autonomously imposed (Leader 
& Corfield, 2008; Parker et al, 1995; Verhaeghe, 2004: 44-5). CFS/ME, when following a 
biomedical approach, is treated as a transparent, observable and detachable object thought to 
accurately mirror a fixed, natural, material reality. This results in biomedical reductionism 
which effaces the person through an exclusive focus on symptoms part of a universal sign-
system (Kirshner, 2009: 99-100). The biomedical account, in this sense, neglects subjective 
experiences and the idiosyncratic meanings weaved around those experiences (Vanheule, 
2014: 66). Moreover, the allegedly ‘natural’ succession of a disease where a condition causes 
symptoms leaves out questions pertaining to subjective influences. However, if any certainty 
can be established around the debate of CFS/ME, it is that the reality perceivably residing 
behind the diagnosis is far from certain — as attested to by the fact that there are two main 
names for it reflecting distinct realities. 
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Dualism: Mind (CFS) Versus Body (ME) 
 
That language is integral to the discussion of CFS/ME is evidenced in the current opposition 
between the names CFS and ME, out of which one is typically embraced depending on one’s 
beliefs. CFS hints at psychiatric/psychological causes to the condition, and tends to be the 
name mostly embraced by health professionals and researchers and those who prefer an open-
ended assumption of aetiology (Fukuda et al, 1994). Patients on the other hand are inclined 
to reject the name CFS and prefer to use the term ME, which alludes to a 
neurological/biological nature and cause. This mind-body dualism for fatigue was first 
mentioned in the WHO in 1992 when ME was classified as a post-viral fatigue syndrome in 
relation to neurology (David & Wesseley, 1993), while (benign) CFS was linked with the 
concept of neurasthenia and psychiatry. Briefly, neurasthenia was coined by the physician 
George Miller Beard in the 1860’s, who postulated that fatigue consisted of an ‘overpressure 
of the higher nerve centres’ as a result of American modern civilisation (Rabinbach, 1992: 
153). The condition came to be viewed by European physicians as extending beyond 
America, who thought there was a link between exhaustion and the intensity of modernity 
(Ibid.: 154).  
 The existence of disparate constellation of symptoms across various governmental 
guidelines, both within and between countries, demonstrates that the inclusion of symptoms 
depends on a consensus on the cause(s). For instance, the Canadian Consensus Document on 
CFS/ME (Carruthers & Van de Sande, 2005) states without supporting evidence that 
ME/CFS is a biological condition inclusive of neurological symptoms such as ataxia and 
photophobia (p. 2). The NICE (2007) guidelines in comparison have not included these but 
instead emphasise cognitive dysfunctions, such as ‘difficulties thinking’, and ‘inability to 
concentrate’, (p. 14). These divergent conceptualisations appear irreconcilable for some and 
result in an either/or view where the mind and the body are thought not to interact. In fact, 
the Scottish Public Health Network (Mackie, Dougall & Conacher, 2011) have proposed two 
diagnoses: a ‘quick’ one for diagnosing CFS and a more thorough investigation for ME (p. 
12). Discourse analytic research (Banks & Prior, 2001; Horton-Salway, 2002; Horton-
Salway, 2004; Tucker, 2004) more or less confirms the presence of such a mind-body 
division in the narratives between physicians and patients within a clinical setting. 
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 Therefore, while the structure of CFS/ME follows that of a conventional, medical 
diagnostic system, there exist different ideas about what constitutes the reality of it, and more 
specifically, a gap between two main realities. The above illustrates how (a lack of) research 
evidence tends to be ignored when defining the nature of it. The Canadian document was 
created due to pressure stemming from a patient charity group, who recognised the need for 
clearer guidelines in relation to defining, diagnosing, and treating the condition, and who had 
much autonomy over the document (Smith & Wesseley, 2012). Furthermore, patient groups 
who voice their experiences online tend to endorse anti-psychiatric viewpoints and engage 
in personal attacks towards those professionals and researchers whose views reside on a more 
psychological side (Hawkes, 2011). Thus, the inclusion of neurobiological symptoms is on a 
whole driven by a desired outlook and pressure rather than research results or a knowledge 
of lived experiences.  
The demand for a biological label resembles the situation for schizophrenia: the 
Schizophrenia Association for Great Britain (SAGB) is attempting to raise funds in order to 
uncover the biological basis of the condition (Parker et al, 1995: 10). Not to mention the 
attempt to conceptualise all mental conditions along these lines too. This reflects a sort of 
‘consumer demand’ on a biopolitical level governed by a conviction that research will 
eventually find an organic cause. It exists in relation to the positivistic sciences which shape 
the idea of a uniform syndrome: one that has the same cause, manifestation and development 
(Verhaeghe, 2004: 84) and in which the psyche is not involved. Conviction rather than 
knowledge reigns — the medical model is seen as a trusting, powerful tool (Parker et al, 
1995: 10). Furthermore, the demand exists in a society where neoliberalist ideology has 
grown, with which Foucault links biopolitics (Kirshner, 2009: 94), where individuals are 
thought (fully) responsible for their health (Turner, 2004: 84). 
 Therefore, the questions necessary to be raised in the face of these movements 
towards a biomedical hegemony are: how is personal desire intertwined with these wider 
social and cultural movements? What are the implications of a biological view? It is clear 
that the appeal to a biomedical model warrants and legitimises symptoms and experiences so 
that one resides on the conceptual side of an objective ‘disease’, rooted in discernible, bio-
chemical processes. This would bypass a subjective view of the illness for which 
psychological experiences, thoughts or affects are considered to be the root, consequently 
leading to the opinion that it is somehow less ‘real’ and therefore made up. After all, ‘Is it 
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real?’ is a common question asked in relation to the topic of fatigue, which is strongly related 
to the question ‘is it psychological or biological?’ as was mentioned above. Not only that, 
but the psychology discourse touches upon individual accountability, with the consequence 
that the individual is considered fully responsible, and thus to blame, for their ailments2. This 
viewpoint appears to be the main reason for the existing campaigns against and the dismissal 
by many CFS/ME patients of the results stemming from the biggest research study conducted 
on fatigue, called the PACE trial. 
The PACE trial is the biggest randomised research study on fatigue carried out in the 
UK with 641 patients diagnosed with CFS/ME, spanning over five years and costing £5 
million, as funded by the UK Medical Research Council. The study tested the effects of four 
interventions on symptoms, with the results showing that two treatments were able ‘to 
moderately improve outcomes’ (White et al, 2011: 823): Graded Exercise Therapy (GET) 
and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). The former is aimed at gradually increasing 
physical activity levels, while CBT aims at changing patterns of thinking into more 
‘beneficial’ ones. CBT and GET are currently outlined as the main recommendations in the 
guidelines for NHS treatment, alongside other therapies such as pacing, which consists of 
energy management in the form of terminating activity and resting (NICE, 2007). The results 
of the PACE trial caused much controversy as it suggests that engaging in exercise and 
‘positive thinking’, with which CBT is associated, could lead to recovery — thus implying 
personal accountability: the possibility for change and cure (and thus cause) lies either in a 
person’s thinking or in their willingness to exercise, or both. The authors of the PACE study 
were brought to trial due to the request for the release of the study’s raw data, which they 
initially refused to share, but which they were subsequently ordered to release. The re-
analysis of the data suggests that, first and foremost, the criteria for ‘recovery’ was redefined 
during the research and set to a low level (Friedberg, 2016), thus proposing that outcomes 
were not as favourable as once believed. This is thought by many to evidence that the PACE 
trial has been debunked (newspaper headlines refer to it as ‘bad science’) and one might find 
many patients supporting this refutal within the ME community. This discreditation stems 
from numerous people associating the PACE trial with psychology and personal 
 
2 However, psychological factors could also turn into external elements from which the subject is divorced. 
This constitutes a structural similarity between the discourses of psychology and biomedicine, as is recognised 
by Verhaeghe (2004: 97): they both can pin an etiological agent on external circumstances, and thereby bar the 
subject who is merely a victim of these. 
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accountability and therefore not a real, serious, medical condition — as shown in the number 
of petitions signed by patients against the PACE trials, who demand therein more (and 
exclusive) biomedical research.  
These real/unreal, and objective/subjective dichotomies related to accountability are 
ideologies conjured by the names CFS and ME, which most likely drive the psyche-soma 
opposition and elucidate that behind names, instead of finding a stable, empirical reality 
independent of language, lie multiple representations — representations which have a real 
impact on patients. 
 
Research Questions 
 
There is no denying the distress felt by people with fatigue is real. However, the ontological 
status of CFS/ME as a single entity separate from other unexplained fatigued conditions can 
be questioned on the basis of the discussion in this chapter. Condensing fatigue with an 
arbitrary number of other symptoms into a highly-structured, autonomous and generalisable 
syndrome with a single cause, creates a closed and rigid structure which is then imposed on 
a person who is thought separate from it. This leads to structural limitations in terms of it 
being unable to account for the complexity and diversity of experiences existing for fatigued 
people, and ignores reflexivity: how does the way in which we think about our bodies and 
sensations arising therein affect symptom formation and experiences (including biological 
symptoms)? The existence of these experiences is not self-evident but is constructed and 
organised idiosyncratically in and through the main medium of communication: language. 
Language is fundamentally social since meaning is created between people and always within 
the limits of a political and cultural background. What role does the body have in society 
today, as reflected in and constructed by language, which influences the increase in fatigued 
conditions? This sociocultural aspect of language alongside a person’s choices, desires, and 
responsibilities are absent in the medicalisation of symptoms, where medical language is 
(attempted to be) stripped from ambiguity and contradictions, or in short, from subjectivity 
itself. The medical focus is on the isolated and decontextualised individual, as is reflected in 
the two main treatments given for CFS/ME: Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and 
Graded Exercise Therapy (GET) (Prins et al, 2006: 350). From this perspective, the cause 
resides either in the mind or the body, creating an inside-outside dichotomy which obscures 
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the relationship between the two. More broadly, the cause is postulated to be situated within 
the individual as separated from the social. Certain qualitative research approaches address 
these gaps insofar as they engage in exploring the discourse surrounding fatigue, particularly 
interviews conducted and analysed through discourse analysis (such as Anderson, et al, 2012; 
Guise, McVittie, & McKinlay, 2010; Hart & Grace, 2000; Horton et al, 2010; Tucker, 2004). 
However, these studies focus exclusively on the experiences of the condition, particularly the 
doctor-patient relationship, tending to focus on the stigma around it; thereby leaving out an 
exploration of the influences of discourse, including broader socio-cultural ones, on symptom 
formation. These are considerable gaps in the way in which symptoms of fatigue are 
conceptualised, researched, and clinically approached, which highlights the need for an 
alternative approach. Therefore, based on the above, the main research questions are the 
following: 
 
• What is the role of discourse in the formation, manifestation and development of 
symptoms common to fatigue/CFS/ME? 
• How are the narratives of people with fatigue/CFS/ME structured and maintained 
through discourse?  
• What impact does the language of and relationships with professionals have on the 
experience of fatigue/CFS/ME? 
• How might this insight into the relationship between language and fatigue be used 
productively by professionals and others? 
 
A Lacanian Approach to Fatigue 
 
In order to address these aforementioned questions, this research projects calls for an 
approach in which the relationship between the subject and the social, and the mind and the 
body, held together by language, is at the centre. It also calls for one which takes into account 
the unconscious nature of the subject’s relationship to both the body and language, one which 
acknowledges that when we speak we say more or less than intended, and which 
acknowledges that ambiguity — something I argued in this chapter that psychology and 
medicine unethically tries to eliminate in the quest for ‘objectivity’ — is related to the 
subject’s desires and thoughts as intertwined with sociocultural ideas and ideals, which come 
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to affect the body. These elements are not consciously or directly available for either the 
subject him/herself or others, but form an implicit structure and logic discernible in language 
by paying close attention to it. An approach which elaborates in-depth on just such a 
relationship between the subject, the body and language is Jacques Lacan’s theory of 
psychoanalysis — and for this reason, this project will adopt a Lacanian perspective in 
exploring the symptomatology of fatigue. The underlying premises of this perspectives offer 
not only productive, much-needed insight, but also the adoption of an ethical position vis a 
vis participants and other subjects who can relate to the research, something which will be 
discussed in-depth in the next chapter. 
Lacan’s theory goes beyond psychological and medical approaches which adhere to 
a strict inside-outside dichotomy whereby a person’s internal states are postulated to exist as 
separated from sociocultural, historical and political aspects, which produces a hegemonic 
and decontextualised view of the subject as mentioned above. A Lacanian approach, by 
contrast, recognises that the inside is always on the outside and vice versa; or rather that the 
personal is always social and the social is always personal, and further recognises the 
impossibility of objectivity due to the structural incompleteness of language and 
consciousness and their reflexive and constructive nature (Frosh, 2007: 641). That is, events 
and memories are not reflected accurately in language but are constructed as they are put into 
writing or speech (Frosh, 2014: 23). Similarly, meanings, affects and thoughts cannot be fully 
articulated, and the very articulation of them changes their nature and the manner in which 
they are experienced in a retroactive understanding — thus meaning is neither pre-
determined nor fixed. This is the case both for the subject/participant and researcher insofar 
as the medium of language is relied upon. The reason why I briefly outline the approach here 
before the sections on data collection and methodology is because, as might be clear, it 
extends far beyond the ‘method’ used in terms of merely applying a certain framework in 
order to understand the collected data — however while not being unrelated to it — and 
instead articulates to an epistemological position adopted beforehand (Willig, 2008: 7). Such 
a position, in this case a Lacanian one, entails the above-mentioned standpoint on language 
and the subject which informed the way in which I approached the topic of fatigue, 
formulated the aims and the criteria to take part in this study, and collected data, as it is not 
the case that one simply approaches data from an a-theoretical viewpoint.  
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There are a number of reasons why a specifically Lacanian approach is appropriate 
and fruitful in studying the topic of fatigue and the outlined research questions. The crucial 
premise underlying this perspective is that a subject is inseparable from the symbolic 
relations enabling communication and interactions (Parker, 2015b: 4) yet cannot be identical 
to, or reduced to, an effect of society — making it an ideal perspective from which to explore 
the subject-social interaction involved in fatigue, as well as the body-mind relation. In other 
words, the individual and the social, and equally the mind and the body, are inseparable and 
intertwined, while not collapsing into one. It avoids the pitfalls the majority of the current 
work on fatigue fall into: placing too much emphasis either on the individual, as biomedicine 
and psychology does, or on culture, as endorsed by those conceptualising fatigue as an effect 
of a high-paced society (for example through the work of the cultural theorist Byung-Chul 
Han’s (2015) ‘The Burnout Society’). However, this premise, alongside the constructive and 
unconscious nature of language, is also the underlying premise of other approaches, and most 
notably those falling under the category ‘socio-critical’ or ‘psychosocial’ approaches. These 
groups include theories such as psychoanalysis, feminist theory, Marxist theory, 
phenomenology and what is sometimes referred to as ‘post-structuralism’ (Frosh, 2003; 
Parker, 2015b: 64-65). Despite their similarities and overlaps, there are also certain 
differences, particularly when it comes to the conceptualisation of the subject. Lacan here 
arguably offers the most rigorous and in-depth account of the functioning of discourse in 
relation to subject and symptom formation3. Lacan’s account of subjectivity is a rich one as 
it is formulated in relation to a sophisticated and rigorous account of discourse that is simply 
difficult to find elsewhere, and in relation to symptoms and the way in which the clinic can 
fruitfully work with these. Due to the latter, the theory also offers in-depth details around 
symptom formation and the relationship between the patient — or analysand in Lacanian 
terms — and clinician that is likewise difficult to find elsewhere. It thus allows, within a topic 
exploring a similar yet in no way identical clinical relationship between patient and medical 
practitioner, some ideas with which to think practically about the clinical implications within 
the medical field.  
That Lacanian psychoanalysis has an in-depth account of discourse theory that is 
taken seriously in the clinic/practically, is evident in the use of the technique ‘scansion’ as 
 
3 Discourse in this sense is not just inclusive of actual language in terms of words or rather signifiers, but also 
images and implicit and explicit rules which structure our psychic realities. 
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part of ‘variable length sessions’ which distinguishes Lacanian psychoanalysis from all other 
analytic as well as therapeutic practices. To briefly explain this, instead of ending a 
psychoanalytic session after the pre-determined, arbitrary but standard fifty minutes, the end 
of the session is determined mainly by the ambiguity of language (the unconscious) which 
accentuates it and effectively puts the analysand to work. The reason I mention this here is 
in order to shed light on just how seriously Lacanian psychoanalysis takes the unconscious 
as the place of non-meaning/ambiguity, which is not found in any other type of 
psychoanalysis. This commitment is reflected in the existing plethora of rich, theoretical 
formulations on which techniques in how to approach discourse are based, be it speech 
produced in a clinical setting or research setting4. Lacan’s theory therefore goes the furthest 
in offering conceptual tools for disrupting meaning — making his writings and seminars 
difficult to read but simultaneously offering a radical and ethical position from which one is 
able to produce in-depth insight and multiple perspectives on a topic. This position, one 
constitutive of a rigorous combination between discourse and (unconscious) symptom 
formation, is arguably the result of taking seriously both structuralism — the work of 
Saussure and Levi Strauss for instance — and the work of Freud (and of course not to 
mention a number of other fields such as mathematics, logic, philosophy etc.). For a research 
project which explores the role of discourse in the formation, manifestation and development 
of fatigue and in the context of medical encounters, such a combination is ideal.  
In using a Lacanian perspective, tracing the subject through articulated discourses 
reveals how symptoms are structured in and by discourse and vice versa. What occurs in our 
(biological) bodies has an impact on the type of symptom arising and its development, and 
subsequently will shape the discourses and experiences around a condition. Conversely, the 
ways in which we think of our bodies and the mind-body relation in discourse — influenced 
by life events in the context of sociocultural discourses— will impact symptom formation (in 
the body). In this way, a symptom from a Lacanian perspective is inextricable from discourse, 
or rather is a type of discourse, since it is integral to organising a psychic reality. A Lacanian 
perspective uniquely gives attention to the idiosyncrasies of a person as well as the social, 
cultural and political as the former can be found inseparably within the latter and vice versa. 
By adopting this lens in exploring first-person accounts of fatigue, the findings of this 
 
4 However, while the approach is similar in terms of how speech is approached in these two settings, there are 
important distinctions between them which is discussed in the section on reflexivity in the next chapter. 
 
 
28 
research will be intimately intertwined with the lived experiences of those suffering from 
fatigue and the sociocultural discourses linked to them. Such a subjective exploration does 
not override the existence of any biological or more physical factors potentially involved in 
the conditions examined; meaning that it does not reduce a phenomenon to one or several 
subjective factors, something that will be discussed more in the next chapter in relation to 
ethics. Rather, as Leader & Corfield (2008) recognise, any condition can be approached from 
a so-called ‘psychosomatic’ standpoint. In fact, in their work ‘Why do people get ill?’, they 
uniquely use a Freudian-Lacanian perspective in examining the subjective side of medical 
conditions, convincingly illustrating how any symptom presented in the body, both 
organically evidenced and not, will be affected by subjective elements (such as responses to 
life events) and their interaction with the wider sociocultural discourse.  
While Leader & Corfield’s (2008) work is extensive and crucial, particularly in their 
attempt to bridge psychoanalysis and medicine, their work does not include fatigue. 
Nevertheless, the psychoanalytic theory of symptom formation delineated therein and used 
as ways of understanding medical somatic symptoms are also utilised within Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in conceptualising symptoms, including fatigue. Most discussed here are 
conversion symptoms (thought to belong to the overarching category of neurosis) where a 
bodily symptom in a disguised form stands in for a symbolic message addressed to someone 
and is posed as a question; and what are symptoms associated with psychosis, wherein 
symbolic material is directly inscribed in the body as an answer (lacking the communicative 
function inherent in a question). A third group, less discussed in Leader & Corfield’s (2008: 
126) work, concerns a structure in which symptoms bypass the mind altogether, thus 
containing no symbolic material. These symptoms arise when something (of the body and/or 
a situation) was not mentally processed, which likewise resemble symptoms of psychosis, 
although those belonging to a different group. The main theory drawn on in relation to this 
group is that of Freud’s ‘actual neurosis’.  
Freud’s theory of the actual neuroses has been picked up as a way of understanding 
fatigue, and more broadly modern somatic symptoms, by one of the most influential figures 
within the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Paul Verhaeghe5. In his work ‘Being Normal 
and Other Disorders’ (2004: 308), he tentatively and briefly suggests that chronic fatigue 
 
5 Another influential work using Freud’s actual neurosis, but in relation to modern addiction, is Rik Loose’s 
(2002) ‘The Subject of Addiction: Psychoanalysis and the Administration of Enjoyment’. 
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could be linked with Freud’s concept of an anxiety equivalent, where it is thought that fatigue 
is an expression of anxiety. Verhaeghe’s theory, and actual neurosis in general, conceptually 
comes close to the Lacanian psychoanalytic notion ‘ordinary psychosis’, which has become 
a dominant way within the field of framing modern symptoms, including chronic fatigue and 
pain. Here, too, symptoms are thought to lack symbolic structuring, while containing the 
colour of psychosis. However, the few works existing in English (Barreto & Besset, 2016; 
Stevens, 2009), to my knowledge, linking fatigue and pain with ordinary psychosis, are short 
papers based on one clinical case study respectively. Despite this, the authors come to make 
a generalisable claim that the majority of symptoms of pain and fatigue belong to the category 
of ordinary psychosis. Beyond the aforementioned theories, fatigue/burnout has briefly been 
discussed from a Lacanian perspective in some research studies, in relation to intersubjective 
factors (Vanheule, 2001; Vanheule, Lievrouw & Verhaeghe, 2003; Vanheule & Verhaeghe, 
2004; Vanheule & Verhaeghe, 2005), and in two philosophical works (Schuster, 2006; 
Zupančič, 2019). It is the aim of this research to bridge the gap pertaining to the exploration 
of fatigue, by exploring it in depth and situating its structure, or rather what my analysis of 
their discourses suggests about its structure, in relation to these current theories on fatigue. 
Overall, this research project constitutes a comprehensive study of fatigue and is the 
first with a dual focus as it investigates both the formation and manifestation of symptoms, 
and how discursive interactions (with friends, family, health professionals and within society 
at large) affect these symptoms and experiences. It is my hope that the results of this study 
have generated novel insight into conditions of fatigue which can help health practitioners 
and those in contact with fatigued subjects in their approach and treatment, consequently 
benefitting patients. More broadly, I hope this project acts as a catalyst for re-thinking fatigue, 
and the mind-body relation on which it is currently governed, and thereby brings a fruitful 
shift in perspective and approach to fatigue and related conditions.  
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Chapter 2: The Process and Ethics of the Data Collection and 
Analysis 
 
 
The following chapter outlines the processes and ethical considerations surrounding the 
participant data collection and the methodology used in exploring the topic of fatigue (semi-
structured interviews, Lacanian Discourse Analysis and the use of Lacanian psychoanalytic 
theory). It additionally includes a brief analysis of the participants’ views of fatigue/their 
conditions in relation to how the mind-body relation is constructed in their discourses, as it 
relates to the biomedical discourse as outlined in the introduction chapter, as well as offering 
a way into discussing the ethical implications as well as reflexivity surrounding the type of 
knowledge a Lacanian approach produces.  
 
Participants and Criteria 
 
In order to address the research questions mentioned in the previous chapter, I have 
conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with nine people who experience fatigue, 
who all happened to be diagnosed with CFS/ME, and I conducted follow-up interviews with 
six of them. The aim was to interview around fifteen people, however nine people ended up 
volunteering, which I deemed sufficient. It was in fact too many for such an in-depth analysis, 
and as a result I had to exclude two participants’ data in the final analysis, which is addressed 
further below. Six females and three males took part ranging from ages 23 to 65. Eight were 
white and one was “from an Asian family” (Gail6, in her own words), and grew up abroad. 
No information about demographics beyond this, such as class or ethnicity, were collected 
during the interview, since it was my belief that if it was important enough to the topic of 
fatigue it would have been mentioned during the interview, which was as open as possible 
surrounding the participants’ experiences. Nonetheless, their class belonging or information 
related to it, for instance, was not mentioned, and thus I am unable to provide this 
information. 
 
6 Pseudonyms have been chosen for all of the participants throughout to protect anonymity. The participants 
were offered the possibility of choosing their own pseudonym, which three of them did. With the rest of them, 
we agreed upon a name I suggested to them prior to commencing the interviews.  
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The criteria for participating in this study was as broad as possible in order to attempt 
to catch a wide range of experiences. Individuals could volunteer to participate if they 
‘experience constant or intense fatigue which is different from everyday tiredness and which 
has affected your [their] life negatively’, or consider themselves to have CFS/ME, or be 
diagnosed with it. The two first criteria follow a Freudian line of thinking in that it is the 
patient who decides, in a way, whether s/he has a ‘pathology’, as it is manifested through the 
presence of complaints, which is also part of the third criteria insofar as the person has turned 
to the medical establishment with complaints in order to be diagnosed. 
 
The Data Collection Process 
 
Prior to data collection, ethical approval was obtained from the School of Life, Sport & Social 
Sciences Research Integrity Committee at Edinburgh Napier University. The participants 
who took part in this study were recruited through the private Facebook group of an 
Edinburgh-based ME charity, with the exception of two of the participants: one was recruited 
through their newsletter and another through word-of-mouth arising from the Facebook 
advertisement. In addition to this, I also circulated a poster on my social media accounts. In 
the advertisement, I announced I was looking for volunteers for my research study in order 
to find out about the personal experiences of those with fatigue/ME/CFS (see Appendix 1). I 
made it clear in the Facebook group post that this research was not associated with or 
sponsored by the ME charity. In the social media post, I stated that my immediate 
friends/acquaintances would not be considered to take part, in order to hinder as much as 
possible imaginary assumptions and pre-learned knowledge from influencing the analysis. 
When people contacted me to indicate they were interested in participating, I emailed to them 
a recruitment sheet with more information (Appendix 2). The recruitment sheet outlines as 
much information about the study as possible, such as anonymity, their right to withdraw, 
the procedure in terms of what areas the interview would broadly be focused on, and the 
estimated time it would take. It was important that this information was included so as to 
prepare the participants’ expectations, particularly of the topics I would ask since they would 
be of a highly personal and therefore potentially sensitive nature, which would help inform 
their decision to participate. Thereafter, upon them agreeing to take part in the study, we 
arranged a time and place for the interview. During the fall semester in October 2016, semi-
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structured interviews were conducted with nine people. As the participants had the 
opportunity of choosing a convenient place, the interviews took place at various locations 
such as in cafés, their homes, one over Skype for the follow-up interview, and three 
interviews took place at the University campus. It was agreed beforehand with the ME charity 
that in order for me to be allowed to interview their members in their homes, I would need 
to have a recent background check, a Protecting Vulnerable Adults (PVG) Scheme which is 
managed and delivered by Disclosure Scotland. I happened to have had one due to my job as 
a support worker, the copy of which I sent to and got approved by the committee at the ME 
charity. There was also a procedure in place to protect myself in these situations where I met 
a participant off campus, which was agreed upon between myself, my Director of Studies 
and the Ethics Committee. In person and immediately prior to the interview commencing, 
the participants were given an information sheet (Appendix 3), followed by a consent form 
which they had to sign before the interview could start (see Appendix 4), and the chance to 
ask questions. I also went through the main and crucial points verbally (that their data will 
be anonymous, they have the right to withdraw or take a break at any time or skip questions 
without giving a reason) to ensure they knew this information reached them before 
commencing. An interview schedule had been prepared beforehand (see Appendix 5) with 
open-ended questions and as non-leading as possible.  
The interview style I adopted towards the participants took the form of a ‘traditional’ 
one in terms of a ‘non-directive’ style (Willig, 2008: 24). There is of course no such thing as 
a purely non-directive approach since the way in which I framed the research questions 
already constitutes a direction, reflected in the topics I chose to be covered in the interview 
schedule. Nevertheless, such an approach is about eliciting as many details and as much 
information from the participants as possible, while my subjectivity (opinions, advice, 
information etc.) should stay as much out of it as possible. This is done by asking open-ended 
questions, prompts or using techniques such as mirroring in a way which allows the 
participant to elaborate on many details in many potentially different directions. I also, when 
I could, attempted to make the participants aware of any contradictions made or elision of a 
detail or event they had previously included in answering the same question — something I 
could do by referring to their first interview in their second interview. This was done in order 
to invite them to reflect on and analyse their own discourse, an interview style arguably in 
line with an open ‘clinical’ style whereby the interviewer asks about the participants’ motives 
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and interpretations (see Young & Frosh, 2010). However, I did not at the time have the skills 
to do this very often or in a fruitful way; it was sometimes not beneficial since the participant 
did not always remember the moment to which I was referring, therefore leading to confusion 
which hindered instead of produced further elaborations.  
After the interview, the participants were given a debrief form (Appendix 6), as well 
as an interest sheet to fill in for participating in a second interview, should they be interested 
(Appendix 7), and were offered a chance to ask questions. Again, I went through verbally the 
most important points on the debrief sheet (that they can still withdraw after the study and 
where they can turn to should they be distressed after the interview), to make sure they knew 
this information was on there. All of the participants were offered a follow-up interview (see 
Appendix 8 for the recruitment sheet sent out). I conducted a second interview about two 
months later, in December 2016, with the six people who agreed to it. For one of the 
participants, Gail, the sound quality was largely inaudible during our follow-up interview, 
and for this reason, I conducted a third interview with her in August 2017.  
The purpose of the second interview was to obtain in-depth data, with an appropriate 
amount of time having transpired in order to allow for new material to emerge. The same 
procedure and sheets outlined for the first interview were used at the second interview, albeit 
with an updated information sheet (Appendix 9). Prior to this second interview, about one to 
two weeks, those who agreed to take part were sent their interview transcripts from the first 
interview for a chance to read it, should they wish to. Giving the participants a chance to 
reflect on their interview transcript acknowledges the reflexivity of consciousness and the 
constructive and reflexive nature (structural incompleteness) of language. I prepared follow-
up questions beforehand based on their transcripts, choosing parts which I considered could 
benefit elaboration. I also repeated some questions I deemed important in order to be able to 
pay attention to repetitions, ellipsis, and new information. The interview schedule for the 
second interview was thus completely adjusted to the participant’s unique transcript. I took 
notes after each interview where I recalled noteworthy moments from the interview that may 
have been difficult/impossible to have been captured by the tape recorder, such as 
emotionally charged moments, events or gestures (however the latter is not crucial to the 
analysis), but also my own feelings, thoughts and responses in order to better account for my 
reflexivity. 
 
 
35 
The participants’ interviews were transcribed verbatim. I attempted to transcribe the 
interviews as soon as possible after the interview took place when their discourses were still 
fresh in my mind to aid transcription. In order to protect the participants’ anonymity, their 
names were replaced with their pseudonyms in the transcripts and throughout this thesis, and 
any specific detail regarding location or names referred to in the interview that could reveal 
the identity of the interviewee has been left out or altered when included in the thesis, and 
also in the transcripts that were sent out to them via email, in the rare event of them ending 
up in someone else’s hands. The transcripts are kept on a password protected computer to 
which only I have access, and will be destroyed ten years after the completion of my degree, 
as stated in the information sheet. When referring to the quotes from the interviews 
throughout the thesis, the first letter represents the interview from which it derives (A = first 
interview, B = second interview, and C = third interview). The lack of letter indicates there 
was only one interview. The ‘L’ and numbers following the letter refer to the line numbers 
as to contextualise a chronological order. Italics refer to an emphasis, and three dots indicate 
a pause of about three seconds. 
My experience of the data collection where I had the first point of contact with those 
who are diagnosed with CFS/ME resonated strongly with the literature outlined in the 
previous chapter with regards to the mind-body divide and the vehement dismissal of a 
psychological viewpoint. What I thought was a relatively neutral advertisement in the ME 
association’s private Facebook group sparked much controversy, heated debates, demands 
and questions from a large number of members. The most important question asked was from 
what perspective I was doing the research (biology or psychology) since this would determine 
their willingness to participate. This caused debates where people wrote lengthy and 
numerous posts (from which I abstained) which were centred around the big question: ‘is it 
a mental or a physical condition?’. Without answering the question of which perspective I 
adopted (since the answer is a complex one not in line with a black-and-white view of the 
mind and the body and as avoid as much as possible to influence their participation), I 
reassured them that I was interested in finding out about their experiences of the condition 
and any interactions with medical health professionals, and that I was not looking to answer 
the question of cause or come out the other end recommending one treatment. I also 
mentioned the importance of keeping it as ‘neutral’/‘open’ as possible when participating in 
the sense that I was unable to explain all aspects of the research beforehand, in order to 
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minimise influencing their answers. In conjunction with this, I explained that they could 
withdraw at any point, that the study had been approved by Edinburgh Napier University’s 
Ethical Committee, and that they will be debriefed afterwards in terms of receiving 
information about the aims and rationale of the study and how their data would be treated. It 
may also be worth mentioning that the first person I interviewed returned to the Facebook 
post explaining that she had just participated in the interview, that it was a comfortable 
experience and that I had been respectful, and consequently encouraging others to take part. 
Despite of this, those expressing strong opinions against psychology did not end up taking 
part in this research, and one of the members from the group, who did take part, emailed me 
pointing out that the word “psychology” was included on my online research page, thereafter 
warning me of possible criticism/abuse from the ME community.  
The reactions to my recruitment advertisement could be understood by taking into 
account the political context of research on fatigue/CFS/ME, particularly the controversial 
research study the PACE trial mentioned in the previous chapter, since it was referred to 
throughout the members’ Facebook comments, in private conversations with me, and 
throughout their interviews — confirming it is crucial to the shaping of patients’ perspectives 
on research. However, contrary to what has been suggested — that those endorsing a physical 
cause of fatigue are against the PACE trial as argued above and for instance in a Guardian 
article (Chainey, 2017) — what seemingly determined the participants’ endorsement or 
rejection of the PACE study was a certain perception of the body in relation to the mind; one 
greatly overlapping with the biomedical view as outlined in the previous chapter. I will 
therefore in what follows briefly outline a summary of the participants’ view of the mind-
body relation, as analysed from the participants’ interviews. 
 
The Participants’ Views on Fatigue 
 
The participants’ views of the mind-body relation come close to the underlying assumptions 
explored as part of the biomedical model in the previous chapter. The following section 
consists of a brief analysis of fatigue in relation to the construction of the mind-body relation, 
which draws upon biological and psychological discourses. First of all, noticeable in all of 
the participants’ discourses is that there is a wish and conviction for having a biological 
condition despite a lack of physical evidence in most cases. The condition is considered to 
consist of a cluster of bodily symptoms going beyond fatigue, where a name, CFS/ME, stands 
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in for these — with ME being the dominantly preferred name. The name is thought able of 
unifying disparate bodily symptoms and of acting as an explanatory cause; one residing 
outside a subjective involvement. The mind is considered either excluded from symptom 
formation in an exclusive focus on the biological body, or subsumed under a biomedical 
discourse where what is normally considered subjective elements acquire an objective status. 
The latter view is what arguably determined the endorsement of the PACE trial for two of 
the participants, in relation to the activity of exercising. The inability to exercise —what is 
referred to as the body being ‘deconditioned’ — is put down to a biological cause. At other 
times, subjective/internal factors are turned into external ones, following the belief that stress 
or trauma is caused by one’s environment such as one’s family, from which one is separated. 
This also follows the reasoning inherent in the biomedical discourse. That is, the 
psychological discourse successfully joins with the biological on the condition that the mind, 
and its accompanied personal accountability, are excluded. Alternatively, when the 
subjective mind is acknowledged to influence the condition, it is often thought to only affect 
the experiences of the condition and not the actual formation of it. The mind is relegated to 
a secondary, less important and influential position. For some of the other participants and/or 
at other times, when subjective factors are considered to play a role in the formation of the 
condition, there is hesitation and carefulness of not putting too much emphasis on them. This 
is manifested when they describe a linear sequence in which biology could still be considered 
as the main cause of the condition: the view that the mind (such as stress) affects the 
susceptibility of acquiring a biological virus, which in turn causes the condition, not the 
psychological factor. Furthermore, there is for some a black-and-white thinking with 
fluctuations between endorsing a psychological and biological cause. Therefore, discernible 
in the interviews is a mind-body divide where the mind and the body are thought separate 
from one another; even when an interaction is postulated, they are unable to intertwine. It is 
further observed that if one acknowledges the involvement of subjectivity in the formation 
of the condition, then this has implications in relation to accountability: the individual could 
be blamed for being fatigued. To endorse a biomedical perspective on fatigue, the dominant 
one throughout the participants’ interviews, means that the mind and anything related to it 
— the subject’s desires, choices, intentions and responsibilities — are capable of being 
eradicated; externality and concretisation being its conditions. Some of these points will be 
touched upon and examined in-depth throughout the thesis through the help of Lacanian 
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psychoanalysis. At this stage, however, these issues raise the question as to what effect this 
type of research might have, which explores the subjective or so called ‘psychological 
factors’ involved in the condition, on a group of people who to a large extent disavow 
subjective factors. This will be discussed shortly, but it is first necessary to delineate the 
methodology used for exploring the interview transcripts. 
 
Methodology and Data Analysis 
 
For the final analysis of the transcripts, I excluded two of the participants’ data and have 
engaged in analysing a total of seven of the participants’ transcripts throughout this thesis. 
This was partly due to the nature of the approach taken, a Lacanian one, where a higher 
quantity would compromise the in-depth nature of the analysis. The second reason was that 
the data of the two interviewees excluded lacked the depth of the others’ in relation to 
elaborations of life events: the attention of their interviews was devoted mainly to the 
encounters with health professionals and not many details were revealed beyond this, which 
makes an analysis of symptom formation difficult/impossible. This shortcoming could partly 
be due to my interview skills, particularly considering one of these was my first interview. 
Additionally, neither of them returned for a second interview, which affected the amount of 
data obtained. There is one person I included with whom I only conducted one interview; 
however, she elaborated extensively on many areas pertaining to her life and her experiences 
with CFS/ME in a lengthy interview. It is to be noted that such an exclusion of data was 
communicated to the participants to be a possibility in the recruitment and information sheets 
(Appendix 2 and Appendix 3), however while stating that their text will be carefully looked 
at — and indeed it was for the above analysis — as to avoid making them feel devalued. 
The participants’ transcripts have been analysed through a form of Lacanian 
Discourse Analysis (LDA), using techniques derived therefrom, and by drawing on Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory. The reason I mention two moments here is because involved in the 
act of analysing are two different yet inextricable processes, both of which are related to the 
epistemological position taken as mentioned in the introductory chapter, which is a Lacanian 
one. The first moment relates to analysing the text in a way which discerns structures, links 
through associative networks, and linguistic elements; briefly what can be said to occur in 
the text, based on a stance on how language can be approached and interpreted (I outline this 
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in detail below). The second moment of analysing relates these former interpretations about 
the text to a theory on subjectivity and symptom formation, in order to further illuminate it 
and add details which will deepen our understanding of the discourse and thus of the topic; 
an interpretation of the interpretation. It is here that psychoanalytic notions such as fantasy, 
desire and the unconscious enter the picture, and in this stage one also goes beyond the text 
whenever possible to link with wider sociocultural, historical discourses and practices. The 
use of the theory also acts to aid the previous step — here noticing how intertwined they are 
— by opening up the text to perspectives and meanings that would have not otherwise been 
able to emerge, or would have been difficult. However, while theory is invaluable and crucial, 
it is important one does not operate chiefly from this standpoint as one would most likely fall 
into the trap of merely applying theory to a text and thereby confirming that piece of theory 
by magically finding what one was looking for. There is of course always theory involved, 
but I am distinguishing here between more specific theory about subjectivity (appertaining 
to fantasy, desire and the unconscious for example), and certain techniques; techniques which 
are nevertheless guided by a theory of language and subjectivity.  
This means I could have, hypothetically speaking, chosen techniques for the first 
moment which are less guided by a particular theory of language and subjectivity but still 
considered compatible (although this is debatable) with a Lacanian approach, for example a 
Thematic Analysis (TA). TA is a common qualitative method in which one discerns various 
themes in the text, and thus I could have applied techniques to the text and thereafter 
interpreted the results of that reading from the perspective of Lacanian theory. This, however, 
would not yield the same amount of details as would a Lacanian Discourse Analysis, which 
stays incredibly close to the text insofar as it focuses on the structure of the text, details of 
which could be eradicated if translating sections into ‘themes’ (however marking themes in 
the text could of course correspond to a useful starting place). Hence, using LDA in 
combination with Lacanian theory would mean getting the most out of the theory on 
discourse and symptoms, since the techniques part of it derive therefrom, thus producing 
more in-depth data and staying ‘true’ to the epistemological approach adopted.  
More specifically, I adopted a Freudian-Lacanian perspective which acknowledges 
the over-determination of meaning, or rather the indeterminacy of language; that there are 
(social, political, cultural and historical) forces going beyond our intentions considering the 
fact that when we speak, we say more or less than intended. There are always exclusions 
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when speaking or using language: there is no ‘saying it all at once’ due to the structural 
incompleteness of language, and that the act of speaking constantly constructs and re-
constructs our experiences. This surplus in speech, which can also be conceptualised as a gap 
as something is always left out (from language and consciousness), constitutes formations of 
the unconscious which are strongly intertwined with discourse on a wider, sociocultural level 
— following Lacan’s famous axiom that ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’. In 
other words, delineating the gaps in discourse allows multiple and associated meanings to 
emerge, revealing a logic potentially at work in a symptom. This place of multiple meanings 
is simultaneously the place of non-meaning, as meanings multiply to the extent of revealing 
their contradictory and non-sensical nature, thus marking the impossibility of reducing a 
phenomenon to one perspective or meaning. Or in other words, the unconscious from a 
Lacanian perspective constitutes not the place of hidden and permanent meaning, but the 
continuous deferral of meaning. Therefore, in order to take the unconscious and language 
seriously, the research techniques submitted to a text must consist of a deconstruction or 
disruption of meaning (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008: 355). 
LDA is not an established or widely used approach which has a clearly defined body. 
However, tools in line with Lacanian theory and the above-mentioned viewpoint have been 
utilised in conducting discourse analysis and yielding valuable and notable work, most 
markedly by David Pavon Cuellar (2010) and Ian Parker (2010). An invaluable work 
identifying some of these in an accessible and lucid manner is that of Calum Neill’s (2013), 
which offers guidance in how to approach a text in the sense of opening up multiple 
meanings/disrupting meaning in what is a Lacanian approach to discourse analysis. I drew 
on these recommendations, more precisely on those techniques facilitating a symbolic 
reading of the text; techniques used by psychoanalysts in approaching analysands in the clinic 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The main focus of such a methodology is on structure/the 
symbolic rather than content/the imaginary.  
The symbolic and the imaginary, together with the real, are three intertwined realms 
which make up the symbolic order and make possible communication. The symbolic is the 
realm of actual language, not only encompassing physical words — signifiers — but 
comprising a way of organising experiences as a sense-making activity. The imaginary adds 
meaning to the symbolic in the sense that it forms an understanding and puts a limit to the 
circularity of signifiers, since a word can only be defined using other words in a circular 
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manner (Neill, 2013: 338-339), in an ‘incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier’ 
(Lacan, 2002/2006: 503). The signified is that which creates (imaginary) meaning and 
identification, by putting such a circularity to a halt — albeit temporarily — without which 
the symbolic would drift in an endless, meaningless shifting of possibilities pertaining to the 
definition of something. The imaginary thus consists of our idiosyncratic understandings 
which can never coincide with those of someone else’s: in the process of (re)presenting a 
phenomenon, we partly construct it anew by bringing our own meaning to it based on our 
own past experiences, understandings, desires, fantasies etc.. The last realm, the real, is put 
simply that which escapes both symbolisation and identification (Neill, 2013: 339), that 
which cannot be integrated into a symbolic-imaginary comprehension; the place of 
impossibility and the failure of symbolisation. 
In a Lacanian approach to discourse, attention is given not to the intended meanings, 
but to the identification of master signifiers — those either explicit or implicit terms which 
organise and give sense to a text — the order of words, which words are used and in what 
context, elisions, repetitions, punctuations (Ibid.: 340-341) and importantly, contradictions 
as these point to the place of non-meaning, of the failure and impossibility of language (Ibid.: 
335). As Neill (Ibid.) points out, this approach is not about excluding the imaginary in the 
sense of eradicating our own imaginings — as this would be out right impossible — but about 
decentralising the image ‘to add further images, to force the notion that this is not it’ (p. 341). 
It is thus, broadly, about allowing multiple meanings to emerge and coexist, which occurs 
through a focus on structure, or what we could say is a focus on the interplay between 
structure and content, between the symbolic and the imaginary, which then marks out the 
edges of the place of the real. Using an example from the thesis to elucidate this process, 
when the participants of this study utter that a certain activity leads to “pain or fatigue”, by 
using the two words in conjunction to each other indicates a structural association between 
pain and fatigue: that being fatigued is painful and vice versa, constituting a painful fatigue; 
but by using the word ‘or’ — here focusing on content — marks a distinction between them, 
an attempt to keep the two apart and perhaps an opposition between them. One could then 
further discern the functions of taking each perspective, which could for instance relate to 
taking or exonerating responsibility, by tracing the associations to both pain and fatigue and 
paying attention to what words and concepts or signifiers are used in conjunction to them and 
in what contexts. More specifically, associations are demonstrated between words/concepts 
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and contexts when, as was partly demonstrated above, one word/concept is followed by 
another, even if the speaker had intended them to be part of separate sentences in a change 
of topic, and when the same word is used in different contexts. This process is known from 
a Lacanian perspective as ‘following the letter’. The analysis is thus not about choosing one 
perspective over the other but exploring as many as possible and merely highlighting, as 
opposed to reconciling, views and contradictions which cannot be reconciled.  
While I used the techniques stated above, they do not form part of an objective 
‘method’ from which I am separated, one capable of being replicated and passively applied 
to the text — as there is no such thing. Analysing is a creative process. That is to say, someone 
else could apply LDA to the same text and our analyses would look radically different. This 
is useful, and the reason for which texts should be discussed with others, something 
encouraged as part of a Lacanian approach in terms of having ‘cartel’ groups but could also 
occur through presenting at conferences and seminars, as to ‘submit’ discourses to as many 
perspectives as possible. My subjectivity is inevitably involved, something which will be 
discussed below, as my use of the techniques emphasised certain ones more than others, 
which was furthermore not a largely conscious process. This makes a sequential ‘step-by-
step’ guide impossible, and indeed is something suspicious and undesirable from a Lacanian 
or critical perspective as it alludes to an objective and fixed set of steps (Parker, 2015a: 4). 
Nevertheless, attempting to trace my steps as much as possible, the first thing I did 
was to read the interview transcripts as a-theoretically as possible so as to pay attention to 
the structure of the text with the use of the techniques outlined above, meaning I tried to 
suspend my knowledge of Lacanian theory and what I might bring in at a later stage to make 
sense of the discourse. The latter was relatively easy considering my understanding of 
Lacanian theory at that early stage was underdeveloped in comparison to my grasp of it at 
the end of the PhD. I made notes in the margin of possible and multiple meanings and 
connections, and marked the text into different areas as much as is possible (such as symptom 
description, life events, medical encounters, analogies, etc.). I thereafter copy and pasted 
certain quotes in different documents, where I gathered all the excerpts from the participants 
but ordered them into the different broad areas, and where I could more easily discern and 
‘compare’ their discourses in relation to a topic. This was a messy and long process where I 
constantly revised the documents in terms of adding and removing quotes and adding an 
analysis of them, and shortening documents into other documents in what seemed to be an 
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ad infinitum process (turning the documents into notes of the notes of the notes etc.). 
However, it enabled me to pay attention to structural patterns both within and across 
interviews and provided me with a basis on which to choose to hone in on and learn more 
about certain relevant theoretical concepts. It also allowed me to make connections with some 
wider sociocultural discourses and practices, however time did not allow me to engage in this 
activity as much as I had planned and would have liked to. 
This type of work meant that some of my analysis did not make ‘the final cut’. For 
example, in preparation for chapter eight, which looks in-depth at individual differences in 
terms of the link between events surrounding the bodily response of fatigue and pain, I made 
an analysis of all of the seven participants’ discourses surrounding this, but ended up 
including only the analysis of two as I opted for an in-depth analysis. However, it was 
necessary to first make a brief analysis, a close consideration, of all of the discourses before 
choosing the ones with enough details which would make an important elucidation. 
There was a constant, dynamic interaction, a back-and-forth movement, between 
interpreting the interview transcripts and the theory, with the two processes enabling each 
other; the theory facilitated different understandings of the texts but the interviews also 
facilitated interpretations of Lacanian theory as they made certain concepts ‘come alive’. 
This occurred more so towards the end. I constantly had to return to the interviews, 
particularly to explore the context of the excerpts I was interpreting. Accordingly, when I 
started paying more attention to the order of words and concepts of the discourses — quite 
simply to associations part of the process of ‘following the letter’ — the analysis took off 
and multiple meanings emerged; it almost felt like the analysis wrote itself. This required a 
certain level of skills as it constitutes a unique, complex way of reading a text in which it is 
necessary to suspend our automatic and commonsensical way of understanding it; indeed, to 
suspend as much as possible our imaginary understanding in order make space for other ones 
(for example to suspend the ‘or’ in “pain or fatigue” and not understand them as exclusive 
entities). I therefore came to re-read the full interview transcripts at a later stage in this 
manner, which significantly produced new notes and interpretations. For instance, this was 
the point at which I linked fatigue with sleep and disappearance, and pain with bodily tension 
and aliveness; two moments further related to the words and concept of ‘doing nothing’, 
which enabled me to compare both the similarities and differences between them, and how 
they were linked to other signifiers in a network of associations. These links subsequently 
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led me to bring in Lacan’s theory of the drive and desire as conceptualised in the context of 
alienation and separation, and related concepts such as unconscious refusal and 
(fundamental) fantasy, two various but related ways of conceptualising ‘doing nothing’. This 
use of the theory both elucidated and added more details around the structure and functions 
of the discourses.  
Using psychoanalytic concepts such as ‘unconscious desire’ in order to understand 
discourses produced by subjects does, however, poses questions pertaining to knowledge and 
ethics: what kind of knowledge are we claiming to produce here, and what consequences 
does this production of knowledge have on the subject about whom we are speaking? This 
brings us to consider ethical issues in relation to psychoanalytic research of this kind. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
Considering the participants’ and many CFS/ME patients’ dismissal of 
psychological/subjective factors, to conduct research exploring the subjective factors 
involved in symptom formation might come across as controversial and unfavourable to 
those referred to, and thus, unethical. However, to not acknowledge subjective factors 
involved (in any condition) would arguably mean to commit an even bigger ethical ‘crime’ 
as it would dismiss the functioning of human nature; that life events and the way in which 
we think about these and our bodies will come to affect (of course to varying degrees) the 
symptoms arising and occurring in our bodies and the experience of them. As such, it would 
do injustice to the discourses elaborated by the participants of this study as they come to 
show a convincing trend that subjective factors exert a large influence on the conditions, as 
evident for example in their conditions worsening after having encountered medical 
practitioners’ dismissive attitudes. Nonetheless, using specifically psychoanalytic concepts 
in relation to research participants, ones used to facilitate in a clinical setting an 
understanding of what is often (mis)understood as a person’s ‘most essential, deepest and 
darkest secrets motivating his/her behaviour’, is a controversial topic within the field of 
qualitative research (see Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). It poses questions surrounding the type of 
knowledge produced and its effects on not only the participants but those who can relate to 
the research results. What is included and excluded in taking a Lacanian approach to the topic 
of fatigue, what conclusions can be drawn, and what might the effect of these be on others? 
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Considering research results today can come to significantly impact others as they are widely 
digested by citizens, used as ways of understanding oneself and guiding one’s behaviour, 
researchers bear a certain responsibility in how it is conducted and what conclusions are 
drawn from it7.  
Adopting a Lacanian approach in research constitutes simultaneously adopting an 
ethical stance vis a vis the data and the research findings stemming therefrom, if taking 
seriously a Lacanian conception of ethics. An ethical stance from a Lacanian perspective 
excludes a judgment concerning the essence or definition of a subject in terms of his/her 
‘true’ nature which would pin her/him down to a certain reductive aspect, to one meaning, 
and would, based on this, elevate some elements to the status of universal ‘ideals’ or ‘goods’ 
through dividing behaviours into ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. This would place the researcher in a 
superior position to the participant, as the one who knows the participant better than 
him/herself, who can access his/her mind by extracting ‘objective’ knowledge with only the 
correct ‘objective’ tools, and inversely whose own subjectivity is not involved in the process. 
Many mainstream psychological approaches, including discursive ones, operate from this 
standpoint, particularly those stemming from a behaviourist viewpoint, which claim to 
uncover internal states of the speaker such as emotions, meanings, cognitive mechanisms, or 
intentions (Parker, 2015a: 16) in what is a reduction of a phenomenon to an individual 
problem. Not only is this unhelpful — since it obscures the complexity of human nature in 
terms of the subject’s idiosyncratic meanings and experiences as shaped by social, political 
and cultural structural forces — but unethical (Parker, 2015b: 76). It is unethical insofar as it 
creates a particular type of impossible/false, reductive knowledge, which is imposed on 
people by authority figures and through the guise of objective scientific knowledge/truth, 
which is then believed by people, and consequently affecting them in harmful ways, as this 
research will demonstrate. More specifically, the supposed knowledge that a person’s 
suffering is the cause of his/her internal state is turned into a universal norm, or ‘truth’, 
upholding divisions such as normal/abnormal and sending the message that a failure to 
embody certain pre-established ideals must mean one is abnormal, and further, fully to blame 
for this abnormality (Parker et al, 1995; Parker, 2007). These norms become accepted as they 
are disseminated and consumed, which is the case more than ever today considering the 
 
7 However, there is a problem here with how both lay people’s and researchers’ interpret scientific research 
results and studies, for it is not uncommon that results are interpreted in more universal and less flexible ways 
(not recognising the impossibility of objectivity) than the claims made by the authors of those studies. 
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psychological discourse has become one of the main ways in which we view ourselves in 
contemporary society as it seeps into all areas of life (Neill, 2016: 11). Consequently, the 
reduction of human nature to these assumptive stories (Ibid.: 108) leads to ever increasing 
alienation from ourselves as we are fed, and indeed today overstuffed, with stories which are 
not our own (De Vos, 2012: 9), and leads to more suffering and unequal power relations in 
that structural social, political and economic issues contributing to this suffering are left 
unexplored, unquestioned and thus maintained. One group of people benefits (the normal 
‘successful’ ones), and the other (the abnormal/pathological or the ‘weak’ ones) is further 
blamed and oppressed. The psychological discourse in this manner creates certain subjects 
more than it describes them (Neill, 2016: 108). Individual blame inherent therein is perfectly 
compatible with economic exploitation as part of contemporary capitalist society (Parker, 
2005b: 105). From this perspective, patients’ dismissal of psychology can be considered 
reasonable. However, there is likewise a reductive aspect inherent in the biomedical 
perspective insofar as suffering (be it either physical and/or mental) is reduced to an 
individual, but this time biological problem/cause, albeit with the possibility of exonerating 
individual responsibility through a diagnosis.  
The unethical issue, therefore, pertains to the reductive nature and to making a strict 
inside-outside opposition, a way of closing down the subject to one meaning and separating 
it from determining influences, which is an act of violence, an act of illegitimate restriction. 
A further act of illegitimate restriction is to postulate this meaning as universal and 
permanent; implying that one’s ‘weakness’ or abnormality is irreversible. Psychoanalysis can 
fall into this trap and indeed does so through the so-called ‘culture of psychologisation’ 
(Parker, 2015b: 79). That is, psychoanalytic notions are pervasive in contemporary popular 
culture and act as ways of understanding human nature, most notably through concepts such 
as ‘repression’ and ‘the unconscious’ (more commonly referred to as the ‘subconscious’). It 
is believed that a person’s behaviour and decisions are guided by an unconscious intention, 
a meaning or feeling that was previously hidden away, repressed, but which can be uncovered 
as the actual, ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ intention of the person; one which is further considered a 
permanent motive throughout a persons’ life. This is not what Lacanian psychoanalysis is, 
even if some researchers/clinicians/scholars come to wrongfully use it in this manner. The 
ethical in Lacanian psychoanalysis is a mode of openness: the multiplicity and polyvocality 
of meanings brought out by a disruption of meaning and a focus on the nonsensical aspects 
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of discourse (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010: 518). Adopting a Lacanian approach therefore 
entails taking seriously the unconscious as the place of an absence of meaning, or rather the 
perpetual deferral of meaning (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008: 355) and not a hidden away 
intentionality or agency of an individual subject. Respect is paid to subjectivity, and equally 
language, as something irreducible and indeterminate, or in other words to its idiosyncratic, 
contradictory, fleeting, and thus structurally incomplete nature. A Lacanian analysis is 
accordingly not ‘down and deep’ but ‘out and wide’ (Ibid.: 357). As there is no fixed essence 
of the subject, one cannot make a judgement as to ‘the’ definition or cause of a phenomenon 
such as fatigue, or particular states or characteristics which would be desirable for a collective 
society or group to obtain. In the light of this study, this means I have not answered the 
question of the cause of fatigue or reduced the condition to subjective factors explored, but 
recognise it emerging in a multiple aetiology where biology may play one role alongside 
subjective elements inclusive of both individual and socio-cultural phenomena. I have neither 
recommended one (reductive) solution to fatigue. Instead of uncovering one or the ‘true’ 
meaning behind discourse — as may be misunderstood to be inherent in a psychoanalytic 
method — I have, through a focus on the structure of the discourse, opened up manifold 
meanings able to co-exist. These constitute my interpretations of the text and I acknowledge 
there are others to be made; the same applies to my interpretations of Freudian and Lacanian 
theory. 
 In accordance with this, there is no expert able to objectively evaluate a phenomenon, 
since all subjects, participants and researchers alike are submitted to these limits of discourse 
in terms of its structural incompleteness. This is a resource rather than a hinderance (Parker, 
2005b: 117), as it allows to open up perspectives around a topic. Thus, avoided in this type 
of research is the validation of the interpretations made, either by the researcher, others in 
the field or by the participant themselves, as occurs in some approaches where the researcher 
and the participant come to ‘agree’ on some views. This is nothing other than staying on an 
imaginary level and ignoring the structural limits of discourse, that it goes beyond 
individuals’ intentions (Parker, 2007: 175), thereby shutting it down to certain views. It does 
mean, on the other hand, that patients’/the participants reactions to these research findings 
could go in any direction and is somewhat out of my control. Negative reactions where the 
participants may feel invalidated is of course a huge concern of mine for this study 
considering the controversies surrounding the PACE trial, which has created a distrust in 
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patients of psychological research as it is perceived to be doing a huge injustice to their 
realities. I have therefore attempted to take certain steps mitigating this.  
First of all, I have attempted to be as transparent as possible in my analysis in terms 
of how I reached the interpretations, outlining as many steps as possible in my thinking and 
outlining as much of the interview excerpts and their context as possible. It is up to the reader 
to be convinced by them or not. I have, beyond this and as made clear above, not reduced 
fatigue to one interpretation or aspect or collapsed the participants’ experiences into one. For 
instance, the next chapter exploring alienating encounters highlights a common experience 
for all of the participants, an encounter with the demand to ‘keep going’, but also showcases 
how the participants encounter and emphasise different aspects of this demand which have 
to do with different alienating elements (lack of control, accumulating demands, lack of 
acknowledgment of subjective differences etc.). I have in other words not united the 
interpretations into one, or reconciled contradictory views where I have taken one side over 
the other, neither within nor across discourses/interviews. I am, moreover, not making any 
fixed or static claims about the participants as individuals. I recognise that their situations 
since the time of the interview have most likely changed, and thus some interpretations may 
not be applicable to their current discourses/situations for this reason. In a similar vein, it is 
important to recognise the uniqueness of a situation in the fact that the discourse was 
produced at a specific time of the participants’ lives and in a specific context which 
influenced it; between them and me as both a person and a researcher of an educational 
institution. This means that their discourse cannot be generalisable in terms of either 
extending it to their current situations or to everyone else who is suffering from 
fatigue/diagnosed with CFS/ME. Neither does this mean, however, that their speech says 
nothing about the current sociocultural context in which we find ourselves. Due to the fact 
that the subject is inseparable from sociocultural discourses, speech will highlight broader 
viewpoints as subjects come to draw on various discourses in formulating his/her 
experiences, some of which are easy to find elsewhere in common medical discourse, for 
example, or in popular culture. Indeed, one of the aims of this research is to underline 
dominant discourses as they repeat themselves both within interviews and across, in order to 
obtain the possibility of changing them, particularly as they oppress and harm subjects. In 
this way, by taking seriously Lacanian theory and rigorously, as much as possible, using the 
techniques part of it, the interpretations derive from a close consideration of the language 
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used, thus gaining an account more in tune with people’s lived experiences and, inversely, 
mitigating the abovementioned unethical position where one makes illegitimate assumptions 
largely from the perspective of one’s imagination. A Lacanian approach avoids these pitfalls 
(Neill, 2013). 
Nevertheless, despite the abovementioned ethical standpoint, it can still be considered 
problematic to conduct in-depth analysis on highly personal and sensitive issues, as the 
analysis is formulated through someone else’s words and perspective. This brings us to the 
issue of the use of clinical concepts and techniques in research, which again raises the 
question as to what we are doing when applying concepts to a text, and particularly those 
linked to a diagnostic category such as ‘neurosis’. In this way, as Parker (2005a: 175) 
recognises, the researcher or the one analysing the text gets ‘full reign’ over interpretation, 
whereas in practice it is the analysand who mainly engages in the act of interpretation albeit 
with interventions and support from the analyst. This makes it all the more important to 
follow the ethics as outlined here in terms of keeping the text open to multiple meanings, 
making these interpretations as transparent as possible, and abandoning any reduction or 
rigidity (final words) around results. However, while this research uses some techniques and 
concepts which are similar to the clinic, there are also important distinctions. In the clinic, 
the analyst is constantly encountering a dynamic discourse constituting of a treatment, 
whereas my analysis, which nevertheless stemmed from a dynamic setting, is afterwards 
more or less un-changeable. It simply means that we need to be extra careful about drawing 
conclusions in research (indeed, which is also crucial in the clinic considering the fleeting 
nature of subjectivity). Symptom formation particularly constitutes a complex topic even in 
a clinical setting where considerably more meetings with the participants than time allowed 
in this research are necessary. I can here only repeat that I am not analysing the symptom of 
an individual, but a symptom of a discourse elaborated at a unique time and place. Moreover, 
and based on this, transparency is paramount not only in regard to my interpretations, but in 
terms of sharing this research with those who contributed to it, considering the thesis will be 
available for anyone to read. To this end, the participants of this study will be given the 
opportunity to read how their discourses have been treated, as a final type of debriefing stage. 
Once the thesis is completed, the participants will be notified and will be sent a copy of the 
thesis, and this will also constitute an opportunity to raise any questions or concerns they 
may have. 
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Continuous conversations about the topic and findings of this study with others and 
particularly patients and medical practitioners is essential, in terms of continuing to 
understand the area and revising/adding perspectives on it, and realising productive and 
respectful ways of formulating sensitive issues. Additionally, these conversations are crucial 
in terms of not merely highlighting dominant and/or harmful discourses — as that would 
reinforce them — but of allowing interpretations of a topic to change the coordinates of that 
topic. By focusing on the indeterminacy of language in relation to fatigue and importantly 
the intricate mind-body relation, it creates the possibility of changing those views on this 
relation and changing practices to more beneficial ones where the complex relation between 
the two is acknowledged, and ones which do not lock certain people (in this case those cases 
unable to be confirmed with biomedical evidence) in certain oppressive or restrictive 
positions. Productive conversations between CFS/ME patients, carers/practitioners and 
myself have already taken place at public seminars I delivered on my research in Edinburgh, 
where engaging and fruitful discussions opened up surrounding fatigue and psychoanalysis 
in relation to the practices of biomedicine and other contemporary ones. I am planning to 
continue, if funding opportunities allows, to engage in public seminars about this research 
and topic in order to shape knowledge with others.  
Nonetheless, as the interpretations made in this thesis could come to affect others, 
and in order to follow an ethical approach as part of Lacanian psychoanalysis where 
meanings are multiplied as opposed to closed down, it is all the more important to consider 
the influence of myself as a researcher on this research. 
 
Reflexivity 
 
I no doubt coloured this research with my own views, experiences, desires and fantasies, 
from the very choice of the topic to the analysis of the interview transcripts. Indeed, such a 
subjective involvement was necessary as it fuelled a thorough investigation of fatigue, 
without which this research would not have been possible. But beyond me as a person, I 
belong to an educational institution existing in a specific culture where research has certain 
meanings and expectations for people volunteering to take part. That is, even though it is 
tempting to generalise the characteristics of the participants’ relationships with me as a 
researcher to say their relationships with their GP’s, medical practitioners or therapists (what 
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could be termed a transference structure), one again needs to recognise the specificity of the 
research situation. There will be different stakes, expectations and consequences involved 
which influences the discourses produced in this situation. For instance, the participants’ 
discourses may be similar when speaking to a doctor as when speaking with me insofar as 
they ‘borrow’ from the same sociocultural discourses when attempting to explain their 
condition and attempting to communicate, for instance, that their condition is serious. In this 
way, I might embody ‘the Other’ (a governing authority), someone capable of bringing 
recognition to their condition on par with a medical practitioner. On the other hand, the 
situation greatly differs from a medical setting in terms of expectations and outcome, insofar 
as the participants were not prescribed a medicine or recommended or undergoing a treatment 
(therapeutic/psychoanalytic practice), even though there were expectations that participating 
in the research would facilitate this process insofar as the results would be fed back to medical 
health practitioners. Indeed, one of the participants was curious regarding my opinion on 
some management strategies in which he participated. This shows how intertwined but also 
different the situations are.  
Something that hugely influenced the interviews in this research were the 
controversies surrounding my recruitment advertisement via the Facebook post outlined 
above, since it framed my research in a certain light. For instance, it may have been clear 
from the way in which I framed the criteria for participating that the research was open and 
flexible when it came to the diagnosis, insofar as I included people who experienced profound 
fatigue but who were not diagnosed, or who considered themselves diagnosed. This may have 
come across as unserious in some people’s eyes if it was thought I was comparing discourses 
among people they considered were not part of ‘their’ ME group. This was not necessarily 
the case though, as some of the participants believed that ME/CFS could be further broken 
down into different groups and that those differences might come across in a study such as 
this. It arguably did, however, set up people’s agenda for participating and the direction of 
what they wanted to talk about, since they did have much influence there. My emphasis on 
fatigue in the advertisement and in the criteria arguably gave rise to the participants’ 
downplaying fatigue as a symptom and instead accentuating the cluster of symptoms 
involved; indeed some people asked in the Facebook post if there was a reason I had focused 
on one symptom (fatigue) out of many. As a result, I remember I made a note to myself to 
try to follow the participants’ speech and the way in which they describe their bodies and 
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situations as opposed to being fixated on fatigue. This type of discourse of course also goes 
beyond me and the wording of the advertisement in the sense that the general view of fatigue, 
that it is not ‘real’ as discussed previously, determines people to speak from certain positions. 
The controversies surrounding the Facebook post also, arguably, highlighted to 
potential participants that taking part was a risky business in terms of not knowing how their 
discourses/interviews would be treated. This risk was minimised insofar as they are 
anonymous and were told they would be debriefed afterwards, and in this way the interviews 
could have presented a unique and open space that some might not have encountered 
previously. In line with this, most of the participants were more open-minded in terms of the 
aetiology of fatigue (although as demonstrated above, there was much ambivalence here 
between physical and mental influences), than is oftentimes voiced within the ME 
community. It is probably true that those who were more open-minded were more willing to 
participate and thus ended up taking part in this study. Not only that, but some of the 
participants expressed a lack of confidence in voicing opinions therein if they go against the 
shared, dominant views. This showcases the importance of this type of research as some of 
the data produced might not have been able to emerge elsewhere8. The structure of the 
research does on the other hand make it (more) possible for certain discourse structures to 
emerge. Inviting people to volunteer to speak about their experiences presupposes a desire to 
speak, be heard and recognised, for their experiences to be symbolically registered and 
marked. It is therefore important to conduct research on a topic in different settings and in 
various ways. 
In terms of the reflexivity related to the analysis of the interview transcripts, I 
inevitably coloured this insofar as I came to focus on parts of the interviews and theory in 
which my own subjectivity was more invested; the reason for which it is crucial to obtain 
other perspectives on the same topic through discussions, and not to mention the importance 
of disrupting meaning by bringing in multiple perspectives through a focus on the structure 
of a text, the process of following the letter. This was a learning process, meaning that I came 
to influence the research more at certain moments and places, particularly when my skills of 
discerning discourse structures alongside my understanding of the theory were under-
developed. Because while the interview transcripts are more or less static — however the 
 
8 Such as life events surrounding the onset of the fatigue, since this is not discussed in-depth elsewhere, to my 
knowledge. Other discourses, on the contrary, are omnipresent within the ME community and easily found 
online, for instance that the condition is described as a broken machine/battery run out. 
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production of which during the transcribing process I had also influenced in the sense of 
interpreting when to punctuate and exactly what to transcribe — my position was constantly 
shifting in relation to the texts. I came to interpret them differently at different stages. I admit 
I came into this research with a narrow view of the mind-body relation, believing there was 
a strong possibility of the research ending up being ‘just another’ one on depression. This 
turned out to be far from the case, and fortunately my views changed and became less rigid. 
There was particularly one significant moment which radically changed my position in 
relation to the texts, which I mentioned briefly above as being the point at which I begun 
focusing on the associative networks present in the text9. Before this, I was seduced by 
Freud’s theory of ‘actual neurosis’, which I more or less imposed on the text. Briefly, this 
theory states that the cause of the symptom — symptom here being used in a Lacanian sense 
in terms of the underlying structure of a ‘condition’ — is somatic and not psychical, and thus 
the symptom corresponds directly to a physical sensation and more precisely anxiety (or an 
anxiety equivalent such as fatigue) as a result of an accumulation of tension which has been 
unable to be mentally processed. If a symptom takes on this structure, one would be unable 
to find any symbolisations in the speech surrounding the condition, or in other words an 
associative network where the symptom would be linked to discourses surrounding life 
events and other subjective factors. This is in stark contrast to that of a psychoneurotic 
symptom and the more commonly known conversion symptom, which has been formed due 
to a psychical conflict and constitutes a formation of the unconscious, a symbolic message 
addressed to the Other, where the body has taken the place of certain signifiers, answers or 
questions, as an attempt to symbolise that which was not symbolised. In this case, we would 
find a plethora of connections between signifiers and various meanings surrounding 
descriptions of their symptoms and various events or thoughts. While the theory of actual 
neurosis is not completely irrelevant to the structure of the discourses of those interviewed 
of this study, as I will argue in the course of this thesis, leaving it there does not do justice to 
what I eventually deemed more appropriate, which better resembled the form of a 
psychoneurotic symptom; or rather the combination of the two structures. Namely, there were 
 
9 Paying attention to the structural associations of the text, understanding the theory and also realising my 
influence on the research, particularly at times I had to a large extent coloured it (or rather imposed my own 
meaning on it such as this moment), was admittedly aided by my own personal analysis with a Lacanian analyst. 
This is not to say that in order to productively conduct LDA one must be in his/her own Lacanian analysis, but 
I merely point this out to be transparent. I wonder how differently the research would have looked had this not 
been the case. 
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plentiful of symbolisations surrounding fatigue and the losses it entailed, which nevertheless 
arose from moments of impossibility/inability, or gravitated around these moments. This led 
me to consider the texts in the context of the differences and similarities to actual neurosis, 
and more importantly in comparison to the theory on conversion symptoms, which assisted 
with elucidating the structure of the discourses, and also helped me stay clear from the idea 
of ‘the’ cause of fatigue. That is, instead of an inability to symbolise one’s body and situation 
(actual neurosis), what I found were many attempts at symbolising these 
(psychoneurosis/conversion symptom), even though these symbolisations and meanings 
repeatedly and eventually fail (there is no such thing as complete symbolisation but some 
stability can be found in certain symbolisations). In other words, what I wanted to find is not 
what I found. I wanted to find a lack of meaning, and what I surprisingly found were a 
multiplicity of meanings and the impossibility of escaping these, and furthermore the 
impossibility of ascribing to a condition a single cause and finding the ‘truth’ — realisations 
which were personally difficult. I found subjects attempting to, in various ways and 
sometimes similarly and sometimes differently, to symbolise the situations they found 
themselves in; constituting a type of logic embedded in an associative network which allowed 
me to put together the following interpretations. It was thanks to taking seriously a 
suspicious/critical point of view that made me repeatedly return to the texts and consider their 
structures closely, together with a constant scrutiny of my own motivation for taking the 
research in particular directions, as facilitated for instance by productive supervision 
meetings which allowed me to speak of and make sense of these issues. I further believe the 
concern I had about doing injustice to the participants’ discourses given the context of 
CFS/ME ultimately made me a better researcher and made me extra critical to my own 
interpretations. Such a process reminds me of the quote from Picasso Lacan brings up in his 
seminars, ‘I do not seek, I find’. In what follows, I invite the reader to suspend as much as 
possible what they think they may be seeking in reading a research study on fatigue, to 
constantly remain suspicious of the interpretations made and to add their own — hopefully 
ones that do justice to the discourses and realities presented in this study.  
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Chapter 3: The Alienating Demand to ‘Keep Going’ 
 
What culture is, in the first place, is a stream of implicit and explicit 
commands to “Wake up!”, keep on living, working, producing, 
consuming, copulating, loving, and enjoying… 
 
— Aaron Schuster 
 
The analysis of the participants’ interviews as conducted for this study will start by exploring 
the discourses surrounding the onset of their conditions. Examining the onset of a condition 
is imperative for understanding any phenomenon as it is indicative of factors influencing its 
emergence and development, suggesting to what a condition is potentially a response. What 
elements are encountered at the initiation of fatigue which possibly act as some precipitating 
factors? Overall, at the onset of the participants’ condition, recognisable there is a mind-body 
divide akin to that which was outlined in the introductory chapter: demands are encountered 
which ignore the subject’s choices, identity, desire, needs and most importantly his/her lack 
and losses of these as a result of various life events. The participants’ experiences of the 
demands can be elucidated through Lacan’s notion of alienation, as the theory explains the 
process of symptom and subject formation — the two being highly intertwined from a 
Lacanian perspective — via the alienating encounter with demands. More precisely, integral 
to the process of symptom formation is the encounter with, and the subsequent response to, 
demands, since the subject/symptom emerges as an effect of language (demands articulate 
by others) on the (biological) body. Alienation will henceforth aptly offer details with which 
to analyse the interviews in what follows, alongside the notion of anxiety as it relates to it. 
 
The Demand to ‘Keep Going’ 
 
The demands found at the onset of the participants’ conditions are tied to various life events, 
with the content of these differing between the participants. Nevertheless, there is an 
overarching attribute brought forth under the imperative to ‘keep going!’ — the most 
dominant one found for all of the participants at the onset of their conditions. The 
commandment to ‘keep going’ is shaped by the ideologies of late capitalism, and particularly 
by the idea of ‘the body as machine’: it asks for perpetual and constant activity and presence, 
for the body to operate like a machine. In so doing, the imperative asks the subject to ignore 
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the need to sleep and rest, or in the very least, relegates them to an unnecessary and 
inconvenient position. We can link sleeping and resting with an absence insofar as they 
constitute passive activities where the (conscious) subject withdraws from societal 
obligations in terms of pre-determined activities10. An absence, in turn, is what constitutes 
subjectivity insofar as the subject is inextricable to lack as a point of indeterminability. The 
subject is thus excluded if meeting the demand for constant productivity and presence. This 
occurs through the demand’s suffocating characteristic which reduces the subject to an object 
of productivity, as depicted in the interviews; a reduction to a pre-determined, concrete place 
where the subject is left out. It is therefore necessary to outline an account of subjectivity 
from a Lacanian perspective in order to proceed with this argument. But I will first delineate 
how the demand for non-stop activity manifests within some of the participants’ accounts at 
the initiation of their conditions, starting with a close focus on Tom’s and Amy’s discourses. 
 Tom was 48 years old at the time of the first interview. He explains that his condition 
emerged alongside two events: working “extra” hours at his work where he was doing 
twelve-hour shifts (A/L19-22) at a multidisciplinary emergency unit, and when his 
neighbours started making continuous noise by “having parties all the time” (A/L28-30). 
Even though he does not explicitly mention sleep around this event, we could infer that his 
sleep was disrupted due to the neighbours’ noise. Potentially as a result, the demand to work, 
and/or the demands at work, become heavier. This could be interpreted through the statement 
he makes with regard to becoming more “sensitive” to the noise: “And this was a continual 
thing but I kept on doing my work, I kept on working” (A/L36-37), after which he became 
tired. The “I kept on working” could be read as a demand to ‘keep working’ and to ‘keep 
going’: that he had no choice but to keep working, and this aspect was arguably emphasised 
during the introduction of the neighbours’ noise. A stronger suggestion that working 
possesses the quality of a demand is that the word “continual” used to describe the noise, is 
also mentioned in relation to his work, in connection to overwhelming demands. Tom lists 
the tasks involved at work: “get case lists going for patients, sitting, bringing them in, 
monitoring”, and “up, down, walking up corridor, getting stuff back”, “on my legs twelve 
hours a day” (A/L386-389) — tasks which could be interpreted as demands for the body to 
physically work. Not only that, but there is a sense in which he is reduced to these physical 
 
10 While sleeping and resting are interchangeable in this manner, I will mainly use the term ‘sleep’ since it more 
aptly relates to the response of the subject in terms of a drive and desire for sleeping (fatigue), and with Lacan’s 
notion of the drive being an effect of a demand on the biological body, with sleep being a biological need. 
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activities since he says straight after this: “I was continual”, denoting an existence, “I was”, 
in never-ending activities. The continuous aspect implies there is a lack of room for other 
activities, most notably those with a low level of activity such as resting and/or sleeping. 
Accordingly, in relation to his neighbours’ partying noise, he said “there was no fucking 
escape” (B/L422). The element of inescapability reinforces the reductive experience. Amy 
similarly invokes the notion of being reduced to work through the factor of inescapability.  
 Amy was 42 years old at the time of the first interview, and her condition started after 
having been “forced”, as she put it, to have the H1N1 vaccination for the swine flu at work 
as a nurse, in order to protect chemotherapy patients. She says: “we got…made, I suppose 
um, encouraged maybe forced may be another word, to go and get the vaccine - to have the 
vaccine” (B/L104-106). While she hesitates to call it “forced”, she emphasises this aspect in 
the first interview: “I was a bit bitter but I was made to have it at work, it was an enforced 
thing” (A/L24-25). This could be interpreted as constituting an event going beyond the 
immediate vaccination where Amy is instead confronted with a general demand to work, or 
to ‘keep going’, which could further be experienced as an intrusion. For Amy, the demand 
does not appear to be limited to work, for when I asked her what was going on generally in 
her life when she got ill — something I repeatedly asked the participants in order to uncover 
details about the potential influences at the onset — she replies: “Apart from being a - a 
working mum…” (B/L302). This can be read as, beyond obviously referring to that she both 
works and is a mother, that being a mother is work, which is attested to when she says that 
while she always had a “high level of stress - stress, high level of responsibility” (B/L363) at 
work, she found that “planning meals for a family was more overwhelming” (B/L364). It 
points to a blurring of the distinction between work and private life –– life itself becoming a 
chore and is experienced as homogeneous. Accordingly, when Amy talks about the onset of 
her condition she conveys: “and I would dread every week I would dread work, my home-
life because I would come home from work not able to cognitively thinking about planning 
a meal for children” (A/L50-52). The two, work and home life, are related, both involving a 
high level of responsibility and a similar task seeing as being a nurse and a mother involve 
taking care of others (we return here to the other side of “working mum” where working is 
being a type of mother). The latter is reinforced insofar as Amy just prior to this explains 
how she switched to a “less physically demanding” role, where she was “using my thoughts”, 
which can be linked to the statement “cognitively thinking about planning a meal for 
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children”. That this leads to a homogeneous reality could be seen in the following excerpt 
where she speaks about being on and off work in what she calls a “cycle”: 
 
Think, when you’re in this work cycle of you know ill, you get better you go back 
to work then you become ill again. When you’re in that complete wheel you’re 
always worried about the next stage. Like you would sit “ugh” if you were on a 
day off you’d be like “God I’ve got work next week”. Or Monday um how am I 
gonna cope with that, how will I feel on Monday night? (B/L199-203). 
 
Even though she is talking about being ill and the fluctuations between working and not 
working, a cycle is linked to work insofar as she terms it a “work cycle”, and the demand to 
work is immanent in the expression “God I’ve got to work next week” — something she had 
to do. She refers to this as a “complete wheel”, with the “wheel” part suggesting a movement 
into which she gets caught, perhaps helplessly so. That she calls it “complete” denotes 
something inescapable and enclosed, and more specifically what she is unable to escape is 
thinking about having to work (outside of it). The demand is ubiquitous. The enclosed quality 
is corroborated in the following sentence: “But when you’re in that cycle you don’t - you 
don’t see that window, you don’t see that way out” (B/L211-212)11. This suggests a cycle of 
never-ending homogenous motion, which is strengthened in her interviews when speaking 
about a “dark period” where she had an “ear infection”: “But to get up every - every morning 
with the same way and every day being the same” (B/L295-298). There is here an imperative 
to ‘wake up’, inextricable to that of ‘keep going’. Amy’s indications of experiencing a 
homogenous reality is in line with what is theorised today regarding contemporary society, 
as influenced by late capitalism. With the belief in a non-stop operation of human activity, 
the binary day/night, and on/off, does not exist and instead, life becomes homogenous (Crary, 
2013: 13). It also goes with Byung-Chul’s (2015: 5) argument that in modern society, instead 
of finding a negativity, there is a ‘surplus positivity’, or more clearly, ‘too much of the same’. 
 Relatedly, it is not (only) a high level of activity which is troublesome for Amy, but 
seemingly when the activities melt together into one. Amy mentions that she became unwell 
after she finished her degree in nursing (B/L334-335), the timing of which is the “opposite 
 
11 Indeed, since she is still talking about fluctuations, fatigue could be a way for Amy to install difference 
through a cycle, which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
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of what you’d expect”, since during it she had to work, study and take care of children –– 
involving a high level of activity. However, studying entails working towards a goal, where 
there is a difference between now (attempting to obtain a degree) and then (having obtained 
a degree), and could furthermore be linked to a more personal achievement, something one 
does for oneself. This suggests an experience that might also be the case for some of the other 
participants: during the onset of their conditions, a goal (as an object of desire) was achieved, 
and without the creation of another goal afterwards there is stagnation and homogeneity with 
no perceived way out of one’s current situation. There thus seems to be a difficulty in working 
full-time after the object of desire was obtained, as Amy herself says during the onset: “I was 
a band 6 nurse, I was in a really good career, and felt important and achieved everything I 
wanted to achieve” (B/L641-642). Another indication of such a difficulty is that she explains 
feeling tired after she gave birth to her son: “So I was trying to be full-time - work full-time, 
um and have a baby at home and it just - the whole things just, crashed around me” 
(B/L322/323). That she says she was “trying to be full-time”, suggests an existence reduced 
solely to the aspect of working, both as a nurse and a mother, the solution to which was to 
work less: “I reduced my hours and then I was great” (B/L326-327).  
 Therefore, in both Tom’s and Amy’s discourses — present too in the other’s discourses 
which will be evident as the chapter unfolds — we discern the demand to ‘keep going’, a 
demand which asks for constant presence and productivity. If met, it reduces the whole of 
one’s being to concrete, specific activities, with no room for other activities and subjective 
factors, as illustrated by the inescapability of their situations. What is excluded is, 
commonsensically, one’s own desire due to a focus on others’ demands, which will be 
considered more below. The disappearance of the subject behind a demand is in line with, 
and can further be understood through, Lacan’s concept of alienation. Alienation outlines the 
emergence of the subject and inversely, how the subject is excluded by meeting a demand 
when the demand refers to a pre-determined, concrete place –– constituting a highly 
alienating state. This then necessitates a discussion on what the subject is, and conversely, 
what it is not. 
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Subjectivity from a Lacanian Perspective 
 
The subject from a Lacanian perspective is reducible neither to the body with its biological 
rhythms, nor to culture (Schuster, 2016: 44) as mediated through discourse part of the social 
order. Rather, the subject can be understood as emerging through the difference between 
biology and culture; a difference which ultimately makes possible a link between the two. 
This can be explained in-depth through the interaction between need and demand, since the 
subject is produced through an effect of language (demands articulated by others) on 
biological needs (Neill, 2014: 52); the pathway by which socialisation occurs. 
The process of socialisation transpires through the communication of biological needs 
addressed to someone else. An infant is at first largely governed by biological needs and 
communicates these through actions such as crying. In order for the child to have its needs 
satisfied, communication in language is necessary. But once a need becomes articulated 
within the structure of language, it is turned into a demand which takes on a symbolic and 
intersubjective function as it addresses someone else, usually the parents (Van Haute, 2002: 
104, 107). Needs then become bound up with social rules through the interactions taking 
place between the infant and the parent(s): the parent demands how, when, what to eat, drink, 
and how and when to defecate, urinate, sleep and so on, the content of which is shaped by 
social decorum. In turn, the child responds to these demands with his/her own demands; the 
demands from both directions becoming intertwined (Pluth, 2007: 65).  
Demands are part of what Lacan calls the big Other, which is inclusive not only of 
language such as words and images as sense-making activities, but also implicit and explicit 
social rules governing our cultural world, thereby giving it meaning and making co-existence 
possible (Salecl, 2000: 3; Žižek, 2006a: 26). The Other structures our psychic realities and 
enables communication through a reference to shared meanings, and through the three 
intertwined realms: the symbolic (which consists of a logic of signifiers producing sense), 
the imaginary (which adds meaning and makes possible imaginary identifications), and the 
real (that unsymbolisable which escapes the two former orders). The intervention of this 
social order on the biological body, through a demand, diversifies needs in that we come to 
have different eating habits for instance, highlighting the fact that biological processes alone 
cannot account for the varied ways in which people eat (Van Haute, 2002: 106). These 
biological processes then become highly intertwined with that of pleasure, also determined 
by social interactions and exchanges taking place around what Freud called erogenous zones 
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(oral, anal, and genital). The articulation of a need in language transforms the need into a 
demand, something that aims beyond the (object of) need such as food, since the demand 
takes on a symbolic function: it possesses the quality of always being about something else 
and something more. More specifically, this ‘something more’ is the search and demand for 
love as Lacan states (2002/2006: 580). The search for (unconditional) love is probably 
obvious in human interactions but particularly evident in children who are not just wanting 
the food or the candy in a shop, but wanting to see how far their parents will go in meeting 
their relentless requests. It is thought that unconditionally meeting the child’s demands is a 
sign of love. In accordance with this, it is well documented through research in attachment 
theory that certain animals are not sufficiently satisfied by basic survival items such as food 
and water, but need something beyond biological satisfaction in the form of a sense of 
comfort, safety and thus love. As Lacan writes: ‘In this way, demand annuls the particularity 
of everything that can be granted, by transmuting it into a proof of love’ (Lacan, 2002/2006: 
580). With this, he points out that demanding love involves asking for something impossible 
to be ‘granted’, because how is love given to the subject who demands it? The simple answer 
is that it is not possible to give — one of the potential meanings of Lacan’s famous axiom 
‘love is giving what one does not have’. There is no final answer or guarantee for the demand 
for love (Van Haute, 2002: 109), which simultaneously means unconditional love does not 
exist as it is not possible to satisfy all of a person’s demands; hence why we see repeated 
attempts from people expressing their love to their partners — the need to constantly repeat 
‘I love you’ for instance. We ultimately do not know what love entails. ‘Why do you love 
me?’ one asks one’s partner (either explicitly or implicitly), only to be met by disappointing 
answers. This means that answers to love always fail; the demand for love is insatiable. The 
demand for love is strongly tied up with questions of existence, as being in the position of 
someone lovable would give meaning to one’s existence; a position which is associated with 
certain qualities the subject perceives to be upraised by the Other. To be loved means, for 
instance, to work hard, or to be engaged with certain professions and so on. However, the 
child cannot, likewise, receive an answer for his/her existence that would guarantee a place 
in the world. At moments when this is realised by the subject, s/he is confronted with the 
mOther’s enigmatic desire and radical lack in the sense that the subject does not know what 
she desires, and consequently, what the subject’s existence and purpose is in relation to her 
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desire. This has to do with the structural incompleteness of language, language being the 
route through which an articulated need travels.  
 Structural lack/incompleteness stems from the fact that there is always a mismatch 
between the physical need, the language used for articulating it as a demand, and the way in 
which the parent interprets the demand; and furthermore, how the child interprets the parents’ 
interpretation. Meaning is either too much or too little (Van Haute, 2002: 109) and demands 
are contradictory (Fink, 1999: 122). Consequently, we naturally coincide neither with our 
biological bodies nor with images or words used to represent and think about ourselves. The 
fact that we say we have a body as opposed to that we are a body attests to this. Our bodies 
are unable to be adequately represented symbolically, which we can all most likely attest to 
during attempts to describe in words a bodily sensation, such as a headache or tiredness. 
Words are insufficient as they do not match up with our bodily experiences and one cannot 
say it all at once (Frosh, 2007: 641). Similarly, an image cannot capture a real, living and 
breathing human being, despite the expression ‘an image says a thousand words’. A mirror 
image or a picture only offers a limited view as it cannot capture all angles simultaneously, 
nor the insides of the flesh. Thus, a representation (of identity) is always partial. Not only 
that, but representing an experience changes the very nature of that experience since it comes 
to frame it (Frosh, 2007: 641), as was argued with biological needs, and such a framing will 
give new meaning to it and alter the previous meaning. We are thus always alienated and 
separated from ourselves since the introduction of the symbolic adds a layer through which 
our experiences get filtered, whether we want it or not. As a consequence, all we can do is 
retroactively postulate a sensation, or a biological need, as having been there beforehand 
(Neill, 2014: 55), since entering the symbolic, a mode of alienation, entails losing access to 
the primordial real as that which resides outside signification, but which nevertheless exerts 
an influence on significations and experiences (Moncayo, 2012:193), such as biological 
factors. In other words, we cannot step outside the symbolic and gain direct access to our 
(biological) bodies, but can only come to understand our bodies through the standpoint of the 
symbolic. What this all means is that we cannot receive an answer for love/our existence, due 
to the fact that ‘there is no universe of discourse’ (Lacan, 2011: 69). The word universe, 
etymologically speaking, means to turn something into one/into a whole. The statement refers 
to the fact that the subject cannot be one with the Other; cannot be fully integrated into 
society, or with its own body which comes to have a life of its own. Non-reciprocity is part 
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of what Lacan (Seminar XIV: 215) calls the ‘fundamental logic argument’, foundational to 
subjectivity and alienation12. Something always escapes.  
 However, the subject is not the ‘true’ or ’real’ being which cannot be captured in 
images and words, but arises as a surplus from the failure of integrating nature and culture, 
or in other words, the body and the mind, where the mind represents the imaginary-symbolic 
order and the body represents the primordial real. The real as the surplus which escapes the 
integration to a system of representation is conceptualised by Lacan's theory through the 
notion of object a, that which ‘gives body to the impasse’ (Schuster, 2016: 44). More exact, 
structural lack inherent in language becomes expressed in the body as a lack of satisfaction: 
a need which is taken up at the level of a demand turns a biological activity, such as eating, 
into an unquenchable appetite as we come to eat either too much or too little, as Freud 
observes (Shepherdson, 1997: 138). A tension related to biology turns into a tension of non-
satisfaction pertaining to the drive and desire, thus driving us to repeat activities, just as we 
repeat love expressions. In contrast to this, a need is a physiological lack which can be 
(temporarily) satisfied, and is satisfied with a specific and concrete object, for instance food 
satisfies the need of hunger (Van Haute, 2002: 104). If a need has the factor of specificity to 
it, i.e. can only be satisfied by a specific object (food, sleep, etc.), in a demand this element 
is lost due to the un-specificity involved in lack (as surplus). Not only that, but a surplus is 
present as the driving force of the subject, which is the very substance of the subject and 
more specifically in the form of drive and desire. The drive and desire are both the effects of 
the intervention of language on the body, having escaped as something ‘additional, 
supplementary or adjacent’ (Neill, 2014: 55), with Lacan stating that desire ‘rebels against 
the satisfaction of need’ (Lacan, 2002/2006: 580). A symptom consists of the drive and 
desire, which come to act as attempts to articulate answers of existence through the 
fundamental fantasy. However, this occurs on an unconscious level, and indeed the surplus 
is strongly related to the unconscious since the latter is the place of non-meaning, from which 
meaning nevertheless emerges. An in-depth account of the interlinked yet different concepts 
of the drive, desire and fantasy will be outlined in the next chapters; the most important factor 
 
12 The process of alienation can only come about retroactively through the other logical process of separation, 
which introduces lack into the social order. Alienation and separation are thus highly intertwined (the lack of 
separation results in a lack of alienation as seen in certain cases of psychosis where a sense of identity is 
missing). In the seminar from where this paragraph is taken, the two notions seem to be more exchangeable. As 
Fink (1997: 61) observes, in seminar XIV and XV, separation becomes subsumed under the term ‘alienation’. 
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to note here is that the subject is not equivalent to a surplus, but that it emerges through a 
surplus.  
 The subject is more specifically divided between two poles. When structural lack is 
embodied, or imprinted in the body as a non-satisfaction, the subject comes to confuse lack 
with loss, thereby experiencing a loss in his/her body. This loss in turn inaugurates a fleeting, 
insatiable desire, perpetually seeking an object that is ‘not it’ (Neill, 2014: 40) — particularly 
searching for its completion through love as a way of remedying it. Lack then comes to act 
as the basis for identifying with an image, an image better and more complete than the 
experience of one’s current shortcomings, which is how the mirror image qua the ego and 
consciousness is established (see Lacan (2002/2006) ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the 
I Function’ essay). However, the subject is neither the imagined completion (consciousness), 
nor the incompletion as the driving force (unconscious) towards completion, but the very 
split between the two, between the unconscious and consciousness (Neill, 2014: 22-23) — 
which nevertheless comprises a form of incompleteness. The subject is only capable of 
emerging through lack and absence (of a symbolic-imaginary place), as the embodiment of 
the surplus stemming from the failure of integrating nature and culture, or the body and the 
symbolic order. 
 In this sense, identity, as a representation of the subject in the Other, always entails an 
alienated form due to its partiality: the subject inevitably disappears behind a representation, 
a process Lacan (Seminar XI: 208-210) refers to as aphinisis based on Ernest Jones' term. 
But a more alienating form, arguably, is not recognising the factor which escapes and 
postulate the subject as complete, as fully coinciding with an idea and/or an image. This 
constitutes a reduction to a need insofar as satisfaction removes lack and the point of 
indeterminability which is the subject. The subject is that which perpetually questions a place 
(Pluth, 2007: 61), meaning that when a demand entails an articulated need, an object is 
present which is able to extinguish desire and thus the subject (Van Haute, 2002: 110). 
 In light of this account of alienation and the formation of the subject, we can better 
understand Tom’s and Amy’s discourses delineated above. The demand to ‘keep going’ 
represents a strengthened form of alienation insofar as, if met, the subject is wholly reduced 
to a physical, concrete and known object akin to a reduction to a need. This is highlighted in 
Tom’s case as someone always on his feet, working with physical tasks, and through the 
position of a ‘working mum’ in Amy’s case, something she is arguably reduced to after 
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having finished a goal (studying). The reductive aspect of it can be recognised through 
references to inescapability present for both, further linked to a homogenous reality. These 
experiences constitute confrontations with being reduced to a machine-like entity, an object 
of productivity in the sense of solely serving others (patients at work and/or children), 
through a constant (conscious) presence. This leaves little or no space for an absence in terms 
of a break or resting, or even something else such as one’s own goals. Meeting the demand 
to ‘keep going’ suffocates desire and the subject.  
 
The Indifference of the Demand to ‘Keep Going’ 
 
While we discern in the interviews the participants being addressed as a machine-like object 
of productivity — being suffocated by someone else’s demands — we also detect, 
conversely, experiences of not being addressed, which around the onset of the condition seem 
more prevalent for some of the participants rather than for others. However, these two aspects 
are strongly intertwined and result in the same scenario: the subject is excluded in a lack of 
a place, still through the demand to ‘keep going’. This will be illustrated in what follows, and 
how a combination of the two can be found for one person, particularly within Mark’s and 
Beth’s discourses which take centre stage in the following analysis. 
 Mark was 44 years old at the time of the interview, and as he describes the events 
surrounding the onset of his condition, some similarities emerge between them. During the 
time he felt unwell, and after having been to the General Practitioner (GP), he presented his 
work with the GP’s fit note, which recommended one day off work a week. His work’s 
Human Resource department subsequently refused “to honour” (A/L29-32) the GP’s 
recommendation. Mark uses the word refuse (“refusing”) to describe this, and what is refused 
more specifically is his subjectivity in the sense of there being a lack of regard of his 
particular circumstance: that he was unwell and needed rest. The latter activity did not receive 
a place/registration, and for this reason, it strongly relates to the capitalistic commandment 
to ‘keep going’. Mark thereafter explains: “I just tried to work full-time um with the 
inevitable result that I collapsed completely and I had to remain off work for some time” 
(A/L36-37). This event thus appears to exert a significant influence on his condition. The 
scenario is repeated when presenting his work with the GP’s second fit note, recommending 
him to work even less (two hours a day): “my work declined to honour my fit note and that 
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is what caused my second collapse” (A/L233-234). Work thus refuses to meet his demand 
for time off and instead demands full presence though full-time work. There is another event 
which potentially relates to this, insofar as Mark is met with a refusal, although in a medical 
setting. 
 Mark goes to his GP and demands to be referred to a specialist clinic, Maudsley, since 
he wants comprehensive help: “CBT, graded exercise therapy and liaise with employers” 
(A/L142-144). He then receives an appointment at Maudsley, only to have it cancelled two 
weeks after. He goes there “literally in floods of tears” with his wife asking them: “Why, 
why have I been declined?” and “why…why can’t I get to see you?” [tearing up] (A/L157-
160). This was the most emotionally charged moment of his interviews, which could be 
elucidated through the words chosen here. The fact that he says “Why have I been declined” 
rather than the appointment, points to the cancelling of the subject itself by not being taken 
seriously and not receiving what he thinks would benefit him. There is beyond this a lack of 
understanding as to why his demand was refused, corroborated when he says prior to this 
that the appointment was cancelled with “no reasons given. No nothing” (A/L152). It 
suggests that he is reduced to an object of nothing — not worthy to be seen, let alone being 
given a reason for why he cannot be seen. The Other’s refusal, here embodied by medical 
professionals, comes across as random and vicious. This moment could be compared to that 
of encountering the mOther’s enigmatic desire whereby the child attempts to symbolise her 
presences and absences in order to figure out what s/he means for her. As long as the absence 
of the Other cannot be explained, or before the child creates an answer in and through the 
fundamental fantasy, the Other appears as an autonomous, omnipotent and unpredictable 
agency who randomly decides whether or not it will meet the child’s demands (Van Haute, 
2002: 117). One faces in such a moment the indifference of the Other; the Other more 
specifically being indifferent to the subject’s own needs and desires, which could relate to 
Mark’s situation when meeting his GP’s refusal. The Other’s refusal in this way is akin to a 
cold indifference, where, as, as Schuster (2016: 140) puts it: ‘There is a side of the Other that 
is not concerned with me and does not in the least accommodate my existence’ (Ibid.: 142). 
An indifference stemming from a refusal is present for Mark both in a medical setting and at 
work, which he experiences simultaneously. He explains the following in a similar scenario 
when he returns to his GP demanding to receive help beyond CBT: 
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They said ‘No. You’re getting the CBT’. And du-and during that time my 
condition worsened so much that I was regularly crying in meetings with my 
boss, saying ‘I just can’t do it, I just can’t do it’. And him saying ‘Yeah well it's 
not my problem’ (A/L177-179). 
 
The refusal of his demand is clear by them saying “No. You’re getting the CBT”, in turn 
demanding a specific treatment. Their refusal is analogous to the demand to ‘keep going’ in 
terms of a reduction to a need with regards to the aspect of universality and pre-determinacy: 
everyone is getting the same treatment, regardless of idiosyncratic needs/personal 
preferences. This situation is not unique to Mark’s situation but omnipresent in contemporary 
society, governed by the logic of science where the average number applies to all. The 
indifference of the Other presents itself when his boss is perceived to proclaim “Yeah well 
it’s not my problem”. In other words, he is not concerned with Mark’s inability to work or 
his need to rest. We notice here the passivity and disorientation connected with encountering 
the indifference of the Other (Shuster, 2016: 142), since their refusal is enigmatic as well as 
unable to be influenced by Mark. Subsequently, the impact of these experiences on his 
condition is evident as it “worsened so much” to the point of being unable to carry on 
working.  
 A disregard for the subject is likewise discernible in Beth’s account. Beth was 23 
years old at the time of the interview, and the emergence of her fatigue came about as she 
was in her final year of her undergraduate studies at university, which she describes as an 
intense and stressful time. Additionally, during this time, her parents split up, resulting in her 
not having a place to live: “So they just didn’t think about it and they both like made new 
plans for their lives that didn’t include me having anywhere to live” (B166-171). It is not just 
the aspect of not having a home after finishing university, but that her place was not even 
considered by her parents, pointing to an indifference of the Other in an exclusion of a place 
therein. Something analogous takes place for Lucy and Gail, whose conditions both 
developed after having undergone operations.  
Gail, 57 years old when I interviewed her, considers that three events precipitated her 
condition: two major operations and her sister’s death. In relation to the operations, she 
postulates there was a reaction to the anaesthetics: “…it was like I never came out of the 
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anaesthetics” (A/L310-311). The first operation occurred in 2000 and was an elective 
hysterectomy as a result of Endometriosis (A/L265; L283), and the second operation took 
place in 2008 where they re-made her oesophagus due to issues related to GERD and IBS 
(A/L69-70), after which she was “bed bound for a year and a half” (A/L305-306). She 
conveys in relation to this latter operation a lack of acknowledgment pertaining to her needs: 
 
Cus the cuts and stuff were so deep and the amounts of cuts they made and things. 
And they wouldn’t give me anything for pain after the operation. Nothing. 
Nothing. I’ve been through hell. And I said I need something for the pain and 
they just wouldn’t give me not even a Paracetamol. And I’ve just been cut like in 
eight places. That trauma just about wiped me under the table (A/L311-315). 
 
The repetition of the word “cut” is reminiscent of having lost something of her body — here 
an actual physical castration — which gives rise to a discomfort in the body, pain, of which 
she then wanted to get rid/diminish. The discomfort constitutes a lack of satisfaction in the 
form of a need/wish, and is expressed through a demand, “I need something for the pain”, 
which the health care professionals refused to meet: “they just wouldn’t give me not even a 
Paracetamol”. This moment of privation, in a similar fashion to the other participants, can 
translate into a confrontation with the Other’s radical lack qua indifference: the Other is not 
concerned with your needs or wishes, subsequently leaving you alone with your “trauma”. A 
similar experience of privation occurs in a third hospitalisation in 2012 where a stone from 
her gallbladder was taken out, and when the health practitioners refused to give her “any food 
or water for six days” (A/L328). Thus, the experiences appear to entail an exclusion of the 
subject and potentially a reduction to being “nothing”. This situation can be elucidated 
through the concept of anxiety as conceptualised by Freud and Lacan. 
Freud (1959), when (re)conceptualising the concept of anxiety in his ‘Inhibitions, 
Symptoms and Anxiety’ paper, somewhat dismisses the view that anxiety results from a 
separation and the subsequent loss of an object, such as the mother as the love object. Instead, 
he emphasises the fact that the mother immediately satisfies all the child’s needs — hence 
the danger lies in a non-satisfaction: ‘a growing tension due to need against which it is 
helpless’, associated to ‘the experience of being born’ (Ibid.: 137). This resonates with Gail’s 
experiences where her needs were unmet, and she further invokes an element of helplessness 
 
 
70 
in relation to this: “I just had to lie there and cry out and say I can’t do a thing for myself 
(C/L429-430). A Lacanian reading of how Freud conceptualises anxiety entails taking ‘being 
born’ not literally but as part of the process of alienation. Alienation, entering into the social 
order, always entails the experience of loss related to the structural lack of language, which 
comes to be felt in the body as a lack of satisfaction. Nevertheless, anxiety about loss or  non-
satisfaction here would not be in line with anxiety proper from a Lacanian perspective. 
Rather, such an experience refers to what Lacan singles out as (imaginary) castration anxiety, 
in the sense of encountering a loss which should not be there, in which case it is accompanied 
by the belief that loss can be resolved (Lacan, Seminar XI: 175-176). For Gail, we can 
postulate that the loss experienced after her operation through references to cuts is considered 
unnecessary since it is thought that it can be remedied by the Other; though the Other chose 
not to and instead ignored the loss of the subject13. Something similar is noticeable in Lucy’s 
discourse who also experiences loss after an operation. 
 Lucy, 44 years old, had an operation in March 2012 (L/446), a “colposcopy to remove 
pre-cancerous cells” (L761), which she deems being one of three causes of her condition. 
The other two were thought to be glandular fever, which she had a suspicion of having, and 
an infection as a result of the operation. There was, similar to Gail, a potential reaction to the 
anaesthetics given at the operation, which she explains as follows: 
 
And then the day I went for the operation, I had a sore throat, a really sore throat 
again. And I though they were gonna say “no” when I went in, ‘cus it was a 
general anaesthetic. And I thought they were gonna turn me away and they didn’t. 
So I thought oh well, must be alright then to get an operation with a sore throat, 
‘cus I know in the past if that was one of the things - if you had a sore throat they 
would not give a general anaesthetic. So they took me, and…the day after I just 
- I was ill, I was so ill (L/779-785). 
 
What is described here pertaining to the operation appears first to be something of the 
opposite to the other participants, since the medical professionals did not say “no”; she was 
not refused (“And I thought they were gonna turn me away and they didn’t”). However, this 
 
13 However, Lacan’s proper concept of anxiety is also very relevant here and throughout this chapter (as a lack 
of a lack), which I will explain later on and argue how the two anxieties are interrelated in the sense that the 
former leads to castration anxiety.  
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could also be read as a refusal of her subjectivity since they did not account for her sore 
throat, something which was wrong with her and according to Lucy deserved a thought of 
precaution in relation to the anaesthetics. The expression “So they took me” could indicate a 
disappearance behind the Other’s decisions/demand to operate, which lead to an actual 
physical loss which might have amplified a symbolic loss. Sore throats seem to be integral 
to Lucy’s identity as she explains they have been present constantly since she was a child, 
alongside the hay fever associated with it (L/92-95). Based on this, an important part of her 
identity was perhaps not considered by the Other. We could postulate that there is an implicit 
demand here to ‘get on with it’ for both Lucy and Gail around the operations, since they were 
given the impression that being put to sleep by anaesthetics is no big deal: there is no need 
to consider what a specific person might need either before (Lucy) or after (Gail) the 
operations which could facilitate the recovery. Recovery/resting time is neglected — in line 
with the lack of space for inactivity found in late capitalism and through the injunction to 
‘keep going’. However, the indifference of the Other is clearer for Lucy following another 
loss, after which she appeals to the medical Other as a body of knowledge.  
The third event Lucy postulates as a cause to her condition is an infection acquired 
from the operation (L288-289). In September after the operation, she was “bleeding 
constantly” (L794), and went to the toilet to wipe herself, whereby a “cotton wool” came out 
of her: “And it had, bits of…tissue on it, as in me attached to it. It was, it was like [quietly] 
vile” (L/803-804). This moment can be considered to constitute a loss of herself (“as in me 
attached to it”), for which she makes an appeal to the Other. It is here Lucy describes a clearer 
refusal as she recounts her interaction with the GP: “I said ‘You don’t need to see me?’ ‘No.” 
(L805). The indifference of the GP is palpable here, and further so when she says after this 
“…[he] didn’t need to see me. Didn’t want to see me” (L/817-818). The GP was unable to 
account for a loss pertaining to her body, or was unable to symbolise her body. Not only that, 
but the Other was perhaps unwilling to do so as there was no urgency (“didn’t need to see 
me”) nor wish (“didn’t want to see me”) to consider the potential dangers for Lucy. Radical 
lack comes to the forefront, which for Lacan is inevitable considering the body can never be 
taken up into a symbolic framework and full recognition (unconditional love) is impossible. 
We further discern, analogous to the other accounts, how the medical encounter constitutes 
a reinforcement of the onset event, where the subject is refused and loss is not recognised, as 
it is experienced through various bodily discomforts strongly tied to a loss of productivity/an 
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inability for the body to ‘keep going’. This is in line with what Verhaeghe (2004: 310-311) 
observes regarding the medical treatment of modern somatisation, that the medical setting 
repeats an earlier situation where the Other has failed to provide answers. Arguably however, 
this moment arises from having received an answer from the Other, most commonly in the 
form of ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’; an answer which excludes the subject from the 
Other. 
 
‘There’s Nothing Wrong with You’  
 
All of the participants, when going to the GP for help with their conditions, encounter the 
medical Other’s either explicit or implicit message that ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’, 
after which their conditions worsen. Amy for instance relays the following: 
 
…you go away and you think ‘right ok. They’ve said there’s nothing wrong with 
me. I’ll keep going’. But then, I was vomiting after I was eating my tea at night. 
And I’m like [breathes out], there’s something else not…something not right 
(B/L476-483). 
 
We discern how the statement “there’s nothing wrong with me” simultaneously invokes the 
demand to ‘keep going’, since Amy says “I’ll keep going”. Indeed, in the face of a lack of 
any positive medical results, there is no excuse to stop — hence the scientific discourse 
reinforces the commandment found in late capitalism. In this case, the statement ‘there’s 
nothing wrong with you’ (alongside the demand) constitutes a lack of a lack insofar as it 
comprises a complete answer which stops further speculations. That is, uncertainty and 
indeterminability (lack) which fuel questions and investigations in an attempt to explain the 
body and the incomprehensible situation and bodily discomforts a subject finds him/herself 
in (an experience of lack/loss), are foreclosed in a lack of a lack. There is no space for 
considering any other explanations or possibilities other than ‘nothing is wrong with you’, 
which excludes subjectivity and desire as such. It involves a symbolisation which stops 
further symbolisations. This statement can also be traced implicitly in the accounts just 
examined, because if nothing is considered wrong with a person, there is no need to take into 
account his/her lack (of satisfaction) or other bodily sensations which has led to a loss of 
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productivity. The subject, in the eyes of the (medical) Other, is not considered lacking, or 
having lost anything. Contrarily, if lack or loss is acknowledged by the health professionals, 
it is thereafter attempted to be removed through treating it, which can be observed when Mark 
is offered CBT. There is an emphasis on a lack of a lack whereby the subject is supplied with 
‘the’ valid answer regarding one’s well-being which science purports to hold: that CBT will 
be able to remove one’s lack, or that nothing is wrong. Such a moment of shutting down 
indeterminacy relates to Lacan’s notion of anxiety proper, since he conceptualises it as a lack 
of a lack, as the ‘void being closed’ (Lacan, 2014: 53 as cited in Hook, 2015). Lacan also 
terms anxiety a ‘universal satisfaction’ (Lacan, 2002/2006: 689), referring to satisfying a 
need which would remove the gap14. If the void as lack/object a closes, then the subject 
disappears.  
 However, the expression ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’ does not remove lack/loss 
for the subject but seemingly does the opposite: it comes forth with a vengeance. For Amy, 
we notice incomprehensibility in the statement “there’s something else not…something not 
right” linked to throwing up, in terms of not knowing the cause(s) of her vomiting (bodily 
tension). Fundamental lack comes to the fore in the fact that it becomes palpable that her 
current body does not coincide with the statement “there’s nothing wrong with me”, and more 
broadly with a person capable of constant activity and conversely incapable of lacking. 
However, through vomiting, Amy is arguably attempting to install an absence in the face of 
a lack of a lack, to create a gap in the place of fullness, which will be the focus of the next 
chapter in relation to this particular passage. Now, the important factor to note is that the 
participants' experience of loss is reinforced instead of it being represented/acknowledged 
and considered potentially treatable, as promised by a specific treatment linked to a 
biomedical diagnosis. This can be explained by elucidating the function of a 
symbol/representation.  
 A representation distances the subject from the real, offers respite, through the Other’s 
recognition (McGowan, 2004: 22). It does so through putting into movement the signifying 
chain and thereby the production of lack, for example, in the form of speculations of what 
fatigue/the condition could be linked to: biological factors, psychological factors, life events, 
 
14 The link with anxiety here, and in what follows in this section, does not necessarily mean that the participants 
are experiencing anxiety, but I am merely linking the structure of their discourses with the relevant concepts. 
This is not to say that anxiety is not felt: there is a case to be made that the bodily tensions/symptoms appearing 
afterwards are linked with anxiety. However, fatigue as a response will be the focus of the subsequent chapters 
and not dealt with here. 
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and so on. Lack in this way becomes represented through possibilities pertaining to its causes, 
influences and nature, or rather exists through them, is mediated by them; a process which 
gives rise to the possibility of externalising loss onto a symbolisation. Without these 
representations — considering also that representations bring with them possibilities of 
removing lack through an answer — lack becomes less mediated through an external source 
(language). Subsequently, lack becomes more of a presence for the subject through a 
confrontation with it, which could be suggested to be the result of encountering the demand 
to ‘keep going’. Žižek (1996: 107-108) recognises such a situation using the Greek sophism: 
‘if you do not have horns, you lost them; if nothing can be done, then the loss is irreparable’. 
The encounter with a lack of a lack, a lack of space for subjectivity linked to Lacan’s notion 
of proper anxiety, thus seems to lead to castration anxiety where the subject encounters loss15. 
This would tally with the psychoanalytic theory of repression insofar as the more something 
is repressed/ignored/denied, the more it will come back to haunt the subject in what is called 
the return of the repressed. After all, the fact that the Other does not consider the subject 
having a loss, or to be lacking, does not change the situation for the subject who experiences 
a loss of the body, be that either in pain or other bodily sensations which is inextricably tied 
to a loss of energy and productivity. Rather, the result is that the subject is alone with his/her 
loss, having been reduced to an object of ‘nothing’ in the eyes of the Other. 
 
The Otherness of the Demand to ‘Keep Going’ 
 
The confrontation with the demand to ‘keep going’ appears, furthermore, for the participants, 
to include an experience of otherness insofar as the demand is experienced as a foreign and 
intrusive element ‘coming in’ from the outside, subsequently questioning the boundary 
between self and other. This can be discerned in all of the participants’ interviews, but I will 
firstly explore Tom’s discourse in-depth. 
 The experience of an imposition for Tom could be traced in his discourse surrounding 
his neighbours’ noise, an event postulated as significant by him since it precipitated his “crash 
and burn” (B/L471). He mentions at the onset that he became “sensitive” to the neighbours’ 
“noise”. Elsewhere, he explains he has become sensitive to noise in general, which could 
 
15 The other type of anxiety, anxiety proper, will be scrutinised more closely further down in relation to other 
examples, where instead of being a confrontation with the void, objects appear therein.  
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indicate an association to the event with his neighbours’. He describes in the following a 
moment in the “canteen” where there are “so many different conversations going on”:  
 
I’m just so sensitive and canny concentrate in one conversation ‘cus I’m - it’s 
like I’m listening to other’s things. […] I wasn’t - never as sensitive to the - other 
people’s conversations. And the stress of that - so it just kinda drains the - the 
life, eh drains the - it’s like somebody sticking a big syringe in your brain and s-
sucking all the serotonin out (A/L292-299). 
 
There is an aspect of otherness here when Tom conveys he is “listening to other’s things”, 
repeated when he says “other people’s conversations”: it is not his own “things” but that of 
others he is sensitive to. This occurrence is linked to “somebody sticking a big syringe in 
your brain and s-sucking all the serotonin out” — giving the indication that the noise 
penetrates the inside-outside barrier as someone reaches in and steals/removes serotonin qua 
energy, which is further associated to life (“drains the – the life”). We could tentatively argue 
that “listening to other’s things” is further related to, beyond the neighbours’ noise, demands 
at work, insofar as his work involves a high level of noise in the form of other people 
“shouting commands”. Another indication of a link between the two is that the canteen 
experience involves “so many different conversations going on” (A/L243), whereas at his 
work Tom becomes “confused with too many - of two people that talking to me once” 
(B/L339). In relation to work, he relays the following: 
 
But if I went back there and it’s like, poof…eh, cardiac arrest, material, open the 
chest, bypass, ooooh a whole (sic) - everybody - that’s another thing - everybody 
getting high frustrates me now, people getting all excited and shouting and poof. 
That gets me. Before that was normal. People shouting commands, you know 
swearing ‘Where the fuck’s this? I need that, I need this, I need this, I need that’. 
Boom. (A/L614-624).  
 
The demands in this quote are stated in the form of necessary tasks to be performed, 
“material, open the chest, bypass”, in the event of a patient having a “cardiac arrest”. There 
are a number of factors appearing overwhelming about the demands. Firstly, they are 
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concerned with other people’s needs: “[people] swearing ‘Where the fuck’s this? I need that, 
I need this, I need this, I need that’”. It conveys a sense of being swept away by someone 
else’s needs as experienced through never-ending demands; being reduced to the Other’s 
need through concrete activities such as “material, open the chest, bypass”. Secondly, they 
materialise from “everybody”, meaning that they stem not from a specific, localisable place, 
but they become piled up by many people shouting simultaneously. Thirdly, these demands 
are attached to a high level of tension: people are “shouting”, “swearing”, “getting high”, 
“getting excited”. It seems to present a mix of what is normally associated with unpleasure, 
an aggressive quality through “swearing” and “shouting”, but also pleasure through “getting 
high” and “excited”. The demands therefore potentially blur the boundary between pleasure 
and unpleasure, which is the implication of experiencing what Lacan terms jouissance. Not 
only does it appear to question the boundary between pleasure and unpleasure but between 
self and other — also the implication of experiencing jouissance — as there may be a sense 
in which his own “adrenaline”, or tension, is reflected in others’ excitement. Indeed, Tom 
describes his work involving “all that adrenaline” (A/L550). His discourse moreover 
showcases how the body and the signifier share a similar structure insofar as the movement 
of demands reflects a movement of bodily tension. It is particularly in relation to the patients 
having cardiac arrest that there could be a blurring of limits, since Tom describes the 
following scenario: 
 
Well when you got a patient coming through the door, stabbed or - coming up 
through the [imperceptible] labs, cardiac arrest. And they go ‘a thump badoom 
badoom badoom’ (sic), doing CPR and we’re all waiting to take these people in 
and you know it’s drama crisis, isn’t it? It’s tshtshtsh (sic) fight and flight. ME’s 
fight and flight. So you put two of them together, it’s gonna burn me out (A/L558-
562). 
 
That Tom is “waiting to take these people in”, could potentially refer to a breaking of a 
boundary, where the beating of the patients’ hearts corresponds to his own “adrenaline” and 
the “fight” stage of ME. To “put two of them together” also implies a merging, perhaps of 
him and the patients, if reading the discourse structurally. This experience for Tom could 
then entail a presence of an otherness which is too close; he explains his work is “too much” 
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(A/L545), perhaps being “too much” involved in other’s demands/needs. What belongs to 
the patients’ bodies in terms of a rapidly beating heart also to a certain extent belongs to 
himself: a very embodiment of the failure of integrating himself into a symbolic structure 
which would allow to distinguish himself from others — the subject being the surplus of such 
a failed intersection as outlined above.  
 A blurring of the identity barrier can further be related to a sense of a lack of control 
for Tom, insofar as he describes his work as unpredictable, particularly in relation to the 
cardiac arrests of the patients as described above. However, a sense of not being in control is 
more noticeable in Tom’s discourse where he explains how he felt “uncomfortable” phoning 
the police for help (for the neighbours’ noise): “’Cus I would usually deal with that situation 
myself” (B/L429-431). Something similar may be the case for Amy when referring to the 
“closed wheel” in relation to work/fatigue: it represents a movement in which she is not fully 
included since it is “closed”, perhaps closed to her influence, which might have been 
reinforced trough the “enforced” vaccination as an experience of an imposition of otherness. 
Indeed, when Amy talks about her work around the onset, she alludes to an aspect of 
helplessness: “there was young people and they were dying and there was nothing you could 
do” (B/L337-338). This foreign aspect of an out-of-control movement, something further 
consumed by one’s entire being in a continuous motion (the closed wheel being too close?), 
can be elucidated through Lacan’s notion of alienation.  
 Symbolic alienation, first and foremost, entails what was outlined above in terms of 
structural lack: that we cannot be One with our bodies or cultural representations. On the 
other hand, we are only able to have a socially meaningful existence and identity, and 
communicate and operate under shared, social rules, by incorporating certain words and 
images, which constitutes Lacan’s concept of imaginary alienation. The way in which an 
existence in the Other is alienating is due to its paradoxical nature. In order to be represented 
and possess a sense of self, one depends on something other than oneself, such as a reflective 
surface in the form of a mirror or another person’s gaze, or language itself — in other words, 
something external and foreign. Because the subject did not invent language, it is not his/her 
own, and it is further something in which s/he inevitably and uncontrollably becomes caught 
up as it precedes and exceeds the subject. Other people largely determine the subject’s 
identity whether s/he wants it or not by carving out a symbolic place, such as naming the 
child before its birth (Pluth, 2007: 55), and that name then comes to largely determine one’s 
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sense of identity. The paradox is that this externality becomes internalised, and is experienced 
as the most intimate part of oneself. This is illustrated through Lacan’s neologism 
‘extimité’/extimacy which constitutes a combination of the word exterior and intimacy: the 
basis of who you are is something you are not, something determined by social forces (and 
of course, in combination with biological ones). The price of having an identity is that the 
mirror image which establishes it through an inside-outside barrier, is but an illusion: the 
inside is always on the outside and vice versa. As a result and due to the mediation of 
discourse, imaginary alienation involves a separation of oneself from oneself (Boothby, 1991: 
45), meaning that life does not naturally originate from within, but is something one becomes 
caught up in (Schuster, 2016: 44). The subject is produced by language. Entering the 
symbolic order then — a process which is repeated throughout life due to the fact that identity 
always fails — may be more akin to a game of rope jumping between a group of people, 
where one tries to gracefully enter the moving ropes without getting hit by them, but ending 
up hit by them in any case.   
 The otherness involved in the process of alienation is not only inevitable, but crucial 
for identity formation, since the subject cannot define itself with itself; a highly circular and 
unsustainable process. That is, the subject and the Other cannot be one, but due to their 
dependency on one another — the subject cannot exist without the Other and the Other cannot 
be meaningful without subjects endorsing its existence — they also cannot be counted as two 
separate entities. For this reason, they are highly intertwined and linked, impossible to 
separate — a status applicable to the structure of the subject since it is, according to Lacan, 
‘neither one nor the other’ (Lacan, Seminar XI: 211). This structure can be compared to that 
of the mind-body relation insofar as the mind can be linked to the symbolic Other, and the 
body to the subject unable to be taken up therein. The mind and the body are neither one 
entity nor two separate entities, meaning that both dualistic and monistic perspectives are 
incorrect/partial ones (Moncayo, 2012: 33). In this way, Lacan’s account of alienation differs 
both from the common view of the term alienation, as a separation from oneself which can 
be amended by a reunion with the lost object — as if an authentic, complete subject exists 
— and from a Marxian perspective of alienation, where alienation is viewed as a result of a 
social structure where the subject is separated from the produced object as a commodity, 
which has an independent status from the subject. Instead, for Lacan, alienation is 
fundamental and unavoidable (Pluth, 2007: 88-89). We can say that the participants are not 
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suddenly alienated at the start of their conditions, but merely become confronted with the 
alienating nature of their lives; and one which is moreover a highly strengthened version due 
to encountering a demand in which the subject is reduced to a need, something we find in all 
of the participants’ discourses.  
 Beth’s discourse showcases such a realisation of alienation where the inside has 
become the outside. When she was in her last year of undergraduate studies, she explains the 
overwhelming experience it entails as it involves “demands on your time and your effort and 
stuff um, that I didn’t really feel like I’d chosen” (B/L410), and: 
 
… things like having time to relax or having time with your friends or having 
time to exercise or cook or um eat nutritional food, and stuff like that, gets put 
to the wayside. And at the time I was like oh that’s just what you do like, I 
need to get - I need to get, good grades, I need to pass, otherwise what’s the 
point of being here. Um but I think that looking back it was actually quite 
unhealthy to sacrifice your - your whole life in order to get your degree. Um. 
[5 second pause]. So being ill has forced me to act on my own needs first 
rather than anything else (B/L48-56). 
 
There is a confrontation with an existence (she says before this her studies were an “intense 
experience” in relation to “get[ting] into an existence”) at the core of her being, since it was 
her “whole life” she sacrificed, one which has now become foreign as she realises it is not 
something she chose. She was allegedly before this unquestionably following the demand of 
the Other (to go to university), but now comes to realise the aspect of otherness involved in 
this, and further mentions how “unhealthy” this was. She recognises she was wholly reduced 
to someone else’s demand (as a need), which constitutes a realisation of her alienation. 
Because alienation is about loss, an elimination as Lacan describes it, and one such loss is 
the inability for a stand-alone existence (Lacan, Seminar XI: 205), due to what was just 
outlined in terms of identity formation always necessarily involving something other than 
oneself. We witness a recognition of a dependency in the interviews, but further an intensified 
version of it insofar as one’s whole being is reduced to an object of productivity determined 
fully by someone else’s demand. The process of entering into the symbolic and the inevitable 
loss this entails is illustrated by Lacan by what he calls the vel of alienation through the 
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analogy of the highway man. ‘Vel’ is the Latin word for ‘or’, alluding to a choice between 
two scenarios, which the highwayman is confronted with when receiving the threatening 
choice of “your money or your life”. Money here represents the subject, who disappears in 
both situations. If one chooses money, one will lose both; if one chooses life, one will have 
a life without money, or, a ‘life deprived of freedom’ (Lacan, Seminar XI: 212), which is not 
much of a life. Thus, some kind of “sacrifice” mentioned by Beth is necessary and 
unavoidable — although certainly not one’s whole life — even though she alludes to in a 
way to having overcome this by “act[ing] on my own need first”. We will indeed see as this 
thesis progresses how fatigue could be a way of saying no to the otherness of alienation. 
 The aspect of the inside becoming the outside discernible in Beth’s account, the 
extimacy of the subject, is also aptly depicted in Gail’s discourse and more explicitly so than 
in the other accounts, when she proclaims: 
 
That anaesthetics dulled me for a whole, four weeks I think. Everything became 
exterior to my internal self. It was like I was out there watching me. It - it was 
very scary (A/L311-313).  
 
We observe how the inside is almost literally experienced on the outside, consequently 
blurring the distinction between inside-outside — something experienced as “scary”. The 
experience of ‘the Other of the Other does not exist’ is important here, which could be alluded 
to in Gail’s discourse; that no one else is watching but her, that you cannot see things from 
other people’s perspectives. In her second interview, when I asked her what it was like to be 
put to sleep by anaesthetics, she again alludes to something similar as an “outer body 
experience”. But she first of all replies: “It’s like…waking up”. Waking up and the related 
outer body experience is further associated to a moment of numbing, something also 
observed above through the word “dulled”. Evoked here is arguably a sense of having lost 
oneself, yet not completely: “You’re here but you’re not here”, “You’ve lost consciousness 
of, the present. But you are still conscious”. This comprises the very structure of alienation 
as an appearance of a disappearance (an inclusion of an exclusion). We could thus 
reformulate her experience as constituting a waking up to her alienation — akin to the other 
participants — as she becomes conscious of her own disappearance (behind the Other’s 
signifiers). 
 
 
81 
 These aspects of reduction, inescapability, and foreignness have so far been explored 
in relation to the demand to ‘keep going’, which demands something specific and concrete 
of the subject (going to university, working x amount of hours, receiving CBT etc.), 
constituting a reduction to a need through a removal of lack (subjectivity and desire). 
However, there is additionally for the participants an encounter with demands which are less 
understood. 
 
Contradictory Demands: ‘Keep going’ Versus ‘Slow Down’ 
 
Within the interviews, we find alongside and contrary to the imperative to ‘keep going’ — 
which asks for perpetual presence through motion/activity — the imperative to ‘slow down’: 
to take a break and to unwind. The imperative to ‘slow down’ is reflected culturally in the 
increase of popular movements such as yoga and meditation, and more generally in the 
importance of the idea of ‘taking time for yourself’. The two commandments appear to follow 
a mind/body divide whereby the body is asked to constantly perform through the ‘keep going’ 
motto, to ‘do without thinking’, and the mind is seemingly linked with a moment of stopping 
and making time for reflection, processing and understanding. In the light of this, the two 
demands together entail a contradiction experienced by the participants, with some saying it 
made their conditions worse; hence its significance in the formation of fatigue. I will outline 
in what follows how this moment comprises a confrontation with the Other’s lack, pertaining 
to a lack of answers regarding one’s existence and what to do with one’s body.  
The two contradictory commandments are present more or less in everyone’s 
discourses, however more explicitly so in Brody’s discourse. Therein, the demand to ‘slow 
down’ is sometimes depicted as stemming from the medical setting and is contrasted to the 
imperative to ‘keep going’ as stemming from the general attitude of society/loved ones — a 
dichotomy likewise observed in some of the other participants’ interviews. Brody, who was 
36 years old at the time of our first interview, states that “there was no diagnosis to say ‘you 
need to slow down’. It was like ‘we don’t know so, sorry’” (B/L73-74). A diagnosis is thus 
strongly associated to the demand to slow down, with the demanding aspect of it being 
showcased through the words ‘need to’. However, for Brody, the contradiction is also found 
within the medical field, one between the psychologist and physiologist: 
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…. and I really struggled with pushing through, feeling the symptoms coming 
on, which is contrary to what the physio - the psychologist was saying. That if 
you feel the symptoms, stop. Have a rest. And the physio was saying… push 
yourself a little bit. Uh so it was contradictory and really [small laughter] 
unpleasant to bring on symptoms… (B/L38-42). 
 
Both demands are placed alongside each other here via the demand to “push yourself a little 
bit” which stems from the physiologist, versus the demand to “stop. Have a rest”, stemming 
from the psychologist. It presents an impossible situation as the two demands cannot be met 
simultaneously. Moreover, the demand to slow down for Brody is strongly tied to taking the 
time to understand (why one cannot keep going), insofar as he mentions that his sessions 
with the psychologist were “very useful” and “kinda made me understand how to - or how I 
needed to pace myself” (B/L29-30) — pacing constituting one of the main recommended 
treatments/strategies for ME/CFS where one attempts to become aware of one’s limits and 
adjust one’s level of activity accordingly, sometimes with the goal to increase it. Contrarily, 
the demand to ‘keep going’ ignores reflections of such a kind. When Brody says in the above 
excerpt it was “unpleasant to bring on symptoms” he is probably referring to following the 
demand to push through where “the symptoms [are] coming on”. However, we could also 
interpret the unpleasantness to refer to the contradiction itself since they come one after 
another, which is indeed strengthened in another place when talking about the “attitude” from 
the GP and his partner, to “get up and get on with it”: “…that’s contrary to everything else. 
All the other ME advice I’ve got. And I would say that that made me either worse or deeper 
into ME” (B/L183-186). Through the contradiction, the subject stumbles upon the Other’s 
lack in terms of there being no answer pertaining to what to do with the body, and on a bigger 
level, no answer to one’s identity. Nevertheless, beyond having a difficulty of being met with 
the two demands simultaneously, it is likewise the demand to slow down with which Brody 
struggles: “… when you are working when you’ve got a great bit of work, it’s really hard to 
down tools 45 minutes into it. Which - because that’s what the rules say” (B/275-277). The 
difficulty of meeting the demand to “down tools” could be due to experiencing it as yet 
another demand, which shines through when conveying: “because that’s what the rules say”. 
Indeed, the ambivalence regarding this commandment is discernible when he states earlier, 
in conjunction with describing how he wanted someone to tell him to slow down: “If I’ve 
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been told, simply told ‘you’re knackered. Slow down’ I would have done - [clears throat] 
probably would have done. No I would’ve done” (B/L75-78). Such an ambivalence could 
point to the divided unconscious/conscious subject in that he wants to meet the demand, but 
(unconsciously) this is difficult/undesirable, particularly if it entails a reduction to a need 
whereby subjectivity (in terms of subjective differences as respected by the factor of 
unknowability) disappears; for example, to take a break every 45 minutes, which is a specific 
requirement. In the light of this, when scrutinising the demand to ‘slow down’, we notice it 
also contains a reduction to a need in terms of pre-determinacy and concreteness (a reduction 
to numbers) akin to the demand to ‘keep going’.  
This is most clearly illustrated by Beth when speaking of her experiences at the ME 
clinic when she had to “count every single thing you do” (B/L111, 116-120). What can be 
inferred from Beth’s discourse here is that the activity of resting is highly regulated: it is pre-
determined since it is restricted to “certain types of rests” (“lying in silence” without having 
to “listen[ing] to the radio or watch[ing] TV or anything”) and has a time frame (has to be 
done every day). It can be interpreted that it is both the activity of lying in silence Beth finds 
“depressing”, but also the fact that she “must go and lie down in silence” — that it is 
commanded — since she claims what is boring is “knowing that you have to do that every 
day” (B/L119). We thus notice how what is supposed to be an absence and passivity, resting 
in the form of taking a break from life or conscious activities, becomes registered in numbers 
and specific activities and turns into a conscious activity, thus becoming a presence which 
removes absence and subjectivity, turning uncertainty into certainty. The subject is removed 
due to the aspect of reduction present therein as governed by the logic of universality and 
pre-determinacy: it is considered, in advance, that only a certain type of resting is beneficial 
for everyone — assuming to know what is ‘good’ for someone (and everyone), which 
dismisses subjective differences. In line with the aspect of reduction, during Personal 
Independence Payment interviews where it is determined whether or not someone suffering 
from fatigue/an illness is entitled to support money from the government, the inability to 
engage in specified, concrete activities is often taken to stand in for one’s whole condition. 
For example, the interviewers — as based on the experience of some of the participants — 
decide that being able to walk a certain distance signifies that one is not ill and entitled to 
money. It thus dismisses subjective differences and the complexity of human nature. That 
the demand to ‘slow down’ dismisses subjectivity in terms of idiosyncrasy is also showcased 
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by Amy when speaking of the general advice stemming from ME support groups, which is 
“don’t do any exercise”. Amy clarifies that for her, other activities such as “planning a meal, 
shopping” are things which make her condition worse (A/L135-140). This aligns the demand 
to ‘slow down’ with that of to ‘keep going’, and we can therefore conceptualise the former 
as a commandment to ‘keep slowing down’.  
Accordingly, the imperative to ‘slow down’ becomes yet another imperative for 
constant productivity/presence insofar as it is requested in order to increase productivity 
levels. This is suggested by Amy when stating the aim of Graded Exercise Therapy: “So I 
had to learn to stop doing things, before I could learn to do them again” (B/L78-79). Brody 
analogously relays that one should attempt to “get rid of all the variables of the stressors”, 
“And then try[ing] to add in things very slowly” (A/L383-386). The ultimate goal is to ‘get 
back to work’ and return to engaging in activities — the general societal attitude 
underpinning most short-term and cost-effective treatments. Not only that, but in 
contemporary society, sleeping/resting has been turned into a commodity as a means of 
increasing productivity levels. Thus, on the level of content, the demand to ‘keep going’ and 
to ‘slow down’ are incompatible: to exercise and to sit down (or rather, to not exercise) are 
opposite activities unable to be met concurrently. The ‘keep going’ side demands to indulge 
in life and activities and thereby asks to ignore/get rid of the need to sleep which is considered 
an inconvenience, while the ‘slow down’ side values sleep and resting, considering them 
worthwhile activities to engage in. However, on the level of structure, this contradiction 
dissolves insofar as they both demand presence and productivity, albeit through different 
activities. 
 Apart from both imperatives containing a reduction to a need and demanding 
productivity qua movement, what they further have in common is that they demand control: 
either get rid of the need to rest/sleep, or contain it within perfect limits — as if the body can, 
like a machine, turn on and off on demand. This type of thinking is omnipresent in today’s 
society, where a synthesis of the two imperatives is well portrayed through the popular saying 
‘keep calm and carry on’. The context of the emergence of this expression is telling of the 
general attitude of how one should engage in life. It was created as a poster by the British 
government in preparation for the Second World War in 1939, with the purpose of sending a 
motivational message to its British citizens. It strongly conveys the view of the human being 
in modern society: even if your life is at risk and could be potentially ended by a bomb 
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dropped at any moment, life must continue in the name of productivity. And in order for 
productivity to continue, a sense of calmness is necessary, which could be the ultimate aim 
fuelling the increase of yoga and meditation today. This echoes another robotic state: ‘don’t 
be (too) affected by life — or death — just do it’.  
 
The Accumulation of Demands 
 
Arguably, the above-mentioned experiences of contradictory yet not contradictory 
imperatives come to have some consequences for the subject. First of all, there is a 
strengthening of the realisation that life is inescapable; that demands are never-ending and it 
is life itself qua movement and productivity which is commanded. This leads to demands 
accumulating and becoming overwhelming. Secondly, given the fact that the contradiction is 
there and in combination with the demand for life, the content of the demand for life is highly 
unknown: it is not known what type of life is commanded. As a consequence, 
incomprehensible demands accumulate. Not only that, but there is a growing sense that, 
particularly as brought forth by the imperative for control, life eludes control. This leads to 
experiencing the demands as impossible.  
Tom’s discourse showcases these above-mentioned elements when he speaks about his 
work at the onset of his condition, where the overwhelming aspect of demands comes to the 
fore. What appears overwhelming is first of all a lack of understanding the demands, or 
“instruction” as he says, as part of performing a bypass (in the event of a patient having a 
cardiac arrest). In his discourse, there is a shift from having met demands (“I could take 
instruction from surgeon, anaesthetist, ODP, whatever, and I could do everything that they’re 
wanting”) to being unable to do so (“now I can’t do that”). The reason he attributes to this 
inability to meet demands is confusion due to “two people talking to me at once”, which 
marks the place of incomprehensibility, of either not having understood/heard demands due 
to their simultaneity — they all come at “once” — or referring to a confusion as to which 
demand to engage in first (and how) 16 . Because even if each demand is more or less 
understood and not contradictory, the simultaneity of demands creates confusion in one way 
or another, since it requires a balancing act on behalf of the subject in terms of having to 
understand what to prioritise. Accordingly, when Tom speaks in his first interview about 
 
16 We saw this above when Tom denotes that demands come from “everybody”: a non-localised location. 
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“running” around at his job, he mentions this inability to process what to prioritise: “Or you 
can’t eh cognitively take instruction like I used to take instruction from like five people at 
once. And process what’s the most important thing I need to do here” (A/L519-520). 
Nevertheless, it marks the place of an impossibility since one cannot either listen to or follow 
two or five people’s instructions “at once”. It becomes, for Tom, “too much” (B/L300), which 
is mentioned in conjunction with the overwhelming demands, all of which is seemingly 
related to anxiety: “Fuck. Everybody is just rushing. Wherever it is it’s just rushing. Creating 
stress. Anxiety” (B/282-283). This moment accordingly relates to Lacan’s notion of anxiety 
proper in terms of an overbearing presence, for Tom in the form of demands, which is helpful 
to bring in here. 
The commonsensical view of anxiety relates it to loss or absence — castration anxiety 
could be said to belong here, which was explored above in relation to privation. But for 
anxiety proper, that which could also be termed uncanny anxiety (L. Jonckheere, personal 
communication, 2018, August 28), Lacan instead emphasises an overwhelming presence 
where an object appears in the place of the void, constituting a lack of a lack17 (Salecl, 2004: 
31). In Seminar X about anxiety, Lacan elucidates what is anxiety-provoking about this 
situation through the fable of a man being confronted with a ‘gigantic’ praying mantis. The 
man is wearing a mask but is unaware of what type of mask he is wearing — the importance 
of which in confrontation with the praying mantis is of a life and death matter, considering a 
female praying mantis bites off the head of a male mantis and devours him after mating: ‘I 
couldn't see my own image in the enigmatic mirror of the insect's ocular globe’ (Ibid.: 6). 
This is nothing other than being confronted with the Other’s enigmatic and traumatic desire, 
as Lacan makes it clear. Someone who wants something, but one does not know what: ‘the 
anguishing I don't know what object I am’ (Ibid.: 325). In other words, one is addressed as 
an object by the Other, but knows not what kind of object. It comprises the moment of not 
having a mirror image, a lack of inside-outside boundaries, and an experience of being 
engulfed by an enigmatic presence. Lacan in this way comes to conceptualise anxiety as a 
 
17 Lucy’s discourse aptly illustrates both types of anxieties: castration anxiety is traceable in that which was 
delineated earlier in terms of a physical loss surrounding the operation, more specifically the ”cotton wool” 
which came out of her, while uncanny anxiety took place as a panic attack (which she terms “bizarre”), when 
she felt a sore throat coming on — something that was lost after the operation. Thus, it returning would 
constitute a lack of a lack where an object (in this case a sore throat) is present as opposed to missing. Also, she 
believes her condition, ME, is still there due to the loss of sore throats, as if it might be necessary to hold onto 
a loss. This is discussed more in chapter six. 
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presence of an absence. Further, Lacan repeats in Seminar X that anxiety is ‘not without 
object’, implying that it circulates around an undefinable object. We could all certainly relate 
to these aspects during a nightmare: there is a presence which should not be there, 
accompanied by an enigma. 
Something akin to this situation is traceable in Tom’s discourse and in many of the 
other participants’, but in general it does seem more prevalent for some rather than others at 
the onset of their conditions, where they are submerged by a large presence through the 
accumulation of demands. They are addressed as an object (of productivity) through 
demands, while being unable to make sense of them. Tom saying “I’m like poof” in relation 
to the overwhelming demands could allude to him disappearing — seeing as it is the noise 
one makes when indicating a disappearance — and thus could point to a lack of 
processing/symbolising his own position, with “poof” further amounting to a nonsensical, 
undefinable sound. The demands constitute an impossible presence bigger than himself, into 
which he becomes lost, which is further conveyed in the following excerpt: “I was a hundred 
miles an hour the way I was - well a hundred miles an hour: brbrb (sic), patient, anaesthetics, 
theatre, tssh (sic), out, up boom” (B/L273-275). What he “was” was an impossibility as one 
cannot go “a hundred miles an hour”, an extension of himself into several demands 
simultaneously (“patient, anaesthetics, theatre, tssh (sic), out, up boom”). Such a movement 
of an impossibility is analogous to Mark’s discourse as he speaks about his job at the onset 
of his condition. His manager told him “you need to have - you need to devote twenty percent 
of your time for every person you manage”, which, given the fact that he managed eleven 
people, meant “operating at 220 percent of your capacity” (B/L334-338). Not only should 
one operate with energy one does not have, but this demand is perceived to be ubiquitous 
since he straight thereafter says: “That’s before you start doing your job” (his emphasis). The 
movement perceived to be demanded is much bigger than himself, or in other words, 
constitutes an overwhelming impossibility akin to the presence of the praying mantis18. That 
this entails a suffocating presence — in line with a lack of a lack — is discernible when Mark 
says: “And…it’s - it’s - it’s an overwhelming almost suffocating feeling. It’s f - so 
 
18 Different factors are emphasised at the onset of their conditions: for Mark it seems to be a lack of limits 
involved in working, for Tom the inescapability and incomprehensibility of demands, and for Brody, 
unpredictability as will be seen shortly (all related to control). Apart from inescapability, we do not really see 
this in the others’ discourses, but more an emphasis on the Other’s lack of acknowledgment (desire) or lack of 
having met one’s needs/demands; however, the two are also present simultaneously. These differences between 
subjects are discussed in chapter six in relation to Lacan’s clinical structures. 
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frustrating” (A/L302). While this is relayed in relation to his condition, it could also be 
applied to the situation of work, since he right after mentions his life before he got ill where 
he was managing a team: “working nine hours a day” and then “socialising” (A/L304-305) 
— reflecting the act of demands piling up. Therefore, in line with what was outlined earlier 
in relation to anxiety, it is not that the ‘void closes up’ (the void qua object a as the failure of 
symbolisation), that it disappears completely, but that it closes up around the subject whereby 
s/he loses distance to it, it becoming a presence instead of an absence. This is illustrated in 
the fact that one does not understand the demands addressed to oneself and how to live one’s 
life; an experience of lack which comes to the fore around the onset of the participants’ 
conditions. The element of unknowability pertaining to the demands could further be 
discerned in the fact that they are unpredictable, and hence uncontrollable — an aspect 
brought forth particularly by Brody.  
Brody’s condition started with, according to himself, working long hours (he works 
within radio) where there “wasn’t much down-time really” (B/L145), and the breaking up of 
a relationship, specifically receiving an email from his partner when in India on holiday: “the 
content of the email just put me into shock and I was ‘poof’” (B/L108-109). The content of 
the email is unknown since Brody was unwilling to share it (it was not “appropriate” he said). 
Nonetheless, what can be suggested from his discourse is that the content of it is 
incomprehensible and came unexpectedly, since it entails an element of “shock”, as seen 
when he says “it was just out of the blue and description of horrible thing” (B113-114). This 
would constitute an encounter with enigmatic desire, something coming to the fore when he 
speaks about the demands of life: 
 
 … my body tenses up which takes energy or if you’re in the car and it’s a bit 
erratic the driving you know you sorta tense up, your body naturally tense up to 
protect yourself, which takes a huge amount of energy. And I’d be exhausted. So 
again, get rid of all the variables of the stressors of work and relationships and 
whatever, and eating well, that’s - establish that baseline seems very important. 
And then trying to add in things very slowly, but that’s not just how life really 
works. Um you know there’ll be work emails or whatever coming in or, other 
thing I needed to go to Linlithgow for, so I don’t feel like I got that ability to - to 
react (A/L381-388).  
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Being in a car with “erratic” movement could potentially be read as a metaphor, standing in 
for “all the variables of the stressors of work and relationships and whatever”, or in other 
words, demands as a movement one gets swept away by. Not only are they connected by 
their proximity in his discourse — indicating an association — but through the words 
“erratic” and “variables”, denoting an irregularity and an unpredictable motion. Indeed, this 
paragraph comes as he explains that he is trying to “see if that can be predictable” [the 
condition] (his emphasis) (A/L377-378). However, what is encountered is the unpredictable 
nature of demands: that despite trying to “establish that baseline” and “then trying to add in 
things very slowly” — a form of control through slowing down — there is a realisation that 
“that’s not just how life really works”. He comes up against the impossibility of life in the 
sense of not understanding how it works and what kind of life is demanded of him, but also, 
he comes up against the inescapability of demands. This can be seen when he says: “there’ll 
be work emails or whatever coming in” after having conveyed an attempt to control them. 
Indeed, the moving of demands qua signifiers, “work and relationships and whatever, and 
eating well”, signals a lack of understanding with regard to how to handle them, and maybe 
how to handle them in relation to one another. How does one balance a relationship, work 
and being healthy? It showcases the metonymy of the signifier without the point of stability, 
the imaginary point de capiton or the signified, and consequently the accumulated demands 
tip into an overwhelming confrontation with enigmatic desire. This forms an anxiety-
provoking moment in the face of an unbearable presence: there is a lack of space for an 
absence, a lack of a lack, in the sense that there is always something [email] “coming in”. It 
seems to echo the increase of tension occurring for Brody in the body, a heaviness of the 
body, possibly mimicking the unbearable heaviness of demands.  
In this way, Brody conveys something akin to the other participants: that it is not one 
specific activity which is demanded, but wok, relationships, eating healthy, and socialising 
are all part of the demand for productivity merging under the imperative to ‘keep going’. In 
other words, life itself becomes one huge chore, something recognised by Schuster (2016: 
32, 124) in relation to the emergence of lethargy. In acknowledging the alienating nature of 
culture, that it is something emerging from the outside and not naturally stemming from 
within, Schuster (2016: 124) eloquently identifies culture with the demand to live: ‘a stream 
of implicit and explicit commands to “Wake up!,” keep on living, working, producing, 
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consuming, copulating, loving, and enjoying’. Add to this the enigmatic factor of not 
knowing how to live one’s life, life itself becomes painful and unbearable, as seen by Brody 
in the above excerpt when conveying “that’s not just how life really works”. This can be 
compared to what Lacan describes as the pain of existence, or the unbearable heaviness of 
being19, which Lacan describes as a ‘pure feeling of existence’ (when speaking about a 
patient of his): ‘It was the sense of existing, as it were, in an indefinite way’, which he links 
to pain: ‘Existence was apprehended and felt by her to be something that, by its very nature, 
is extinguished only to re-emerge forever further on, and this was accompanied in her by 
intolerable pain’ (Lacan, Seminar VI: 90). It is thus lack, an exclusion, which comes to the 
fore (re-emerges) in an intolerable way, in its presence, as a presence of an absence. 
That life itself becomes the problem is attested to more clearly in Amy’s and Lucy’s 
discourses, when I ask them what made their conditions worse. Lucy responds: “Everything 
made it worse. Living made it worse. Just getting up made it worse” (L/132). And Amy 
states: 
 
It’s like you put a - as soon as I get out of bed in the morning and put a foot on 
the floor the shooting pain’s go up through my legs. And so you - you just go ‘oh 
here we go’. And so you just keep going because you have to (A/L248-250). 
 
It seems like waking up to life is the problem and not a definable, concrete activity (at least 
here). Further, the issue lies with the commandment to ‘wake up’/’to live’ as inherent in the 
imperative to ‘keep going’, since Amy says “And so you just keep going because you have 
to”.  
Arguably, however, both these types of demands as explored in this chapter — 
demands which include a need and demands which include enigmatic desire — are 
unbearable; each on their own but also in their combination. On the one hand, demands which 
reduce the subject to a specific, concrete place (a reduction to a need) has too much meaning, 
whereas incomprehensible demands (enigmatic desire) have too little meaning Both, 
therefore, lead to an encounter with radical lack and one’s alienation. All in all, we can say 
 
19 Or as Milan Kundera’s title suggests, this moment could likewise and conversely refer to the ‘unbearable 
lightness of being’ if we compare existence to an inability to be fixed and stable; a fleeting moment unable to 
be repeated; our own insignificance and lack of understanding. But in the face of accumulated demands, I 
believe a heaviness primarily better represents existence.  
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that the subject wakes up to his/her alienation, consequently experiencing life as a heavy, 
unbearable burden. 
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Chapter 4: The Unconscious Refusal of the Demand to ‘Keep 
Going’ 
 
What is a rebel? A man who says no: but whose refusal does not 
imply a renunciation. 
 
— Albert Camus 
 
While the previous chapter delineated demands encountered around/before the onset of the 
participants’ conditions, this chapter examines the response to these in the form of symptom 
formations. How a symptom is formed and in what context can shed light on the potential 
function(s) of a symptom. In the interviews, the encounter with the demand to ‘keep going’ 
is accompanied by bodily manifestations which causes the participants to engage less, or not 
at, all in (certain) activities. The emergence of bodily ailments suggests that that the response 
to the demand to be reduced to a machine-like object is enacted through the body as a way 
of saying ‘no’. At this stage — still focusing on the incipient phase of the condition — the 
participants do not present so much with the form of fatigue qua a diminishment of tension, 
but with a wide variety of tensions. We will see in what follows how this initial moment of 
the refusal could entail making space for one’s own desire in a moment of defence, and 
marking the presence/aliveness of one’s body. This chapter unfolds through a Freudian and 
Lacanian exploration of symptom and identity formation; identity and symptom being 
inextricable from such a perspective. This entails a focus on related concepts such as anorexia 
as a refusal of the Other’s demand, and the (death) drive, which explains the various bodily 
forms acquired at this stage. These notions come under Lacan’s more overarching concept 
of separation, which aptly elucidates the structure of the discourses, insofar as separation 
constitutes a defence against alienation through the creation of a space, a distance, into which 
the subject can emerge and take up a singular position. 
 
Symptom Formation: The Body as the Place of Protest 
 
When exploring the participants' descriptions of various bodily manifestations emerging at 
the start of their conditions, what is noticeable is that they appear in conjunction with the 
demand to ‘keep going’, that they take on numerous forms, and that they lead to fatigue and 
less engagement in activities. I will firstly scrutinise Brody’s discourse in relation to this. 
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Brody accords pain a prominent role at the onset of his condition, and his discourse suggests 
that the formation of pain appears as an unconscious protest against the demand to ‘keep 
going’. This can be inferred from the following excerpt where he explains how he received 
no help from either the GP or anyone around him (including his now ex-partner):  
 
…that partner and a couple of other people was like ‘you just have to grin and 
bear it, get on with it’. So I did, so whenever we were socialising or working I’d 
have incredible pain like… up and - you know eight out of ten if - yeah - like 
ridiculous pain. But there was no other answer, I couldn’t lie in bed all day ‘cus 
I needed to work. It wasn’t socially acceptable and [deep breath], I have to live 
my life. So I’d have ridiculous pain down my legs and arms and um, base of my 
neck, um. And you just had to get on with it, and I lived a - in spite of that lived 
a relatively normal life I suppose (A/L331-336). 
 
The imperative for perpetual movement, appearing under the overarching demand to ‘keep 
going’, is clear when he says “you have to grin and bear it, get on with it”, not just in relation 
to work but socialising, and that “I have to live my life”. That the body unconsciously refuses 
this demand can be observed through the emergence of pain, insofar as pain leads to fatigue 
and causes him to engage less in work and socialising (not altogether stopping them; if 
anything, Brody seems to engage less in socialising than working). But we have to be careful 
here and not suggest that pain has the hidden meaning of ‘saying no’ –– as if the unconscious 
is the place of the true and actual intention of a person (someone who refuses) –– but that it 
stems from an impossibility, a failure of symbolisation.  
Prior to the outlined excerpt, Brody describes the events and experiences surrounding 
the onset of his condition: he was going through a break up, received shocking news, 
experienced a “huge amount of emotional stress” (A/L323), and subsequently did not get any 
help from those around him or the GP due to the idea to ‘get on with it’. Being met with the 
demand to ‘keep going’ presents an unsymbolised situation for Brody in the sense that his 
current state, inclusive of shock and stress as he mentions, is incompatible with the idea of 
someone who keeps going, is fine, energetic and positive –– terms all implied in the statement 
‘grin and bear it’. As if one can switch off like a machine. Something was not processed or 
symbolised, attested to when he conveys “there was no other answer”. That there was no 
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other answer implies, on the other hand, that the answer was pain, albeit as a last resort, a 
‘forced’ solution. This is indeed how all symptoms start, as a failure of having symbolised 
one’s situation, which leads to the emergence of a surplus which the subject then tries to 
express and meaningfully integrate into his/her sense of identity— something that Freud 
explains in his account of symptom formation. 
According to Freud, a psychoneurotic symptom20 arises due to a psychical conflict: an 
idea accompanied by an excitation/affect (an ‘unsatisfied libidinal force’) comes into conflict 
with the ego as it is incompatible with its moral strivings, the way in which it wants to be 
seen. In order to defend against this contradiction, the ego attempts to diminish the idea and 
affect by separating the two: the idea becomes repressed or detached from a(n) (conscious) 
associative network, while the affect or ‘sum of excitation’ (Freud, SE XVI: 359) gets ‘put 
to another use’ — it needing to be used in some way — by transforming it into something 
tolerable for the ego (Freud, SE III: 49). The detached/repressed idea thereafter forms 
connections with other repressed ideas and becomes part of a different network which makes 
up the unconscious, while the libido/affect transfers its energy to the unconscious where it 
undergoes condensation and/or displacement and becomes a substitute satisfaction by having 
inhibited satisfaction in reality (Freud, SE XVI: 359). This part is the same as for dreams: the 
preconscious censor finds an alternative way of satisfying the libido, while simultaneously 
finding a means of expressing the symptom/dream in an acceptable way for the ego (Ibid.: 
359-360). However, the difference between a dream and a symptom, according to Freud, is 
that the sleeping person is more tolerant towards ideas in dreams due to being asleep, whereas 
in relation to a symptom, the consciousness/ego shouts out ‘sharply ‘No! on the contrary!’ to 
the unconscious wishful impulse’ (Ibid.: 360). This means there are two oppositional forces 
in the form of an anti-cathexis involved in the formation of a symptom: 
 
Thus the symptom emerges as a many-times-distorted derivative of the 
unconscious libidinal wish-fulfilment, an ingeniously chosen piece of ambiguity 
with two meanings in complete mutual contradiction (Ibid.: 360). 
 
20 A psychoneurotic symptom is thought to belong to the clinical structure of neurosis from a Freudian-Lacanian 
perspective. I discuss the three clinical structures (neurosis, psychosis, perversion) in relation to the structures 
of the interviews in chapter seven. However, it is to be noted now that I operate from the standpoint that the 
structures are capable of being fluid (simultaneously existing) for one person. I merely link the theory most able 
to elucidate the structure of the interviewee’s discourses (which happens to belong mainly to the theory of the 
neuroses). 
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In the context of Brody’s interview, the act of fighting against an impulse is traceable when 
stating it was not “socially acceptable” to “lie in bed all day” and not work (something present 
in everyone’s interviews) — the impulse being just that — probably stemming from a wish 
on behalf of the ego not to be considered lazy in the eyes of society. There is a pull in two 
opposite directions, which could be depicted through attempting to meet the demand (“So I 
did”), while refusing (through “pain”). This is attested to when he says: “‘you just have to 
grin and bear it, get on with it’. So I did, so whenever we were socialising or working I’d 
have incredible pain”. The word “so” in the statement followed by the expression of the 
emergence of pain links the ideas of the sentences together and implies a consequence of 
what came before, a refusal of the idea to ‘keep going’. We could say that the incompatibility 
between the idea ‘everything is fine’ and his current state, leads to an unconscious protest 
against the sociocultural idea to ‘keep going’.  
However, pain could simultaneously act not only as a refusal, but as a resistance 
against the impulse to not keep going; saying ‘no’ to the symptom, which would constitute a 
refusal of the refusal. This would turn pain into a means of meeting the demand to ‘keep 
going’. Because a similar structure repeats itself when he mentions, and in relation to the 
demand to live life/keep going: “I have to live my life. So I’d have ridiculous pain down my 
legs and arms and um, base of my neck, um”. This suggests, together with the sentence “in 
spite of that I lived a relatively normal life I suppose” — if temporarily suspending the 
content of the meaning “in spite of” — that pain is not only a stand-in for a refusal to live 
life, but a solution to living his life, with the emphasis being on his life. It follows Freud’s 
idea that a symptom offers a solution through a ‘flight into illness’ (Freud, SE XVI: 382). 
Pain would perhaps offer a more acceptable form than fatigue as a form of (partly) 
withdrawing from society, potentially following a belief that it better represents the biological 
body. We have here what Freud expresses as ‘an ingeniously chosen piece of ambiguity with 
two meanings in complete mutual contradiction’. The mutual contradiction is that pain is a 
means through which one simultaneously refuses to live one’s life and is able to live one’s 
life. It is the depiction of two forces coming together concurrently, amounting to a 
condensation in the body through what Freud terms a conversion symptom21. The body then 
 
21 This is by Freud linked to the clinical category of hysteria, whereas in obsessional neurosis/phobia as a 
distinct category (while also, like hysteria, belonging to the overarching structure of psychoneurosis), an idea 
stands in for the original incompatible idea/impulse as opposed to the body, constituting a displacement (Freud, 
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stands in for these contradictory ideas (to keep going and to not keep going). Or put 
differently, there is an inability to have reconciled these two ideas: an impossibility which 
acquires expression in the body. This follows both a Freudian and Lacanian perspective on 
the unconscious, which is helpful to clarify. 
As stated above, it would be easy to (mis)read the unconscious, which is commonly 
done, as the site at which the ‘deeper’ message hides, the ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ version of a 
person which is tucked under one or a few surface layers. This follows the belief that once 
we remove those layers, the real message can be revealed as a desire for stopping and a 
refusal, as the true intention of the person. Or in an almost opposite way, the unconscious is 
commonly referred to as the ‘subconscious’, thereby implying that the subconscious is a kind 
of substratum to consciousness and thus secondary and less significant. This word indeed 
reflects the general unacceptability of the unconscious in today’s society since there is a 
tendency to override lack with knowledge. The omnipresent endorsement of the ancient 
Greek aphorism to ‘Know thyself!’ means we believe to be in control of and self-aware of 
all our actions (and if we do admit an unconscious element, we only admit it in relation to 
small decisions such as subliminal messages influencing our choice of drink with a meal). 
However, both these conceptions outlined above are wrong from a Freudian and a Lacanian 
perspective. The former view of the unconscious as a ‘hidden site’ is more heavily attributed 
to a (mis)reading of Freud, since Freud depicts the unconscious as ‘another scene’ where 
thinking is always elsewhere in relation to consciousness. The unconscious is not an 
independent entity but an ‘inconsistency of consciousness, its internal skew and division’ 
(Schuster, 2016: 33). This is in line with Lacan’s notion of their relation, which is not so 
much a case of chronology or, as mentioned, separate entities, as in there is first a subject (a 
perpetually working/moving person) which is then refused in the unconscious. But the 
subject is the division between consciousness and unconsciousness, the very split itself. 
Lacan elaborates on this in seminar XI where he outlines that the unconscious is where the 
subject is subjected to an ‘irreducible, traumatic, non-meaning’ (Lacan, Seminar XI: 251).  
Returning to Brody’s discourse, what the symptom of pain more specifically allows 
is to live one’s own life, as Brody proclaims “I have to life my life”, as opposed to living 
 
SE XIV: 155-156). Within the Lacanian field, a conversion symptom is likewise commonly associated with 
hysteria; however, for now a discussion on the clinical structures is left aside until chapter seven, and I take the 
stance, following Bruce Fink (1999: 115), that a conversion symptom is capable of belonging to any clinical 
structure. 
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someone else’s, or being too close to other people’s desires/needs inherent in meeting the 
demand to ‘keep going’. This aspect is observed in all of the participants' interviews as they 
allude at the onset to the experience of otherness in following someone else’s commandment 
and the subsequent relief through the illness of having ‘more time for myself’. It suggests 
that one of the functions of the symptom formation is to separate from the proximity of the 
Other and others with their suffocating demands, in order to create one’s own identity, 
through the use of the body. This can be inferred when exploring the refusal in a slightly 
different context, and can be better understood by bringing in Lacan’s notion of anorexia as 
a refusal of the Other’s demand. 
 
Anorexia: ‘Doing Nothing’ as a Refusal of the Demand to ‘Keep Going’ 
 
The unconscious refusal of the demand to ‘keep going’ enacted through the body can further 
be detected in the interviews after having been in contact with medical practitioners. We 
notice here an incredibly common situation to all of the participants which was expounded 
in the previous chapter: they go to the GP, who tell them, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
‘there’s nothing wrong with you’. This statement reinforces the demand to ‘keep going’ 
because in the face of a lack of a biomedical marker, there is no excuse to stop. It is after this 
encounter that the participants mention their conditions worsen and bodily tensions appear 
(leading to fatigue), which points to the significance of it, indicating that the body is used as 
a refusal of the demand to ‘keep going’. Amy for instance conveys the following after having 
seen the GP about her symptoms:  
 
And so - you do, you go away and you think ‘right ok. They’ve said there’s 
nothing wrong with me. I’ll keep going’. But then, I was vomiting after I was 
eating my tea at night. And I’m like [breathes out], there’s something else 
not…something not right (B/L476-483). 
 
I explained in the previous chapter how this excerpt and the sentence “there’s nothing wrong 
with me” constitutes a lack of a lack as it comprises a full answer preventing further 
speculations and possibilities regarding the subject’s condition. This is reminiscent of too 
much presence — particularly if considered in conjunction with the demands to ‘keep going’ 
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— which Lacan explains is the conditions under which anorexia emerges. Anorexia arises, 
he writes, when the Other stuffs the subject ‘with the smothering baby food it does have’ 
instead of ‘what it does not have’ (Lacan, 2002/2006: 524). In comparison, instead of 
allowing a space for lack which would fuel investigations, the Other, by pronouncing ‘there’s 
nothing wrong with you’, stuffs the subject with an imaginary-symbolic meaning, one which 
kills off lack as the point of uncertainty (and other possible significations). This leads to a 
fullness in which the subject does not participate since the subject is the place of non-meaning 
and lack. We can say that the emergence of a bodily tension here (vomiting) is a way of 
introducing absence — or lack in proper Lacanian terms — in the face of fullness. This is 
arguably enacted by refusing the demand to ‘keep going’ and embodying the notion of 
‘nothing’. Amy, through vomiting, expels the meaning the Other imposed on her, refuses it, 
in order to make space for a void and otherness insofar as she says “there’s something else 
not…”. That is, she does not say what is wrong but merely that something is wrong, which 
constitutes a point of indeterminability. The body marks its impossibility to be taken up into 
a symbolic-imaginary position, unconsciously pronouncing that something is wrong, thereby 
carving out a void. 
However, it should again be noted here that this does not translate to the ‘true’ or 
‘authentic’ desire of the subject, but there is a simultaneous pulling of two forces. The 
statement “I’ll keep going” in conjunction with bodily tensions seen for all of the participants 
reveal the conscious/unconscious split of the subject which is that of the mind-body divide. 
Consciousness is exposed in that to one’s knowledge, one is merely following the demand to 
‘keep going’, but the flipside reveals a refusal inscribed in the body as that which does not 
keep going. Lacan’s intricate relation between consciousness and the unconscious as depicted 
through the Möbius strip can be helpful in deepening our understanding. The Möbius strip 
does not consist of two separate sides, but a single surface with a separation from a void 
(Greenshields, 2017: 56). In other words, consciousness and the unconscious have the same 
relation as the mind-body: neither one entity as they cannot be united, nor two entities since 
that would imply too much of a separation. Rather, they are in opposition to each other while 
being highly intertwined, containing the impossibility of saying what belongs to what. 
Because while the unconscious body can be seen as that which protests against the demand 
of “I’ll keep going” (as that which does not keep going), we also find that something does 
keep going, which is precisely the physical body in the form of various tensions. This blurs 
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the distinction between the two as it is something which reveals and hides at the same time. 
Nevertheless, let us look closer at the refusal as that which does not keep going through 
Lacan’s concept of anorexia. Lacan writes about anorexia: 
 
It is the child who is most lovingly fed who refuses food and employs his refusal 
as if it were a desire (anorexia nervosa)… Ultimately, by refusing to satisfy the 
mother’s demand, isn’t the child requiring the mother to have a desire outside of 
him, because that is the pathway toward desire that he lacks? (Lacan, 2002/2006: 
524). 
 
Lacan is not referring to anorexia as literally not eating, but he is approaching it from the 
viewpoint of the symbolic, as entailing a symbolic refusal to be suffocated by someone else’s 
desire (through a demand); the start of separation. Subject formation for Lacan includes, in 
addition to alienation, separation as a logical moment. Separation is part of the process of 
socialisation whereby one comes to occupy a place in society, and more specifically, enables 
one to become alienated in fundamentally different ways (Fink, 1999: 162). This includes 
the ability to take up a singular place and not become completely lost in other people’s 
meanings — because if alienation was the full story, we would be wholly determined by 
others in a machine-like manner. Separation, se parer in French, equivocally refers both to 
dressing oneself, to be ‘put into the world’, and to defending oneself, as Lacan (Seminar XI: 
214) points out. More exact, separation is a defence against alienation, against the Other as a 
governing body of authority and/or language, in a moment of giving birth to oneself through 
taking up a position in relation to it.  
In relation to anorexia, Lacan invokes the mother who lovingly feeds the child, which 
means she bombards the child with demands, demands formed through her own ideas about 
the child’s needs, as Lacan mentions (2002/2006 524). In this way, should satisfaction 
through following a demand be obtained — leading to being reduced to an object of the 
mOther’s desire — the subject(’s desire) disappears (Lacan, Seminar VIII: 201). A bodily 
manifestation in conjunction with having mentioned the demand suggests a refusal to 
incorporate the Other’s ideas inherent to the demand(s) in an attempt to create a path for 
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one’s own desire as separate from the mOther’s22. The refusal here is thus not a desire in and 
of itself, which Lacan makes clear when stating ‘that [lack] is the pathway toward desire that 
he lacks’, but it carves out object a as the void in order to allow desire to emerge, which 
would make it equivalent to the object cause of desire, or rather allowing this to materialise. 
In this respect, Lacan clearly specifies that anorexia is not about a negation of an activity, not 
eating, but about ‘eating nothing’, where the subject savours an absence ‘vis-á-vis what he 
has facing him, namely the mother on whom he depends’ (Lacan, SIV: 211). To ‘eat nothing’ 
is to make room for a nothingness qua lack in order to introduce distance between oneself 
and the Other/other. Lacan thereafter claims about this ‘eating nothing’: ‘If you do not 
understand that, you can understand nothing not only of anorexia, but also of other symptoms, 
and you will make the greatest errors’ (Ibid.). We can therefore go beyond conceptualising 
anorexia as tied to the literal activity of not eating or certain surface conditions and view it 
as part and parcel of symptom formation, because the condition for the subject to emerge is 
the bringing forth of a void necessary for desire23. We can say that a refusal is the minimal 
sign of subjectivity insofar as it constitutes a refusal to be part of the symbolic order, 
following Hoens' (2018: 176) take on the Lacanian subject: ‘yet the notation that presents the 
subject most adequately, is a plain and simple ‘no’ (to the symbolic order)’.  
In line with ‘eating nothing’, I argue that the fatigued subject is refusing the Other’s 
demand by ‘doing nothing’— something pronounced by all of the participants — as an 
attempt to introduce distance from the Other and create a void therein through which one can 
emerge. Indeed, this ‘eating nothing’ is evident in Amy’s account if following the structural 
order of her discourse: the mentioning of eating her tea precedes the pronouncement 
“something else not” pertaining to uncertainty (lack). Thus, putting the two together would 
amount to eating lack. We find this in other accounts, for example in Gail’s when she 
describes the inactivity tied to fatigue, that there was: “No eating. Nothing” (C/L274). 
Accordingly, if the Other asks for the subject’s constant energy under the imperative to ‘keep 
going’, a way of creating a desire outside the Other’s would be to not give it, to withhold 
 
22 Modern society is very good at telling us what we are and should be and do: ‘you are what you eat!’, ’Be 
Happy!’, ‘Keep going!’, ‘Enjoy!’ — and in an era where technology aids to strengthen the experience that the 
Other is always present, particularly via never-ending demands through our phones/gadgets. 
23 Perhaps here Lacan is referring to neurotic symptoms since strictly speaking there are no ‘symptoms’ in 
psychosis insofar as repression is non-operative therein, and desire is absent. However, all subjects regardless 
of structure deal with the proximity of the Other in one way or another, and the three clinical categories could 
be viewed as three various defences (refusals) of the Other. 
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energy. Not only does one simply engage in not-doing, but one ‘does nothing’: engages in 
the activity of ‘doing nothing’ in order to carve out, through the body, a void. In this way, 
considering there is an increase of tension in relation to the demand to ‘keep going’ (vomiting 
and pain as explored so far), we can postulate that the subject, through ‘doing nothing’, 
hoards energy instead of producing it for the Other. And perhaps by hoarding it, it 
accumulates and turns into a tension. Or put differently, energy is produced by the subject 
but not expelled, transforming it into an overwhelming tension, and one which is furthermore 
unsymbolised as it signals a void.  
A loss of energy here does not take the form of what we normally associate with fatigue, 
an ‘impoverished tension’, the way in which Freud (SE III: 114, 144) describes it, particularly 
as he conceptualises it under the rubric of ‘neurasthenia’ part of the actual neurosis. On the 
other hand, the similarities of the participants’ accounts to what Freud theorises under the 
term ‘anxiety neurosis’ — the other sub-category of the actual neuroses — is striking. 
Anxiety neurosis is thought by Freud to constitute an ‘accumulation of excitation’ which has 
not been mentally processed, in line with an unsymbolised tension. It is thus worthwhile to 
briefly explore Freud’s theory on the actual neurosis since it will add to the discussion of the 
function(s) and form of fatigue, including its possible link with the biological body.  
 
Freud’s Actual Neurosis and the Mind-Body Relation 
 
Freud first developed the theory of the actual neuroses early on in his work in the 1890’s, 
being preoccupied with it specifically in 1893 and 1894. Some of the symptoms which Freud 
links with anxiety neurosis come close to the descriptions of the participants of this study, 
such as an oversensitivity to noise, digestion problems in the form of vomiting or diarrhoea, 
paraesthesias (sensations of tingling in your body) (Freud, SE III: 92-98), and pain (Ibid.: 
114). Oversensitivity was seen for Tom in the previous chapter, and is something that many 
of the participants mention; pain was relevant for Brody — and we will see further on how 
this is relevant for everyone — vomiting was observed for Amy above, and is further, in 
conjunction with diarrhoea, the first symptoms Mark mention (after tiredness) emerged at 
the onset (A/L10-12). And lastly, one of the first and predominant symptoms Amy mentions, 
in line with Freud’s list, is tingling (B/L25-26). These symptoms are all linked to each other 
according to Freud — more so than symptoms part of neurasthenia (Ibid.: 114-115). What 
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the symptoms more precisely appear to have in common is that they constitute a tension 
which is too much (such as oversensitivity), and an attempt by the subject to expel the 
tensions (digestion problems through vomiting and diarrhoea). This is in line with Freud’s 
main thesis about what occurs in anxiety neurosis, that there is an ‘accumulation of 
excitation’ (Ibid.: 114) taking place in the body which fails to be symbolised, and for this 
reason, it transforms into anxiety. Anxiety here can take on various forms, but what would 
be relevant for this stage of fatigue — since anxiety in its pure form is not so much mentioned 
— is what Freud terms ‘anxiety equivalents’. An anxiety equivalent is where another bodily 
sensation has taken the place of anxiety (Freud, SE III: 91-94). The same process according 
to Freud takes place in hysteria through a conversion symptom, which belongs to the 
overarching category of the psychoneuroses. In hysteria, however, there is an accumulation 
of tension stemming from a ‘psychical insufficiency’ (Ibid.: 115), a failure of symbolisation. 
Instead of being worked over mentally, the tension is directed to the body where it transforms 
into a tension. This is what I argued above could be traced in Brody’s and Amy’s discourse 
in the sense that that their situations are not symbolised, resulting in a surplus of tension. 
However, Freud distinguishes between hysteria and anxiety neurosis on the basis of one 
important factor: that a conversion symptom has been provoked by a psychical conflict, 
whereas the origin of an actual neurotic symptom is ‘purely somatic’ (Freud, SE III: 115). 
The symptoms part of actual neurosis are thought to have no link to symbolic material since 
they are not, in contradistinction to psychoneurotic symptoms, a substitute for an idea deemed 
unbearable to bring to consciousness, and for this reason they present no solution. In other 
words, the symptoms are not formations of the unconscious since there is no repression of 
symbolic material involved here. Freud more precisely thought the tension was a result of an 
excitation worked up during sex but which was insufficiently dispelled, through for example 
coitus interruptus. Thus, what was explored surrounding Brody’s (and Amy’s) discourse does 
not match a symptom part of actual neurosis, since I argued that the structure of a conversion 
symptom could be outlined in the former, where the idea of a refusal is repressed. Another 
reason for this is that the participants are met with an idea, as opposed to engaging in a purely 
somatic activity, which points to a conflict pertaining to symbolism. This also differs from 
one of the leading clinicians and theorists within the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Paul 
Verhaeghe’s (2004) argument in relation to chronic fatigue — and other accounts in which 
Freud’s theory of actual neurosis is utilised as a way of viewing modern symptoms as direct 
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encounters with the real, for example De Rick (2002) and Loose’s (2002) theory of modern 
addiction. 
Verhaeghe (2004: 308) postulates that chronic fatigue ‘in all probability’ belongs to 
the group of anxiety equivalents, as well as is part of what he coins ‘actualpathology’. His 
concept of actualpathology subsumes Freud’s outlined view and combines it with Lacanian 
theory as well as attachment theory, mainly that developed by Peter Fonagy. He, akin to 
Freud, places symptoms here which have no symbolism, and in more Lacanian terms, where 
an ‘original’ bodily tension as he calls it has not been processed through the imaginary-
symbolic order, and thus is not a defence against the real. In this way, a symptom part of 
actualpathology constitutes an unmediated, direct encounter with the real and has no links to 
mental factors. However, a complete lack of symbolic material does not have to be the case, 
insofar as he claims that in actualpathology — probably particularly when linked to neurosis 
which he deems a possibility — there is either little or no symbolism involved — that the 
symptom has not at all undergone processing through the symbolic-imaginary axis (Ibid.: 
289) — or there is a ‘minimal inscription of the somatic in the Symbolico-Imaginary order’ 
(Ibid.: 309). Verhaeghe could be said to view a refusal as containing minimal symbolism, 
insofar as he links anorexia proper with the position of actualpathology, which is ‘semi-
independent’ of the sociocultural discourse. The subject here refuses to identify with the 
Other’s images, and the focus is on the act of separating in order to gain one’s own position. 
This would differ from anorexia as part of psychopathology — linked with hysteria within 
psychoneurosis — where the subject is dependent on the gaze of the Other and desires to 
identify with the Other’s images (Ibid.: 231-232). So far in the thesis, there could be an 
indication of both of these, since the bodily symptom, I argued, could be recognised to 
contain a refusal of the sociocultural idea to ‘keep going’, but also an attempt to meet it, it 
then suggesting there is a desire to do so. However, more comparisons are needed with other 
aspects of fatigue in order to situate them in relation to the theory of actualpathology, which 
I will make as I continue to analyse the participants’ discourses throughout this thesis. 
Nevertheless, while Verhaeghe (2004: 308) distinguishes between actualpathology and 
psychopathology and claims it is crucial to tell the two apart — thus postulating they can and 
do occur apart from each other — Freud arguably views them as more linked than separated.  
The link between actual neurosis and psychoneurosis is attested to in the structure 
and development of Freud’s work: that he came to develop his theory of actual neurosis early 
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on where he dedicated a few essays to it, whereas later on in his work when mentioning it, it 
no longer received individual papers and was not mentioned independently from 
psychoneurosis. Additionally, while Freud stated that ‘neurasthenia and anxiety neuroses are 
easily found in pure forms as well, especially in young people’ (SE II: 259), he did not go 
further into this or provide any examples24. Some of his published case studies he had 
investigated mainly from the viewpoint of hysteria, such as Anna O, Emmy von N, Miss 
Lucy R and Elisabeth von R, whose pathologies he suspected had a basis in the actual 
neuroses. Although some of these, such as Anna O, had never been considered from the 
perspective of actual neurosis (Ibid.). The actual neuroses is thus considered the foundation 
of the psychoneuroses such as hysteria (most commonly) and obsessional neurosis — the 
two subcategories of psychoneurosis. For instance, in hysteria, where symptoms are 
substitutes for fantasies or memories, Freud argues that the pain linked to these ‘was also at 
one time a real one and it was then a direct sexual-toxic symptom, the somatic expression of 
a libidinal excitation’ (Freud XVI: 391), and that hysteria borrows from symptoms of anxiety 
neurosis (Freud, III: 115). The focus in his later work is thus on their interaction. He claims: 
‘For a symptom of an ‘actual’ neurosis is often the nucleus and first stage of a psychoneurotic 
symptom’ (Freud, SE XVI: 390):  
 
… [the actual neuroses] provide the psychoneuroses with the necessary 
‘somatic compliance’; they provide the excitatory material, which is then 
psychically selected and given a ‘psychical coating’, so that, speaking 
generally, the nucleus of the psychoneurotic symptom - the grain of sand at 
the centre of the pearl - is formed of a somatic sexual manifestation (Freud, 
SE XII: 248). 
 
The mind-body interaction depicted here means that what occurs in the body will influence 
the selection of symbolic material for a psychoneurotic symptom, and to the former belongs 
biological processes since Freud oftentimes links actual neurosis, although more so 
neurasthenia than anxiety neurosis, to organic occurrences, saying it is ‘not amenable to 
psychotherapy’ (Freud, SE III: 97; Freud, SE XX: 26). This may be relevant for the 
 
24 He writes in SE XX about the actual neuroses that they ‘seem to me still to hold good’ (p. 26). He nevertheless 
adds: ‘I should have been very glad if I had been able, later on, to make a psycho-analytic examination of some 
more cases of simple juvenile neurasthenia, but unluckily the occasion did not arise’ (p. 26).  
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participants of this study, seeing as they mention that their conditions potentially started with 
viruses, and the fact that Amy went through a vaccination, and Lucy and Gail had operations, 
which would have had physical effects. And in general, fatigue is usually associated with 
organic occurrences such as Lyme disease, glandular fever (which Lucy suspects she had), 
flus and viruses. 
When writing about the interaction between biology and psychoneurotic symptoms, 
Freud states that a more or less physical symptom can be imbued with symbolism, where 
‘unconscious phantasies [which] have only been lying in wait to seize hold of some means 
of expression’ (Freud, SE XVI: 391), while, nevertheless, acknowledging an influence in the 
other direction. That is, after an operation or another bodily event, bodily sensations felt in 
conjunction with it can prove to lend themselves well to unconscious material (such as a 
refusal). For instance, the fatigue involved in being put to sleep by anaesthetics could have 
had an impact on Gail’s and Lucy’s symptom formations. This can occur some time after the 
event, where a symptom of the body was registered and later turns out to fit appropriately 
with a current thought (Leader & Corfield, 2008: 132), or immediately afterwards where a 
biological bodily sensation (biological here in the sense that it was brought on by anaesthetics 
and the operation) does not disappear. In light of this, causes are retrospective: it is not an 
event which in and of itself causes symptoms, but a subsequent episode throws light at the 
perception of an earlier one and gives it (new) meaning. Several factors need come together 
concurrently, amounting to an aetiological equation according to Freud, or more broadly, to 
the over determination of a condition. Furthermore, as Leader & Corfield (2008: 321) 
recognise, a condition will move through different stages with different emphases and 
influences, and ‘the factors that predispose one to an illness will not necessarily be the same 
as those that sustain it or, indeed, those that initiated it’. The fact that there is a similar pattern 
for all of the participants in terms of a rise of bodily tensions after having encountered the 
imperative to ‘keep going’, suggests fatigue cannot be reduced to a biological occurrence, or 
even a purely somatic condition which Freud suggests is involved in anxiety neurosis, but 
that it goes beyond it. The fact that the words and beliefs of others have such an impact on 
the condition — alongside an apparent absence of positive biomedical results for many and/or 
that treatment does not help even when something is found (most commonly inflammation, 
a lack of vitamin D or iron deficiency) — proposes there is a large subjective element 
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involved. A biological condition, or precipitating factors involving biology, could have 
turned into something else and something more. 
However, while Freud does seem to postulate a pain which was once ‘real’ before the 
formation of a symptom, to engage in a discussion of what was there before — a bodily 
sensation or a thought — amounts to an impossible discussion akin to ‘what came first: the 
chicken or the egg?’ Did it all begin with a thought, or with a physical sensation? From a 
Lacanian perspective, an answer regarding the existence of something prior to symptom 
formation is impossible. This because the mind and the body cannot be entirely separated 
due to the fact that alienation is inevitable. Once operating from within the symbolic, one 
cannot step outside of it and postulate something prior to it because such postulation occurs 
from within the confines of the symbolic. Nevertheless, that which is outside of signification 
— equivalent to Lacan’s concept of the primordial real — influences signification and vice 
versa, as Freud recognises. The mind and the body therefore exist in an intricate, and almost 
impossible relationship. Freud could be said to recognise the impossibility of this too, insofar 
as he states that ‘not infrequently it had to be left an open question which of the two elements 
[a bodily sensation or thought] had been the primary one’ (Freud, SE II: 180).  
The interaction between the mind and the body is sometimes acknowledged within 
the medical establishment insofar as many health professionals will acknowledge the 
involvement of subjective factors (talked about mainly in the form of ‘stress’ and 
‘depression’ etc.), for example in the lowering of the immune system, and consequently in 
the acquiring of an illness. Conversely, if someone breaks a leg, it would probably be 
impossible — particularly for subjects who operate within a shared, symbolic order — to not 
imbue it with meanings. There is therefore no telling how something started, particularly if 
it is no longer relevant for the condition and it is maintained, as was hypothesised, by other 
factors. I am not concerned in this research with answering the question of the cause of 
fatigue, but more precisely — in line with a Lacanian perspective — to suggest how fatigue 
for the participants is structured, and what that might suggest about some of the subjective 
influences on the symptom formation. This will, inevitably, not capture all of the influences 
involved in the formation of fatigue, not only due to the fact that there are other forms of 
fatigue which have not been included in this research, but also because discourse is not stable, 
and I can only examine the current discourse as it was elaborated at a specific time in a 
specific place and context. A symptom is not a stable entity but is something which, akin to 
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identity and separation, repeatedly fails and consequently forms — hence why various 
factors can influence it at different stages.  
Thus far, the structure of actual neurosis appears both similar and dissimilar to the 
structure of the participants’ discourses, the latter in the sense that the symptom here cannot 
be reduced to a purely somatic factor. I will nevertheless continue to make comparisons to it 
as we go along, particularly to the theories within the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis using 
it as a basis for theorising modern symptoms. In terms of subjectivity, what fatigue has been 
linked with so far is the function of separation through a refusal, and an attempt to gain a 
position independent of the Other, which I will continue to explore in what follows and more 
specifically in relation to the function of bodily tension. 
 
A Lack of Energy: The Body Speaking the Unspeakable 
 
Returning to the Lacanian concept of anorexia which was brought in above, fatigue can be 
viewed not as a pure refusal in the form of a negation of an activity, not doing, but as ‘doing 
nothing’ whereby a tension is produced. The tension appears to signal a void, and further, to 
then be ‘used’ in order to mark the presence of one’s body, to be included within the symbolic 
order. Arguably, Amy, through vomiting, attempts to signal a difference and an otherness as 
a way of including herself in the social order. This would be in agreement with Lacan stating 
about anorexia that ‘Nothing – that is precisely something which exists on the symbolic 
plane’ (Lacan, SIV: 211). The refusal would in this way amount to an inclusion of an 
exclusion, or the presence of an absence, an embodiment of nothingness.  
Using the body for this function is also noticeable in Brody’s discourse when 
explaining the onset of his “symptoms” in relation to the physiotherapist’s demand to “push 
through”: 
 
Um so I’ve been referred to a physio to build up some strength because I’ve lost 
it all. And she wants me to do five minutes a day where my - of exercise where 
my heart rate is higher than 110 bpm. And I did that for two days, measuring my 
pulse and 110 or around that area is where the symptoms start coming in and the 
- the - the nerves go and it’s, my body’s saying ‘drrr (sic) something’s wrong’ 
(A/L279-286). 
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Present in the above discourse is the demand from the physiotherapist to ‘keep going’ despite 
symptoms coming on, in order to build up the strength which he lost. In accordance with 
what was argued, he is attempting to meet the demand (“And I did that for two days”), which 
is followed by the emergence of bodily tension — a tension which could be interpreted as a 
refusal of the demand. Not only is the bodily tension a negation of the Other’s commandment, 
it is here clear that the body is used to convey the message of saying ‘no’ through a tension: 
“the nerves go and it’s, my body’s saying ‘drr something’s wrong”. Akin to Amy’s 
“something not right”, what the body signals and devours is not a specific sensation, such as 
pain or fatigue capable of being captured in words, but merely something unspeakable and 
undetermined. It is a void or nothingness as that which is missing from any pinning down in 
comprehension; and by the very fact of it missing and that this is signalled (Brody saying his 
“body’s saying”), it is included. This inclusion of an exclusion is inherent to anorexia and is 
aptly captured by film producer Samuel Goldwyn’s pronouncement to ‘include me out!’ 
(Leader, 1997: 67). It can further be compared to the process of the naming of the void, which 
is precisely what is involved in identity formation as part of alienation and made possible by 
separation. 
Imaginary alienation entails, if established, an identification with ideas and images 
making possible a sense of identity and co-existence with others within a shared, meaningful 
social order. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, this identification through 
incorporation is built on a paradox because in order to define oneself, one comes to depend 
on something other than oneself, either in the form of an external reflective surface such as 
a mirror image, or language, which also represents an externality, and one into which one is 
born since one does not choose or invent one’s language. This system of externality is thus 
partial in representing the subject and something always escapes: object a. The exclusion 
stemming from the act of representation can be exemplified with René Magritte’s painting, 
‘La Trahison des Images’, known as ‘This is not a Pipe’. It is not a real-life pipe insofar as it 
constitutes a representation of a pipe which cannot correspond to the real-life thing. It cannot 
be viewed from all angles and capture all its qualities. In the act of representing/naming, all 
the distinguishing elements of the event are obliterated. Lacan follows Hegel’s line of 
reasoning here by paraphrasing his idea that ‘the symbol first manifests itself as the killing 
of the thing’ (Lacan, 2002/2006: 262). This is nothing other than the failure of integrating 
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biology and culture. The failure gives rise to a surplus, an exclusion, one which does not 
amount to a pure exclusion but instead is included as a crucial element within the symbolic 
order. More specifically, this impossibility qua failure of symbolisation becomes inscribed 
in the body where it operates as a mark of difference. The surplus is then a void as a form of 
a gap emerging logically before subject-other differentiation (Moncayo, 2012: 53, 194). For 
self-identity, defining oneself with oneself, is impossible. There needs to be an otherness or 
difference in order to invoke meaning, or else one would disappear in one whole mass with 
no means of differentiating between oneself and the other, as found in certain forms of 
psychosis. This mark of difference comes about by transforming nothing into something, 
which is fundamental to the process of alienation by which the subject emerges, through the 
‘naming of the void’ (Fink, 1990: 87). Lacan illustrates this idea through the making of 
pottery: a gap is formed through the creation of its sides, thereby turning 
emptiness/nothingness into something. To explain it yet differently, we can compare it to the 
emergence of desire, which amounts to a moment of pure desirousness, a desire to desire part 
of ‘include me out!’. The desire to desire involves counting the form (structure) into the 
content as put by Žižek (2000: 113). This is explained eloquently by Leader (Seminar XI: 
49-50) with an anecdote about a man suspected of stealing at work. Every day they search 
his wheelbarrow for stolen goods, but they cannot find anything — until they eventually 
realise it is the wheelbarrow itself the man steals. It moves attention away from the inside of 
the container to the empty container itself, from a set of objects on the inside to the set itself 
(the set of the empty set), which Leader (1997: 50) compares to the act of speech. Within 
speech, it is not a particular object which is sought, but the act and meaning of speaking itself 
which has priority (Ibid.: 51), insofar as the act of speaking produces differences and gaps 
on which desire feeds. The only way in is out. We discern this in the interview excerpts 
mentioned so far where different bodily sensations take the place of a nothingness. The idea 
of ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’ inherent in the demand to ‘keep going’ is a type of 
nothingness (I suppose one could also call it a fullness, which I did above) which the subject 
attempts to make a gap in, one included in the social order. We can take this moment to 
amount to an endeavour to invoke a void in relation to the symbolic, or in more Lacanian 
terms, bring forth the real in relation to the symbolic; a void in relation to structure as opposed 
to within structure (Chiesa, 2006). The naming of the void is then something which ‘sutures’ 
— a Lacanian concept coined by Jacques-Allain Miller (1977-1978) — the relation of the 
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subject to the Other, and constitutes the precondition of taking up a position within the social 
order. 
That is, one has entered the symbolic order when one is capable of using metaphors, 
for which a void is necessary. Accordingly, Lacan refers to the metaphorical function of 
language as a ‘synchronic structure’ and explains that it is when the child can say ‘the dog 
goes meow, the cat goes woof-woof’ that the transformation of the sign into the ‘function of 
the signifier’ has taken place. This involves ‘disconnecting the thing from its cry’ (Lacan, 
2002/2006: 682): recognising that a word does not correspond directly to a concrete, external 
referent; that any word can take its place. This allows us, for example, to speak of anorexia 
as disconnected from the activity of literally not eating (something not everyone in the field 
picks up on). Put differently, disintegration is necessary for integration (of identity); object a 
has a creative function. This process is inherent in the practice of psychoanalysis wherein 
one’s identity is first and foremost disintegrated in order to build up a new one (or rather to 
accept that identity and integration is impossible). In this way, the refusal of the symbolic, 
logically speaking, starts already at the alienating encounters when the subject encounters 
the indifferent ‘nothing’ of the Other, and realises that one is excluded therein. The subject 
realises that the statement ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’ does not correspond with his/her 
situation. It follows Lacanian theory in that, as Pluth (2007: 73) recognises: ‘what is called 
the subject in Lacan’s theory begins when the Other no longer addresses you’. Along these 
lines, Lacan explains that an anorexic refusal, contrary to common sense, is ‘the first sign of 
this bond’ (Lacan, Seminar X: 328). The refusal does not constitute a separation from the 
mOther but the ‘inhalation, into oneself, of a fundamentally Other environment’ (Ibid.: 327), 
with the Other environment implying something other than oneself as a point of nothingness 
and difference. The refusal, counterintuitively, through which one installs and realises the 
gap between the subject and the Other, allows a link to be made between the two since one 
can therefrom use metaphors in an act of identification25. It is thus the inhalation of the 
statement ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’ by the subjects which illustrates both the 
difference from and link with the Other.  
Thereafter — still logically speaking — the subject(‘s body) taking the place of lack 
could be tied to the activity of the anal drive, which can be understood in its relation to 
 
25 The gap between the subject and the Other as it occurs through the act of separation will be discussed in more 
details in chapter seven in relation to the clinical structures. 
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anorexia qua the oral drive. Lacan explains that anorexia occurs at the level of the oral (drive), 
where ‘that from which the subject was weaned is no longer anything for him’ in the act of 
‘eating nothing’ (Lacan, Seminar XI: 103-104), which I just explained. However, the body 
taking the place of lack could be related to the anal drive insofar as Lacan links this with ‘the 
locus of metaphor — one object for another, give the faeces in place of the phallus’, which 
is further where ‘man is inscribed’ (Ibid.: 104). One then gives lack (‘nothing’) as something. 
We can supplement this with what Lacan claims in seminar X (p. 328), that following an 
anorexic refusal involving a making of a bond, the anal object ‘is going to come and fulfil 
this function in a more clear-cut fashion when the Other itself elaborates its own function in 
the form of a demand’. The function more specifically relates to ‘give what he is – in so far 
as what he is cannot enter the world except as a remainder’, meaning again that object a as 
lack (a nothingness) is given. The relation between the oral and the anal drive could 
potentially be understood through the concept of retroactivity which puts into question any 
theory of genesis and sequential development: it is only from the standpoint of the body 
having already taken the place of lack in a metaphorical act that the void retroactively appears 
to have been there beforehand.  
In line with the anal object and in the context of fatigue, one gives a lack of energy to 
the Other through ‘doing nothing’ as a response to the demand to ‘keep going’. Albeit this 
giving nothing is enacted through bodily tension, possibly linked to a moment of producing 
and hoarding energy, which carves out a void. The subject gives nothing as something, 
introducing an object (a bodily tension) between the subject and the Other through which the 
subject both appears and disappears, or appears by disappearing (here literally withdrawing 
from activities)26. The anal object qua faeces is appropriate here since ‘shit’ has connotations 
both to ‘nothing’ — through expressions such as ‘it’s shit’ and ’you ain’t shit’ — and to 
something valuable — through for instance saying ‘it doesn’t mean shit’ and ‘get your shit 
together’. The reason for this could be structural and traced back to the infant-parent 
interactions. 
 
26 It is akin to what Lacan mentions in relation to ‘active separations’ in Seminar X, referring to a case by 
Margaret Little where a patient stole whenever her mother came close: ‘I’m showing you an object I’ve stolen, 
by hook or by crook, because somewhere else there is another object, mine, the a, which deserves to be 
considered, to be allowed to emerge for a moment’ (p. 145). She was trying to put an object between herself 
and her mother when her mother did not recognise her lack, as a way of ‘acting out’ and showing her lack by 
disappearing behind an object. The object here could be said to be an unsymbolised bodily tension. 
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The anal object is related to the actions of giving and receiving because the excrement 
represents a sort of gift: the parents demand the child to go potty, to produce something for 
them, which the child, upon success, gets commended for. It sends the message to the child 
that something of its body is wanted by the parents and that it can be given to them as a gift 
which would bring pleasure and joy. But the excrement is a highly ambiguous object because 
what is thereafter demanded is to flush it away, to get rid of it. This changes the message 
into: we want something of your body (loss) that we then reduce to nothing. We can contrast 
this to current capitalistic production in that the human is demanded to constantly produce 
through work and enjoyment, but mass production takes over and the objects, and the humans 
producing them, are more and more viewed as exchangeable, replaceable and ultimately 
temporary and insignificant. This moment of being excluded from something of value can be 
related to the participants’ alienating encounters where they are reduced to nothing. 
Embodying the anal object thus could be said to counteract this, by producing energy/tension 
which is then withheld from the Other, reduced to nothing, albeit something which 
nevertheless is valuable. It represents something of a paradoxical situation since in order to 
signal a lack of energy and delineate a gap, a deficient of some sort, tension qua energy is 
needed. The production of an unsymbolised tension can thus aptly be compared to the process 
of naming the void as an inclusion of an exclusion. 
The naming of the void in this manner can be found at a more general level for the 
participants, who explain that their symptoms and conditions elude descriptions. However, it 
is most clear in the act of diagnosing fatigue, in which case a name as opposed to the body 
signals a void (although these are highly intertwined). The diagnosis is arrived at based on 
exclusions of illnesses insofar as nothing is found in terms of biomedical markers, and thus 
assigned to the condition is the name CFS/ME. This name represents an enigma, evident in 
categorising it as Medically Unexplained Symptoms (MUS). But more precisely, the name 
comes to represent a nothingness without an established set of knowledge backing it up and, 
perhaps more importantly, without validation and recognition from the Other pertaining to 
its existence. Indeed, the participants repeat through complaints the fact that the diagnosis 
“means nothing”. On the other hand, it is something which gets assigned a name and is 
‘counted’ as a diagnosis, as something. It then amounts to a registration of an absence. Instead 
of viewing this complaint as a pure ‘negativity’ (as a complaint), the existence of a 
nothingness also implies there are potentially endless possibilities and explanations which 
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could take its place — as long as the nothingness represents a void as opposed to a foreclosure 
of it (a lack of a lack); or rather they try to counteract the foreclosure of the void by bringing 
it forth. A void means it is not pinned down to anything in particular — with many of the 
participants and patients in general holding out hope for explanations pertaining exclusively 
to the biological body. While a name is thought to be powerful enough to signal differences, 
at a more fundamental level, it is the body which allows the void to be brought forth. Pain 
seems particularly apt for this function, and further acts as a way of differentiating between 
the self and other, as found within the context of the interviews. 
 
(Pain) Signalling the Boundaries of the Body 
 
The increase of tensions seems better able to signal an aliveness than fatigue, where 
particularly pain acquires a prominent role. What this refusal entails, beyond that which has 
been discussed, is an endeavour to delineate the boundary of one’s own body. This comprises 
a focus on the inclusion part in an attempt to erect a barrier between self and other. 
 Using the unsymbolised body as a way of signalling the presence of one’s own body 
was seen in Amy’s and Brody’s discourses above, but it is more perhaps clearly recognised 
in Mark’s discourse, particularly when speaking about his mother not taking his condition 
seriously: 
 
But she still, she still - and she's seen me collapse through exhaustion. 
She’s…she’s done it repeatedly, she - I've been in the car saying ‘I’m too tired to 
talk, don't talk to me I’m too tired to talk’, and then they continue to talk to you. 
And then the-the-the shaking comes back due to stress in that situation, when my 
body is starting to really enter survival-mode. And she's seen me collapse and 
start to twitch uncontrollably because of the energy I spent listening to her talk 
to me and she still has this world where…I - I might be able to just go for a drive 
for half an hour then wander around the museum on foot for an hour and then 
drive back for half an hour. Like a normal person (A/L388-397). 
 
The demand found within his discourse is that of being “a normal person”, someone “able to 
just go for a drive for half an hour then wander around the museum on foot for an hour and 
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then drive back for half an hour”. In other words, there is a demand for constant movement, 
stemming not just from his mother but the big Other insofar as he states “then they continue 
to talk to you”, it being embodied by several others. The demand is linked with the Other 
refusing his subjectivity, since there is a lack of acknowledgment that Mark is unable (or 
unwilling) to ‘go on’. Or rather, the Other refuses his demand (“I’m too tired to talk, don’t 
talk to me”), thereby disregarding his wishes; in line with Lacan’s conceptualisation of 
anorexia where the mOther (literally here Mark’s mother) has ‘its own ideas about his [the 
subject’s] needs’ (Lacan, 2002/2006: 524), marked by Mark’s words that “she still has this 
world where… [he is able to drive and walk]”. This results in his body “shaking”, described 
by Mark elsewhere as a “Parkinsonian tremor” (A/L38), which can be interpreted as a refusal 
of the demand to ‘keep going’ since they are mentioned simultaneously; a refusal of the 
Other’s refusal. One of the reasons for this refusal is suggestingly not to disappear altogether 
in the Other’s desire, but to preserve one’s own, indicated by him saying that “the shaking 
comes back due to stress in that situation, when my body is starting to really enter survival-
mode”. Survival-mode is related to the shakes, further linked to something visible: “she has 
seen me collapse and start to twitch uncontrollably”. The emphasis here is not on the retreat 
from the activities mentioned through the condition (a disappearance), but rather about a part 
of his body surviving in the social order, through a registration of something uncontrollable. 
The rise in tension points to a lack standing outside of a symbolic understanding, if I can 
interpret the world ‘uncontrollable’ in this way. The body here takes the place of lack, as an 
element included in the symbolic order, something capable of differentiating between self 
and other, between him and what is considered a “normal person”, and thus between him and 
his mOther’s desire. The body is that which allows the link to the symbolic to be made, since 
the symbolic order is built on differences between signifiers — words are defined with other 
words in a circular movement — and thus, the subject’s body can support this nature by 
constituting a difference from the symbolic (Hoens, 2018: 176). Throughout the interviews, 
it is indeed not the form of fatigue which acquires this role of signalling a presence and 
establishing a link, but pain appears to better demarcate the body.  
When mentioning at some point his “physical pain”, Mark explains it “exhibits mostly 
in my legs” (A/L345-348). That he uses the word “exhibits” could point to an (unconscious) 
attempt to signal the presence of his body, as something showing itself as “burning” — 
another word Mark uses to describe pain — a flame which hardly goes unnoticed. Indeed, 
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many of the participants describe their pain as a burning sensation. In addition, Gail seems 
to associate pain with her wheelchair and crutches, since these are frequently mentioned 
together, where her pain is explained as the reason for using them. She further talks about 
how this increases the visibility of being ill, necessary particularly for interviews regarding 
her Personal Independence Payment. This moment could thus comprise an attempt to give 
lack (of energy) to the Other; to open up people’s eyes to the fact that something is wrong 
with them, that it eludes their understanding and assumptions, and, ultimately, that one is 
different from others. Brody, along these lines, mentions fatigue and pain and gives an 
indication that pain is a way of differentiating oneself from others: “’Cus I feel, tired. I feel 
tired the same way anyone else feels tired but with like constant pain in my legs, just now” 
(B/228-230). That “anyone else feels tired” implies a feeling capable of being experienced 
by everyone, perhaps following the omnipresent sociocultural expression we hear today that 
‘everyone’s tired’; hence the inadequacy of fatigue of singling out a unique position. The 
emphasis on the word ‘but’ would point to a situation of an exception, which is that of 
“constant pain”, capable of perhaps distinguishing between everyday tiredness and a serious, 
severe form of fatigue. We see how the body as a mark of difference supports the conceptual 
difference within the symbolic as one between ‘fatigue’ and ‘everyday tiredness’, and the 
differentiation between self and other. Bodily pain functions to signal the aliveness of the 
body, which is not surprising since ‘pain sharpens and defines bodily boundaries’ seen in 
practices such as cutting (Leader, 2017: 106): 
 
The cut here is an autonomous act, and the cutter the sole agent. As well as 
permitting an idea of agency, it can introduce a rhythm, a sense of before and 
after, crucial if the person feels caught in a relentless and never-ending 
experience of numbness or anxiety (Ibid.: 107). 
 
Introducing a rhythm in the form of a difference indeed seems to be one of the effects of the 
condition as the participants explain that their lives can be divided according to a ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ ME/CFS. Mark explains it as a division into two “very clear sections” (A/L596-
598). However, like I stated previously, what supports this division is the body, more 
specifically the process of hoarding energy — an accumulation of excitation — which 
transforms energy into a tension signalling a void. These tensions, in turn, seem to cause 
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sleepiness, as they ultimately lead to sleeping/resting/stopping, and thus resemble the drive 
to sleep. 
 
The Drive to Sleep as an Unconscious Refusal 
 
While there is a large variety of bodily tensions present in the interviews of the participants, 
tensions which signal a refusal and the presence of the body through a void, a subsequent 
moment — still a refusal — sees more uniformity, as all of the participants describe an urge 
or necessity to go to bed and sleep (or rest), or largely to ‘do nothing’, usually in relation to 
the demand to ‘keep going’. There is a wish or a push on behalf of the body to stop and 
disappear, but most importantly to sleep. For Mark, pain constitutes a signal to stop, a point 
where he knows he “shouldn’t be trying to do anything else” (A/L348), which seems to be 
the case for the other participants too. We can therefore note that these tensions cause fatigue, 
or rather constitutes a movement towards fatigue, and thus I argue that they can come be 
conceptualised as a drive to sleep — the drive being, according to Lacan, a constant tension 
arising in relation to the demand of the Other. Unpacking the notion of the drive can therefore 
shed light on fatigue as a refusal of the Other’s demand to ‘keep going’. While the moment 
of stopping will be considered in the next chapter, I here (still) focus on a tension as a 
movement, however one towards a non-movement.  
In the interviews, discernible for all of the participants is a necessity or an urge to “close 
my eyes and get to bed” (Gail, A/L621), and a “need to get back to bed” (Tom, B/L366) 
— usually expressed in relation to demands. This is strongly related to ‘doing nothing’ as 
they are usually mentioned together, illustrated in the following by Lucy in the context of the 
never-ending demands of life: 
 
…the body’s physically unable to do anything. The mind wants to, but what can 
you do if your body’s acting like it - just wants to sleep all the time. It’s horrible 
(L/224-226). 
 
Noticeable here is a mind-body divide, where the “mind wants to” (do something) while the 
body “just wants to sleep all the time” (do nothing), showcasing the unconscious refusal of 
the body in the face of the ego fighting against the impulse to ‘do nothing’. It is the divide 
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itself which Lucy could be referring to as being “horrible”, referring to a force experienced 
out of one’s conscious control as well as, most likely, going against the ideal image of a hard 
working person. Nevertheless, the crucial aspect here is that she does not say she does sleep 
all the time — something some of the participants mention: that being fatigued is not 
necessarily about sleeping more; however this could certainly be the case for some — but 
that she wants to sleep. There is a bodily force driving the subject towards sleep or resting 
(stopping, disappearing), which is in line with the other participants’ urge and necessity to 
sleep, and one which is present “all the time” as Lucy states. We can then conceptualise this 
force as a constant bodily tension, which brings us close to the notion of the drive as theorised 
by Freud and Lacan. 
Freud defines the drive as a ‘constant tension’ situated on the ‘frontier between the 
mental and the somatic’ (Freud, SE XIV, 121-122). With the introduction of the death drive, 
however, things become more complicated. The death drives, or Thanatos with which he 
equates it, is thought of in opposition to another group of drives, the life drives, Eros, which 
are thought to possess two distinct functions: 
 
The aim of [Eros] is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus - 
in short, to bind together; the aim of [the destructive instinct] is, on the contrary, 
to undo connections and so to destroy things (Freud, SE, 23:148).  
 
The death drive as a destroyer of things is usually thought of, particularly following a simple 
reading of Freud, as a diminishment or removal of tension. This is detected in Freud insofar 
as the death drive is thought to aim towards death, or the inorganic, inclusive of a return to 
an earlier state. Contrarily, the life drive is constantly producing tensions (Freud, SE XVIII: 
63). However, this binary view gets put into question, particularly when Freud links the death 
drive closely with the pleasure principle, whose function it is to ‘reduce, to keep constant or 
to remove internal tension’ (Freud, SE XVIII: 56). The presence of three various functions 
concurrently suggests an ambiguity pertaining to the functions of the pleasure principle, as 
also noted by Boothby (1991: 86). Indeed, Freud (SE XVIII: 62) states himself that he could 
not decide which one of these three functions is inherent therein. That the pleasure principle 
is thought by Freud to overlap with the death drive, and in turn with the life drive, complicates 
the concept of tension in relation to the death drive. The inextricability between the life and 
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death drive will be dealt with later on in this thesis; the most important aspect to note here is 
that the drives on a whole are linked to a continuous tension, insofar as Freud is merely 
speaking about the aim of the death drive (as removing tension), and not the result as such. 
In accordance with this, Freud (SE XIV: 122) puts emphasis on the fact that the drive is 
always ‘a piece of activity’, even if its aim is passive. Indeed, a common misconception of 
the Freudian death drive is that it constitutes a wish to die, where even the execution of 
dying/suicide is prescribed to it. I discuss in chapter six of this thesis how Freud’s view is 
more nuanced than this, but for now I will focus on a Lacanian perspective wherein the death 
drive is less ambiguously an attempt to keep a tension alive.  
The drive for Lacan is a bodily force which emerges as an effect of the social on the 
organic body. The social intervenes on the biological body primarily through demands 
articulated by those around the subject, and thus in more Lacanian terms, the drive stems 
from an intervention of a demand on an organic need (Neill, 2014: 52). That Lacan prioritises 
a demand when it comes to the theory of the drives is seen in his formula of the drive, where 
the split subject is situated in relation to a demand ($&D). This can be explained through the 
interrelation but difference between need, demand and drive. 
As was outlined in the previous chapter, when a biological need such as hunger is 
expressed via language, it changes the very nature of the need and turns it into a symbolic 
demand. A demand becomes imbued with a social, subjective function, acquiring a certain 
colour influenced by the child-parent relationship. This means that biological activities obtain 
the symbolic function of always being about something else (pleasure), and something more 
(unconditional love). Lacan expounds on the drive in relation to a demand in the following 
manner: 
 
The drive is what becomes of demand when the subject vanishes from it. It goes 
without saying that demand also disappears, except that the cut remains, for the 
latter remains present in what distinguishes the drive from the organic function it 
inhabits: namely, its grammatical artifice, so manifest in the reversals of its 
articulation with respect to both source and object (Freud is a veritable wellspring 
on this point) (Lacan, 2002/2006: 692). 
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It is evident from Lacan’s paragraph that the drive ‘inhabits’ an organic function yet is 
distinguished from it by its ‘grammatical artifice’. The way in which the drive is linked to 
organic life is that the drive follows a demand in which a need of the body resides: it follows 
the activity to eat, defecate and sleep for example. But the difference between the drive and 
an organic function stems from the presence of ‘the cut’ as Lacan mentions, which refers to 
the signifier of lack having arisen as an effect of entering the social order. Due to the fact that 
the body cannot be fully integrated into language — that nature and culture cannot coincide 
— a surplus qua impossibility arises as that which escapes the conjunction of the two. The 
drive as the surplus of the failure of integrating the two (Schuster, 2016: 101) then gets 
inscribed in the body, or more precisely, a part of the body takes on the place of lack (Van 
Haute, 2002: 174-175). These places are called erogenous zones, privileged sites where 
pleasure is produced and where exchanges with the caretaker take place such as feeding and 
potty training, giving rise the oral and anal drive (Van Haute, 2002: 142). That is, biological 
functions such as receiving nourishment, since they become intermixed with the exchanges 
and demands of the Other, become imbued with pleasure, turning these into activities 
extending beyond biology. The difference between a biological need and a drive is the 
following: while hunger as a biological need is capable of being extinguished/satisfied with 
the physical object of food and food alone, the advent of the oral drive turns hunger into an 
unquenchable appetite where satisfaction never arrives; one comes to eat either too much or 
too little as Freud recognises (Shepherdson, 1997: 138). In other words, the drive constitutes 
a bodily excess signalling a lack of satisfaction. Not only that, but the drive ensures this very 
excess where a lack of satisfaction is the aim. Lacan in this way takes up the notion of a 
constant tension by defining the drive as ‘la pulsion en fait le tour’ (Lacan Seminar XI: 168), 
which in French signifies ‘to walk, to drive, etc., round something’. With the word ‘tour’ he 
plays on a double meaning where in addition to a circular movement, it refers to a deceit 
(Ibid.: translator’s notes). The drive ‘turns’ around the object, as Lacan explains, through a 
‘trick’, and it is such a detour which amounts to the ‘satisfaction of the drive’ (Ibid.): to never 
reach the goal and instead gain satisfaction through the very repetition of activities, even if 
that satisfaction is accidental (see Zupančič, 2017: 102). Nevertheless, attempts at 
satisfaction are enacted through substitute objects in relation to the source, such as thumb-
sucking, alcohol, smoking for the oral drive (Shepherdson, 1997: 138). The drive keeps 
returning to the source (hunger in the case of the oral drive), and its object (food supposedly 
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capable of extinguishing the source), moving from the source to the object and vice versa. 
Lacan thus helpfully distinguishes between the goal and the aim. The goal of the drive is to 
get rid of appetite and non-satisfaction, while the aim is to miss the goal in order to circulate 
around object a as a void, to instead repeat the activity of eating, enabling the ‘constant 
tension’ immanent to the body. The drive supports the biological function, as without an 
appetite, one will not eat. On the other hand, we are also far too aware today of the destructive 
tendency of the drive acquiring an independent status of biology, where people engage 
repetitively in the oral drive such as smoking, drinking and eating, despite the risk it poses to 
their lives, and no doubt do people derive pleasure from these activities and their repetition. 
We can link this constant-ness of a tension arising due to the introduction of the 
symbolic order, as Lacan does, to a gap (Ibid.: 171), to the structural incompleteness of 
language since he states that the object of the drive is the lost object appearing in the gap of 
language (Lacan, Seminar XI: 185). Something of the body has failed to be satisfied and 
understood. Put differently, a lack of satisfaction is coterminous with a lack of symbolisation, 
since as long as something is not understood, it is repeated; and as long as pleasure was not 
derived from an activity, it is repeated. The body and language then share a similar structure. 
‘It goes without saying’, as Lacan mentions in the excerpt above, aptly characterises this 
moment of the drive where both the subject and the demand disappear behind an 
unsymbolised constant tension. In this manner, for Lacan (1977: 199) every drive is a death 
drive, as it — in line with Freud postulating the death drive as a destroyer of connections — 
contains an anti-synthetic function (Chiesa, 2007: 143). The drive as a bodily surplus gives 
rise to the experience of loss since it carves out a void, non-satisfaction, in the body. The 
object of the drive is thus loss itself as a means of maintaining a gap, from which desire 
springs up. 
In relation to fatigue, due to the intercession of the sociocultural demand to ‘keep 
going’ (to be awake and alive) on the body, and the subject’s response to this in the form of 
a refusal, the organic need to sleep — which is temporarily satisfied after a night’s sleep — 
transforms into an unquenchable drive to sleep in the sense of wanting to “sleep all the time” 
as Lucy puts it. It becomes an urgent, necessary force manifesting as a loss of energy, and a 
subsequent need to remedy it — the drive being both the goal to remedy it and the aim to 
make sure that such a remedy is unattainable. This drive to sleep, arguably manifested 
through various bodily tensions insofar as they lead to fatigue/sleep, is capable of undoing 
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identification/points of identity, evidenced when the participants explain how they lost a part 
of themselves through the emergence of the condition, which has come to sabotage their lives 
and desires. The desire sabotaged here is that of wanting to be a hard-working person, attested 
to when the participants attempt to meet the demand to ‘keep going’. The drive unravels this 
identity tied to ‘the body as machine’, through sacrificing a part of oneself and repeating a 
loss, which simultaneously amounts to an ‘act of creation’ linked to entering the social order, 
as recognised by McGowan (2013: 13) in relation to the death drive. The loss of energy is 
this ‘saying no’ to being reduced to a bodily machine in order to make space for one’s own 
desire; an anti-synthetic, unconscious attempt to separate from the proximity of the 
demanding Other. However, as have been argued, this loss is not a pure loss but amounts to 
a tension pointing to and carving out this loss — or really at this stage we are speaking of a 
void and not really a loss, since the unsymbolised tension in the interviews constitutes a 
presence of an absence — the way in which we can understand the hoarding of energy and 
accumulation of tension. Fatigue here follows the view on anorexia as a rejection of 
otherness. Legrand (2011) explains that the anorexic rejects a dependency on food as an 
object other than oneself, ‘the realm of anonymous organic processes and of corpses’ (p. 
506), in order to preserve one’s subjectivity. Subjectivity is that which cannot be incorporated 
to an object considering the subject (tied to the realm of indefinability) and the object (the 
realm of the definable) are irreconcilable. The objective realm of anonymity and dead corpses 
can be compared to that of the symbolic-imaginary order: a pinning down therein entails the 
the ‘murder of the Thing’ as explained above, insofar as representations are always partial 
and reductive, and even more reductive when that partiality is not acknowledged. 
Considering the latter, the statement ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’ presents a strengthened 
version of alienation. Fatigue in this way could be viewed as a refusal of the Other’s 
otherness, a saying no to alienation and being reduced to an object therein; however by 
paradoxically embodying the otherness of one’s own body. 
The drive can therefore be equated to pure desire, a desire to desire, since the aim is 
to keep on living/desiring and to persist as a tension, to never reach the object of desire or to 
coincide with an object. Because lack/loss is the basis for desire, the presence of which 
inaugurates a search for an object which will quench a tension and remove loss (arguably 
sleep which is the focus of the subsequent chapter). It is thus arguably the search itself which 
is sought after, where — in contrarily to what is normally thought of the Freudian death drive 
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in relation to the idea of Nirvana — the drive is concerned with keeping itself alive, 
presenting an excess of life (Žižek, 2006b: 62). It becomes a form of inertia since the drive 
is fixated on a gap and in this way presents a movement of a non-movement as it repeats 
certain activities. The drive being an excess of life would make it appropriate in signalling 
the aliveness of the body.   
The drives are accordingly the bodily manifestation of the ‘single force’ of pure 
desire. More precisely, the representation of desire takes form through a variety of part 
objects of the drive (Evans, 2006: 38). Part objects are both something corporeal and 
hypothetical in that object a as the void is present therein, and they are related to the 
erogenous zones (Vanheule, 2014: 132). This would explain the variety of tensions present 
in the interviews at this ‘initial’ stage of refusal if reading the interviews chronologically, 
such as pain, vomiting, and shaking; all of which cause fatigue just as the drive is the object 
cause of desire. In contrast to this, the ‘wish to sleep’ as a desire capable of extinction is 
expressed in the same/similar manner. Putting the two together would amount to the 
movement of a non-movement as seen in the interviews. 
While Lacan did not put forth a ‘drive to sleep’, since his drives (the oral, anal, 
invocatory, scopic) are organised around bodily rims, sleeping is nevertheless an organic 
need, and we need not take the drives too literally. The uptake of the body’s anatomy into 
the social order provides a link yet differentiation between the body and language, the latter 
since language fails to refer to a direct, physical correspondence with its inevitable ambiguity 
(or excess of meanings) and its capability of using metaphors. The symbolic takes advantage 
of a ‘margin or border’ where there is an opening and closing, such as the lips/mouth, 
genitals, anus and ears through what Lacan terms ‘the cut’. (Lacan, 2002/2006: 692). Lacan 
adds the gaze and the voice to Freud’s list of drives in light of this. The potential reason for 
language having its effect in those rims is that a continued opening and a closing mark the 
incompleteness of the body, thus the signifier can come to inscribe itself there as lack (Van 
Haute, 2002: 144-145). Such an opening and closing of the body reflects an opening and 
closing of the unconscious in relation to consciousness. The drives contain a certain structure: 
Lacan relates the oral and anal drives to the Other’s demand and the invocatory and scopic 
drives to the Other’s desire (Lacan, Seminar XI: 104). This I argue means we can interpret 
the drives to be flexible pertaining to their physical content, even though they were formed 
based on the anatomy of the corresponding bodily part, as seen from Lacan stating in relation 
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to the drive: ‘This does not in the least mean that, in our symptomatology, other zones do not 
come into play’ (Ibid.: 172). The organic need to sleep could be taken up into any of the 
existing drive structures put forth by Lacan27. Accordingly, in this chapter I have linked pain 
relating to the drive as a constant tension with the oral and anal object, the former being part 
of the ‘eating nothing’ as recognising the void and the latter where the body takes the place 
of the void. Additionally, in the next chapter I briefly link the desire to sleep, strongly related 
to the drive to sleep, with the scopic drive, which seems to follow Lacan’s structural 
differentiation that the anal and oral are related to demands, while the scopic drive is tied to 
desire. It would also suggest that the oral and anal drives are more linked to biological 
functions and more tangent, insofar as the drive is situated in relation to a demand. Lastly, 
sleeping can be considered a zone since it constitutes an opening and a closing in a rim-like 
structure: as one opens one’s mouth to eat and fill a gap, one sleeps and closes one’s eyes for 
the same reason. Sleep is aptly associated with a breach due to its unconscious nature — it 
represents somewhat of a black hole into which we disappear every night. For some people, 
this moment of letting go control and of not existing in the conscious moment presents such 
a difficulty that insomnia creeps in. This brings us back to Lacan’s quote above about the 
subject disappearing in the demand and the drive. We have to engage in biological needs 
whether we want to or not, and particularly due to the fact that they have become interwoven 
with social influences beyond our control. Being a speaking subject entails forces going 
beyond one’s conscious intentions, and indeed we see this in Lucy’s discourse where she is 
describing a surplus on behalf of her body, an unquenchable wanting-to-sleep force, 
belonging to herself yet unable to be controlled by her — which is what the “horrible” 
element could refer to.  
Accordingly, the drive to sleep, immanent in the refusal to be reduced to an object of 
productivity, is unconscious and constitutes a force going beyond the subject. It amounts to 
a moment of alienation and in agreement with Lacan’s notion of extimacy where the core of 
oneself — wanting to constantly sleep presumably being the prioritised activity in one’s life 
— resides on the outside. The drive possesses this structure of an external internality, hence 
why Lacan (Seminar XI: 181) claims that the manifestation of the drive is a ‘headless subject, 
for everything is articulated in it in terms of tension, and has no relation to the subject other 
 
27 Of course, the theory of the drives can be questioned; are there really only four (structural) drives? Further, 
sleep, in contrast to the other drives, does not have a physical external object which stimulates the zones as 
obviously as the other drives, such as food and faeces. 
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than one of topological community’. Tension is the flip-side of the Möbius strip which is the 
subject: tension is both that which never manages to be taken up into subjectivity/a symbolic 
structure in the first place, but also an effect of the structure — acquiring a paradoxical, 
impossible status akin to that of object a. Put differently, the subject is that which is always 
lacking, missing; a tension is likewise missing from the symbolic order, however 
simultaneously ex-ists as a physical presence, one from which the subject is separated yet 
forms an integral, inextricable part with. This split constitutes the subject/object split (with 
the object being the drive here) manifested as a mind-body split, where the two are 
inextricable yet irreconcilable. As Žižek (1996: 161) puts it, the ‘drive is that which is “in the 
subject more than herself”’ as an ‘impersonal willing’ which disregards his/her well-being. 
It appears for the subject as a force stemming out of nowhere, ex nihilo. Taking responsibility 
for the force constitutes a self-contradiction as noted by Nietzsche (2014: 23) in his 
discussion of the drives, who claims that to be fully responsible for one’s actions, to postulate 
a cause and effect, is an illusion ‘amount[ing] to pulling yourself up by the hair out of the 
swamp of nothingness into existence’. The subject as an agency having been there before an 
act, as the one intentionally committing it — an argument in line with the postulation of a 
biological cause which was discussed in this chapter — can only ever be an assumption in 
an impossible moment. The drive is nevertheless something which must be assumed by the 
subject since it has the paradoxical status of being both on the inside and the outside — Lacan 
(Seminar XI: 184) refers to the object of the drive as a ‘headless subjectivication’. The subject 
is therefore the object of the drive, the same as it yet different from it, following Lacan’s 
logic of ‘the same but different’. We return here to the formation of a symptom as a ‘forced 
solution’ as presented in the context of Brody’s discourse at the start of this chapter: the 
symptom (of fatigue) is both a solution and a problem. Or rather, a problem is used as a 
solution. Nevertheless, we will see in the next chapter how another moment of ‘doing 
nothing’ is more tied to the function of a solution and defence through escapism.  
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Chapter 5: Fatigue as the Desire to Sleep 
 
 
I love sleep. My life has the tendency to fall apart when I'm awake, 
you know? 
 
― Ernest Hemingway 
 
The formation of fatigue as elaborated by the participants of this study is arguably not just 
about making room for one’s own desire by signalling the aliveness of the body through a 
lack of energy — best done through bodily tensions such as pain, on which the previous 
chapter focused. In contradistinction to this, a ‘second’, subsequent moment outlines fatigue 
as a disappearance and an escape from the life of demands, and, ultimately, from the limits 
of society and the body. This moment seems to take the form and function normally attributed 
to fatigue, as a diminishment and an absence of tension, related to “doing nothing” (stopping, 
disappearing, sleeping). To diminish tension would constitute a way of counteracting the 
anxiety-provoking accumulation and movement of demands, accompanied by a rise in 
tension. This will be explored in what follows through Lacan’s theory of desire, particularly 
‘the desire to sleep’ as a defensive desire related to the fundamental fantasy, and further 
linked to his and Freud’s notion of inhibition.  
 
The Loss of Energy through Consumption 
 
Noticeable in the interviews alongside the demand to ‘keep going’ is a rise of bodily tensions, 
which was investigated in the previous chapter. This was related to a hoarding of energy as 
a refusal of the demand to ‘keep going’, where energy was turned into a tension signalling a 
deficit of energy. However, following this, particularly once the condition has ‘settled in’ so 
to speak, we discern how the subject aims not towards an aliveness but quite the opposite: to 
extinguish all tensions in the quest to ‘do nothing’, as another way of refusing demands/the 
demand to ‘keep going’. Fatigue here takes on the role of a protection against tension, a 
protection associated with stopping, disappearing, sleeping and being fatigued. Arguably, 
this could constitute another aspect of ‘eating nothing’, where energy is consumed to the 
point of losing it — loss and lack being highly inextricable from one another but ultimately 
different. 
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The presence of a rise of tension/energy followed by a loss is demonstrated in Brody’s 
discourse when explaining the unpredictability of his condition, which was analysed in the 
previous chapter in relation to an accumulation of demands: 
 
…my body tenses up which takes energy or if you’re in the car and it’s a bit 
erratic the driving you know you sorta tense up, your body naturally tense up to 
protect yourself, which takes a huge amount of energy. And I’d be exhausted. So 
again, get rid of all the variables of the stressors of work and relationships and 
whatever, and eating well, that’s - establish that baseline seems very important 
(A/L381-389). 
 
The expression to “tense up to protect yourself” makes a link between a rise of tension and 
an act of protection. Thereafter he says this “takes a huge amount of energy”, meaning energy 
is used up, ultimately leading to exhaustion (“And I’d be exhausted”). Exhaustion is therefore 
linked to a loss of tension. The moment of increasing tension here could be compared to the 
activity of consumption in order to quench a non-satisfaction qua something uncomfortable 
in the body. The consumption of energy is enacted in order to eradicate unpredictable 
demands (“get rid of all the variables” which are linked to “stressors of work and relationship 
and whatever and eating well”). There is a loss of energy whereby nothing is left. More 
correctly, it is the activity of ‘doing’ which uses up energy, and this is something observed 
in all of the participants’ discourse, particularly at the onset of their conditions where they 
utter “I kept going”, or that they were pushing themselves. Tom, for instance, indicates not 
just a continuous movement, but an increase of it when he says he was “pushing” himself 
more at the onset of his condition: 
 
I would say since November, December, I felt a - a change. I felt a kind of - I 
was pushing myself more and more - becoming chronically fatigued like 
somebody pulls your battery power out. That what it was like at the start and that 
was after having a shower. I’d be like ah no I need to get back to bed (B/L362-
366). 
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It is the activity of “pushing” himself “more and more” which leads to the urge to sleep/rest 
for Tom (“I need to go back to bed”), not necessarily sleeping. A similar ‘pushing’ is present 
to a large degree in Gail’s discourse throughout her interviews, who says she is unable to 
stop pushing herself and start pacing, as instructed by the medical establishment through the 
imperative to ‘slow down’. This process whereby an increase of energy is followed by a 
decrease can be compared to an activity towards passivity, and thus we can compare it to 
Freud’s notion of neurasthenia. 
Neurasthenia is a concept subsumed under the term ‘actual neurosis’, which was 
explored in the previous chapter (but with a focus on the other subcategory, anxiety neurosis). 
Instead of an accumulation of excitation taking place in anxiety neurosis, neurasthenia 
consists of an ‘impoverished tension’ (Freud, SE III: 144), which is where Freud places 
fatigue. He conveys that a neurasthenic, as a result of excessive masturbation, is constantly 
removing ‘even the smallest quantity of somatic excitation’ (Ibid.: 111). Perhaps similarly, 
fatigue here could be a way of ‘masturbating’ in the sense of engaging in the activity of 
‘doing’, overexertion, in order to eventually deflate, to discharge and lose tension — in line 
with the Freudian notion of the drive being a piece of activity which seeks discharge 
(Boothby, 1991: 86). Important to this process is that a tension rises, as an increase is 
supposedly necessary for a decrease. This may be more relevant at the incipient phase of the 
participants’ conditions as it is mentioned more frequently there. However, many do describe 
throughout their interviews problems with pacing, with them mentioning a “boom and bust” 
cycle and many fluctuations inherent in their conditions. The masturbatory act is especially 
appropriate since, as was argued, fatigue could be a way of keeping energy to oneself as an 
attempt to create desire away from the Other. Accordingly, this moment could constitute 
another aspect of hoarding energy in relation to ‘doing nothing’: using it up oneself and 
keeping it at a distance as a means of truly preserving it.  
The loss of energy could be an attempt to ensure a separation from the Other, because 
energy is both something the Other is asking for and takes away from the subject. The latter 
is attested to in the interviews when the participants mention that their lives have been stolen, 
with energy more precisely having been taken. Tom explains fatigue as someone having 
stolen his serotonin, which is in general linked with energy: “it’s like somebody sticking a 
big syringe in your brain and s-sucking all the serotonin out” (A/L249). The act of stealing 
is especially evident in Mark’s discourse who recounts analogies of people stealing someone 
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else’s food (sometimes unbeknownst to themselves, sometimes intentionally), where Mark 
identifies with the position of the victim. The loss of energy occurs at moments when people 
talk to him, observed in the last chapter in relation to his mother, and is further present 
elsewhere in his interviews: “Even if I’m not responding, even if you’re just talking to me, 
you’re consuming energy…of mine” (A/L488-492). He names the energy his (“energy…of 
mine”). However, in the act of someone else stealing, it no longer belongs to him. Therefore, 
keeping energy to oneself instead (qua tension) could comprise an attempt to preserve one’s 
own (desire), in a way stealing energy (back) from the Other. But if the Other is asking for it 
through the imperative to ‘keep going’, the best way of ensuring energy does not reach the 
Other, that energy cannot be stolen — constituting at the same time a subtraction from/a 
protest of the idea of ‘the body as machine’ — is to use it up and get rid of it completely, as 
a means of truly preserving it; a separation of oneself from oneself (and the Other). The 
function of the anal object could be compared to this scenario, which was linked in the 
previous chapter with the act of embodying lack/the void. ‘Nothing’ is given a valuable 
message, seeing as the word ‘shit’ has connotations with both a devalued nothingness and 
something valuable. Here, instead, we could emphasise the aspect of nothingness and 
separation, where the subject in a sense literally gives nothing to the Other, or gives one’s 
loss. Giving nothing could comprise a type of withholding, however one which is enacted 
through first and foremost separating from a part of one’s body and losing it, which is the 
structure of the act of defecating: a part is flushed away — used up by the subject — and 
thereby reduced to nothing. The function of fatigue here would additionally be, alongside a 
separation, a protection against the energy and anxiety produced via the movement of 
incomprehensible demands, which was perceivable in Brody’s discourse (“your body 
naturally tense up to protect yourself”). This resonates with that put forward about automatic 
and signal anxiety in Freud’s paper ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’.  
Therein, Freud argues that a signal anxiety arises as an ‘intentional reproduction of 
anxiety’ in order to prevent automatic anxiety to emerge, which has the aspect of economy 
(Freud, SE XX: 138). Automatic anxiety is an ‘involuntary fresh appearance of anxiety’ 
equivalent to a real danger insofar as there is an accumulation of tension which needs to be 
discharged (Ibid.: 137) — strongly echoing the picture of anxiety neurosis part of actual 
neurosis which Freud himself links to automatic anxiety. That is, automatic anxiety part of 
actual neurosis equals a ‘surplus of unutilized libido’; in other words, an unsymbolised 
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tension which the ego endeavours to defend against and does so by binding the anxiety 
through the formation of a symptom (Ibid.: 141). Therefore, signal anxiety as an intentionally 
produced tension is a protection against automatic anxiety in the same way that a 
psychoneurotic symptom is a defence against an intolerable pain rising unexpectedly. Based 
on this, we could link automatic anxiety with the participants’ descriptions of the alienating 
encounters since these include an invasive, unsymbolised and unforeseeable force of pain 
capable of accumulating in the form of demands and physical sensations. Then, the rise of 
tension in relation to the demands as explored in the previous chapter and here can relate to 
signal anxiety as a form of protection. However, these moments cannot truly be separated, 
which is in line with what I argued in the previous chapter with regard to the inseparability 
between psychoneurosis and actual neurosis. Nevertheless, what is seemingly more 
protective in Brody’s discourse is the successive loss of this tension — to bind it through a 
symptom as Freud states. We can perceive this in the interviews for all of the participants 
through the act of numbing the body (and the body of language) into nothingness as it relates 
to the formation of the fundamental fantasy. 
 
Numbing the Body (of Language) into Nothingness 
 
In the interviews, ‘doing nothing’ is linked with stopping, disappearing and/or sleeping. What 
these ‘activities’ have in common is that they entail a numbing of the body (of language) into 
nothingness. It is here that fatigue comes to the fore as the function we normally attribute to 
it, as a diminishment or loss of tension, a shutting off, which is expressed via various 
inhibitions pertaining to mental and physical movements.  
First of all, what fatigue seems to shut off (or attempt to) through ‘doing nothing’ is the 
ever-constant movement of demands, as expressed by Lucy:  
 
You’re under pressure to earn money, you’re under pressure with your studying 
or your working if you’ve got kids. I was a single parent at the time. Life canny28 
just stop. But that’s what this disease wants you to do. It wants you to stop. It 
wants you to do nothing (/L143-146). 
 
 
28 ‘Canny’ is Scottish slang for ‘can’t’. 
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The commandment for productivity presents itself as the “pressure to earn money”, 
“studying” and also being “a single parent”. That these entail a constant movement is seen 
when Lucy says “Life canny just stop”; an acknowledgment that it is impossible to stop, 
particularly seeing as one cannot bypass the demand to “earn money”. Thereafter is expressed 
a wish “to stop” and “to do nothing”. This can be read as a(n) (unconscious) desire to shut 
off life itself, a desire for the impossible — desire after all being about that which lies beyond 
an obstacle. The unconscious nature of the desire is attested to in the fact that the refusal/the 
act of ‘doing nothing’ is not recognised to belong to Lucy but is an action attributed to the 
“disease” as something seemingly independent to her.  
Beyond shutting off demands, or in conjunction to it, what ‘doing nothing’ appears to 
involve is an inhibition of the mind. The participants and many patients in general refer to 
what is called ‘brain fog’: a well-known symptom for fatigue in which mental aspects are 
diminished. Brody for instance conveys the following: 
 
There will be times when I’m having a conversation and somebody will be 
talking for a decent long time and I’ll - yea - lose the track – I would just stop 
listening [small laugh]. Like really not being able to concentrate on what the point 
of it is. Um. A dulling of the senses I guess [quietly] (B/L353-356). 
 
Brody is experiencing a “dulling of the senses”, not being “able to concentrate on what the 
point of it is”, which suggests, in conjunction with the fact that he “would just stop listening”, 
that the interpretative aspect of language is turned off. That is, meaning is shut off, or 
conversations are rendered meaningless in that he is unable or unwilling to figure out “what 
the point of it is”. Fatigue numbs cognitive thinking, something present in everyone’s 
accounts as they describe being unable to think, find and remember words, form responses, 
and there is a difficulty in understanding or processing what others are saying to them. 
Furthermore, not only are mental activities inhibited but so is desire, as relayed by Gail: 
 
My brain stops taking in anything, it’s not interested even if I’m in college I just 
basically cut out. Completely. Um I’ve got to - got to get to bed. I’ve got to close 
my eyes and get to bed (A/L606-621). 
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Gail articulates an urgency to sleep, not in the sense of falling asleep but a push towards it, 
which can therefore be related to a drive to sleep. This is associated to a “cut[ting] out” of 
one’s surroundings, including an “interest” in college, possibly reflecting desire. Indeed, the 
inhibitions presented by the participants extend far beyond thinking and appear to be linked 
to a core part of themselves, evident in that they associate the loss of their bodies and their 
minds to themselves (having ‘lost themselves’ through having acquired the condition). For 
instance, for Mark, the mental difficulties are analogous to having removed the “whole layer 
of one’s personality” in a lobotomy, which relates to “higher mental functions [which] just 
aren’t there” (B/L257-259). It is as if one is reduced to a mere, barely existing body. 
Nevertheless, it appears that it is not just the body of language the subject attempts to 
numb into nothingness, but also the body in its material, fleshy and ultimately excessive state. 
Lucy conveys something like this: “There’s nothing there so any kind of emotional stress and 
you’re, you’re, you’re floored” (L359-363). Expressing that she gets “floored” from 
emotional stress in relation to “nothing” suggests that the emotional stress gets numbed into 
nothingness. Likewise, Gail alludes to disappearing into nothingness by saying “And I’m not 
really here. I’m - I’m like, just floating above the surface. ‘Cus I can’t really feel” (B/L331-
332). She refers to a state of numbness into which she and her feelings disappear. The 
participants in other words describe zombie-like states, becoming dead and numb objects 
whose affects, desires and, ultimately, responsibilities are shut off. At large, their bodies are 
disconnected from a meaningful Other. Lucy proclaims: “…your body, feels completely 
disconnected. And you feel, you feel like you’re permanently drunk” (L39-40), where being 
drunk relates to a nonsensical state where there are no laws or rules. All in all, it is thus not 
a specific emotion or meaning which is shut off, but emotions and meanings as such, or in 
other words, the symbolic Other and the body as such. Instead of viewing this numbing into 
nothingness as a purely ‘negative’ experience which ‘happens to you’ and contains the 
element of horror to the person experiencing them in the sense that it reflects an encounter 
with the incomprehensible real — which it no doubt does — we can recognise the protective 
aspect of it as well. This is in line with the idea that a symptom formation is a defence against 
anxiety from both a Freudian and Lacanian perspective. 
Freud had previously come to view anxiety as a product of repression, but when 
revising the concept of anxiety in his paper ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’ (Freud, SE 
XX) he came to the opposite conclusion: that anxiety was a cause of repression (however 
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while not dismissing the view of anxiety as an effect). Lacan likewise views a symptom as a 
defence against the Other’s desire, against the enigma of existence and identity to which there 
is no answer, through an act of separation. Separation (se parer) in French after all signifies 
to ‘defend oneself’. We have seen how the encounter with incomprehensible demands 
involves encountering enigmatic desire, leading to the fundamental question with which all 
subjects are faced: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘What do you want from me?’ (Fink, 1999: 122; 
Vanheule, 2014: 70). We attempt to calculate, through the mOther’s absences and presences, 
what we mean for the Other in order to understand our existence and place in the world. 
Subsequently, an answer is constructed in and through the fundamental fantasy, the place in 
which the subject stages desire and the subject-object relation; a response which comes to 
determine formations of the unconscious and the nature and function of symptoms 
(Vanheule, 2014: 72). In other words, it is with a symptom one responds to the desire of the 
Other, and thus a symptom, from a Lacanian perspective, is inevitably a way of organising 
reality. The function of the fundamental fantasy is then twofold: to provide a meaningful 
existence in the world, an answer as to who I am or will be, and thereby to shield against loss 
and lack inherent in desire (Chiesa, 2007:142-143; Neill: 2014: 68; Žižek, 2006a: 59). The 
answer in fantasy follows a certain logic discernible by attending to the structure of a person’s 
discourse, which is determined by the way lack (and loss resulting therefrom) is dealt with, 
or rather defended against.  
I argue that for fatigue, the answer given in the fundamental fantasy is that of ‘doing 
nothing’, as a protection not just against the demand to ‘keep going’, the demand for constant 
presence and activity, but against incomprehensible and contradictory demands (‘keep going’ 
versus ‘slow down’). Therefore, fatigue constitutes a protection against demands, life and 
language as such. While in the previous chapter I postulated how ‘doing nothing’ brings forth 
a void necessary for identity formation — which is arguably part of the fundamental fantasy 
but which occurs via the side of the subject (to preserve subjectivity) — providing an answer 
focuses on the ‘second’ function of the fundamental fantasy. This functions comprises a 
bulwark against lack and loss, which transpires on the side of the object. This latter moment 
coincides with the function of fantasy as a way of plugging up lack, which is not to be 
confused with the fundamental fantasy as such (Swales, 2012: 89), since the fundamental 
fantasy includes both moment as it stages the subject-object relation. Put differently, ‘doing 
nothing’ at this stage seems to be about disappearing into an abyss, a numbing into 
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nothingness, and through this, removing lack (and loss). It is especially sleep which appears 
to gain a prominent role here — sometimes depicted as the only thing which offers reprieve 
from a painful life.  
 
The Desire to Sleep  
 
Sleep as an escape from demands and the pain these bring is discernible in many of the 
participants’ accounts. Beyond expressing an urge and desire to sleep, equating sleep with an 
escape can be traced in their complaints about not getting a good night’s sleep and still feeling 
exhausted after having slept through the night — as if sleep would provide the ultimate 
solution to fatigue. Amy puts sleeping on a pedestal when she states: “’Cus I do sort of 
wonder if I could - I feel every day in life if I just go to my bed and wake up tomorrow and 
feel refreshed, it would be great” (A/L399-400). Accordingly, it seems like sleep, and only 
sleep, provides relief from pain for Amy: “This is like having that from the minute you get 
up - having the - the pain from when the minute you get up in the morning ‘til you go to bed 
at night” (A/301-302). Saying that pain comes on only when awake is a testament to the fact 
that it disappears during the night. In this way, we can compare sleeping, together with the 
above-mentioned inhibitions involving a numbing the body (of language) into nothingness, 
with Lacan’s notion of the ‘desire to sleep’. 
In seminar XIX, Lacan mentions a sleep which ‘suspend[s] the ambiguity at work in 
the relationship of the body to itself, namely the enjoying’; ‘To sleep, is not to be disturbed. 
Enjoyment, all the same, is disturbing’ (Lacan, 2011 as cited in and translated by Zupančič, 
2017: 90). The body can be related to both the body of language and the body in flesh, and 
‘the ambiguity’ to the state of discrepancy between the two. The discrepancy stems from the 
fact that we say we have a body, which means we do not naturally coincide with our body — 
language and the body are ultimately incompatible. Moreover, the body has a life of its own 
and is affected by others’ beliefs and words, an inescapable situation of alienation. This 
means there are always disturbing excesses (‘enjoyment’ as jouissance) which cannot be 
integrated into our sense of self. The discrepancy between the body and the body of language 
constitutes the divided subject, a division which can come to the fore and become unbearable 
at certain moments in our lives. This can be linked with the accumulation of demands as 
encountered by the participants during the alienating encounters, which represents for the 
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subjects a disturbing excess, jouissance, related to a closeness of the Other’s 
desire/demand/need and thus unable to be integrated into the subject’s sense of identity. 
Alternatively or additionally, the drive to sleep, also related to jouissance, is experienced by 
the ego as an incomprehensible, out-of-control excess unable to be integrated into the image 
of being a hard-working person who ‘keeps going’. Put simply, there is a difference between 
where one wants to be, or believes one should be, and where one currently experiences 
oneself to be. Falling asleep protects against such a division as it appears to contain the 
function of fantasy. The fantasy constitutes imagining a point in the future wherein one has 
no tension, where the imaginary (Lacan, Seminar XXI: X3-4) puts a stop to the circularity of 
language. In this context, fantasy linked to the moment of falling asleep has the ability of 
halting the piling up of incomprehensible demands and alongside this, the tensions of one’s 
body, making it possible to forget the confines of the body and of society and more 
specifically to put up a barrier between the subject and the Other, to limit one’s movement 
as related to the Other. The way in which this occurs is through providing the answer of 
‘doing nothing’ in the fantasy, which constitutes a moment of concretising lack into sleeping: 
one moves away from incomprehensible desire and existence — not knowing what object 
one is for the Other as demonstrated through the movement and accumulation of demands 
— to the answer of sleeping whereby all problems are condensed into one specific, knowable 
entity. The ‘nothing’ as a void is turned into ‘nothing’ as an answer. This answer further 
involves a merging with the object of ‘nothing’ believed to exist in sleeping/disappearing, 
which is in line with what Lacan (2002/2006: 513) says about part-objects in fantasy, that: 
‘he is destroyed by them or preserves them, but above all he is these objects’. This explains 
the above section regarding the subject numbing him/herself into an object of nothing. The 
function of the fantasy is precisely to move from subject to object when ‘the libidinal being 
threatens no longer to be able to maintain itself as the bearer of signifiers’ (de Kesel, 2009: 
33), that is, when one cannot tolerate the tensions which signifiers, qua demands here, bring 
in their movement. Fatigue here could then be a viewed as a way of falling asleep in the 
fantasy in order to avoid alienation and castration, and in which, in Lacanian language, one 
obtains real jouissance in the form of pure and limitless enjoyment protective against the 
excess of the body (of language). Lacan links the fantasy to a desire to sleep — and in his 
paper ‘The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power’ (2002/2006) he more 
specifically links the fantasy with the dream and falling asleep with desire, which is to be 
 
 
137 
read metaphorically. However, we can say that fatigue presents itself as an almost literal 
incarnation of the fantasy, or rather brings out its fundamental nature, and more precisely, of 
desire.  
Insofar as desire only functions in relation to an unattainable object — as soon as an 
object of desire has been obtained, desire moves onto another object in a metonymic 
movement — what is desired, in its most fundamental form is a type of nothingness. As 
Lacan (Seminar II: 223) states, a desire at the core of the subject is ‘the desire for nothing 
nameable’. One desires both to lack, and that which is capable of imaginarily removing lack. 
To explain this in more detail, for the fantasy to work, a void is needed and desired, which is 
a type of nothingness on the side of the real put in place by making sure one does not obtain 
the objects one wants; that one has nothing (the object of desire). On the other hand, having 
obtained what is perceived as the object of desire would entail the end of desire and mean 
that one, thereafter, is complete and thus needs and wants nothing — another type of 
nothingness, although on the side of the imaginary. Desire is thus always about a nothingness, 
as the object is kept at a distance (devoured through consumption, or unattained). It is in this 
way that Lacan expounds on the paradox of desire and fantasy by stating that: ‘To desire 
involves a defensive phase that makes it identical with not wanting to desire. Not wanting to 
desire is wanting not to desire’ (Lacan, Seminar XI: 235). Where there is lack, to desire, there 
is also simultaneously a desire to do away with it, which would constitute the defence, to not 
desire. Focusing here on the desire to sleep as a moment of removing tension and lack, we 
are more on the side of not wanting to desire, which is the defensive part of the subject. In 
this case, the numbing of the body (of language) into nothingnesss is based on the belief that 
satisfaction is possible, that the place of Nirvana exists wherein one is free from the hunger 
and thirst of life and the pain this brings, and that an escape from the societal Other and one’s 
body is possible.  
This could be compared to Lacan’s view of anorexia as satisfying the insatiable, or 
rather to satisfy the mOther’s desire, in which case the child would make ‘himself a deceptive 
object’ (Lacan Seminar IV: 223-224), as s/he would postulate him/herself as the object of the 
mOther’s desire as a way of defending against her impenetrable desire. Lacan (Ibid.: 214) 
further states that the object ‘which appears under the sign of nothing’ is ‘annulled as 
symbolic’. We can bring forth another aspect of ‘eating noting’ here, which is turning the 
symbolic-real object (of lack) into the imaginary object through satisfying the insatiable, 
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thereby removing lack. The consumption of energy as an escape from the Other and from 
one’s body through ‘doing nothing’ can be said to have this function of being fulfilled, of 
wanting and needing nothing and no one. Sleep becomes a means of establishing this and 
removing the tension of discrepancy as it is experienced as a place of bliss, comfort, safety, 
free from pain, responsibility and any restrictions (while yet paradoxically restricting lack/the 
movement of demands). This is also related to various forms of addictions and eating 
disorders where indulging in an object makes it possible to forget that one ‘has’ a body 
through merging with the object (alcohol, drugs, food, sleep).  
For example, to not desire is in line with Valdré’s (2018) take on anorexia, who 
recognises the increasing aspect of it today, not as the activity of starving oneself but as 
inclusive of all the forms in which desire and pleasure are inhibited (Ibid.: 90). Anorexia can 
be grasped as ‘an aversion to desire in its different forms’ (Ibid.: 3) where ‘it is the desire of 
not having needs or desires’ (Ibid.: 93). However, many other theorists, and particularly 
within the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis, arguably fail to acknowledge this type of 
defence when conceptualising modern symptoms as real, that is, viewing them as not 
structured symbolically or imaginarily. Verhaeghe (2004: 291) claims that in 
actualpathology, with which he links fatigue, any ‘accompanying fantasmatic developments 
are completely absent’29, and that in hysteria belonging to psychoneurosis, when the fantasy 
fails, depression comes to the fore through an experience of being and meaning nothing 
(Ibid.: 377) 30. Rik Loose’s (2002, 2015) argument in relation to addiction and modern 
symptoms takes on a similar viewpoint in that he claims that symptoms are not structured via 
the symbolic, which means they are unable to protect against the real. I argue that this line of 
reasoning neglects an important aspect of fatigue, and probably of many/some other modern 
symptoms. Following a Lacanian perspective, we can view the fantasy as something 
deceptive: the object of fantasy can on the surface come across as a void and a nothingness 
(the real), while it can be covered over imaginarily; with it sometimes being impossible to 
tell the two apart. This is due to their inextricability from each other, and due to the function 
 
29 However, Verhaeghe’s (2004) perspective here becomes confusing when he claims that for actualpathology, 
the ‘relation boils down to the fact that the Other failed in its initial verbalisation of (a) [the original drive 
tension], with the result that the secondary elaboration was not set in motion, or only barely’ (p. 308). It is not 
certain what the position of ‘only barely’ would entail.  
30 A similar line of thinking is also present from lay perspectives, where it is though that depression, for 
example, constitutes a more realistic view on reality since the person is in contact with the void or with the 
meaninglessness of life. 
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of language; that it simultaneously hides and reveals the unconscious. The confusing nature 
also stems from the fact that, as Žižek (2000: 107-113) recognises in relation to the notion of 
anorexia as ‘eating nothing’, the structure is included in the content. The content of fantasy 
does not include variability in terms of a displacement and movement of different objects as 
one would normally find here, but an object (‘nothing’) which is indifferent to all other 
objects — an object of fantasy nevertheless. In a way, the content is diminished, while the 
fundamental structure is strengthened as the desire to (not) desire. Not only that, but a void 
can be used as a protection and a defence. As long as nothing and everything is desired (using 
the void as a way of plugging it up), one need not make a decision with regard to providing 
an answer to one’s identity, or in this case, one need not respond to a demand — sleep being 
the response of a non-response and a way of saying no to alienation and otherness. It is this 
bare minimum of an object inherent in ‘doing nothing’, or rather the object of a non-object, 
which I argue can give the appearance that there is no fantasy life, or that it has been 
diminished. This is in accordance with what De Rick (2002) calls an ‘impoverishment of the 
fantasy life’ which she claims frequently comes to the fore today. However, she follows 
Freud’s line of reasoning inherent in actual neurosis in claiming that there are no secondary 
elaborations of the symptom present in terms of a ‘symbolic-imaginary processing of the 
Real’ (Ibid.: 127). I argue, in contrast, that desiring ‘doing nothing’ are signifiers framing the 
fantasy, and thus constitutes precisely such a processing, or at least an attempt of it. Of course, 
the object of ‘nothing’ can easily lose its imaginary clothes and turn into an encounter with 
the void, which will be discussed more in the next chapter. Nevertheless, given the fantasy’s 
conceiving nature in this manner outlined, could it not be that what is thought of and comes 
across as a ‘real symptom’ is easily confused with the defence of the subject? Since this type 
of symbolically structured symptom is not entertained as a possibility in the theories just 
mentioned, we can consequently in relation to fatigue as presented here, question the division 
made between the symbolic-imaginary and the real in the formation of symptoms — or in 
other words; question the large division made between the mind and the body. 
Returning to fatigue as not wanting to desire, there is a sense in which the subject’s 
attempt of numbing into nothingness, alongside the complaints that life is inevitably full of 
demands, echo Oedipus’ exclamation of me phúnai: ‘Never to have been born’. It could 
amount to an impossible desire to eradicate one’s existence, which would relate to wanting 
‘nothingness’. Lacan invokes this desire in relation to the pain of existence at the end of 
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desire, when ‘suffering is excessive’ and when one no longer has a ‘desire to live’ (Lacan, 
Seminar VI: 91) — resonating with what has been discussed so far. The wish for nothingness 
in this manner also echoes Freud’s conceptualisation of the death drive as the aim to restore 
an earlier state, to return to the inorganic. 
When hypothesising the origin of the drive (mistakenly translated as ‘instinct’ from 
the German ‘Trieb’ by James Strachey) in his text ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, Freud 
(SE XVIII) places great emphasis on the death drive, which appears in agreement with 
Lacan’s proclamation that all drives are death drives. The characteristic of a potential 
universal drive, Freud claims, is the aim towards death: ‘the aim of all life is death’ (Freud; 
SE XVIII: 38), amounting to a tension attempting to ‘cancel itself out’. The cancelling out of 
itself ascribed to the death drive translates into ‘the instinct to return to the inanimate state’ 
in the face of life. This stands in stark contrast to the life drive, whose aim is to preserve life 
and to produce tensions (Ibid.: 40). Freud further argues for an inextricable relation between 
the death drive and the pleasure principle, the latter of which is a tendency with a function to 
‘free the mental apparatus entirely from excitation or to keep the amount of excitation in its 
constant or to keep it as low as possible’ (Ibid.: 62). Hence, there is a large overlap between 
the death drive and the pleasure principle: ‘The pleasure principle seems actually to serve the 
death instincts’, because it is protective against ‘increases of stimulation from within’ (Ibid.: 
63). Freud, however, writes that it cannot be decided which of the function is to be associated 
with the pleasure principle (Ibid.: 62); whether it is to eradicate all tension or keep it constant, 
or low. In the interviews, fatigue as a numbing into nothingness could be linked with the first 
function mentioned, to get rid of tensions entirely, echoing the exclamation ‘never to have 
been born’ as a means of protecting oneself against the tensions of demands. Because if 
‘nothing’ is sought after, then the ‘nothing’ associated with sleeping becomes the promise of 
a complete break from all demands, decisions and bodily ailments (remember Brody’s “get 
rid of all variables”); an eradication of one’s existence. ‘You want life? I’ll give you death’ 
appears to be the response at some level to the demand for constant presence and 
productivity, to the demand for life itself.  
By bringing in Lacanian theory, we can link this imaginative moment, postulated by 
Freud to belong to both the aim of the death drive and the function of the pleasure principle, 
with that of impossible and defensive desire. After all, it is impossible to get rid of all the 
tensions of the body, or to put a stop to the demands of life, or to erase a lived life. Thus, the 
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aim towards the inorganic — Freud’s terminology of such a Nirvana principle having given 
rise to many misunderstandings regarding the drive as wanting death — if focusing on the 
term ‘aim’, would better resonate with the desire not to desire, with that which imagines an 
absence and nothingness where things are still, dead, peaceful, and restriction-free — rather 
than ascribe it to the activity of the drive. Not only that, but in line with the Lacanian literature 
and that Freud’s life drive can more adequately be assigned to Lacan’s concept of the death 
drive as I argued in the previous chapter, desire can be viewed as a defence against the drive. 
This would be in line with the interviews where we can perceive that fatigue is a defence 
against pain, which will now be explored through Freud’s and Lacan’s notion of inhibition. 
 
Fatigue as an Inhibition and a Defence Against Pain 
 
The interviews are full of repetitive mentions of inhibitions which we saw above — probably 
the most repetitive aspect of the interviews. Inhibitions are expressed as “I can’t” followed 
by a number of activities (Gail’s “I can’t really feel” and Lucy’s “You can’t process 
information”). Fatigue as a whole is an inhibition of physical and mental movements, a 
moment of inertia supposedly in the attempt to numb the body (of language) into nothingness. 
Fatigue as an inhibition thus includes a protection against pain, which we can trace in the 
interviews in the fact that exhaustion follows an increase of tension in the form of pain. We 
can further track this through certain utterances, for instance when Gail claims: “You’re tired 
because the ME always comes on from the pain ‘cus you’re fighting pain” (C/L46-47). The 
process this entails can be elucidated with Freud’s and Lacan’s notion of an inhibition as a 
defence against anxiety.   
Freud (SE XX) defined an inhibition in relation to a symptom, delineating both their 
potential overlap as well as difference. In terms of their difference, an inhibition, he argues, 
is a ‘restriction of the function of the ego’ put in place as a protection or because of an 
‘impoverishment of energy’, due to an illness for example (Ibid.: 90). A symptom on the 
other hand does not reside within the ego but emerges from repression, ‘proceeds from the 
ego’, due to an incompatibility between the id impulse and the ego, for example a conflict 
created by the involvement of the superego (strongly related to societal ideals demanded by 
others). This means the symptom is a substitute for the repressed impulse (Ibid.: 90—91), 
disguising the impulse (Ibid.: 112). In short, if an inhibition works to avoid an occurrence of 
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anxiety then it has the function of a symptom, since symptoms are created to ward off danger 
(Ibid.: 144). Bogdan Wolf (2019: 25) in his book ‘Anxiety Between Desire and the Body’ 
postulates that Freud, as well as Lacan, separates an inhibition from a symptom, where he 
ascribes the inhibition to Little Hans’ phobia and the symptom to the horse (as a signifier) 
being substituted for the father. This does not quite hold up reading Freud, who seem to 
profess an inextricability between a symptom and an inhibition; however it depends on how 
one interpret what a symptom is, as it has several components. Lacan likewise attributes to 
an inhibition the function of a defence against anxiety. 
In seminar X, Lacan defines an inhibition in relation to an anorexic ‘refusal of the 
breast’, explaining that while the refusal brings out the void of ‘nothing’ qua lack (object a 
as the condition of subjectivity and desire), an inhibition is brought out by the anal object and 
has the function of working against object a by withholding it: 
 
That which is going to identify desire, primordially, with the desire to hold back 
is appended to this object as a causal object. The first progressive form of desire 
is, therefore, as such, akin to the realm of inhibition (Lacan, Seminar X: 328). 
 
Lacan thus distinguishes between two types of desires: a primordial desire and a 
progressively formed desire. Primordial desire is linked with the presence of lack and an 
object ‘primordially produced’ which is a ‘product of anxiety’. Progressive desire defends 
against the primordial anxiety, because it turns ‘against the pre-existing function that 
introduces the object a as such’ (Ibid.). An inhibition is thus a defence against lack and 
anxiety through a defensive ‘progressive’ desire, and therefore, both a Freudian and Lacanian 
take on inhibition resonate with the interviews and can be compared with the moment of 
holding back energy, of hoarding it, and not desiring. This depicts the subject-object relation, 
if relating the subject to the drive and lack and the object to (defensive) desire. We could 
further say that an inhibition comes to be a refusal of the refusal, or, put differently, a 
symptom of a symptom. This is in accordance with Lacan’s excerpt outlined above in that 
primordial desire is linked with a refusal, while progressive desire is linked with an 
inhibition, and the latter has attached itself to the former and is a defence against it. In 
addition, Lacan (Seminar X: 316) claims there is a ‘structural concealment of desire behind 
inhibition’. This would add another ‘layer’ or rather function to the symptom, one which 
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disguises it further and renders it a disguise of the impulse (the refusal), as expounded by 
Freud. We can argue based on this that tied to an inhibition, an “I can’t”, is desire as a refusal, 
an ‘I don’t want to’. Insofar as the inhibitions are tied to a numbing into nothingness with a 
protective function, this refusal of the refusal can be compared to alcohol addiction, where, 
as Adam Phillips (2017) astutely puts it: ‘Drinking becomes a problem, but actually the 
problem is what’s being cured by the alcohol’. Not only does the inhibition defend against 
anxiety — with which a decrease of tension is associated — but against the recognition of 
lack due to the involvement of repression.  
We notice repression of lack at work in the interviews through the experience that the 
body is living a life of its own (remember from last chapter Lucy’s proclamation “but what 
can you do if your body’s acting like it - just wants to sleep all the time?”). That is, the body 
(or the illness as a “disease”) is thought to represent an organism working independently of 
the subject which is to blame for one’s inhibitions — hence why they are expressed as an 
inhibition in the form of “I can’t”. The endorsement of this idea keeps the subject from 
recognising any subjective involvement in their conditions, concealing the refusal fuelled by 
one’s own desires and drives. This constitutes an externalisation of loss and lack, which we 
can compare to what Lacan terms a ‘passion for ignorance’. Indeed, Lacan (Seminar X: 323) 
places an inhibition at the scopic level with a ‘desire not to see’ which can be linked with a 
desire not to desire, and the passion for ignorance. 
The refusal, in turn, arguably hides fundamental lack insofar as it can be tied to the 
notion of primal repression, which is part of the theory of the establishment of the 
unconscious. Primal repression is the first moment of repression and occurs, according to 
Freud, when the ‘psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct [is] being denied 
entrance into the conscious’ (SE XIV: 148). According to Lacan, what is denied entrance 
into consciousness is lack itself, a refusal of lack, seen when Lacan says that a ‘saying no’ 
gets assigned to ‘the unsaid’ (Lacan, Seminar VI: 76), where the unsaid is equivalent to lack. 
Lacan follows Freud (SE XIX: 235-242) here by claiming that a rejection of an idea always 
entails an affirmation of that idea — a way and sometimes the only way in which an 
unconscious idea can enter consciousness. A negation of lack is simultaneously an 
acknowledgment of lack. In my interpretation, we can observe these two sides part of primal 
repression in the interviews. On the one hand, a void is acknowledged and attempted to be 
invoked in the social order through an unconscious refusal. On the other hand, lack is not 
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tolerated as seen from the arguments in this chapter, and is further attested to in the act of 
trying to introduce their bodies into the symbolic as a way of remedying lack — when being 
met with radical lack as a result of encountering the statement ‘there’s nothing wrong with 
you’. Introducing lack as enacted through the body could be a way of attempting to do away 
with lack through it coinciding with a diagnostic label. These two processes need not be in 
complete opposition to one another but could be said to be complementary, in the sense that 
there needs to be a disintegration in order to integrate: object a as the void is foundational 
for identification, because the experience of lack is what causes the identification with 
something which would do away with it. The latter could be understood more clearly in the 
appeal to a diagnosis as a totalising explanation, accompanied by the belief that the body can 
coincide with a label. However, at a more fundamental level, the refusal of lack can be 
witnessed in encountering the medical Other’s ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’. As long as 
the statement is experienced as a dismissive one where the doctor does not wish to take an 
interest in you (thus could if the Other wanted to), which appears to be the experience of 
many of the participants, the subject fails to acknowledge that the medical Other does not 
have the answer — that the Other of the Other does not exist. Instead, the take-home message 
is that an answer is being refused them. We then observe the opposite situation play out 
through the formation of fatigue, where the subject refuses the Other. 
 
To Sleep or Not to Sleep: Pain Versus Fatigue 
 
Obvious by now is the fact that there is a significant contradiction present in the condition. 
On the one hand, the body is used to signal the subject’s aliveness, for which tension is 
needed as a way of keeping desire alive. On the other hand, there is a numbing of the body 
into nothingness where desire and tension are (attempted to be) extinguished. The struggle is 
thus between to desire and not to desire, life and death, between presence and absence. This 
split arguably manifests in the interviews as pain/tension versus fatigue, where pain better 
represents the drive marking the presence of the subject, while fatigue better depicts an 
absence or disappearance. I argue that this contradiction is the fundamental split of the subject 
in terms of a split between the drive and desire. In this sense, Freud’s life drive better 
represents the death drive from a Lacanian perspective, if following a simple reading of his 
text ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’. Freud (SE XVIII: 63) claims the life instincts are 
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‘constantly producing tensions’ and are ‘breakers of the peace’, which is in line with a 
Lacanian perception of the drive as brought forth clearly by Žižek (2006b): the drive is a 
surplus jouissance, an excess of life, in the form of a constant tension produced in order to 
keep desire unsatisfied, for it to keep persisting through the repetition of loss. Its aim is, 
contrary to popular belief, to remain alive and to keep going. Conversely, desire is about 
absence, about always being elsewhere than one’s current situation as restricted by the big 
Other and the body, about being fulfilled, and therefore constitutes a point of imagining pure 
absence qua wholeness with which death and sleep are associated. More correctly, it amounts 
to imagining something positive in the place of loss (Žižek, 2006b), thereby removing it and 
the accompanying tensions. It comes very close to the (again simple) Freudian idea that an 
increase of tension is related to anxiety and a decrease to its absence. There is, furthermore, 
a sense in which this paradox mimics the sociocultural demands to ‘keep going’ and ‘slow 
down’, where the latter constitutes in the case of fatigue a shutting off of desire. 
Lacan paraphrases Hamlet as a way of depicting the split of the subject: ‘to be or not 
to be, to sleep, perchance to dream’ (Lacan, 2002/2006: 524). To be the phallus (that which 
completes the mOther’s desire), or not to be the phallus, to sleep or not to sleep, to maintain 
lack and desire or not to — that is the question of castration. The original quote from Hamlet 
goes: ‘to die, to sleep – to sleep, perchance to dream – ay, there’s the rub, for in this sleep of 
death what dreams may come…’. Sleep is equated to death, a ‘sleep of death’ in which it is 
not certain ‘what dreams may come’ considering one is dead. Death here can be read in two 
ways in relation to castration, thereby portraying the paradoxical nature of fantasy and desire 
giving rise to the two oppositional forces of the subject. Fulfilling one’s desire — escaping 
castration — equals the death of lack and subjectivity, the inability to dream (to stage desire 
in fantasy, since Lacan seemingly equates the dream with the fantasy31); because if one 
merges with the object in fantasy, the object here being ‘nothing’ in sleeping, one is deprived 
of the object (Lacan, 2002/2006: 532). Conversely and paradoxically, not fulfilling one’s 
desire — being castrated — also equals death, however a different kind of death. Entering 
into the symbolic realm results in the death of the pure being of the subject who is unable to 
 
31 As seen in the following quote: ‘It is, in any case, a fact of experience that when my dream begins to coincide 
with my demand (not with reality, as is improperly said, which can safeguard my sleep) – or with what proves 
to be equivalent to it here, the other’s demand – I wake up’ (Lacan, 2002/2006: 521) — here we also see how 
the dream represents the fantasy for Lacan. 
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be represented therein, which gives rise to the experience of lack and loss necessary for 
fuelling desire. The latter presents difficulties for the subject who cannot bear his/her lacking 
and constantly finds ways of escaping it. We could thus attribute to sleeping the place of no 
desire, to not desiring, while not sleeping, the desire (not) to sleep, amounts to keeping desire 
alive, the desire to desire. In relation to fatigue, if assuming sleep as the object of desire (with 
which this section deals), the subject coincides with it in terms of what has been described as 
becoming dead, numb objects in the form of being and having ‘nothing’, where there are no 
desires, needs or demands. Here, there is nothing to satisfy because all is satisfied. On the 
other hand, sleep as a satisfaction of desire never arrives, and instead there is an unquenchable 
tension moving towards sleeping — presenting an obstacle but simultaneously the foundation 
of desire; the latter since one can only dream of sleep if one lacks sleep.  
The contradiction between these two forces also comes to the fore in the interviews 
through the concepts of ‘starting’ and ‘stopping’, echoing again the sociocultural 
contradiction between the demand to ‘slow down’ and to ‘keep going’. To give an example, 
Lucy conveys the split and the attempt to defend against an “overload” in the following 
excerpt: 
 
… your system has started - your system’s shut down. So you’re in so much pain, 
you’ve got an overload of information coming in. So you’re trying to figure this 
out with, a mental impairment (L214-215). 
 
Something “start[ing]” and “shut[ting] down” are here depicted in opposition to one another, 
with presumably “started” being a slip of the tongue. We could interpret the “overload of 
information coming in”, perhaps also inclusive of uncontrollable slips of the tongue, to be 
linked with “so much pain”, which is in line with the movement of the signifier qua the drive 
as an incomprehensible and external force. Thus to shut down, to have “a mental impairment” 
where there is presumably an inability to “figure this out”, could be interpreted as a defence 
against such an invasion. It would constitute a defence against the symbolic itself, against the 
very act of information coming in, which is what has been argued in this chapter: that the 
refusal of the Other through an in inhibition does not entail shutting down a specific meaning, 
but shutting down meaning as such, as a way of escaping the Other. Nonetheless, this 
paragraph demonstrates the split of the subject stuck between starting (presence, aliveness) 
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and stopping (absence, sleeping), and ultimately, the difficulty and impossibility of ‘shutting 
down’. In accordance to this, despite there being attempts by all of the participants to shut 
off the Other, to shut off an otherness both in its symbolic and physical form, we discern how 
the moment of shutting off always fails. 
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Chapter 6: The Pain of Fatigue: The Failure of Mourning 
 
The reason I'm painting this way is that I want to be a machine, and 
I feel that whatever I do and do machine-like is what I want to do. 
 
— Andy Warhol 
 
Observed in the interviews alongside the subject’s attempt to numb the body (of language) 
into nothingness, is the failure of doing so. Instead of nothing, the participants stumble upon 
something in different shapes and forms, namely demands and tensions of the body. Not only 
that, but discernible is an appeal for a symbol to stand in for the subject, more precisely a 
medical diagnosis which would externalise subjective elements — an idea which, 
paradoxically, has links to that of ‘the body as machine’. This chapter explores the failures 
of ‘nothings’ on these different levels and how they constitute a painful fatigue. It further 
contextualises the contradictions they bring forth, in combination with what has been 
explored so far in the thesis, by utilising the Freudian and Lacanian concepts of mourning 
and separation — the two being highly inextricable. 
 
Pain as The Failure of ‘Nothing’: Too Much of Not Enough 
 
The failure of ‘nothing’ is first and foremost evident in the presence of a demand in the place 
where the subject wants or expects ‘nothingness’. This has to a certain extent already been 
outlined insofar as it was described previously how the realisation of the impossibility of 
stopping gives rise to a desire to “do nothing”. However, the focus now is on how the 
presence of a demand — and its accompanying bodily tension — leads to a realisation of the 
impossibility of the desire itself, the failure of desire as opposed to its cause. 
Mark’s discourse illustrates this when comparing a “bad day” of his condition to having 
run a marathon: 
 
Well, imagine you’ve done the London marathon and you’ve been wrapped in a 
blanket and you’re not one of the collapsy (sic) people. You’ve managed it, 
you’re feeling a bit great, breathless, you’re really ‘I’ve done that and that’s 
brilliant’. You are very tired. And then imagine that someone comes over to you 
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and says ‘Right, now we start the day. It’s time to go to work, have a shower, 
then you’ve gotta do some cooking’. You’d be-you would be picking yourself up 
off the ground to try and go and do things and… on a bad day that’s what it’s like 
(A/L289-295). 
 
After such a strenuous activity as a Marathon and what is considered a huge achievement 
(having “managed it” and feeling “that’s brilliant”), tiredness and a break is the logical next 
step. In accordance with this, being “wrapped in a blanket” exudes connotations with a bed, 
rest and sleep, and perhaps completion (covering up lack in blankets). Instead of a break, 
what Mark is presented with is the imposition of imperatives: to “work, have a shower” and 
“cook[ing]”. He is describing something not restricted to the experience of fatigue but a 
lament of a life full of ceaseless demands. In other words, there is no space for fatigue, no 
space in a way to be allowed to be tired. There could even be a realisation of not being 
allowed to enjoy his tiredness; the word “brilliant” is followed by the sentence “you are very 
tired”. This would resonate with the drive (demands qua signifiers) being an obstacle to 
desire (to sleep) and to the pleasure principle, as that which endeavours to keep tension 
constant or low (Grigg, 1997: 164). The drive is a constantly moving force messing up the 
stillness, silence and pause that life could contain, which exists in the fantasy of ‘doing 
nothing’. Not only does this occur in terms of demands, but in the form of various bodily 
tensions, particularly — again — that of pain.  
Stumbling upon a bodily tension instead of the peacefulness of nothingness is most 
evident throughout the interviews in the literal failure to fall asleep. This is the case for Gail 
who further illustrates how the failure of the fantasy to fall asleep removes the answer of 
‘nothing’, and in its stead she is confronted with the unanswerable question of existence 
(radical lack). In her third and last interview, Gail explains that her pain and exhaustion is 
“all consuming” (C/L30), that she “can’t really fall off to sleep” because of the “night sweats 
and the fire build up”, and that her “ME tiredness is unbelievable” (C/L35). She is completely 
overtaken by pain and tiredness through a failure to fall asleep, confronting instead the 
enigma of existence: “it’s reached a stage where I don’t know why I’m living anymore. I 
have no idea” (C/30-31). The failure of ‘nothing’ is also demonstrated in Brody’s following 
discourse: 
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But um you know what I mean if you run without stretching and you get like that 
ache, it can be like that from nothing at all. I could sit here all day and I would 
get that. Um, and that can be very - although it’s dull…(A/L48-49). 
 
That “it can be like that from nothing at all”, from “sit[ting] here all day” means it is not just 
doing too much — this is told in conjunction with explaining how overexertion brings on 
aches — but likewise doing too little which can bring on pain. The body could be viewed as 
an inconvenience interfering with the act of ‘doing nothing’, which bears similarities to 
Schuster’s (2016: 108) argument, following Nietzsche, that for philosophers, the body 
presents an obstacle with its inevitable needs (sleeping, defecating, eating), interrupting the 
activity of pure thinking (or in this case pure inactivity). In this way, the subject fails to fall 
asleep in the fantasy, since the fantasy of ‘nothing’ is nothing but a fantasy. The achievement 
of ‘nothing’ is impossible as there will always be either demands of life (earn money, shower, 
cook), biological needs (cook, eat, sleep), or tensions of the body. Put differently, 
disappearing is impossible. In accordance with this, when scrutinising the other participants’ 
accounts of a description of their (overwhelming) fatigue, we find there, instead of a 
nothingness and a decrease, an increase of tension in the form of a heaviness. 
Mark explains at the start of his condition: “…I remained tired and the tiredness just 
increased and other symptoms started to come in as well. Such as the cold and the…the pain 
in the legs and what not” (A/L664-665). Bodily tensions “coming in” and increasing (“the 
tiredness just increased”) attests to the failure of nothing. Something similar is reflected in 
Amy’s discourse: 
 
I feel like a hypochondriac ‘cus it’s always - there’s always something arrives or 
something like that. But I think predominantly the pins and needles and the 
jumpiness and the heaviness of just not feeling… like you want to get up and 
move (A/L336-339).  
 
The failure of nothing occurs in that “something [always] arrives or something like that”, 
which is precisely bodily tensions in various shapes: “pins and needles”, “jumpiness” and the 
“heaviness” of fatigue. The latter is particularly important, since due to the pause indicated 
by the dots, it can be read as “the heaviness of just not feeling”. This would suggest that the 
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defence of not having any desires, affects or needs and the hoped-for diminishment of 
tensions part of the desire to ‘do nothing’, fails and turns on itself: it becomes a heaviness of 
feeling nothing. Put differently, rather than the lightness of being as imagined by sleeping, 
one is met by the ‘unbearable lightness of being’ to quote Milan Kundera, the experience 
when an absence becomes an unbearable presence. This place is one of ambiguity since it 
constitutes a ‘feeling of not feeling’, the place where tension is mixed with (the thought of) 
an absence of tension. The tension of no tension can be observed in Gail’s discourse when 
saying “you’re feeling that you’re feeling numb” (B/L339). This site of feeling nothing is 
linked to pain since she says thereafter “you’re feeling pain”. Lucy also describes fatigue as 
a heaviness and further the ambiguous place of too much and not enough tension: 
 
… so you’re carrying on it’s like your weight you’re pulling behind you gets 
bigger and bigger and - but you’re still, like you’re still alert. You’re still like, 
and you fe - but this is adrenal starting to kick in now so like the adrenal’s hit 
you, and you’re like that and you’re drinking lots of sugary drinks and you’re 
like, a wee bit like this. But on the other hand your body’s like -  it’s a horrible, 
horrible, horrible, horrible feeling - it’s not like a, feeling, it’s like a wired but 
really really really fatigued feeling (L/508-514). 
 
Lucy describes a place of too much tension (“alert”, “adrenal starting to kick in”, “wired”) in 
conjunction with an opposite experience of not enough tension (“really fatigued feeling” and 
heavy “weight”), signalled by the words “But on the other hand”. If reading the latter of 
Lucy’s discourse structurally as opposed to two different sentences, she is saying ‘it’s a 
horrible feeling it’s not like a feeling’. This could be read as the unbearable feeling of having 
no feelings, or in other words: ‘too much of not enough’. In this way, we can interpret fatigue 
here being a sensation of ‘too much of not enough’ when the gap qua insignificance (not 
feeling, not existing) has become an overwhelming presence. It turns into the pain of fatigue. 
What is ‘not enough’ is not simply a tension which in itself becomes too much, but perhaps 
the unknowability, ambiguousness and foreignness of the tensions, that there is not enough 
understanding of the tensions felt at the level of the body; a mind-body divide. Lucy in the 
above quote keeps mentioning “you’re like that” and “a wee bit like this”: an unnamed but 
nevertheless present feeling. It tallies with what Lacan writes about the pain of existence: ‘It 
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was the sense of existing, as it were, in an indefinite way’ (Lacan, Seminar VI: 90). We can 
link this with an awareness of one’s alienation, insofar as being alienated, being alive, always 
comprises an ambiguous state since the symbolic order separates the subject from his/herself 
and there is a loss of the ability for a stand-alone existence, instead (dis)appearing through 
the symbolic. Gail alludes to something like this when mentioning in relation to her above 
quote about numbness: “You’re here but you’re not here”, and likewise Lucy when she brings 
up the heaviness of her weight, which could be compared to an act of disappearing (insofar 
as it causes her to withdraw from activities), and the fact that she says “you’re still alert”. 
They are alert of the fact that they are disappearing, and that they reside, in a way, outside of 
themselves. In other words, one has not disappeared enough insofar as one is aware of having 
disappeared too much. More exactly, it points to the limit of life, the disjunction between 
being neither dead nor alive but in between the two as an embodiment of the un-dead, or the 
living dead. 
Since fatigue as a desire to sleep was a protection against an enigmatic existence and 
against alienation, we notice the circularity and the failure of fatigue. The pain of existence 
was tied to either the participants’ work, university studies, or encounters with medical doctor 
in the alienation chapter, where they were reduced to an object of nothing, albeit without an 
explanation as to what type of object one was. Through the formation of fatigue, arguably all 
that was done was displacing the tensions related to societal life and human interactions onto 
the body, instead getting lost in the incomprehensibility of bodily tensions. This is attested 
to in the fact that what was described at the onset of their conditions as being stuck in a 
movement with no escape, such as working, is now the way in which their conditions are 
being described, where there is no escaping their painfully fatigued bodies. This scenario 
points to the presence of repression (the return of the repressed), which will be discussed 
further down. Moreover, such a situation is not simply a return to the beginning where pain 
is experienced in the same manner, but could constitute a shift in nuance from ‘the unbearable 
heaviness of being’ to the ‘unbearable lightness of being’, which will likewise be discussed 
more below. 
Not only can we designate the pain of fatigue as a state which passively ‘happens’ to 
you, but we could trace the subject playing a role in the sabotage of his/her desire. ‘Doing 
nothing’ is not fully desirable, which is suggested most clearly in the emergence of boredom 
when facing (a) nothingness —another type of experience which is ‘too much of not enough’. 
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Boredom as the Failure of ‘Nothing’ 
 
Returning to Brody’s excerpt delineated above where he speaks of the failure of ‘nothing’, 
even though he describes his pain as dull (“although it’s dull”), this could be interpreted to 
mean that the activity of sitting down, to which he refers, is boring. The dullness of ‘doing 
nothing’ is attested to in Brody’s second interview where he describes he is “trying to cut out 
the highs and lows and - of sugar and coffee and alcohol” (B/L265-266), thereafter 
announcing: “Great in theory. Boring.” (B/L266). The absence of highs and lows suggest a 
homogenous level perhaps akin to that of ‘doing nothing’, which is considered boring for 
Brody. We can observe this moment to be present in the other interviews where the 
participants describe experiencing difficulties of resisting the urge to ‘do’. In this way, 
boredom becomes another manifestation of the failure of the fantasy of ‘nothing’. This is 
particularly observed in Mark’s account, which corroborates that ‘doing nothing’, while 
being highly desirable as seen in the previous chapter, is at the same time not desirable and 
possibly feared.  
Mark mentions boredom when explaining the inhibitions involved in the conditions. 
He is comparing his condition to that of having a lobotomy and conveys regarding this 
experience: “it’s a bit like being sentenced to exile from the world” because “you’re not 
allowed to go anywhere, you’re not allowed to hold a meaning conversation” (B/L250-251). 
Within this context he makes an association between waiting (or ‘doing nothing’) and being 
bored: “You just have to sit and wait. I was gonna say you have to sit and be bored” (B/L250-
254). Mark then expands:  
 
But that’s one of the scariest things to me is that - I’m not bored by it, when it’s 
like that. Um boredom requires energy. Boredom requires cognitive ability to 
know what you’re missing out on. And on that sort of overwhelming fatigue, 
you’re just…your - your higher mental functions just aren’t there (B/L256-258). 
 
That “one of the scariest things” follows and precedes the word “bored” could indicate that 
one of the scariest things is being bored, and this because “boredom requires cognitive ability 
to know what you’re missing out on”. In other words, boredom comes with the realisation of 
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loss. He is contrarily indicating that one of the scariest experiences is an overwhelming 
fatigue where lack is lacking; where one does not even feel loss because “your higher mental 
functions just aren’t there”. This could simultaneously be read as the defensive moment of 
protecting against loss, but also as the failure of it in line with what was just discussed insofar 
as he is aware of the “higher mental functions [which] just aren’t there”; being engulfed by 
lack/loss itself, something missing, while not having the mental capacity to understand what 
is missing. Boredom could thus be read as a sign of anxiety, a fear of disappearing into 
nothingness, but simultaneously a protection, since it stimulates the subject to engage in 
activities in order to quench the surplus of restlessness and remedy loss, which is what Mark 
is describing in the following excerpt: 
 
I am now struggling to do as little as I have been doing. I’m starting to get a 
surplus amount of energy. And that makes me restless. And it gives me the drive 
to say ‘ah, I can just nip to the shop, I can just do this…’ (B/L169-174). 
 
This is in line with Leader’s (1997: 239) suggestion that ‘to be bored one has to have a body’, 
and that boredom comes not when desire ends but when it is maintained, desire ‘in transition 
between the object we think we are searching for’, as something ‘puts in question the libidinal 
charge we gain from it’ (Ibid.: 240). The interviews seem to reverberate with Leader’s 
proposal insofar as the participants question, through boredom, the ‘libidinal charge’ gained 
from the desire to ‘do nothing’, which is basically turning off desire. Instead of finding no 
desire, what is found is the subject’s desire. 
 
The Pain of Fatigue as The Drive of Desire 
 
What has been uncovered thus far is that fatigue as a moment of ‘doing nothing’ is 
impossible: numbing the body (of language) into nothingness is impossible insofar as there 
are always going to be tensions or thoughts present; excesses which cannot be accessed. Even 
when asleep we are dreaming and thus feeling and thinking with brain activity going on. 
Sitting down is the activity of sitting down, and importantly, if fatigue is used as a protest 
against the dominant sociocultural idea of ‘the body as machine’, then one is definitely doing 
something. There is no escaping our bodies or realities; disappearing is impossible. Shutting 
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off desire is equally impossible, evident in that while one tries to do this, it ironically turns 
into a desire not to desire. This is explicitly and eloquently explained by Marya Hornbacher 
(1999: 6) in her memoir about the addictive nature of anorexia and bulimia: ‘A wish to prove 
that you need nothing, that you have no human hungers, which turns on itself and becomes a 
searing need for the hunger itself’. Žižek (2000: 107) also points this out in relation to an 
anorexic refusal: a ‘co-dependence between detachability from any determinate content and 
excessive attachment to a particular object that makes us indifferent to all other objects’. Or 
put differently, this moment constitutes an attachment to one’s detachment (Cohen, 2018: 8) 
— in line with what was expounded earlier regarding the fantasy for the object of a non-
object (‘nothing’). There is always the presence of the subject in the negation of an activity, 
as elucidated by Lacan (Seminar VI: 83) when emphasising that one does not eat. As he 
further pronounces, to desire not to desire, or ‘not wanting’32 as he writes, are identical. More 
precisely however, they constitute different sides to the same coin/surface as illustrated 
through the Möbius strip (Lacan, Seminar XI: 235), which Lacan uses to depict the split 
subject. They are the same but different: different when it comes to the ambivalence of 
wanting to keep the object at a distance but also wanting to acquire it and be fulfilled — two 
forces working against each other — but the same insofar as one finds fulfilment by being 
unfulfilled. We come back here to the notion of the drive as a satisfaction of a non-
satisfaction, even though such a satisfaction can be said to be accidental (Zupančič, 2017: 
102). In the process of desiring to ‘do nothing’/to sleep — a moment of defence which 
eradicates pleasures, desires, affects, and needs — the subject is the one sabotaging this 
desire, following Schuster’s (2016: 5) useful depiction of the subject as emerging through 
‘the failure not to be’. Put differently, the subject is the one potentially gaining pleasure in 
the thought of no pleasure, or more broadly, in his/her suffering, portrayed in the interviews 
as a tension being present instead of no tension, and that this tension is associated with 
‘positive’ affects. We saw this for Lucy when describing the place of too much tension (and 
not enough), being linked with adrenaline and a “wired” state. We reach here an ambiguity 
and contradiction where she appears to say that something is “wired” — tied to a state of 
adrenaline — but simultaneously a “fatigued feeling”, with the word “but” implying that the 
latter constitutes something of the opposite to the former, or at least something different to 
 
32 The reason Lacan uses the word ‘not wanting’ as opposed to ‘not desiring’ could be that he links the former 
more with the conscious ego, the ego who believes it to be sufficient who wants nothing or no one. 
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it. The place of fatigue in this instance suggests an ambiguous, obscure place akin to Lacan’s 
notion of jouissance, where pleasure and unpleasure — and simultaneously presence and 
absence — are intertwined with each other and there is a difficulty of saying what belongs to 
what; a blurring of boundaries33. Analogously, Brody describes a “nerve pain which is a 
constant eh buzz, or sparks” (A/L52-53), where the word “buzz” is associated with being 
‘buzzed’ and happy. As it is mentioned in relation to pain, it points to a blurring of the 
unpleasure-pleasure limit. The ambiguity of the presence-absence boundary might be a more 
apt way of describing fatigue as we cannot exactly say that there is a pleasure of the thought 
of no pleasure — the concept of enjoyment is a difficult topic. But we cannot entirely dismiss 
it either insofar as such a Freudian discovery explains why people will not easily relinquish 
their suffering (Schuster, 2016: 5). The sabotaging of desire in conjunction with enjoyment 
aptly illustrates subjectivity and in particularly a neurotic complaint, which can come to shed 
light on the structure of the participants’ discourses. Schuster (Ibid.: 5-6) writes that the 
neurotic complaint presents itself as a ‘double failure’ in the sense that ‘the human being is 
that animal that strives to sabotage its own being but is so incompetent it ends up bungling 
even that’. In other words, the subject attempts to sabotage his/her own desire but ends up 
enjoying the process of sabotaging — enjoying his/her suffering. This process does not 
simply revert the negative into something positive (‘nothing’ into ‘something’ in this case), 
but it is ‘undermined or deviated from within’: 
 
To vary a phrase from Freud, men enjoy less than they imagine (hedonistic 
fantasies and images of total gratification that fill their heads) and far more than 
they think (where and when it’s least expected or even wanted, an insistent 
pleasure suddenly crops up) (Ibid.: 5).  
 
In a similar manner, Žižek (2017) speaks about the negation of the negation where the failure 
of the negative is not simply turning the negative into something positive (again), but a ‘less 
than nothing’, where — when taking into account Schuster’s description — that ‘less’ always 
contains something ‘more’. Something like this could be said to be involved in the pain of 
fatigue as the unbearable lightness of being, where emptiness is not empty enough. This 
 
33  We could maybe even say that it is the lack of boundary between pleasure and unpleasure which is 
(un)pleasurable. 
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convoluted way of describing the desire not to desire can for clarity’s sake be compared with 
the inextricability between the life and death drive. Because we cannot speak of a pure 
passivity in relation to fatigue — as if fatigue is about simply turning into a passive sloth — 
but that there is an activity towards such a passivity. This is in agreement with Freud 
describing every drive as an activity ‘whose aim is passive’ (SE XIV: 122). 
While I argued in chapter four of this thesis how Freud’s life drive is more similar to 
Lacan’s theory of the death drive, and Freud’s notion of the death drive as the aim/return 
towards the inorganic is more in line with Lacan’s concept of defensive desire as seen in 
chapter four, Freud’s elaboration in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ about the relation 
between the life and death drives comes close to Lacan’s theory of the inextricable nature 
between the two. Because Freud, early on in his paper, entertains the idea that ‘the aim of all 
life is death’ (Freud, SE XVIII: 39, my emphasis). This suggests that death is always present 
within life, a view which is attested to when he states that life is just a postponement (or 
deviation) of death: ‘What we are left with is the fact the organism wishes to die only in its 
own fashion’ (Ibid.) 34 . The inseparability of life from death and vice versa is further 
corroborated towards the end of his essay where Freud argues for the co-operation between 
the pleasure principle — whose function it is to reduce, keep constant or remove tension — 
and the death drive as the aim towards the inorganic: ‘the pleasure principle seems to actually 
serve the death instinct’ (Freud, SE XVIII: 63). In turn, the life drive as a production of 
tension through binding it (to an idea), he claims, is a ‘preliminary function designed to 
prepare the excitation for its final elimination in the pleasure of discharge’ (Freud, SE XVIII: 
62). This goes with the interviews in that an increase of tension occurs sometimes in order 
to decrease, a process which can also be thought of in terms of a disintegration in order to 
integrate (in sleeping) — in line with Lacanian theory that lack is necessary for identification 
and completeness. Put differently, life and death are inextricable yet do not form a unity, 
following Lacan’s logic of them being ‘the same but different’. They are different when 
desire becomes a defence against the drive, where desire attempts to make less or extinguish 
the bodily agitations and tensions related to the drive (existing on the life-death, presence-
absence poles), but they are the same or on the same level and in co-operation, as I argued, 
when the thought of no/less tension itself turns into a tension. Or put differently, when one 
 
34 Schuster (2016: 34) aptly compares this with the psychic structures (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), each 
constituting a different way of dying. 
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actively (the drive) tries to achieve a passivity (desire). The same goes for pain and fatigue, 
something biomedicine aims to distinguish through separating them into two distinct 
diagnoses, CFS/ME and Fibromyalgia. The fact that they are repeatedly mentioned together 
points to an inextricable relation between the two; however, they can also constitute opposite 
experiences. This passivity within an activity, if we can put it like that, as a deviation of the 
negative, is what brings Zupančič (2017: 97) to formulate the death drive as an ‘ontological 
fatigue’ in her reading of the Freudian drive, where life is but an accidental deviation of the 
inanimate (the negative). She claims that it is not necessarily felt as fatigue, but instead refers 
to the aspect of repeating a negativity (a gap) which always comes with surplus satisfaction, 
the latter of which she argues is not the aim of the drive but something the drive pursues 
despite its emergence (Ibid.: 104). The drive is something which does not stop living but 
which nevertheless moves towards death, or to quote Schuster (2016: 125) again: ‘the feeling 
that life is nothing but a chore and a drudgery and a burden, and cannot go on, yet does not 
stop doing so’. Nevertheless, this repetition of negativity is not the same as the repetition of 
sameness, the latter of which we could link more with desire and the stillness and 
completeness imagined by the fatigued subject to reside in sleeping (or working if following 
the imperative to ‘keep going’). Since the drive involves the repetition of lack, no repetition 
is ever the same: we all die differently as Zupančič (2016: 106) highlights. Insofar as fatigue 
is potentially formed, as was postulated in chapter four, as a way of introducing difference in 
the face of a homogenous reality through a movement towards a non-movement, then fatigue 
constitutes an embodiment of the death drive. However, when difference and incongruity 
between the body and the symbolic-imaginary order is not tolerated and conversely a unity 
is strived for — more in line with defensive desire — then this constitutes a refusal of the 
movements, gaps, differences and ultimately losses produced by the drive. This explains the 
‘stuckness’ of the subject between the imperative to ‘keep going’ and to ‘slow down/stop’.  
Accordingly, the object of ‘nothing’ constitutes a unity and therefore a type of 
sameness, the failure of which is precisely what is complained about in the interviews 
(however alongside or rather logically after complaints about sameness). The participants 
complain about fragmentary, unpredictable, and ambiguous tensions in relation to the idea 
of something complete. We can say that the complaints of these are about the drive, the 
complaint that something fragmented and incomprehensible exists and goes on despite the 
attempt to disappear and restrict them (in fantasy). The lament of the impossibility of 
 
 
160 
‘nothing’ echoes the exclamation of the impossible desire to ‘never have been born’, in the 
form of frustrations about encountering demands or bodily tensions instead of a pure break 
from life (causing the desire to sleep as the drive towards ‘nothing’). We can, based on this, 
come to the conclusion that the more one believes in the object of ‘nothing’ as the place of 
Nirvana (the object of desire capable of removing lack) the more one is driven to achieve it, 
or rather driven to maintain the fantasy. This involves constantly circulating around a void, 
so that one can fantasise about extinguishing it. Desire gives force to the drive. That is, the 
drive is necessary in order to sustain the fantasy to ‘never have been born’ — because it can 
only be thought of after having been born and from the standpoint of living. I thus 
conceptualise the inextricable relation between them as ‘the drive of desire’. In this way, we 
can postulate that there has been a failure of separating from the image and the idea of 
‘nothing’, which fuels desire and in turn fuels the drive. 
Moving away from the concrete bodily enactment of the failure of ‘nothing’, we also 
find this failure on a symbolic level when the subject appeals to the Other as a system of 
knowledge, wishing for a symbol, often in the form of a diagnosis, to stand in for the subject. 
 
Appearing by Disappearing 
  
In contradistinction to the desire to disappear from society into the sweet release of sleep, 
there is also an appeal to be part of society. This takes the form of an appeal for validation 
and recognition for one’s disappearance, where the object of ‘nothing’ is put on display for 
the Other in order to become something in the social order; constituting an inscription of lack 
in the Other. This comes close to the process of the naming of the void explored in chapter 
four, however now it is not a bodily tension signalling an aliveness, but a symbol signalling 
the body’s disappearance and non-existence, which would inscribe the subject on a symbolic-
imaginary level through a representation (such as a diagnosis), as opposed to a symbolic-real 
inscription. 
First of all, we observe in the interviews an appeal to the Other where the participants' 
fatigue, as a disappearance from activities (society), becomes a message to the Other. Mark 
suggests this when conveying the following: 
 
 
 
161 
…by March I was coming home and unable to talk, cook, speak. Sometimes I 
was unable to move myself from the sofa to the bedroom, not even involving 
stairs. Um and my wife would have to lift me up from the sofa and help to carry 
- support me to the bedroom because my legs just didn’t have the energy to 
support my body, um, and this was a very gradual decline, but I could see it 
happening and I was telling people ‘this was what’s happening’. Um…and telling 
my employer ‘this is what’s happening’ (A/L219-224). 
 
There is a retreat from activities (“talk, cook speak” but with an emphasis on speaking since 
it is mentioned twice), in the form of a disappearance, and a subsequent appeal to register 
this disappearance. Not only is there an appeal for another to help him physically (his wife, 
representing something external), but there is a desire to tell others about his disappearance: 
“but I could see it happening and I was telling people ‘this was what’s happening’. Um…and 
telling my employer ‘this is what’s happening’”. There is a desire to be seen, more precisely 
to be seen as someone who disappears in “a very gradual decline”; being seen as the unseen. 
We notice how this relates to a desire for recognition, and indeed Lacan relates the scopic 
and invocatory drives to desire, whereas the anal and oral object are linked to demand. Lacan 
further emphasises an aspect of the drive as an activity, a ‘making oneself’, more precisely 
making oneself seen and/or heard (Lacan, Seminar XI: 195). He mentions that the scopic 
drive involves a loop which returns to the subject and closes it, which is absent in the 
invocatory drive since the ears cannot be closed. This can be understood as inscribing lack 
in the Other in order to close the gap between subject and the Other; to be one with the Other 
and thereby overwrite lack. More precisely, this is enacted when the subject disappears 
behind the object of ‘fatigue/CFS/ME’, allowing a representation in the Other to stand in for 
him/herself, and whereby fatigue/CFS/ME would be validated as a serious, real condition. 
However, the first step towards this is to mark one’s disappearance, to inscribe lack in the 
Other. Sometimes we discern this when the participants mention their deaths or that they are 
planning their funerals. Gail states: “I’ve arranged my funeral” (A/L116), and Mark that he 
“was writing my will” (A/L73) and said goodbye to his mother, which immediately follows 
the sentence of having explained the difficulty of being seen and taken seriously (“I had to 
call around desperately in tears looking for a private consultant who could see me”). Invoking 
their own disappearance can be viewed as an appeal to the Other and can be compared to the 
 
 
162 
fantasy of one’s death as a way of invoking the desire of the Other35. This is still in line with 
Lacan’s take on ‘anorexia nervosa’, wherein one gives one’s loss and disappearance to the 
Other: 
 
The first object he proposes for this parental desire whose object is unknown is 
his own loss—Can he lose me? The phantasy of one's death, of one's 
disappearance, is the first object that the subject has to bring into play in this 
dialectic, and he does indeed bring it into play—as we know from innumerable 
cases, such as in anorexia nervosa (Lacan, Seminar XI: 214-215). 
 
We can then speculate that instead of simply becoming and embodying ‘nothing’, ‘nothing’ 
is produced by the fatigued subject for the Other in order to gain recognition and be 
something valuable (an object of desire), which relates again to the anal object as giving 
one’s loss. One disappears in order to appear. The appearing part is best enacted through the 
biomedical diagnosis of CFS/ME, but more correctly through ME which better represents a 
biomedical condition.  
It is under this name that the subject disappears, since the subject lets the symbol stand 
in for the him/her — another way the failure of ‘nothing’ manifests itself. The disappearance 
of the subject behind the name is attested to by the fact that the participants, and many patients 
in general, refer to ME as an “invisible illness”, which relates to what was mentioned in 
chapter four about ME being a registration of an absence, a diagnosis of a nothingness. 
However, the structure of a disappearance being an appearance is most aptly captured by the 
campaign for ME promoted and embraced by the patients and their loved ones, entitled 
‘Millions Missing’. Through it, what they demand is recognition for their very disappearance 
from society: they want to be included in society as someone excluded, echoing the anorexic 
act to ‘include me out!’ as also mentioned previously. This is in agreement with other 
accounts of anorexia (as a form of starving). For instance, Hornbacher (1999: 9) in her 
experiences with bulimia and anorexia conveys: ‘A disappearing act, the act of becoming 
invisible, is, in fact, a visible act, and rarely goes unnoticed’ (Ibid.: 129), and: ‘One’s worth 
is exponentially increased with one’s incremental disappearance’. 
 
35 Imagining one’s own death/funeral is appropriate for this because one imagines who and how many would 
turn up. In other words, one tries to imagine how desired one is by others (Verhaeghe, 2004: 224). 
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The presence of an appeal to the Other is contrary to what some theorists claim about 
modern symptoms in the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis. For instance, Domenico Cosenza 
(2015) in his discussion on anorexia claims that ‘in the majority of cases’, the symptom is 
neither a message nor an appeal addressed to the Other. This follows the line of reasoning of 
the theories claiming many contemporary symptoms are real, due to the lack of symbolism 
thought to be involved in them. The refusal is rather seen as a ‘pure’ refusal, as solely 
containing the function of separating. In relation to fatigue as presented in this study, and in 
relation to there not being an appeal to the Other, this cannot be maintained as there are 
several suggestions contradicting it.  
Beyond a validation or a recognition of one’s existence, what a validation of a diagnosis 
appears to encompass for the subject is a permission and an explanation for the drive/desire 
towards ‘nothing’, for disappearing. This is suggested by Beth when explaining the effects 
of receiving the diagnosis: 
 
…getting the diagnosis of ME is slightly a relief because it means you can stop, 
kind of, hoping that it will just disappear tomorrow. Um…and accept it uh but 
it’s also really overwhelming (A/L382-384). 
 
The name ME, because it is associated with a chronic illness, is something considered long-
lasting which seems to be “really overwhelming” but simultaneously “a relief”. The “relief” 
could be interpreted to be linked to having received, through the diagnosis, a permission to 
stop: “it means you can stop” (if we cut the sentence there). In other words, a permission to 
give into the desire to ‘do nothing’. We notice here how the signifiers part of a scientific 
discourse, a medical name, sustains the fundamental fantasy. How well the fantasy functions 
depends on the amount of recognition and validation received through a medical diagnosis. 
The validation, in turn, seemingly depends on the explanatory factor: the medical label has 
the ability to explain, or rather (dis)place, the enigmatic functioning of the condition, the 
drive to ‘do nothing’, outside of oneself. This would entail an exoneration of responsibility, 
made possible by placing the cause of one’s incomprehensible bodily tensions on the side of 
the biological body, onto something separate from oneself. The organic body represents here 
an entity independent of the subject, and is to blame for, all his/her shortcomings. A 
symbolic-imaginary inscription of lack thus externalises loss, corresponding to a defence on 
 
 
164 
the part of the subject against not taking responsibility for, or recognising, his/her subjective 
involvement in the condition (Vanheule, 2014: 134). This type of defence is in turn linked to 
the act of separating, which is about fantasmatically (dis)placing the lack and loss in the 
Other, thus offering a function and a place for it (Pluth, 2007: 87).  
More precisely, the signification of a diagnosis can be compared to a symbolic 
identification and to a master signifier, or a point de capiton. A master signifier imaginarily 
halts the sliding of the signifying chain, in a pronouncement of ‘it’s like that’, as opposed to 
it being many other possibilities, as presented by the void (for example other medical 
diagnosis such as IBS, cancer, depression, psychiatric labels, ‘made up’ or simply nothing 
etc.). The diagnostic label corresponds with the function of what Leader calls a 
‘representation of a representation’ (Leader, 2008: 105) where an object is not merely an 
object ‘but the representation of that object’ which is ‘situated in another register’ (Ibid.: 
102). In this case, fatigue as a representative of ‘nothing’ acts as an object put on display 
within a representation — indeed I argued earlier how the diagnosis is a registration of an 
absence, of ‘nothing’, which would fit here too. Leader (Ibid.: 105) further helpfully explains 
a symbolisation in terms of a frame, window or a stage which would emphasise the 
artificiality of an object. The artificiality of a medical diagnosis is particularly evident where 
a name is thought to unite the many various bodily parts (symptoms) and provide a totalising 
explanation of it (coming together under a ‘syndrome’). We can compare this to Lacan’s 
mirror stage whereby the ego is constituted, and add that this process, counted as an 
imaginary identification, is only possible through a symbolic identification. A symbolic 
identification is achieved through the process whereby the mother, or someone else, stands 
beside the child gazing at his/her own reflection in the mirror, or any other reflective surface, 
and is the one to confirm ‘that’s you!’. Thus, a symbolic identification — amounting to the 
notion of the ego ideal — determines and gives form to the imaginary identification, known 
as ideal ego. Žižek (2006a: 80) explains the difference between an imaginary and symbolic 
identification in a simple manner: the imaginary ideal ego is the image you wish to identify 
with, while the ego ideal represents the person/perspective for which the image is intended. 
In the case of fatigue, the image can be said to entail the bodily force towards ‘doing nothing’ 
as a real, serious illness, which takes on meaning from the perspective of the medical 
establishment. The medical establishment acts as a third external point guaranteeing the 
image and limiting it from spilling out everywhere to other unwanted labels such as 
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depression, pure laziness or simply nothing, and thus providing an explanation for it. The 
name ME/CFS becomes the symbol which imaginarily represents the subject, which means 
the imaginary is invoked in the symbolic, in contrast to the body as real (the void) which was 
summoned in the symbolic through the initial refusal. Now, the imaginary functions to 
remove the void and relatedly loss by representing loss. And the more the identification with 
the medical label has been established, the more lack is overwritten and the ego established 
— this due to an explanation, an answer, having been provided for the bodily force towards 
‘doing nothing’ as a way of framing it. But to what extent has this occurred for the 
participants? When the ego is established and the fantasy ‘functions’, there is less anxiety, 
incomprehensible and unbearable tensions and probably ambivalence — since the indication 
that fantasy has failed is the presence of anxiety. Based on this, we can argue that the 
participants have achieved this type of identification to different degrees. In order to elucidate 
this, I will focus on Lucy who appears to have identified with the label ME to the highest 
degree, and who, to a certain extent, has made language her own — the process of separation 
whereby language has been subjectivised (Fink, 1999: 87). 
 
The Biological Body as an Externalisation of Loss 
 
When I met Lucy for her interview, she described her condition as being in remission, saying 
that she “solved the puzzle”. She did this through taking low-dose Naltrexone, a drug usually 
taken to manage drug and alcohol addictions, which is a treatment she herself researched. 
Lucy identifies with the diagnostic category of ME, but only when it includes those people 
who have no colds, sore throats and hay fever36 — something she herself has had all her life 
until they disappeared after her operation which precipitated her condition. Conceptualising 
ME in this manner is not particularly widely established, but rather appears to comprise a 
singular idea stemming from herself — hence alienation having, to a certain degree, been 
made ‘her own’. Even though she is in remission, she explains she is not fully well since she 
is unable to participate in everything she used to, particularly extreme sports: there is still 
space for desiring the object (energy). The identification with ME allows an exoneration from 
 
36 “I think a lot of people that don’t get ill anymore like the people who lose getting colds, hay fever; those 
people that get that set of symptoms have got major immune element. There’s a lot of other people with chronic 
ME or chronic fatigue that get loads of colds, loads of infections. I think they’re in a different section, and their 
fatigue’s caused by something a wee bit different” (L/116-120). The disappearance of colds and infections is 
thought by Lucy to be the reason she still has ME, even though she’s in “remission”. 
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responsibility by placing the emphasis, or rather the sole explanation in Lucy’s case, on 
neurobiology. She elaborates on her condition with exclusive help from neurobiological 
explanations, and believes that these, embodied in the term ME as a metaphor and a unifying 
representation of the processes of her body, are accurate representations of what she has. This 
differs from the other participants where biomedical explanations are endorsed in a more 
speculative manner. She often says “that’s exactly what happens” (my emphasis), for instance 
seen when she explains her panic attacks: “So that’s exactly what happens. It’s orthostatic 
intolerance, it’s dyston – dysautonomia” (A/L84-85). The loss of colds and sore throats seems 
crucial for her sense of identity because it is at moments when she feels a sore throat coming 
on which leads to the onset of panic attacks — when identity disintegrates and object a 
becomes included (lack of a lack) as opposed to excluded. This showcases how loss 
necessitates identification. With the panic attacks now gone since the condition is in 
remission, Lucy has to a certain degree made sense of the loss of energy entailed in the drive 
and desire for ‘nothing’: she considers it part of the condition of ME, which is something she 
places outside of herself and onto the biological body, constituting a life from which she is 
largely separated. Lucy’s discourse arguably showcases a separation insofar as there has been 
an establishment of the ego: an identification with ME has allowed an over-riding of lack 
(where lack and loss is nevertheless foundational) and there is additionally a (false) belief in 
having established an independent position from the Other. This latter is something 
discernible for the other participants too when expressing a positive sense of independence 
gained as a result of the condition, as having more time for themselves. It can be compared 
to the establishment of imaginary castration (Van Haute, 2002: 205), where the ego and a 
meaningful identity have been put in place. The ego organises tensions and excesses of the 
body, an organisation which Lucy assigns to the result of having taken the low-dose 
Naltrexone: 
 
The drug, it’s only - it’s - it’s only scaffolding. It only stops your body from over-
reacting, it doesn’t fix your body it doesn’t encourage it to work properly again. 
It just stops - it’s almost like a damp in a river. It doesn’t stop the water from 
flowing, it just stops it from reaching a cert - do you know - a cert - a certain area, 
so the water’s still flowing you’ve still got to figure out how to then stop that 
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damm from overflowing by getting - maybe redirecting the water or using the 
water or doing something with it (L375-382). 
 
We discern how Lucy conveys something uncannily reminiscent of Freud’s concept of 
sublimation and the pleasure principle as keeping a tension constant. That is, there is not so 
much a release of tension but a containment of it, which can be compared to the process 
whereby the ego integrates drive tensions of the body into its image — the life drive as a 
binding force according to Freud. This keeps the death drive as the unsymbolised tension at 
bay. Even though Lucy is talking about the drug, we can hypothesise that this process is also 
tied to the explanatory power of the diagnosis — while not dismissing there may have been 
physical effects due to taking the drug — given the fact she says she “solved the puzzle” by 
taking it. However, not all subjects identify to this degree with the label, to the point where 
a more or less stable identification amounts to a more or less stable fantasy. For some/most, 
we discern anxiety and incomprehensible, uncomfortable bodily tensions often emerging, 
where the subjects are taken over by their unpredictable nature. The presence of these 
tensions points to the failure of the fantasy of containing/organising them. What is further 
present for the other participants is seemingly an ambivalence in terms of an identification 
with ME/CFS, and the possible explanations and answers deriving from them.  
The ambivalence present for some of the participants in relation to the label ME/CFS 
can be explained by putting together the two opposite moments analysed in the interviews: 
an appeal to the Other and a refusal of the Other. The simultaneity of the refusal of the Other 
and the appeal to the Other — if operating strongly — gives rise to an impossible way of 
relating to the Other. This is illustrated in the interviews by the subjects demanding answers, 
while giving off an indication that an answer coming from an authority is not tolerated. Brody 
for instance relays that he “muddle[s] through until the answers [are] handed to me” 
(A/L548). However, at another place he says that the sessions with a psychologist were 
valuable, since they gave him “time to understand what was happening. It wasn’t just ‘here’s 
the answer, go away’” (A/L184-186). The latter because maintaining lack, through not 
having been given an answer, would also entail maintaining someone else’s desire (interest 
in you). Something similar is discernible for Tom when he conveys at one place that the 
diagnosis helped: “… I didn’t know what it was and I like to have a - a label. And the label 
helped” (A/L361-363). Later on, in the same interview, he contradicts this by saying (when 
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speaking about the medical professionals): “If somebody’s telling me they think it’s this and 
that’s what it is and [speeding up and making a mumbling sound]. I’ll not go back to them. 
That’s their stuff, you know what I mean?” (A/L477-479). Implicit in “That’s their stuff” is 
the subject’s attempt to escape/separate from the Other’s symbolic-imaginary explanations 
and more generally the signifier in “it’s this and that’s what it is”, in its metaphorical function 
which provides and pins down meaning. On the other hand, there is a difference between the 
two statements. “Somebody’s telling me they think it’s this” could indicate a lack of 
toleration of it coming from a person (of authority), but the “label” appears independent from 
a person and refers to the linguistic system itself, in which relief is supposedly sought through 
knowledge (“know[ing] what it was”). However, such a separation is of course impossible 
because the diagnosis needs to be confirmed and relayed through others with medical 
authority. Further, wanting to “know what it is” versus not wanting to be told “it’s this and 
that’s what it is” presents a contradiction. The impossibility is thus that the subjects reject the 
very system which would grant them recognition, and thus what seems to be observed is a 
very ambivalent relation for some of the participants: consciously, an answer for their 
condition is demanded, while unconsciously such an answer is not tolerated. This is in line 
with Lacan’s view of the subject, someone who wants some recognition but not full 
recognition, because the latter would remove the subject — the subject being partly 
represented through a symbol (behind which it disappears). Nevertheless, those who have 
more or less established the ego/imaginary castration through a medical label, and those who 
have not to the same degree, have something in common. If the former can be argued to have 
established a ‘higher’ degree of separation, we can problematise this and ascribe a failure of 
separation to both groups. Instead of being unable to separate from the idea of ‘nothing’, 
which I discussed above, we now turn to the failure of separating from the idea of ‘the body 
as machine’. 
  
The Body as a Non-Functioning Machine 
 
As might be evident by now, the appeal to biology as an externalisation of loss/lack/the 
patients' conditions, and the belief their conditions have an almost exclusive biological cause, 
have connotations with the concept of the ‘body as machine’. Even in cases where the appeal 
to biology does not strongly operate, the body is thought of as an independent, external entity 
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entailing a type of machine-like mechanism. This is evident in the analogies used by the 
participants to describe a loss of energy pertaining to their bodies, which consist of references 
to different types of machine. Tom, for instance, explains that “becoming chronically 
fatigued, like somebody pulls your battery power out” and further compares it to an iPhone. 
Lucy likens her body to the engine of a car, to it being in “limp mode” (L280-288). More 
broadly, many of the participants frame their loss of energy, as a loss of a core part of 
themselves, in the form of mechanical power, where a loss of energy is equated to a loss of 
power, and even a loss of money; as if the body, and oneself, can be neatly measured in 
numbers. It echoes the idea that the body is a capital machine, and suggests that loss has been 
symbolised through the Other. When Lucy for instance, speaks about her body not 
functioning, she compares it to operating at the capacity of thirty-five percent at one point, 
after which she says: “That’s no use to anybody. I wanted to be a hundred percent again, I 
want to be me. I want to be back to my normal self” (L/685-686). This showcases the structure 
of imaginary alienation: a separation of oneself from oneself, accompanied by the belief that 
the core of oneself can be (re)found in the Other. Indeed, the Other can be compared to a 
machine-like order insofar as it constitutes an otherness in which the subject gets caught. 
Beyond this, her quote showcases the body as a usable object for someone else (“That’s no 
use to anybody”), and thus fatigue suggestingly as the refusal of it. 
In the light of this refusal to be reduced to a bodily machine, we can state that the 
fatigued subject has merely turned him or herself into a non-functioning machine. The body 
as a non-functioning machine implicitly referred to by all of the participants signifies a 
foreign, external element working automatically and independently of the subject and the 
psyche. It mimics the denial of desire part of the defensive moment of fatigue, and ironically, 
echoes the big Other’s statement ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’ — showing how the 
subject’s desire is always the Other’s desire. Thus, it is irrelevant what type of machine the 
participants are referring to — non-functioning, moderately functioning, not-fully 
functioning — the reference to the body as a machine is clear. In other words, one 
paradoxically refuses to be reduced to a machine-like object by reducing oneself to a 
machine-like object. However, the difference could arguably be that the latter object (non-
functioning machine) is not considered to belong to the Other but to oneself. Nevertheless, 
not only is there a failure of having separated from the idea of ‘the body as machine’, but 
there is an idealisation of it: a belief that the body can be a machine (Lucy’s “I wanted to be 
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a hundred percent again”), a constantly producing entity in motion — which is, of course, 
nothing but a myth. Not only do we witness this through references to their conditions, but 
such a belief was most likely present before their onset, or at least retroactively postulated to 
have been there before. 
It is often understood that those who become fatigued are ambitious, those who 
‘dream big’ and attempt to materialise their dreams. It implies that, first of all, one has a large 
appetite, and secondly, one believes this appetite can be satisfied. We can say that all of the 
participants tried to meet the big Other’s demand for perpetual movement, and presumably 
did so quite well before getting ill, according to themselves, as they describe having good 
careers, being engaged in hobbies, socialising and so on. Put briefly, they ‘worked hard and 
played hard’, possibly reflecting an addiction to the activity of doing. Not only do they 
idealise the position of a constantly hard-working person and want to be seen as one, but they 
believe this position, the body as a machine, to be a possibility; that it exists. There is a belief 
they can keep going no matter what, and that one will get there in the end, accomplish the 
goal and attain a prize. Such an idealisation of the mirror image has indeed been identified 
by other researchers within the field, namely by Vanheule (2001), who claims that: ‘In people 
who are engaged in this dynamic of idealisation, exhaustion is to be expected, for one’s 
mirror image can never be reached’. One tires oneself out trying to achieve the impossible. 
Arguably, the more one believes in the existence of the image qua the object of desire, such 
as the idea of a constantly hard-working person, the more one will be driven to try to achieve 
it — resulting in a type of ‘can’t-stop-won’t-stop’ movement. Here is another indication of 
how the drive gives force to desire. Further, as we theorised previously, attempting to meet 
a demand — fighting against the impulse to ‘do nothing’ — is crucial for symptom formation. 
This process can be elucidated by Lacan (2002/2006: 698) when he writes that the neurotic 
takes the Other’s lack as a demand, and this in order to protect against anxiety, in which case 
‘his fantasy is reduced to the drive’. Reducing lack to a demand involves reducing it to a 
known object so one can have the possibility of being the answer to the Other’s 
demand/desire — the first solution the subject attempts in protecting him/herself against the 
Other’s anxiety-provoking desire. It can further be related to Lacan’s scopic drive in that one 
imagines oneself being seen as “a hard-working member of society” in the eyes of 
others/society (A/L604-605), as Amy puts it — the notions of visibility and invisibility being 
repetitive in the interviews. But bringing this more in line with fatigue as an inhibitory 
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moment, Lacan (2014: 316) states, paraphrasing Freud, that an inhibition of a body part takes 
place when that part has been eroticised; meaning a belief one can be ‘one’ with the body. 
This is nothing other than believing one can coincide with an idea of the body. An inhibition 
would thus occur in order to avoid the unity with an idea as a way of sustaining desire and, 
concurrently, the idea. Additionally, it would occur in order to avoid the loss and eclipsing 
of oneself imagined to be involved in meeting the Other’s demand — something which 
becomes palpable when the mirror image is recognised in its alienating, foreign aspect. 
There is in the interviews an inability to accept loss due to a belief that the ideal image 
is attainable, discernible in moments of frustrations where the participants explain that parts 
or a part of their lives have been stolen. This is in accordance with Lacan’s notion of 
imaginary castration. Lacan (2002/2006: 698) explains that when taking lack as a demand, 
or rather when confusing the two, while this hides anxiety, it shifts ‘the whole treatment 
toward the handling of frustration’. For example, Mark frustratingly speaks about how 
everyone but him is “superman” and how they have “magical powers” (A/L437-442). He 
believes to have failed to meet the demand (to ‘keep going’). While this depicts an 
endorsement of the body as machine — a superman having magical powers is supposedly 
someone capable of constant productivity due to possessing beyond-human qualities — it 
also portrays a rejection of it. The subject could reject the existence of the ideal as an excuse 
of not having attained it, through postulating the demand as impossible, which is observed in 
Mark’s discourse here as well as in the other participants’ discourses. After all, having 
magical powers or being superman is impossible. It would follow the line of reasoning that 
it is not the subject who has failed to meet a demand which was perfectly able to be met, but 
it is the Other’s fault for asking the impossible; consequently, freeing oneself from 
culpability. Nevertheless, in both cases, loss and lack are not accepted.  
Thus, I have demonstrated various ways in which the ideal of the ‘body as machine’ 
is endorsed and held on to. This distinctively differs from some of the theories I introduced 
earlier, where it is suggested that fatigue, and many modern somatic symptoms, are not 
structured symbolically, such as Verhaeghe’s theory of actualpathology, those theories 
building on Freud’s actual neurosis, and the theory of ordinary psychosis (which will be 
discussed briefly in the next chapter). The symbolism present here for the fatigued is arguably 
that of ‘the body as machine’, where this is both endorsed and rejected. Further, as argued, 
both of these moments could be said to have a protective and defensive function, since it 
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offers a symbolic-imaginary solution of exonerating responsibility37. It differs from the 
aforementioned theories which state that ‘real symptoms’, with which fatigue and pain are 
associated, are not defences against the unsymbolised real (for example, Lose (2015); 
Verhaeghe (2004: 289-290)). However, when the ME/CFS diagnosis is not considered to exit 
or is not validated by the Other, which occurs often, then the fantasy fails and one is 
confronted with radical lack (the real). In this sense, it could echo something of these 
aforementioned theories, that symptoms are more often real than symbolic-imaginary. 
However, leaving it there and not exploring the symbolism potentially involved could miss 
out crucial aspects. Verhaeghe’s theory is particularly relevant here, as he separates anorexia 
belonging to actualpathology and that part of psychopathology (hysteria more precisely), on 
the basis of a presence of a refusal. In anorexia belonging to actualpathology, which he argues 
is ‘semi-independent’ from a sociocultural Other, there is a refusal to incorporate the Other’s 
ideas: the function of the symptom is to separate and gain an independent position of the 
Other. In psychopathology contrarily, anorexia is fuelled by a desire to incorporate 
sociocultural images, where one is dependent on the Other’s gaze (Verhaeghe, 2004: 231-
232). I mentioned this part of Verhaeghe’s theory in chapter four and speculated that both 
aspects, a desire to identify/dependency on the Other and a refusal, is present for fatigue. 
Now we can make a stronger argument for this based on what has been uncovered in this 
chapter, where it appears that these two opposite functions are precisely what constitutes the 
split of the subject: refusing what one identifies with38. More exact, while Verhaeghe claims 
there has been no identification with signifiers in actualpathology (imaginary alienation has 
not taken place), and that these are rejected by the subject, I argue that it is both an 
identification (with the ‘body as machine’) and a rejection of it which has contributed to the 
formation of fatigue. The latter is in accordance with the Freudian-Lacanian theory of 
negation, that a negation is always an affirmation — and in this case an endorsement — of 
the idea being negated. This does not necessarily contradict Verhaeghe’s (2004) theory, since 
he argues that a ‘progression’ from actualpathology to psychopathology will also contain the 
previous (actualpathological) moment (p. 460); that the two moment will be present 
 
37 It will also be evident in the subsequent chapter, which has a more in-depth focus on the structure of the 
discourses, that other signifiers and ideas are possibly involved in the formation of fatigue. 
38 This comes close to what Verhaeghe argues is present in hysteria, that there is simultaneously an attempt to 
fulfil and escape the Other’s desire. However, this does not address the extreme ambivalence found for fatigue, 
where the refusal is not just against being reduced to an object of the Other’s desire, but for the Other as such 
(as I argued in the previous chapter). 
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concurrently. Nevertheless, he does not discuss their interaction and the way in which the 
two can turn against each other, but the focus is rather on the position taken up by the subject 
(either actualpathology or psychopathology in various forms). The treatment is dependent on 
the position, which consists of two opposite treatments for the two groups. The two, indeed, 
are opposites since the symptom is either a direct encounter with the real, or a symbolic-
imaginary processing of it. This does not acknowledge their interaction in the sense that the 
real qua the void always emerges in relation to the symbolic-imaginary, in relation to the 
fantasy. Or rather, the void only appears retrospectively from the standpoint of the symbolic. 
For the participants of this study, the pain of fatigue as a presence of an absence is complained 
about by the subject precisely because the fantasy of ‘nothing’ as well as ‘the body as 
machine’ exist, as argued. It can also be elucidated by Lacanian theory with regard to the 
split of the subject that there is a discrepancy between one’s current experiences and where 
one believes one should and could be. In this sense, Verhaeghe appears to be making too 
much of a separation between the positions, particularly in singling out actualpathology as 
an independent one and particularly in relation to neurosis. We can question if a separation 
between them is necessary or even possible, as is oftentimes done by Freud which was 
outlined previously — and the same goes with dividing symptoms into those which are ‘real’ 
and those structured symbolically-imaginarily.  
Returning to the non-acceptance of loss as found within the participants’ interviews, 
this brings us to the idea of the failure of mourning. A failure of mourning is coterminous 
with a failure of separation insofar as there is an inability of separating from an idea. I will 
now trace how the concept of mourning, as it relates to the interviews, can aptly elucidate 
what has been discussed so far in the thesis.  
 
The Failure of Mourning 
 
Almost all of the participants, either before or around the onset of their conditions, 
experienced loss in the form of a death of or a separation from a loved on39. The loss of a 
 
39 The only person who did not mention a loss (apart from the physical loss of her operation) was Lucy. 
However, she did not return for a second interview and she spoke only briefly about the events she believed 
influenced the onset of her condition. I also did not ask, like I did with the others, what went on more generally 
in her life around the onset, which proved to be an important question which brought events to the fore (the 
omission of which was partly due to Lucy often speaking uninterruptedly). 
 
 
174 
loved one can arguably play a significant role in the onset of their conditions insofar as it 
involves the loss of one’s identity — seeing as identity is defined in relation to others, in 
relation to the Other, which the loved one could be said to have embodied. If so, then fatigue 
could have arisen as an attempt to deal with the loss. The loss of identity in mourning is 
something acknowledged by both Freud and Lacan.  
Freud points out that mourning is not the mere loss of the actual physical presence of 
a person, but includes the loss of abstract ideas and ideals (related to that person) which were 
significant to one’s identity (Freud, SE XIV: 243). He further renders this process 
unconscious: ‘he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him’ (Freud, SE XIV: 
245). Lacan’s view on mourning takes on a similar shape but adds more details surrounding 
this process. In Seminar X Lacan (2014: 333), compares mourning with separation insofar as 
he links it with the constitution of desire, stating that ‘the problem of mourning is the problem 
of maintaining, at the scopic level, the bonds whereby desire is suspended, not from the object 
a, but from i(a)’ (Ibid.: 335). The i(a) refers to the ideal image, the image with which one 
identifies. The image become suspended, or more precisely, the brackets (‘the bonds’) 
holding together the image are suspended. What holds it together is the exclusion of object a 
— hence it being in brackets — which keeps loss and lack at a distance. Thus, the suspension 
of them leads to an inclusion of object a within the image or in relation to it, a lack of a lack, 
consequently blurring it. In simple words, the subject loses the grounds on which lack was 
maintained (at a distance) and subsequently completed, thereby losing the anchoring point of 
identity. According to Lacan: 
 
We mourn but for he of whom we can say I was his lack. We mourn people that 
we have treated either well or badly, but with respect to whom we don’t know 
that we fulfilled the function of being in the place of their lack (Ibid.: 141).  
 
To have been someone’s lack means to have been desired by the Other — desire only being 
possible through lack — which entails the possibility of completing the Other, being the 
‘missing piece of the puzzle’. This is precisely what love is about which is strongly related 
to being someone’s lack; in line with Lacan’s famous axiom that love is ‘to give what one 
does not have’. To be in the position of lack can therefore be translated into being loved and 
desired, and this being something providing a meaningful existence for the subject. But as 
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Freud and Lacan state, one is unaware of having been in this position. Since most of the 
participants only spoke briefly about the lost one — most of them treated it as a tangent to 
their stories which could point to the unconscious nature of it as a displacement — we cannot 
say with certainty that they held this position in relation to the other. We can, on the other 
hand, speculate that it might have been the case insofar as they all state they were close to 
the loved one. We could trace the loss of the position of someone loved/desired/wanted in 
Mark’s and Beth’s accounts.  
Mark explains how around the time he got ill, he was in a psychologically abusive 
relationship40, and that the end of it was a “big shock” because of her telling him “I don’t 
love you anymore” in the midst of planning their wedding. He states: “suddenly the blind 
folds fell away from all of us in more or less the same time. And we all went ‘oh my god, 
she’s just been playing this game. All along’” (B/L422-424). He is thus confronted with the 
indifference of the Other, and an experience of being reduced to the object of the Other’s 
enjoyment. The latter could be inferred from the statement “playing this game” and from his 
description of her as “obsessively controlling” (B/L362); and more obviously from his 
statement: “And she gets this… this delight, it gives her delight to have control over the 
situation” (B/L412-413). In other words, he is reduced to an object for the Other’s pleasure, 
who does whatever she pleases with the other and whenever it pleases her. 
Beth, on the other hand, is confronted with her parents’ divorce shortly before the onset 
of her condition, which arguably puts into question her subjective position: “So they just 
didn’t think about it and they both like made new plans for their lives that didn’t include me 
having anywhere to live” (B/L170-171). Again, here is found a lack of consideration for the 
subject, resulting in an experience of being reduced to a mere object of nothing — a lack of 
a lack — whose existence is irrelevant for the Other. This signifies perhaps a loss of the 
identity as someone lovable. We discern then how these experiences of a reduction to 
nothing, losing lack, align themselves with the alienating encounters expounded in chapter 
two, albeit they were there related mainly to work (Mark) and university studies (Beth). 
Based on this, we can hypothesise that repression is at work, where the more personal events, 
problems with certain personal others, are displaced onto more impersonal events, to the 
Other, to which they react against. This would keep the former events disguised and at bay; 
 
40 The time of this in the context of his onset is ambiguous and confusing for Mark as he changes his mind a 
few times as to when it took place. 
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an attempt at a bulwark against the anxiety of the loss of a subjective place. It can more 
precisely be tied to Freud’s and Lacan’s notion of secondary repression. The first moment of 
repression is that of primal repression and occurs according to Freud when the ‘psychical 
(ideational) representative of the instinct [is] being denied entrance into the conscious’ (SE 
XIV:148). For Lacan (Seminar VI: 76), this moment constitutes assigning a refusal to ‘the 
unsaid’; a repression of fundamental lack. I linked this to a refusal of lack in the previous 
chapter, where instead of acknowledging that the Other does not have an answer about the 
subject’s condition (existence), the participants experience the answer is being refused them. 
Freud then explains a second moment of repression, ‘repression proper’ involving the 
following: 
 
…affects mental derivatives of the repressed representative, or such trains of 
thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it. 
On account of this association, these ideas experience the same fate as what was 
primally repressed. Repression proper, therefore, is actually an after-pressure 
(Freud, SE XIV: 148). 
 
The ‘trains of thoughts as, originating elsewhere’ which ‘come into associative connection’ 
to the repressed representative (a representative of lack/loss essentially) can be said to 
constitute these impersonal events at work or at university which have become attached to 
the earlier more personal events where lack was repressed. In simple terms, we can postulate 
there was an enigma the participants dealt with during earlier events, or rather did not deal 
with, and hence the emergence of the ‘return of the repressed’ at another event which was 
linked to the former by an association. The later event also represses lack (Freud writes ‘these 
ideas experience the same fate as what was primally repressed’) — a link which will become 
more obvious in the next chapter — since traced here is the subject’s refusal. Repression 
occurs based on the logic of retroactivity, as noted by Freud to be involved in the experience 
of trauma. An event is not in and of itself traumatic, but only becomes so after the fact; after 
having encountered a second event which retroactively frames the first event as traumatic. 
This could be due to the two events being linked by a factor of similarity, in which case one 
realises a gap involved surrounding an earlier occurrence. Or put differently, a gap can only 
emerge in relation to two events (to two signifiers). In this way, we need not be reductive and 
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give priority to the earlier events — to say that this is really what the problem is about — but 
we can recognise that both episodes possess equal significance.  
What further links the two events together is the encounter with an enigmatic and 
painful presence. Contrary to what is generally considered about mourning, one does not deal 
with a hole or an absence in one’s life after a loss, but with an overwhelming presence. This 
is in line with Lacan’s theory in that, instead of the exclusion of object a, it is included in the 
image whereby, as a consequence, one gets lost in it. And, interestingly, Freud thought there 
was a strong link between mourning and pain (Freud, SE XX: 131). One is thus engulfed by 
an overwhelming presence, more specifically entailing the ‘over-presence of the image of 
the other’ (Boothby, 2013: 218): 
 
What was already impossible of determination, what remained unanswerable and 
inaccessible in the other, the enigma of the other’s desire, is in death impossibly 
amplified, expanded and multiplied (Ibid.: 220). 
 
Accordingly, we notice the participants’ confrontations with a presence of an enigma, for 
example when Mark says it “was a big shock” and “suddenly the blind folds fell away”. 
Perhaps, what was previously a reasonable and containable enigma ‘Why does she love me?’ 
(every person asks this to their partner and says ‘I love you’ repeatedly in order to gain 
reassurance; the repetition showcasing how the enigma is always there), now perhaps 
becomes amplified and turns into the question: ‘Why didn’t she love me?’. The emergence 
of fatigue could be said to have the function of questioning one’s value for the Other, staging 
the question in one’s body. However, since this is enacted unconsciously, we can say that the 
image and the presence of the other is not processed, as we see it repeating itself in the 
condition itself: it has transferred over to the enigma of their bodies.  
Another attempt at a solution appears to be to identify with the lost object, either with 
loss itself, which would explain the numbing into nothingness as a defence, or with certain 
qualities the lost person had. Gail’s discourse showcases the former when she relays about 
her sister who died in between her operations: “I believe she should be alive and I should be 
dead” (A/573-574). Amy’s discourse illustrates the latter in that her symptoms come to 
mimic those of her grandmother’s, who died of a stroke not long before the onset, a 
mimicking of symptoms which she puts down to a genetic cause. She describes herself as 
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having stroke-like symptoms (“but it was like everything felt heavier on one side and that I 
was like - I was like dragging - dragging my leg”, B/L49). This suggests the maintenance of 
an imaginary identification with the lost one. With these two last-mentioned points in mind 
— mourning being about an overwhelming presence and an identification with the lost object 
— we can perhaps appreciate and give context to the ambivalence and split of the subject 
found for fatigue, in terms of the increase and decrease of tension, related to the poles of 
appearance and disappearance.  
The subject could endeavour to signal the presence of the body through a tension, as 
if trying to keep the other person alive by stubbornly holding onto a presence which is never 
enough there, while contrarily attempting to get rid of an unbearable enigmatic presence 
which is too much there. However, such a divide can also be flipped around since we can 
suggest that the removal of tension as a numbing into nothingness constitutes an 
identification with the lost object (with loss itself), while the signalling of tension could be 
the attempt to live one’s (own) life — a pulling in the directions of life and death 
simultaneously. A failed solution to these two oppositional forces becomes the embodiment 
of the undead, which comes to the fore in the discourses. Indeed, there might be a sense in 
which both being dead and alive comprise a loyal pact to the dead/lost one.  
The latter is very common when facing the death of a loved one, which we saw 
expressed by Gail: the guilt of being alive while the other person is dead41. Simultaneously, 
the importance of living one’s life seems to be an attitude which had been embraced by the 
dead ones, as relayed by some. Gail conveys that her now dead sister “used to always say to 
me: ‘don’t be lazy [imperceptible] you have enough time to sleep in your grave’” (B/234-
235). Similarly, Brody, whose grandfather died very close to the initiation of his condition, 
relays that he said to him: ‘don’t get old. Do whatever you can, but don’t get old’” (A/L39-
41). What is evident in both of these statements is the echo of the demand to ‘keep going’; 
again, noticing how this demand might have then been displaced onto impersonal others 
(doctors, friends, work/bosses). The subject would in this case be unaware of the origin of 
the demand and the multitude of meanings and enigmas attached to it. That Brody failed to 
meet the demand is traced when he describes feeling like an old person, due to fatigue: “So 
it kinda feels, um like I’m in my 80’s” (A/L44). Therefore, giving into the demand to ‘keep 
 
41 This might not work for those who lost someone not through death, such as Beth whose parents got divorced, 
and Mark whose partner broke up with him. 
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going’ could thought of as meeting the loved one’s request; while refusing it could constitute 
a ‘revenge’ on the loved one due to feelings of anger of having died, the latter of which is 
not uncommon in the event of loss. On the contrary, not giving into the demand, which is 
basically the demand for life as I argued in chapter three, could comprise a loyalty of meeting 
them in death. This split can also be framed in a different shade in terms of responsibility, 
because for many of the participants, we trace a sense of responsibility towards the loss, some 
of which explicitly acknowledge it.  
Gail, for instance, brings up guilt over her sister’s death. More precisely, what she 
feels guilty about is that her sister was “stuck with my parents, looking after them and things 
and I was out there having a life in some way” (C/L524-525). This brings us closer to 
understanding her potential self-inflicted punishment of ‘death while alive’ through pain and 
fatigue. She describes her condition as “it’s like a death sentence while you’re living” 
(B/L182), but elsewhere she says “life sentence” (C/L57); as if to signal she has been 
punished for not dying, and perhaps, in a way, wanting to. Amy does not explicitly mention 
guilt over her grandmother’s death, but she does mention it in relation to having the condition. 
Nonetheless, there might be a sense in which it applies to the situation of her grandmother as 
well, related to not having believed her grandmother suffered from a real, biological 
condition when she was alive. She believes in hindsight that her grandmother had undetected 
strokes before dying from a stroke. Amy repeatedly mentions how no one in her family 
believed her grandmother had a serious illness and treated her as a hypochondriac (B/433), 
saying: “we used to joke…about her being a hypochondriac [chuckles]” (B/L400) — and she 
says herself she feels like a hypochondriac (A/337). Maybe more importantly she says: “They 
just could never work out why she just was… always so - so ill. But I was a child and didn’t 
really understand it all”. There could speculatively be a sense in which she feels guilty about 
not having taken her seriously. Likewise, there could be an implicit guilt in Mark’s discourse 
when he says “suddenly the blind folds fell away”; implying perhaps that had he not been 
blind to his partner’s deceits, he could have prevented the abuse from happening, which 
included death threats and being cheated on (B/450). This is all the more significant since he 
explains how he had at the time allowed a friend who became homeless to stay with them, 
whom his partner had also threatened; threats which had continued despite moving out and 
unbeknownst to Mark, which greatly exacerbated her existing mental distress, as relayed by 
Mark. Thus, he could have experienced guilt surrounding this event. Finally and in contrast, 
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Tom, akin to Gail, mentions guilt over his mother’s death, a death which took place in front 
of him when he was a child: “So I think I carried a lot of shame and guilt regarding…the last 
words I ever spoke to my mother was ‘I hope - wish you had fucking died’” (B/L120-122). 
He recognises the impact of this trauma in the appeal to his addiction42, claiming the latter 
masked his anxiety (B/L72), and also claiming he “shared it” during his recovery period, 
implying it is no longer relevant. We might have reasons to believe it is, particularly as there 
is a similar logic operating in his discourse at the time of his mother’s death — having given 
into one of his needs/wishes — and around the event with the neighbours’ noise which 
precipitated his condition, in which he had failed to take care of his own needs/wishes (which 
will be explored in the next chapter). The structure nevertheless illustrates the logic of trauma 
as retroactive, as highlighted by Freud. Thus, taking responsibility for the loss of the loved 
one implies that guilt has not been processed — in which case the only solution would be to 
take guilt upon oneself (Verhaeghe, 2004: 277-278).  
In the light of this, we can elucidate the split of the subject as being one between 
taking/feeling responsibility for the loss as a way of holding on to the other person, and 
conversely, getting rid of a responsibility which is too much (through both the desire to sleep 
and the exoneration through a diagnosis). Indeed, the attempt to get rid of responsibility 
presupposes that the subject feels responsible. We can in this way understand the encounter 
with the castrating demand to ‘keep going’ insofar as it asks the subject to take responsibility 
and to lose something, because being represented in the Other — having a meaningful 
identity — entails the exclusion of all other identities, including those of the loved one. Not 
having processed guilt and the enigma of the other person, the subject is perhaps unable to 
give up loss and instead says no to it, no to castration and alienation — choosing instead to 
meet their loved ones in death. Of course, it represents a forced choice in the face of not 
having processed loss and guilt/responsibility, as a result of which the accumulation of 
responsibility could become too much. The body could thus become the place of attempting 
to process that which was not processed; asking questions of responsibility (‘Am I 
responsible?’) and of love (‘Am I loved’?) — answers to which in the fantasy we see fail 
repeatedly. Amy potentially illustrates this failure and the attempt to process the image of her 
 
42 Which he has had for twenty-two years but at the time of interviews he had been in recovery for twelve years 
(B/L356-357). 
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grandmother when speaking about grocery shopping, something her grandmother likewise 
used to struggle with:  
 
… sound, um the noise, the lighting it’s like, total overload. And it just - it - 
almost puts me in a trance, that I become a bit…I just like forget where I am it’s 
almost like you become stuck. Um and so I’ve just avoid them. So I can maybe 
understand a little bit about how she did struggle when, supermarkets first 
became - and she - she couldn’t go around them (B/L450-454). 
 
To forget where she is and to “become stuck” could potentially indicate a loss of identity 
(forget who she is), seemingly related to a “total overload” of sensory information — an 
experience of ‘too much’ potentially pointing to the presence of an absence related to 
mourning. We also discern, linked to this, the attempt to “understand a little bit about how 
she did struggle”. Amy has, in a way, become stuck in her grandmother’s image through an 
attempt to try to process it. The failure of mourning could here be present in the failure of 
having separated from the image of her grandmother — and something similar could be 
argued for the other participants. 
What is important about the process of mourning is recognising the artificiality of an 
object (Leader, 2008: 105), or the image of an idea. It involves inscribing a loss or a 
disappearance in symbolic terms (Ibid.: 119), and separating from the image we had of 
ourselves in relation to the other; an image which functions as a way of rectifying lack 
(Leader, 2008: 132). Covering over lack is precisely what hinders mourning and separation 
as it offers an escape into the image which promises unity, infinite enjoyment and wholeness, 
and overrides loss and lack as points of uncertainty and randomness. We observe such an 
escape on two levels for the fatigued: firstly, in the failure of separating from the idea of 
‘nothing’, since loss is positivised therein (the imaginary-real axis), and secondly, in the 
failure of separating from the idea of ‘the body as machine’, where more precisely ME/CFS 
represents an artificial entity which unites different body parts qua symptoms (the imaginary-
symbolic axis). The idea of ‘nothing’ can be subsumed under that of ‘the body as machine’, 
insofar as the desire for nothing, to have no needs, desires, responsibilities etc., is akin to an 
impossible, robotic state. Mourning entails recognising that the ideas were merely ideas and 
not something one’s whole being coincided with. As long as this mourning of images has not 
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taken place, and a separation from them has not occurred, we observe the return of the 
repressed through the very condition and more specifically through the loss of energy related 
to a part of themselves, which is then not accepted. Indeed, the participants often mention 
how they are grieving this lost part of themselves. Loss has thus been displaced and the 
subject does not recognise the link between their conditions and what they lost in relation to 
the loved ones. 
Not having accepted loss or the artificiality of a linguistic system — the artificiality of 
unity we can say — is related to a lack of symbolic castration and a lack of separation more 
generally. Symbolic castration involves transforming the imaginary object into a symbolic 
signifier (Van Haute, 2002: 205). As long as ‘nothing’ qua lack is positivised into something 
which has the ability to remove lack/loss, symbolic castration has not taken place. The latter 
would occur by viewing an object from many angles, in order for the symbolic object of lack 
to emerge, which is in contrast to the imaginary object with its fixed locus. Following Freud, 
the more we run through representations, the closer we get to its point of exhaustion where 
the object no longer exists (Leader, 2008: 101). This would supposedly make the ‘drive of 
desire’, as I termed it earlier, lose its charge due to an acceptance of the difference between 
desire and jouissance. Or rather, due to realising that the object of desire does not exist, the 
fascination of the imaginary wholeness which covers over the point of impossibility loses its 
charge (Van Haute, 2002: 280-281). We could not claim that this would automatically entail 
a diminishment of tension, however that might be the case. It would diminish the tension 
between wanting-to-be and being, but it could potentially be replaced by the agony of the 
meaninglessness of life (radical lack), which one would be met with instead. In this way, one 
would accept the movements of the drive around a gap, accept its aim (to maintain lack) 
instead of overriding it with the goal of it (to get rid of lack). This is in line with what Bruce 
Fink (1997: 41) claims is the goal of analysis: to remove the inhibitions of desire and accept 
the satisfaction obtained by the drive, to ‘enjoy his or her enjoyment’. I would also add, 
however, that this involves less force given not only to the goal of the drive as quenching 
lack, but the aim of it in terms of circulating around a void, since a strengthening of this 
circuit is what maintains and strengthens the desire to get rid of it. Or in other words, this 
would entail an acceptance not only of lack but of a lack of a lack (the presence of an 
absence), subsequently diminishing the need to inscribe a lack in the Other. The tension 
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between the two would diminish, and one would be less caught and inhibited between two 
poles, between to ‘keep going’ and to ‘slow down’. 
Therefore, it is not enough to simply link an event with the emergence of one’s 
condition — Gail for example is aware of the role of her sister’s death in her condition — but 
to bring implicit ideas to the fore43, ideas to which one was attached, and to recognise their 
artificiality. And further, the subject needs to recognise the ways in which s/he is implicated 
in these, instead of externalising them onto a biomedical diagnosis, or attempting to escape 
the symbolic Other altogether. Both latter ones present imaginary solutions, and solutions 
which come at the high price of creating more problems; the repressed returns in an 
unbearable form. The escape from the big Other into the imaginary world discernible in the 
interviews is strongly linked to the idea of ‘the body as machine’, as said, in the sense that 
‘nothingness’, as well as a biomedical diagnosis, can be compared to that of an impossible 
machine where a subject’s responsibilities, affects, needs — including the need to mourn — 
or desires are cut off. These were merely (attempted to be) withheld and displaced. Overall 
however, the belief in a unity with any idea represents an artificiality akin to that of a 
machine, since an idea is ultimately incompatible with the subject. Biology and culture do 
not (fully) integrate. This process of mourning is akin to that of separation as it relates to the 
constitution of the subject, for which there need not be real losses involved, and which is the 
goal of the practice of psychoanalysis. 
Not only does that which has been presented so far constitute a failure of separating 
from the image of ‘nothing’ and ‘the body as machine’, but Lacan in Seminar V elucidates 
the consequence of a refusal: 
 
In his relationship to signifiers a subject may occasionally, insofar as he is asked 
to constitute himself in signifiers, choose not to do so. He can say ‘No, I will not 
be an element in the chain’…What does the subject do, in effect, when he chooses 
in some way, not to pay a debt that he has not contracted? He does nothing but 
perpetuate it (p. 229). 
 
43  However, from a Lacanian perspective, these ideas were not there a priori — that would render the 
unconscious as the place of hidden meaning. It is more correct to say these ideas are constructed in the process 
of exploring potential meanings surrounding an enigma. However, certain ideas are ‘there’ but displaced, such 
as potentially ‘the body as machine’, which is not hidden, but revealed in language. What is hidden — 
unconscious — for the subject, is the link between it and the impact on his/her condition.  
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The subject, having said no to partaking in the symbolic order, and said no to loss (‘not to 
pay a debt’) inherent therein, ends up perpetuating it rather than escaping, or in Lacan’s words 
which are very appropriate in the context of fatigue: ‘does nothing but perpetuate it’. In sum 
therefore, rather than accepting and acknowledging that the body cannot coincide with that 
of a machine and which never really existed in the first place — a process akin to mourning 
and separation — it is idealised and held onto by the fatigued subject. One ends up reinforcing 
what one tried to escape from in the first place.  
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Chapter 7: A Closer Look at The Structure of Fatigue 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued how fatigue could be interpreted as a refusal and a 
defence against the demand for productivity (in the wide sense). However, since a refusal is 
the minimal sign of subjectivity as I argue, we need to go further in order to gain more insight 
into the details of the refusal. What is the refusal refusing precisely? What is the separation 
from? The details pertain to the function(s) of the subject’s refusal, which has been touched 
upon and discussed throughout the thesis. This now necessitates an in-depth analysis in order 
to bring out differences and similarities between the discourses with more clarity, which will 
simultaneously highlight their structures. To this end, I will return to the alienating 
encounters and look at these in more detail, and more specifically, investigate their structure 
in relation to the response of the formation of fatigue. I will also explore the link between 
these onset events and the earlier events concerning loss. The reason for this focus is that, 
first of all, the events include an encounter with fundamental lack, which can be formulated 
as the question of ‘What do you want from me?’. They put into question one’s own identity 
and demands a response in terms of taking up a position in relation to the big Other. More 
importantly though, exploring two related events in relation to the formation of fatigue will 
bring forth more evidently the way in which the subject relates to lack, as a minimum of two 
events frame lack. This will consequently indicate the logic of the symptom. 
It is Lacan’s theory of the clinical structures which can shed light on the above-
mentioned questions, insofar as it closely examines the logic of a symptom as embedded in 
discourse. A logic has a specific function immanent to a structural mode of relating to 
lack/absence/loss: either neurosis, psychosis, or perversion, which constitute three various 
ways of relating to lack; or arguably, three different ways of refusing lack. However, a word 
of precaution is warranted here prior to proceeding. The clinical structures are used in the 
practice of psychoanalysis by the analyst in order to discern the logic at work in the 
analysand’s (patient’s) speech. This is done, first and foremost, so as to guide the analyst’s 
position vis a vis the analysand toward the establishment of a safe and fruitful investigation 
of the unconscious, since the treatment is dependent on the logic of a symptom 44 . To 
 
44 A Lacanian way of diagnosing differs markedly from the biomedical approach, insofar as it focuses on the 
structure of a symptom, and not on the mere presence of isolated, surface symptoms. Further, the ‘diagnosis’, 
if arrived at, is never disclosed to the analysand, but its purpose is to guide the position of the analyst. It is also 
very possible to arrive at the conclusion that there is more than one logic at work, which is usually done in the 
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recognise the logic of the analysand’s speech usually takes months and several meetings with 
the analysand, and even after a few years, a diagnosis may not be clear (Miller, 2015: 95). It 
is not my intention to diagnose the participants, with whom I met only twice, with an overall 
and/or permanent structure for each, since this would be impossible in this type of research; 
and maybe impossible at all, depending on one’s view of the structures (if they are fixed, able 
to co-exist etc.). To repeat what I mentioned in chapter one, it is not the symptom of the 
individual I am investigating, but rather the symptom of a discourse — a discourse elaborated 
at a specific and unique time (of the participants’ lives), in a specific context (with me, 
representing the university at which I am researching). Through a Freudian-Lacanian 
approach I ‘follow the letter’ in order to uncover the logic of the signifier governing the 
unconscious (Miller, 2011: 9). I am thus starting from the assumption that the clinical 
structures, constituting different ways of relating to lack, are fluid and do not exclude each 
other. I use them not as a way of diagnosing individual differences — seeing as the individual 
is inseparable from its social and linguistic context — but to open up a discussion surrounding 
the possible similarities and differences emerging in the discourses. A structural logic will 
be explored in this manner throughout this chapter, where for instance, using the same 
signifiers or concepts surrounding two different events points to a link between the two and 
a certain logic. It is to be noted, however, that since the participants do not go into many 
details about these events, particularly the earlier events — and some less than others — there 
could potentially be a myriad of (unconscious) associations present here, while I am only 
focusing, and only capable of focusing, on a few.  
 In what follows, I firstly compare the structure of the participants’ discourses as 
outlined so far in the thesis, in relation to the theoretically complex neurosis/psychosis 
distinction. Thereafter, I explore in-depth two of the participants’ discourses in a case-study 
approach — Tom's and Gail's — as a way of uncovering more details relating to their 
structure. I have included only two of the participants, and I have left out a comparison to 
perversion, due to the limited scope of this research, and because that the latter was deemed 
less relevant. 
 
 
 
manner of marking something as traits (for example a hysteric/neurotic logic with perverse traits). See Dor 
(1998). 
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The Experience of Invasion in Relation to Psychosis 
 
A structure common to many of the participants’ discourses around the onset events is the 
invasion of something coming from the outside to the inside. This was observed in chapter 
two where the invasion most often took the form of a demand, which was related to a number 
of various events. The interviews, in this way, appear to reverberate something of the 
paranoiac position, with regard to the invasive nature of the Other. The Other is experienced 
for the paranoiac subject as a threatening agent out to get him/her, and more specifically, 
aiming for an element/essence in the subject’s being (Vanheule, 2014: 139). Amy, for 
instance, mentions how she was “forced” (B/L104) to have a vaccination at work in order to 
protect chemotherapy patients, about which she was “bitter” (A/L24-25). She could 
potentially refer to an experience of the Other wanting something from her, or rather, 
infecting her. Close to this experience could be said to be Lucy’s and Gail’s operations, who 
both mention they reacted to the anaesthetics given; it being potentially viewed as something 
external and harmful which was imposed on them. This is clearer in Lucy’s discourse, 
wherein it is stated that the anaesthetics should not have been given to her, and that it went 
down her throat and caused an infection — leading to the presence of a foreign element in 
her body that “they left [something] behind” (L/292). Further, Tom experiences noise as an 
imposition of an externality and explains how he is oversensitive to it, as relayed in chapter 
three, which is related to the imposition of his neighbours’ constant partying noise. In relation 
to describing this oversensitivity, Tom explains his fatigue as “somebody sticking a big 
syringe in your brain and s-sucking all the serotonin out”. This clearly points to the 
invasiveness of the Other, where the Other wants his serotonin (however, here not only 
wanting it, but taking it). Mark describes something similar to this insofar as he conveys that 
the lack of energy, based on an analogy where someone is eating his biscuits, is the result of 
others stealing it: “they’re reaching in aggressively and stealing your stuff” (B/L57-58). As 
has been seen in this thesis, energy, with which serotonin is associated, is considered 
something at the core of one’s being, as life itself. These intrusions outlined are also 
experienced as enigmatic and puzzling, and further something which blur the boundary 
between self and Other, subject and Other, which is also in line with the structure of 
psychosis. For example, this is observed when Tom cannot interpret the noise, as it is 
connected to demands, and Lucy cannot understand why they would give her anaesthetics. 
Additionally, it was argued in the previous chapter how a usually earlier encounter with loss 
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(in mourning) is linked with the loss of one’s identity, an identity which turns into an enigma. 
However, being met with the enigma of the Other’s desire and thus with the enigma of one’s 
own position is something all subjects go through, but it is experienced in different ways 
depending on the structure of the subject. It is thus helpful to outline this process in detail.  
The process of socialisation and identity formation is one of separation where the 
child redirects his/her desire exclusively from the mother to something/someone outside of 
the family relations (McGowan, 2004: 12). The child encounters the mOther’s enigmatic 
desire when s/he gets an inkling that there is a beyond of the mother-child unity through the 
comings and goings of the mother. These absences put into question what the child means 
for the mother in relation to her desire, and are accompanied by a sense of passivity and 
helplessness and the experience of the mother being omnipotent as long as s/he cannot figure 
out what motivates her absences (Vanheule, 2014: 59). A first solution attempted at in order 
to protect against this incomprehensible question is putting oneself in the place of the 
imaginary phallus for the mother: to imagine that it is the child she desires and keeps 
returning to. This cannot be maintained as the child notices that the mother desires something 
beyond the child, realising that the mother is a desiring being and thus a lacking being and is 
incomplete, followed by the logical realisation that so is the child. The Name-of-the-Father, 
or the ‘No!’ of the father since nom (name) in French is a homophony of ‘no’, constitutes a 
third point in the breaking of the mother-child unity. It comes to replace the mother’s desire, 
by naming what she wants, and acts as a prohibition to exclusive access to the mother (and 
the child for the mother). This concedes the installation of culture and norms (Vanheule, 
2014: 60). The Name-of-the-Father is a symbolic function, meaning it can be projected onto 
anyone and thus can be divorced from the physical father. The limitation imposed by the 
function constitutes a second signifier retrospectively signifying the loss of the mother-child 
unity (Fink, 1995: 56-57). It is thus arguably not so important what the mother desires, but 
that she desires beyond the child, installing loss and a search for that which remedies loss on 
the side of the Other (as a societal reference point). This metaphorical process of naming the 
mother’s desire through the paternal function makes the mother’s desire less enigmatic, a 
process whereby the subject adopts norms and thus a way of relating to others (Vanheule, 
2014: 60). It offers distance from the mother’s desire and a capability to self-reflect. In other 
words, the Oedipus complex/installation of the Name-of-the-Father constitutes a triangular 
logic necessary for meaning-making by introducing a third point acting as reference in 
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relation to which the subject can make sense of his/her own identity. This can be thought of 
in a simple way: the direction of left and right in a room only makes sense from the 
perspective of a third point therein (Verhaeghe, 2004: 194).  
For the psychotic, however, the third term which would make possible an answer and 
install law and a meaningful and safe co-existence with others is foreclosed, consequently 
leaving the subject with no orientation in terms of formulating his/her existence (Leader, 
2012: 40). This means that lack has not been registered, which it has for the other two possible 
‘outcomes’, neurosis and perversion, where the Name-of-the-Father has installed cultural 
norms. While lack has a place in the two latter — it has been inscribed — it is not fully 
accepted (Van Haute, 2002: 232); thus, neurosis and perversion can be said to constitute 
different levels of refusing lack. For the pervert, lack is recognised to exist for his father and 
others, and has been registered for himself and his mother, though it is denied for the latter 
two (Verhaeghe, 2004: 411). Hence the illusion of unity with the mOther operates strongly 
therein as the pervert comes to adopt the position of the object of the mOther’s desire (Van 
Haute, 2002: 234-235). In neurosis, lack is recognised for everyone, the Other of the Other 
does not exist, but pathology presents itself through a repression of lack, more precisely, by 
believing in the existence of a non-lacking Other. These defences against lack can be thought 
of three different ways of relating to, and ultimately refusing, lack: foreclosure (psychosis), 
denial (perversion) and repression (neurosis). 
The adoption of the Name-of-the-Father is typically considered an all-or-nothing 
process within the Lacanian field, where it is either present in perversion or neurosis, or 
foreclosed in psychosis. That is, one is either psychotic or neurotic, as the comparison usually 
goes; constituting a qualitative as opposed to quantitative difference. Vanheule (2014: 164) 
problematises this categorical distinction by arguing that Lacan in his later work came to 
view the limit between the clinical structures as fluid as opposed to dichotomous. He 
emphasises instead the singular and complex way in which the subject deals with the three 
psychic realms — the imaginary, symbolic and the real — through what Lacan terms a knot, 
or a sinthome. In this way, a neurotic knot reflecting a type of psychic structure — a specific 
way of relating to language, authority and others — cannot (easily or always, and at least 
theoretically, as Vanheule claims) be differentiated from a psychotic knot. Van Haute (2012: 
234, 236) also moves away from the considered all-or-nothing theory surrounding neurosis 
and psychosis and argues instead that there are different logical ‘moments’ or tendencies. 
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These tendencies can be, and sometimes needs to be, present simultaneously, although they 
will have different weights for a subject, with various conflicts between them. Hence the 
three structures — and it can be questioned whether there are three or more — could be 
viewed as a continuum, with separation constituting an increasing factor. I will in what 
follows try to operate from this assumption when exploring the structures of the participants’ 
discourses. 
Returning to how the interview discourses potentially resemble a psychotic logic, we 
can compare the ‘too muchness’ of a situation with the experience of psychosis whereby the 
Other comes across as a threatening agent wanting to steal something from the subject. Lacan 
follows Freud when conceptualising psychosis not just as something rejected, but 
‘unthinkable’ (Leader, 2012: 40), due to the Name-of-the-Father, and consequently norms 
and the means of meaning-making, not having been installed. This results in loss, object a, 
not having been extracted from the body and situated in the Other; the reason for which Lacan 
states that the psychotic has object a in his pocket (Vanheule, 2014: 137). The lack of 
separation/extraction from object a turns it into a ‘strange internal element’, with two 
structural relations possible in relation to this non-extracted object: paranoia and 
schizophrenia (Vanheule, 2014: 138). In schizophrenia, there is no relation between object a 
and the Other, instead there is a ‘senseless ravaging force’ and one which ‘overwhelms the 
subject from within’ (Ibid.: 140). Language becomes mad and chaotic (Lacan, 1973 as cited 
in Vanheule, 2014: 142) as there is no way of organising one’s reality. In paranoia on the 
other hand, a surplus is situated in the Other and on the outside (Leader, 2012: 87), while the 
object a is on the side of the subject. This results in experiences of intrusions which are 
puzzling and shocking (Vanheule, 2014: 139), experiencing the Other as a threatening agent 
and out to get him/her. The participants’ discourses as outlined above thus seem to echo such 
a structure, particularly that related to paranoia, and primarily in relation to the onset events, 
where a demand is experienced as an intrusive, external and incomprehensible otherness 
which is too much. 
Relatedly, integral to the paranoid position is the passivity of the subject, ‘as an 
innocent victim of a jouissance-driven Other’ (Ibid.: 140). There might be a sense in which 
the operations for Lucy and Gail consist of them being put in a position of a helpless victim, 
since the anaesthetics put them to sleep where they literally become passive objects for the 
Other (to operate on). Gail alludes to a sense of helplessness after one of her operations, when 
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she is in disbelief that the Other would not give her water or food: “and it was after that 
operation when I just had to lie there and cry out and say I can’t do a thing for myself” 
(C/L429-430). Something similar could be suggested in Tom’s situation, as he portrays 
himself as a “prisoner” (A/L72) of his neighbours’ partying noise. His symptoms also come 
to mimic those of his patients, suggesting there could be an identification with the passivity 
immanent to patients in the cardiac surgery whom are put to sleep and operated on. He 
explains the process of the surgery as “you gotta re-open the chest and suck them out and the 
pressures go really down” (A/277-278) — akin to the way in which he describes the serotonin 
being “sucked” out of him when explaining the loss of energy (“pressure”?) involved in 
fatigue45. Additionally and analogously, that life was “drain[ed]” from him, and that he 
describes these events in the cardiac surgery as “draining” (282-283), suggests a link between 
fatigue and the passive positions of his patients. However, at this place, and the other just-
mentioned accounts, there are no references to anOther who enjoys the subject being in the 
place of a victim, which is what jouissance refers to in the statement a ‘jouissance-driven 
Other’. It could, however, be present for Tom’s situation insofar as his neighbours’ noise 
stems from them partying, thus implying them enjoying themselves. We also notice 
references to an enjoying Other in Tom’s discourse, as well as in Mark’s. 
The manifestation of the Other’s threatening jouissance aiming for an element in one’s 
being manifests for the psychotic as ‘a commanding voice that intrudes with jouissance-laden 
comments’ (Vanheule, 2014: 139). In Tom’s discourse, this aspect can be traced implicitly 
when he explains how he gets shouted instructions at work from “people getting all excited 
and shouting and pooff” (A/L617). We get the sense that those shouting instructions ‘get off’ 
from it. This would compromise a similarity to psychosis in that the Other, as someone out 
to get you, is experienced to be driven by a ‘mad pleasure’ (Vanheule, 2014: 139). An account 
of this could be traced most explicitly in Mark’s discourse, who was “the victim of domestic 
abuse” (A/L245-246) during the time of the onset.  
Mark’s discourse hints at his ex-partner enjoying others suffering when he explains 
how she used to steal from others and blame someone innocent for it: 
 
 
45 Here, however, since we are talking about a loss of energy (that the Other is not just wanting something but 
steals it, leading to the subject experiencing a loss), we are already marking a difference between psychosis and 
neurosis, which will be discussed more further down. Indeed, in the previous chapter, the experience of the 
Other stealing from the subject was linked to imaginary castration (present in neurosis). 
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And she gets this… this delight, it gives her delight to have control over the 
situation. To the extent that this other innocent person is now being blamed for 
something they didn’t do. It - she - she loves the manipulation game. She thrives 
on it (B/L412-414). 
 
There is a clear sense here of being in the position of a victim, and further that the person 
takes “delight” in victimising the other. Even though he is talking about someone else here, 
we could speculate it is also applicable to himself, insofar as he goes straight from here to 
talk about the ways in which his partner deceived him. If this is the case, then repression is 
at work, thereby entering a neurotic logic with the process of displacement (that what is 
relevant for someone else is relevant for himself, considering there is no repression in 
psychosis). In psychosis, there are no formations of the unconscious where symptoms are 
decipherable in this manner. An echo of the situation with Mark’s ex can be found to occur 
at work, when his employer would not honour the GP’s fit note: 
 
I can’t - yeah - I’m getting worse, and I need to change my hours and why are 
you as an employer, why are you obstructing me? Are you trying to make me 
quit? Are you trying to damage my health? (A/L181-183). 
 
There is an experience of his employer as intentionally attempting to harm him, pointing to 
this position of a victim whereby the Other is out to get him. However, formulating it as a 
question (“Are you trying to damage my health?”) highlights a crucial difference to a 
psychotic logic, and a similarity to a neurotic logic. Psychosis is hallmarked by certainty and 
neurosis by doubt (Fink, 1999), in the way in which existential elements are approached, 
which is oftentimes considered the most important distinction between the two. The neurotic 
poses the question through a symptom ‘What am I for you?’, while the psychotic knows what 
he is, in the form of an ‘imposition of a solution’ (Leader, 2012: 37-38). Leader gives the 
example of someone who is convinced of being evil and pregnant, where signs in the external 
world are read as being addressed directly to her sexuality: ‘the sexual content of the thoughts 
is not repressed but rather attributed to others’ (Ibid.: 39). There is something absolute in 
psychosis, in other words. This is not to say that the psychotic does not doubt, that doubt in 
itself should be read as a ‘guarantee’ of a psychotic logic. Instead, doubt, uncertainty, can 
 
 
194 
very much be found in psychosis, but pertaining to the content of a message as it is 
experienced as enigmatic, while the person is certain that there is a message addressed to 
them (Rogers, 2018: 13). In neurosis, one would doubt whether or not someone is out to get 
them, whether one is directly addressed, since the position of being a victim is not self-
evident. We notice this in Mark’s discourse in the excerpt just mentioned: the structure of a 
question implies it is not certain whether his employer, and potentially his ex-partner if they 
are linked, is trying to intentionally hurt him. Accordingly, there could be an unconscious 
identification in place for Tom with his patients, where the aspect of being passive is relayed 
in a roundabout manner.  
In line with this, the invasion of the Other is put forth as a metaphor in the discourses. 
For example, Tom’s description of fatigue (“it’s like somebody sticking a big syringe in your 
brain and s-sucking all the serotonin out”) is indicative of a metaphor insofar as he says “it’s 
like”. Mark likewise explains his condition using analogies, one of which was mentioned 
above, describing how others are unknowingly eating his biscuits, saying: “it’s like they’re 
reaching in aggressively and stealing your stuff” (B/L57-58). That others are unknowingly 
eating his biscuits, in combination with the situation at work, could again point to an element 
of insecurity with regards to whether or not someone is intentionally hurting him. This would 
differ from a psychotic logic, where the Other is seeking something concrete of the subject 
(Vanheule, 2014: 139), seeing as psychotics are unable to forge new metaphors (Fink, 1999: 
90)46. Considering also that for the paranoiac subject, the Other is thought to have put 
something in the body/mind of oneself (Vanheule, 2014: 139), again on a concrete level. It 
differs significantly from the participants’ interviews in the fact that the invasiveness pertains 
to the Other stealing energy, leading to the experience of loss which stands at the centre, 
which is absent in psychosis due to object a not having been extracted from the body. This 
aspect is of course blurred in cases where a physical intervention has taken place, such as for 
Amy (vaccination) and Lucy and Gail (operations), where they indeed received something 
physical, and the Other has literally ‘taken’ a body part. However, there is still a difference 
here to a psychotic logic insofar as it is considered that a part of them has been stolen/lost, 
and not the whole of them, and consequently that they entail the experience of loss. Tom lost 
 
46  Another difference between the two is that the paranoid subject names the Other’s desire in a non-
conventional way — it has to be invented — for example, the CIA, FBI, or aliens are after the subject (Vanheule, 
2014: 85), whereas this aspect is missing in the interviews. 
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something enjoyable “serotonin”, Gail lost her “stomach” and Lucy lost “bits of me”. This 
brings us to a discussion of the limits of identifications and identities.  
 
The Limit of ‘Too Much’ in Relation to Psychosis 
 
The identifications explored so far for the participants in this thesis, including the 
identification with passivity and the experience of disappearing behind the Other, come 
across as partial in nature in their discourses. The identifications related to this is that of 
‘nothing’ subsumed under the desire to sleep, which can be conceptualised as an 
identification with loss. In this way, it comes close to that of melancholia as part of psychosis, 
where the subject merges with the lost object. However, for the melancholic subject, the 
identification is all-compassing, meaning that the self is completely equated with the lost 
object. Due to the absoluteness inherent in psychosis as discussed above, where instead of 
uncertainty there is certainty of being in a particular position, exclusive self-reproach is 
usually present for the melancholic, as well as, sometimes, a literal incarnation of the dead 
one through suicide (Leader, 2009: 169, 172). In the interviews and in relation to culpability, 
in contrast, we could trace the outline of implicit questions of responsibility, ‘Am I to blame’? 
— which could hypothetically underpin Mark’s question to his employer “Are you trying to 
damage my health”?. This will be explored more further on in relation to others’ accounts. 
Nevertheless, a partial identification with the dead would explain the ambivalence and 
struggle between life and death, not just the equation with death, and between taking 
responsibility and an exoneration of it through a medical diagnosis. In fact, we have noticed 
how responsibility oscillates between these two poles, between too much and not enough, 
which could comprise the very questioning of responsibility, of a limit. This suggests that the 
limit is there between the subject and the Other. In agreement with this, there appears to be 
a limit in place for the participants when confronting an enigma. 
When the psychotic is confronted with the enigmatic desire of the Other, there is a 
problematic encounter with the ‘hole’ in the symbolic: the imaginary and the symbolic do 
not work together but instead there is a confrontation with the real, an inability to signify, 
where words make no sense and there is no possibility of articulating anything regarding 
his/her identity. There is instead tension and enigma. What is experienced is an 
incomprehensible imposition coming from the outside, since there is nothing there (Rogers, 
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2018: 37-38). An element of this could be tracked in the participants’ discourses insofar as 
they describe experiencing something shocking after the invasive imposition of the Other, 
where language becomes incomprehensible as they no longer understand what others are 
saying to them, and unable to form responses; constituting an encounter with the real. Of 
course, this confrontation with the real, the Other’s unsymbolised and enigmatic desire, is 
not only particular to the psychotic but is something met by all subjects. But we could argue 
that there are different degrees of a lack of symbolisation as represented by the three clinical 
structures. The structure of the participants’ discourses seems to lack the aspect of 
absoluteness inherent in psychosis, meaning that the experience of being taken over by the 
Other, or an otherness, is not the full story or a ‘complete’ takeover. In psychosis, due to the 
foreclosure of meaning and the fact that nothing is there, the enigma is disintegrative at a 
wide level, to the extent that, as Rogers (2018: 9) points out, one is unable to differentiate 
between one’s own thoughts and that of others’. What is often noticeable for psychotics when 
recounting their experiences is the strange, confusing and threatening nature acquired not just 
by a bodily/mental sensation, but by the external world around them. This to the point where 
thoughts or messages perceived to stem from a wall, for instance, are impossible to be 
distinguished from that of one’s own47. For all the participants, the disintegration does not 
seem to entirely extend past a limit between the subject and the Other, between the internal 
and the external world. Even when residing within a psychotic schizophrenic logic, wherein 
the enigma does not stem from the outside as in paranoia, but from within one’s own body, 
there is still a difficulty of recognising that one’s own body belongs to oneself. In contrast to 
the participants’ accounts, enigmatic forces are experienced to stem from their bodies, held 
together by an ambiguous limit, but a limit nevertheless. 
For instance, in relation to Tom’s inability to stand noise and understand what others 
are saying, he says “I’m just so sensitive” and that “he was never like that”, which implies 
an attribution of these ‘symptoms’ of incomprehensibility to his own self. Important here is 
that there is a self, even though that self is difficult to describe, as he says: “That’s a [small 
laugh] - not a very good way of explaining it but that’s how I feel”. A similar discourse can 
be traced for the other participants, in line with the conceptualisation of a neurotic logic 
where the division of the subject is experienced as internal, whereas fragments in psychosis 
are experienced as external (Vanheule, 2014: 44, 138). An easy example of the former is that 
 
47 See Annie Rogers’ (2018) for a highly accessible discussion on psychosis and some accounts therefrom. 
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the incomprehensible dreams neurotics have, containing one’s unconscious elements, are 
viewed and experienced by neurotics as ultimately stemming from themselves, produced by 
themselves, despite their foreign nature. More accurately, this showcases the structure of the 
unconscious as an internal externality. We notice something akin to this in Mark’s discourse 
when describing his bodily tremors: 
 
I had lost - I had completely lost control of every limb. And when one considers 
oneself as an entity, as a mind and a body and your - your mind can control your 
body, it’s absolutely horrifically terrifying to no longer be able to control your 
own body. Especially if it’s still attached, you know I’d understand not being 
able to control an arm that had been amputated, but to have the arm there, to be 
able to see it. And for that arm to be moving under instructions which I haven’t 
consciously given is very very scary (A/86-92). 
 
Mark puts down the trembling body as something “no longer able to control”, which is 
“horrifically terrifying”. The terrifying aspect could refer both to a lack of control and the 
fact that this uncontrollable mess is “still attached”. That is, his body is not his, in a way, 
since it eludes “instructions” related to consciousness. At the same time, the body belongs to 
him since it is “your own body”, one which he can furthermore “see”. It is therefore 
something simultaneously on the outside and inside, both belonging and not belonging to 
oneself. It is as if he sees his own disappearance, that the body has a life on its own: a presence 
of an absence he is unable to comprehend, yet attached to him. This attachment suggests that 
a limit is there insofar as the lack of control does not appear to spill over (entirely) to the 
external world, even though this barrier to an external world is ambiguous.  
Such a relation to the body is in line with how Miller (2015: 156) differentiates 
between a neurotic and psychotic logic: in neurosis it is ‘the body that has its own ways’, 
whereas in psychosis there is ‘a gap where the body is un-wedged, where the subject needs 
some tricks to re-appropriate his own body’. That is, the psychotic interprets a foreignness 
as either stemming from others or from nowhere: the body never really belongs to him/herself 
due to a lack of establishment of the mirror image whereby one acquires a sense of ‘having’ 
a body. A commonly cited example of how a psychotic relates to his/her body, a sense of not 
having a body, is taken from an episode in James Joyce’s book ‘A Portrait of the Artist as 
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Young Man’, since Lacan refers to it as a way of illustrating the missing register of the 
imaginary. Therein, Joyce describes Stephen, the protagonist, being beaten by friends with 
no subsequent feelings aroused by it; there are no subjective bearings. Lacan interprets it as 
a form of disconnection from the body and likewise from feelings of anger, since Joyce writes 
they can vanish ‘as easily as fruit is divested of its soft ripe peel’ (Vanheule, 2014: 168). This 
is in line with Vanheule’s (Ibid.: 142) interpretation of the psychotic’s relation to the body in 
schizophrenia, where holes are created in the body in the sense that parts of it disappear into 
nothingness, by an ‘unmotivated force’. It differs from Mark’s and the participants’ 
experiences of the bodies, who witness their bodies disappearing, and experience the horror 
involved in realising that their bodies, or a part of their bodies, do not belong to themselves; 
while they should and do to a certain extent belong to themselves. This could merely convey 
the mind-body divide in that their bodies are physically theirs, but not mentally. Ultimately, 
the division is thought to stem from themselves. Something similar in terms of an inside 
becoming an outside could be traced for Gail when she says that after her first operation: 
“Everything became exterior to my internal self. It was like I was out there watching me. It - 
it was very scary” (A/L312-313). These experiences seem to echo the structure of the mirror 
stage as part of alienation, which was outlined previously: the inmost part of oneself resides 
on the outside (an inclusion of an exclusion, a presence of an absence). It resembles more 
specifically the structure of imaginary alienation as made possibly by separation, which has 
not taken place in psychosis. It implies that the ego has been established and that it is the 
contrast between the ego and that which stands outside of it, object a, which gives rise to the 
uncanny experience. 
A difficulty which presents itself in recognising this above-mentioned aspect is that 
the defensive moment of the subject as a refusal of the Other — the desire to sleep whereby 
there is an identification with dead, zombie-like objects — shares similarities with aspects of 
the real and with, as I said, the psychotic structure of melancholia. Further, the inhibitions 
elaborated in relation to this, particularly pertaining to the understanding of and usage of 
language, can come close to the psychotic’s inability to signify. Therefore, if the defence is 
strong, it may be difficult to recognise the refusal as both wanting to be part of and refusing 
the symbolic order — an ambivalence which would be absent in psychosis since that would 
imply a limit between the subject and Other. Nevertheless, wanting to be part of the symbolic 
order is clear in the participants’ appeals to the Other, which follows a neurotic logic in that 
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object a is experienced to reside on the side of the Other (Vanheule, 2014: 139). Object a 
here is that which is able to imaginarily rectify loss and provide an answer for an enigma, the 
presence of which implies that the neurotic believes and aims to re-claim that which was lost 
through turning to the Other (Vanheule, 2014: 134) — believing in the ‘subject supposed to 
know’. Furthermore, as opposed to psychosis, the identification with loss appears more 
protective due to the imaginary coating of the real (positivisation of loss). The difference 
could pertain to an inhibition, as found in the interviews, being more in line with ‘not wanting 
to’ (neurosis), as opposed to ‘not being able to’ (psychosis) recognise lack, with the latter 
being present in neurosis but not to the same degree and in the form of a failure of 
symbolisation as opposed to inability.  
I argue that it is a difficulty of telling these two apart, due to a strong presence of the 
inhibition/defence of the subject, which could have contributed to the rise in theories where 
modern symptoms are conceptualised as states resembling, or linked to, psychosis. The most 
popular theory based on the structure of psychosis is Miller’s (2009) coinage and concept of 
‘ordinary psychosis’, which some theorists and clinicians have used as a way of 
understanding chronic fatigue and pain. This concept can easily be misunderstood to refer to 
a borderline category, residing somewhere in between a neurotic and psychotic logic. 
However, Miller (2009: 96) relates it to psychosis, while stating that it gives off the 
appearance of a borderline condition: ‘some cases would look like they were between the 
two’ (Ibid.: 95, my emphasis). Ordinary psychosis is what he calls a veiled psychosis, which 
can also be conceptualised as a mild psychosis, where the extreme disturbances usually 
associated and related to psychosis, such as dissociations and hallucinations, are absent. 
Those utilising Miller’s theory in conceptualising fatigue and pain along these lines — for 
example Steven’s (2009) and Barretto & Besset (2016) — tend to, alongside Miller himself, 
be reductive in what aspects are focused on, and to separate functions and categorise based 
on their mere presence — which does not stray far from the biomedical way of diagnosing. 
As not enough details are brought into their argument, it makes an application of them 
questionable. For instance, Barretto & Besset (2016) argue that chronic pain in ‘the majority 
of cases’, following other Spanish-speaking authors, does not align itself with the picture of 
hysteria and conversion symptom (where symptoms are symbolic formations of the 
unconscious), but with that of ordinary psychosis. More specifically, the symptom comes to 
act as a sinthome. To briefly explain this concept, Lacan coined the term sinthome — an old 
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spelling of the word symptom — to indicate a symptom with the same functions as that of 
the Name-of-the-Father, functions related to ‘castration, social identification and naming’ 
(Redmond, 2014: 120). A sinthome offers a supplementary function which links jouissance 
(as a force disrupting limits) to a signifier, which brings stabilisation and a sense of identity 
in the form of a social bond. It is the subject who singularly invents a sinthome, meaning it 
is self-made and does not depend on the Other’s conventional ideas. The prime example here 
is considered to be that of James Joyce through his identification with being an artist 
(Redmond, 2014: 121-122), and through his singular, non-conventional work. The sinthome 
offers a way of knotting together the orders of the symbolic, real, and imaginary, through the 
use of a ‘signifier in the real’. Body phenomena are thought to belong to a signifier in the 
real, where, instead of consisting of an eruption in an encounter with the hole in the symbolic, 
they offer stabilisation and a way of naming one’s experiences. According to Barreto & 
Besset (2016: 192), pain is used in order to ‘construct a body and to name a jouissance that 
lies outside meaning’, following the imperative to delineate one’s identity. This differs from 
the neurotic subject where pain acts as a denial of the possession of a body. Moreover, Barreto 
& Besset follow Gaspard (2012, as cited in Barreto & Besset, 2016) in associating hysteria 
with the function of a refusal, which they dissociate from the majority of pain as a ‘body 
phenomenon’ (Ibid.: 192), conceptualising pain here instead as a type of surviving strategy 
instead. This appears to echo Miller’s theory (2009: 105) which links a rebellious nature with 
hysteria. 
Barreto & Besset’s conceptualisation of ordinary psychosis in this manner appears to 
be making too much of a separation between the functions of using the body for identity 
formation and a refusal, and also between signalling the aliveness of the body and denying 
it. This research has illustrated how, first of all, using the body to demarcate one’s identity, 
the body in its real aspect, using it for the function of separation akin to the sinthome, is 
foundational and the first step to any symptom48. It has further been illustrated how the 
process of naming the body can be tied to a refusal — a refusal which, in the light of Lacan’s 
work, can be conceptualised as the minimal sign of subjectivity. Indeed, as mentioned in this 
chapter, the three various ways of defending against lack (psychosis, neurosis, and 
perversion) can be viewed as three various ways of refusing lack. A refusal is perfectly 
 
48 The act of self-naming the body could be relevant here as in line with the function of the sinthome, seeing as 
the patients are active in ‘promoting’ a type of diagnosing; however it is done through the conventional 
biomedical framework. 
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capable of being executed by the psychotic subject (see Leader, 2016: 29 and Rogers, 2018), 
but it will be enacted for primarily different reasons than those inherent in neurosis or 
perversion (this will be discussed below). Further, the subject can both use the real body as 
a way of marking the boundaries of the body, while simultaneously denying the body — this 
we witnessed present between the ‘initial’ refusal and the defensive desire to sleep. Due to 
not acknowledging this — and not engaging more in-depth in the neurosis/psychosis 
distinction — it makes the separation between ordinary psychosis and conversion symptoms, 
and ultimately the former’s existence in relation to modern symptoms such as fatigue and 
pain, unconvincing.  
However, bodily symptoms which are not symbolically structured — an element 
crucial to the theory of ordinary psychosis — has also been theorised as a possibility within 
the structure of neurosis. The main influence here stems from Freud’s theory of the actual 
neurosis, which, as was mentioned previously, Verhaeghe’s takes as his basis when 
theorising his concept of actualpathology49. He argues that actualpathology is a possibility 
within any of the three structures, neurosis, perversion or psychosis; that it constitutes a 
position within these structures, where the latter shapes the former (Verhaeghe, 2004: 307). 
That is, actualpathology and psychopathology are two various positions, each containing 
further ‘subcategories’ or structures which have achieved various degrees of separation. 
Actualpathology constitutes the least amount of separation, with which he links chronic 
fatigue, while psychopathology has achieved the most  degree of separation (Ibid.: 285). 
There are also varying separations within the structures, for example in neurosis, obsessional 
neurosis is viewed to contain more separation than that of hysteria (Ibid.: 383). Verhaeghe 
thus puts forth a new theory within the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis: a position somewhat 
resembling psychosis can take place in neurosis. This appears untenable both in the light of 
Lacan’s theory and the analysis of this research. The analysis just above illustrated how, even 
when confronting an enigma, object a as the void emerges in relation to one’s mirror image 
which is symbolically structured; that the ego as that which establishes inside-outside barriers 
is still in place, although more ambiguously — mirroring the structure of imaginary 
alienation which Verhaeghe argues is absent for actualpathology. We can see this in Lacan’s 
formula of the ideal ego, i(a), where object a is excluded from the mirror image, but when 
 
49 The category of actual neurosis has also been suggested to constitute a fourth independent structure, in 
relation to the three existing Lacanian structures, by Rik Loose (2003) in his discussion of addiction. 
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the brackets are suspended, as discussed in relation to mourning, object a becomes included 
within the mirror image. The same can be said for the fundamental fantasy, which Verhaeghe 
also claims is completely absent in actualpathology and in fatigue, since it was argued how 
for the participants’ of this study, the unbearable void appears in relation to the fundamental 
fantasy. It is in accordance with Lacanian theory that once the ego, alongside the fundamental 
fantasy, have been established — which they have in neurosis — they cannot then completely 
disintegrate. If a subject is already operating within a symbolic realm, with the installation 
of norms and culture through the Name-of-the-Father, is it then possible that bodily 
symptoms can appear without much or any reference to a symbolic-imaginary elaboration? I 
argue that it is unconvincing and unlikely. Even a largely biological occurrence would be 
given a meaning in a person’s life, creating or reinforcing or altering an unconscious logic. 
One could even argue that this is the prison of the neurotic, s/he being someone who cannot 
help but to put meaning onto everything. Here is then another indication that the 
aforementioned contemporary theories could be confusing the appearance of a symptom with 
the defensive part; the defence of the subject which consists of a refusal of the symbolic 
order, giving the façade that the imaginary and the symbolic do not operate therein. Indeed, 
I will in what follows continue to explore the ways in which the formation of fatigue as seen 
in this research is symbolically structured.  
 
Tom: Failing to Complete his Lack 
 
Exploring the discourses around the onset of the participants' conditions, it is noticeable that 
they are confronted not only with the Other’s puzzling desire, but also with experiences of 
disappointment, frustrations, and anger. The presence of these implies that the Other here is 
not always enigmatic, but indifferent, which arguably relates to experiences of loss as well 
as questions surrounding responsibility. This will now be explored by honing in on the 
structures of Tom’s and Gail’s discourses, chosen for the purpose of illustrating both similar 
and different aspects. For each, I will focus on the link between the triggering events and an 
earlier episode in which they experienced loss. I will firstly explore the logic of the two 
discourses respectively, and thereafter bring them both together in relation to relevant theory. 
 Starting with Tom, following the logic of his discourse, we notice a structural link 
between the event he associates with causing the onset of his condition, and certain episodes 
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occurring both immediately prior to the onset and in the distant past. Beginning with the 
former, it is the constant partying noise from his neighbours, from which “there was no 
fucking escape” (B/L463), which Tom relates leading to his “crash and burn” (B/L471), the 
initiation of his condition. As was argued in this thesis, noise for Tom could relate to his 
work, where “people [are] shouting commands, you know swearing “Where the fuck’s this? 
I need that” (A/L617-618), explained by Tom as being frustratingly “too much”. Noise is 
also associated with listening to conversations in a public space, “listening to others’ things” 
(A/L293), which in turn is associated to the draining of the serotonin out of him since he 
mentions one after the other. All of this could potentially relate to an indifference of the Other 
pertaining to the subject’s needs/wishes, insofar as they are centred on the Other’s need (“I 
need that” as he explain what others are shouting, and that it is “other’s things” he listens to). 
However, what is also of significance around the event of the neighbours’ noise for Tom is 
the inescapability from asking others for help, or in other words, dependency. In the second 
interview he explains how his neighbours’ noise led him to having to phone the police and 
ask for help, something he found “uncomfortable” (B/L471), “stressful”, and “going against 
the grain” (B/475-476): 
 
Well phoning the police when somebody’s having a party, don’t do. You just go 
down and deal with it yourself. Through whatever measures you need to m - to - 
to use to get your need met (B/L441-443). 
 
This event seems to be linked with a potential failure of meeting his own needs, a failure of 
being independent, and inversely, a ‘fear’ of dependency on others insofar as Tom is of the 
belief that one should not need to ask for help. There could potentially be shame here 
associated with lack. If one is not lacking, one does not desire, and thus to want/to lack is 
shameful. Tom further indicates that to not lack (“to get your need met”) — to be complete 
— is a responsibility on his part (“you go down and deal with it yourself”). Thus, this 
paragraph points to a failure of having completed his “need”, through not dealing with his 
neighbours’ party, and that as a consequence, an appeal to others/the Other (embodied by the 
police), is “uncomfortable” and “stressful”, possibly feared. This could be related to an event 
occurring around the onset, potentially before, but the timeline is unclear. When I asked Tom 
what went on generally in his life around the onset, he replies: “I went through a relationship 
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split which was of - of my own doing, because I was in a - a relationship that wasn’t working 
for me (B/L473-474)”. This is all he says about the separation, but it does suggest a link to 
having had to phone the police insofar he was meeting his own need here by splitting up with 
his partner (it “wasn’t working for me”). The logic, for both events, circulates around 
meeting/not meeting his needs or wishes (in lay parlance these are interchangeable). Indeed, 
his condition on a whole is expressed as a relief of having more time for himself: “I never 
really had time for me. And this has certainly given me the opportunity to reflect and say well 
you know, eh” (A/L224-225). However, we discern around the neighbours’ noise a failure 
of meeting his own wishes, or completed his lack, and a difficulty in asking others to satisfy 
it, which suggests this could be the place of an enigma or contradiction with which he 
struggles: trying to meet his own need while finding this problematic/not wanting to. The 
reason for the latter could be due to the details surrounding his mother’s death, insofar as the 
discourse also circulates around his need/wish, albeit with grave consequences: 
 
… she died in front of us so there was a lot of guilt, I had said to her ‘I hope you 
die’ then - the - a - two hours before she did she had been in hospital, ‘cus I didn’t 
get my own way with something for a change, ‘I hope you die’ and then two 
hours later she did. So I think I carried a lot of shame and guilt regarding…the 
last words I ever spoke to my mother was ‘I hope - wish you had fucking died’ 
(B/L117-122). 
 
That “I didn’t get my own way with something for a change” is related by the same signifiers 
surrounding the separation from his partner: it was “of my own doing”. Further, to “not get 
what I wanted” constitutes an unmet wish reminiscent perhaps of one related to the 
neighbours’ noise. That he threw “abuse” at his mother for this failure implies there was an 
expectation for his mother to take care of his wish, that he may have appealed to her for help, 
but was left disappointed or angry that this did not occur. In this way, to ask others to meet 
his needs or demands could be reminiscent of his mother’s death — a death for which he 
took responsibility since “there was a lot of guilt”. We see clearer his sense of responsibility 
in her death when he says: “I’ve kept - a-almost thought I was powerful as well because if 
you say that and then two hours later that happens, you begin to think….my god. Maybe. But 
I don’t know” (B/L126-128). It appears as if he is unsure (“I don’t know”) whether it was his 
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words or not causing her death, since this structurally comes after wondering if he is 
“powerful”. The insecurity could imply he is unsure if/how much he is responsible for his 
mother’s death, subsequently suggesting that responsibility has not been processed. 
Accordingly, observed in his discourse is a fluctuation between being responsible and being 
free of it, between a ‘too much’ and a ‘not enough’, the latter of which is evident when he 
explains the outcome of his twelve-step program: 
 
I always thought you know you didn’t talk about this stuff, eh you didn’t… [deep 
breath in] blame [deep breath out] eh parents or parent or whatever, brother. 
Family. Eh…about how you were. You only took drugs ‘cus you took drugs 
(B/L104-106). 
 
That he “blame[d]” his family — or as he says elsewhere, that other people also had a 
“dysfunctional family” and that it was “not just me” — follows the bio-psychology discourse 
wherein circumstances such as family become external elements from which one is 
separated 50 . On the other hand, the twelve-step programme involves “taking personal 
inventory, on myself” (B/L44), and in relation to explaining he was “resentful” at his mother 
(and “god”) “for dying”, he says: “so it’s a bit looking and seeing my part in it” (B/L142). 
This oscillation between himself and his family, something seen in the other interviews as 
well, besides pointing to a potential unprocessed responsibility, suggests, like I argued 
before, that the limit is there between himself and others — in line with a neurotic logic — 
since it points to a questioning of the limit. For as Leader recognises, the neurotic asks him 
or herself ‘Am I to blame?’, while the melancholic in psychosis is certain, ‘I am to blame’ 
(Leader, 2012: 91). Therefore, the structure around Tom’s discourse arguably circulates 
around meeting a need/wish of his, with a potential implicit question present regarding 
responsibility. By identifying with the patients going into “cardiac arrest” who are passively 
operated on, Tom could speculatively ask the question of ‘Am I to blame?’ through the body. 
It could further be a way for him to unconsciously appeal for help — by putting himself in a 
 
50 This type of psy-discourse can be problematic for the subject who takes responsibility, feels responsible on 
some level, because it asks not to process responsibility but to ignore and externalise it (depicted in Black 
Mirror’s Season 5 episode ‘Smithereens’, whose protagonist got angry when other people told him he was a 
victim, seeing as he did not feel like a victim). It can further be problematic due to the subject possessing a 
sense of loyalty to the family.  
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passive position — when he was unable to explicitly/consciously do so, since asking 
someone else to ‘fix’ his need/lack was problematic in the past.  
Arguably, the symptom of fatigue could for Tom resemble that of a conversion 
symptom as elaborated by Freud, which I explained in-depth in the beginning of chapter four. 
To recapitulate, a conversion symptom is formed due to a psychical conflict, where an 
unbearable impulse (an affect accompanied by an idea) is repressed due to the consciousness 
refusing the idea; finding it incompatible with the ego’s morality. The idea gets cut off from 
consciousness while the affect becomes transformed into a somatic tension (Freud, SE III: 
49; Freud, SE XVI: 359). A conversion symptom in this way contains a symbolic message 
addressed to someone which can be deciphered; a formation of the unconscious in line with 
Lacan’s axiom that the unconscious is structured like a language. For Freud, two forces are 
‘reconciled’ in the symptom through a condensation (Freud, SE XVI: 359): the bodily 
symptom expresses both the unconscious idea deemed contradictory to the ego’s ideals, and 
the refusal refusing it (Freud, SE V: 596). The selection of a symptom occurs through being 
able to express both of these pressures simultaneously (Freud, SE XIV: 182). For Tom, we 
could hypothesise that the passivity embodied by fatigue could represent an appeal to the 
Other to complete the subject (to get rid of his need/lack), while at the same time representing 
a fear of dependency and a subsequent attempt to complete his own lack by his ‘own doing’, 
through withdrawing from society/the Other. We discern how the symptom allows both a 
solution in the form of a focus on himself, but also the creation of more problems, and, 
probably and paradoxically, a stronger dependency on the Other insofar as the condition leads 
Tom to appeal to the medical Other (saying he never makes appointments unless necessary). 
There is a noticeable analogy in Gail’s discourse regarding responsibility, but the accent 
appears to lie on others failing to meet her lack and her failing to meet someone else’s lack.  
 
Gail: Failing to Complete the Other’s Lack 
 
Gail links the onset of her condition with two operations having taken place, one in 2000 
where she had an elective hysterectomy (A/L321), and one in 2008 where they “half re-
made” her gullet in her stomach (A/L305-306)). With regards to the latter operation, she says 
she received “nothing” for her pain after the operation: “And they wouldn’t give me anything 
for pain after the operation. Nothing. Nothing” (A/L350-351). Something similar takes place 
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after she collapsed and became hospitalised for six days, when they had to take out a stone 
from the gallbladder (A/L359). During that hospitalisation, she explains how “they didn’t 
give me any food or water for six days. And they didn’t give me a drip. So I was starving to 
death” (A/L323-324). Additionally, after this operation she conveys: “…and it was after that 
operation when I just had to lie there and cry out and say I can’t do a thing for myself” 
(C/L429-430). Gail invokes here the notion of helplessness, akin to Tom’s discourse of not 
being able to fulfil his own lack. However, she emphasises the Other’s failure of meeting her 
need as opposed to it being a failure on her part: “they wouldn’t give me anything for 
pain…Nothing”; “they didn’t give me a drip”, which was the reason for her starving. This 
marks the indifference of the Other not concerned with her need/lack, an experience possibly 
accompanied by disbelief and disappointment in the Other. Indeed, that she would “cry out” 
could amount to an appeal to the Other to remedy her lack (hunger, thirst and pain). The 
descriptions of these events are structurally related to the discourse surrounding her sister’s 
death, which is the final factor she relates to the triggering of her condition, it being the “last 
straw” which “broke” her (A/L580).  
Firstly, the way in which they relate to each other is through the idea of having 
“nothing” as seen in the following excerpt: 
 
And I believe that’s got a lot to do with it. But I feel very, very guilty about my 
sister dying. I believe she should be alive and I should be dead. Not in a bad way, 
if you know what I mean, but if you look at it I mean I had everything in life, she, 
what did she have? Nothing (A/L572-575). 
 
Instead of Gail receiving “nothing” from the medical Other at her operations, it is here her 
sister who has “nothing”. Not only that, but her sister is thought to have received “nothing”, 
and more specifically from herself (Gail), which is arguably what she relays feeling guilty 
about: her sister was “stuck with my parents, looking after them and things and I was out 
there having a life in some way” (C/L524-525). That Gail was “out there” means she had a 
job as an air hostess and was never around for her sister: “You know and, so I was never 
there. She took on all the problems and I was never there for her” (A/L566-567). We notice 
that she in a way blames herself for having failed her sister, having failed to complete her 
lack, in contradistinction to Tom where he failed to plug up his own lack. The hospitalisations 
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could then depict a reversal of this situation, thus disguising the earlier event: instead of her 
failing someone else, the doctors are failing her. This could point to the presence of 
repression, where the hospitalisations could have invoked the trauma of her sister’s death and 
questions surrounding Gail’s potential role in it. It also suggests an identification in place 
with her sister, where Gail takes a similar position as her as having received “nothing”.   
Further following the logic of her discourse, the operation(s) and the details of her 
sister’s death are linked by the same signifiers beyond that of “nothing”. There is potentially 
another logic linking her sister’s death with her hospitalisations, particularly the latest one 
where Gail explains how other people were prioritised, resulting in her operation being 
postponed:  
 
Because they just kept saying ‘when the theatre is open, when it’s open we can 
push you’. Twice they took me into theatre ready for the op, twice they brought 
me back (A/L362-364). 
 
Something being “open” could relate to a space for her on a wider, symbolic level, with the 
theatre being closed potentially signifying an exclusion of her subjective place: the Other did 
not care (for her lack). The signifier “theatre” could relate to the circumstances around her 
sister’s death insofar as her sister died coming out from “a movie” (theatre): 
 
She just dropped dead. Walking in the mall and she dropped dead. Wasn’t sick, 
nothing. Just walked in the mall. She went to a movie and she came out. And she 
was just walking through the mall to come out. She dropped dead (B/L263-264).  
 
Even though Gail does not mention the word theatre here, she saw a movie at a movie 
theatre51 and thus a conceptual link is present. Additionally, the word “nothing” is present 
again, this time referring to the lack of (clear) signs/causes of her sister dying. Not only that, 
but what led to her last hospitalisation was a collapse during “walking”: “I was walking past 
here to work, ‘cus my work was just down there, [name of place removed], and I collapsed 
on the road” (A/L355-356) — reminiscent to the process of her sister dropping dead. More 
 
51 This is the North American way of referring to the cinema, which could be relevant in Gail’s case seeing as 
she lived there for “a long time”: she says she speaks with an American “twang” (A/L208). 
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importantly though, she says her sister “came out” from a movie, something she repeats, thus 
the operating theatre being something they took her into (“they took me into theatre”), is 
something she would come out of after the operation was done. Indeed, the problem around 
the operation, according to Gail, which led to her fatigue, was that she never “came out of 
the anaesthetics” (A/L310-311, my emphasis).  
This implies that there is, for Gail, an unconscious identification with her sister: 
someone who ‘comes out’ of a theatre and dies, who is “nothing”, who is dead. This 
identification with “nothing”, which is a repetitive one in her discourse, could further be a 
way of holding onto the image and presence of her sister, and as an attempt to process it. 
There is conversely a difference here between her and her sister, insofar as her sister “came 
out”, while Gail did not come out of the anaesthetics. Gail could have considered that the 
formation of fatigue, being dead in life, constitutes an appropriate punishment for potentially 
being responsible for her death, or at least, for having lived her life while her sister had 
“nothing”.  She thus withholds life. The place of the pain of fatigue here is simultaneously a 
place of ‘too much’ — Gail saying the pain and exhaustion is “all consuming” (C/L30) — 
which would indicate that the image of her sister has not been processed, and potentially, her 
part (responsibility) in her sister’s death. Because of this, and on the other hand, she could be 
attempting to separate from the image of her sister and to live her own life, by retreating from 
society into her own flat, a flat which she associates with an “independence [which is] really 
is good. I love that.” (A/L525). After all, Gail did come out alive after the operation, and she 
was “out there” as she says, living her life. Another indication that she is attempting to live 
her own life is her reluctance to give up her studies, even though it is something knowingly 
contributing to her condition, due to the stress and her “pushing” herself despite becoming 
fatigued. She says: “I’m gonna get this degree even if it kills me” (B/L609). She never 
finished her honours degree in the past, and she never had the choice of studying the degree 
she is studying now. She relays that she is the only one, together with her dead sister, whose 
picture and degree certification is not up on the wall in her family’s house. This would 
elucidate the split and ambivalence of the subject as explored in this thesis, particularly in 
relation to mourning; as one between life and death. With regard to responsibility, there is an 
ambivalence here too which points to a lack of having processed it and the attempt to do so: 
we see her take responsibility for her sister’s life/death, but at the same time, fatigue is a form 
of forgetting and numbing, which is particularly emphasised by Gail who says she forgot a 
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large part of her childhood — pointing to an attempt to escape responsibility. Also, she 
emphasises her having a (self-made) diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, which 
could exonerate responsibility. Thus, the experiences surrounding the operations could have 
retroactively framed Gail’s sister’s death as something for which she was responsible, or 
rather something she asks if she was responsible for, hypothetically putting into question 
whether she deserves to live or not.  
The structure of the logic of something (not) coming out is echoed in her body, 
particularly as she describes the ingestion of food: “And up ‘til today, because of that I can’t 
swallow well. I can’t eat bread and stuff ‘cus it, just gets stuck and I start choking” (A/L409-
410). That food “just gets stuck” is linked to her situation as a whole of being both 
symbolically and physically inhibited (“But I couldn’t move” (A/L346)) and could further 
point to an identification with her sister, seeing as her sister was “stuck” with her parents52. 
Moreover, she explains how “my bowel doesn’t assimilate my body properly. So anything - 
everything you eat just comes out” (A/L647-648, my emphasis). We thus see the structure of 
something both not coming out, being stuck, and something coming out (“everything” 
“comes out”). Both moments could mark the failure of a bulwark against an unbearable 
presence — one which cannot be “assimilate[d]” “properly”, in terms of it not being 
susceptible to an understanding (particularly in terms of her sense of identity); the point at 
which symbolisation fails. 
Analogous to Tom, fatigue for Gail, as representing the living dead, could thus be in 
line with a conversion symptom where it acts both act as an appropriate punishment — a way 
of simultaneously attempting to process the image of her sister by identifying with her (not 
coming out/withholding) — but also as an attempt to live her own life and escape the image 
of her sister (by coming out). The latter of course fails, since this also constitutes an 
identification with her sister. When talking about how she pushes herself, meeting the 
demand to ‘keep going’, Gail explains that she “think[s] it’s got a lot to do with my sister 
that died” (B/L233-234), since her sister used to tell her “don’t be lazy [imperceptible], you 
have enough time to sleep in your grave” (C/L234), and that she is now in “in a way” “trying 
 
52 In relation to being stuck, she refers to her husband and the demand to ‘get on with it’: “But eventually I had 
to get on my feet and do something ‘cus I had a husband that was sitting on top of me and saying like ‘get with 
it’ you know healing yourself. And I couldn’t explain to him what I was feeling, why I was so tired, why I was 
in pain. But…and it was after that operation when I just had to lie there and cry out and say I can’t do a thing 
for myself” (C/L426-430). 
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to live for her” (C/L234). Considering Gail thinks her sister lived a life of “nothing”, it is not 
surprising that attempting to live for her or live her own life fails (that living her sister’s life 
simultaneously means not living) — the identification with the dead object of ‘nothing’ being 
overdetermined and spilling over here too. Not to live her own life could be a way of evading 
her sister’s demand in an act of separation, which, of course, also fails. After all, she 
announces herself in relation to having said that she will pursue her studies “even if it kills” 
her: “well actually it’s now killing me” (B/L611). As long she has not finished her degree, 
both her and her sister’s pictures are missing (from the wall), but we could also view her 
attempt to finish her degree as a way of compensating and live the life her sister never had. 
It is thus clear that trying to live a life is problematic for Gail: there are two forces 
working against each other, each overdetermined. These fluctuations between life and death, 
between too much and not enough, could potentially echo the question ‘Am I to blame?’ and 
‘Do I deserve to be alive?’ which become inscribed in the body. The result is being stuck 
between the two poles as the living dead. 
 
Neurotic Logic: Obsessional Neurosis and Hysteria 
 
In relation to what has been analysed for Tom’s and Gail’s discourses, we can make some 
tentative comparisons to the theory of structural differences. First of all, the presence of 
disappointments, frustrations and blame seem to appear in relation to lack (something which 
was not good enough, either oneself or the Other), which implies that lack has been 
registered. This is in line with what Vanheule (2019: 79) observes regarding the Name-of-
the-Father having been installed in neurosis: it represents an agency one can trust, in which 
case not living up to expectations results in anger, disappointment or shame. For were it not 
this way, the Other’s intrusion would be experienced as more — or exclusively — puzzling 
and shocking due to the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father (Vanheule, 2014: 139). We 
can trace experiences related to disappointments — accompanied by explicit 
acknowledgments of disappointment directed especially towards the medical Other — in all 
of the participants’ discourses. Symptoms emerging after such episodes suggests that a 
symptom is used as a way of questioning one’s value for the Other, whereby the symptom 
invokes the Other’s desire through one’s disappearance, asking the question ‘Can he lose 
me?’ (Lacan SXI: 214).  
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However, comparing Gail’s and Tom’s discourses, this might be more relevant for 
Gail, whose discourse seems to accentuate the indifference of the Other, or in other words, 
the absence of the Other’s desire: the Other did not address or even consider her lack. In 
contradistinction, Tom seems to struggle with the presence of the Other’s desire (the police), 
as he has difficulties invoking support from an authority, something other than himself, to 
deal with his lack. The two thus showcase oppositions, a difference which is usually how the 
neurosis/psychosis distinction is conceptualised, particularly between hysteria, as part of 
neurosis, and psychosis. In psychosis, a symptom is used to deal with the proximity of the 
Other, while the hysteric would invoke the Other’s desire as a way to ask the question ‘Am 
I loved?’. In this way, Leader (2016: 29) recognises that while a psychotic can mimic a refusal 
linked to this question of one’s value, the difference is that in psychosis the aim is not to 
produce a question but to gain distance to the threatening proximity of the Other. It may be 
impossible to tell which one is more prevalent in the discourses explored, particularly within 
the scope of a qualitative research study, and particularly for some of the participants who 
emphasise the invasive ‘too muchness’ of a demand qua otherness (such as Tom and Brody). 
It could also be that a symptom moves through different phases with different emphases on 
functions. As Vanheule (2012: 164) points out, there is no strict rule or single criteria that 
can differentiate between the two types of logic. Furthermore, the theory of the clinical 
structures is complex with sometimes contradictory statements found within the secondary 
resources of the Lacanian literature. Nevertheless, I am not grouping each participant, or all 
of them, into an overall structure, but merely suggesting links to theoretical elements. I argue 
that there are traces of both separating from the proximity of the Other and constructing a 
question within the discourses — with the presence of traces inferring the unconscious nature 
of the question. While the question of love might be more prevalent for Gail and for some of 
the other participants whose discourses also emphasise the absence of the Other, there is a 
sense in which the question of responsibility is present for both Gail and Tom. They were 
confronted with a moment, a triggering event, in which they were asked to take responsibility 
for one’s own lack, which, hypothetically, framed an earlier loss as traumatic and 
unprocessed, or more simply framed a gap. However, there is a contrast between Tom’s and 
Gail’s discourses, considering that Tom illustrates a failure to complete his own desire qua 
lack, and Gail emphasises a failure to meet someone else’s desire, both, however, with grave 
consequences (the death of a loved one). These differences could be elucidated through 
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Lacan’s theory of obsessional neurosis and hysteria respectively, as belonging to the structure 
of neurosis. Indeed, in obsessional neurosis there is a similar threatening ‘proximity of the 
Other’ as that present in psychosis, making it difficult to tell the two apart53. 
 Lacan (2002/2006: 698) highlights that the hysteric’s unconscious operates on the 
side of the object, ‘slipping away as its object’ in relation to the Other’s desire, thereby 
creating a lack in the Other. The obsessive, on the other hand, ‘negates the Other’s desire, in 
forming his fantasy by accentuating the impossibility of the subject vanishing’. This means 
the obsessive operates on the side of the subject by refusing to fade away as an object, or 
rather, by denying a dependence on an object 54 (Van Haute, 2002: 250). What this implies 
is that one overcomes separation either through completing the Other in hysteria, or 
completing the subject in obsessional neurosis (Fink, 1999: 157). It is in this way the 
structures are ‘illuminated by the other’ (Lacan, Seminar VI: 301). Obsessional neurosis 
constitutes a ‘strategy of mastery’, trying to annul or neutralise the Other’s desire in order to 
illustrate that one is a master of one’s own desire (Soler, 1996: 270), meaning that one 
attempts to erase traces of dependency on something/someone else. The hysteric, in contrast, 
is more in tune with the Other’s desire, always trying to calculate what the Other wants in 
order to situate her/himself as its (missing) object.  
We could compare Tom’s and Gail’s discourses to these two structures, where Tom 
failed to complete himself — the refusal being partly against a dependency on the Other as 
seen in that he was uncomfortable to resort to ask the Other qua the police for help — and 
Gail failed to give her sister a life of fulfilment, failed with completing the Other’s desire. 
This could fall in line with Verhaeghe’s (2004: 384-385) distinction between the two, where 
the obsessional is anxious about satisfying the desire of the Other too much to the point of 
disappearing, whereas the hysterical subject is anxious about not satisfying this desire, and 
indeed hysteria is oftentimes associated with experiences of not being good enough (Dor, 
1998: 80). For Tom, satisfying the Other’s desire could perhaps amount to being seen as a 
lawful citizen, if asking the police for help. And we could add to this that there could be a 
 
53 This could perhaps explain the differences noticeable in the alienation chapter where some emphasise the 
lack of address from the Other (an absence of desire), while others speak about the proximity of the Other 
through demands (a presence of desire). However, both of these are also present for one person, depicted 
through various events. 
54 It may however make more sense to reverse these positions, insofar as subjectivity is linked to elusiveness, 
corresponding to hysteria, and the ego as mastery is linked to an object of wholeness, corresponding to 
obsessional neurosis. Also considering Lacan says the obsessional neurotic accentuates the ‘subject vanishing’, 
meaning the subject is not there. 
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fear of satisfying his own desire (the desire of the subject always being the desire of the 
Other), since it was problematic in the past. I argue, however, that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to go after hallmarks such as not being ‘good enough’, since Tom also indicates 
an insufficiency pertaining to himself, but for himself as opposed to for others/the Other; thus 
one would have to put these characteristics into context.  
In terms of neutralising or annihilating the Other’s desire, the obsessional element 
complicates the neurosis/psychosis distinction, making it more challenging to discern an 
appeal or question directed to the Other. Not only that, but such an annihilation is strongly 
tied to that of the ego and can be compared to the defensive moment of not desiring as 
explored for fatigue in this thesis, which can further be linked to the desire to sleep. In this 
way, the structure of obsessional neurosis shows something fundamental for neurosis, but 
also for fatigue. More specifically, what appears appropriate is what Lacan terms, in relation 
to obsessional neurosis, a ‘masturbatory jouissance’, which crushes desire and demand 
(Lacan, Seminar VI: 306). The relevance of this is clear in the desire to sleep where the 
subject attempts to eradicate demands, desires and tensions — or in other words any excess 
and ambiguity. Or more correctly, these are withheld, which is the term Lacan (Seminar X: 
328), uses in describing an inhibition, ‘to hold back’, an inhibition which he further strongly 
relates to the structure of obsessional neurosis (Ibid.: 317). This is appropriate seeing as I 
argued that fatigue can be a hoarding of energy/tension. The act of hoarding energy (which 
thereby turns it into a tension), could be an attempt by the subject to separate from the Other 
and not satisfy its desire — energy being the object of the Other’s desire. Indeed, obsessional 
neurosis is linked with the accumulation of objects (Gessert, 2014: 61), and thus hoarding.  
This does not mean we can ‘diagnose’ the structure of the participants’ discourses as 
obsessional, but, to follow Lacan (Seminar X: 317) when speaking about obsessional 
neurosis in relation to a defence against the Other’s desire: ‘the obsessional has the most 
exemplary value for us’. Hence, there is something relevant for obsessional neurosis which 
showcases a fundamental element in neurosis in general, or maybe even subjectivity at large. 
However, perhaps there is a difference in the defence pertaining to the distinction between 
obsessional neurosis and hysteria, if we ask the question whose desire is being eradicated: 
the subject’s or the Other’s (if we can separate them like that)? Maybe we can argue that the 
hysteric attempts to eradicate his/her own desire in an attempt to focus on the Other’s, or as 
a punishment when the latter has failed, having felt guilty about giving into one’s own desire, 
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seen when Gail was “out there” living her life while her sister was stuck. However, the 
numbing into nothingness and merging with the object of ‘nothing’, does not allow to 
distinguish between the subject and the Other insofar as the distance between the two is 
sought to be eradicated: demands, and thereby desires, are crushed in the face of the pressure 
or accumulation of demands. It could be that there are different emphases beyond the defence 
— the defence which is similarly expressed in everyone’s discourses — but I cannot make 
any such claims in this research. If only focusing on the triggering events and only on Tom’s 
and Gail’s discourses, the perceptible difference is that Gail puts emphasis on others failing 
her and her failing others, and Tom (in relation to his neighbours’ noise) on him failing 
himself and being unable to ‘take care of it’ himself. The similarity here is that, through the 
formation of fatigue, both evade the demand/desire of the Other while nevertheless being 
faithful to it; endorsing, more generally, the idea to ‘keep going’ and to ‘slow down’ plus the 
ideas that the subject is capable of being fully in control of him/herself and independent from 
the societal Other. It echoes the overarching idea of ‘the body as machine’. This is in 
agreement with a neurotic structure, since the Other’s desire is also evaded in hysteria 
(although not annulled, quite the opposite): to be the object of the Other’s desire means to 
never fulfil it — hysteria being characterised as an unsatisfied desire.  
Therefore, fatigue could be both an attempt to satisfy one’s own desire and thus not 
desiring — maintaining a position of independence in relation to the Other akin to 
masturbatory jouissance — while simultaneously keeping the desire unsatisfied, since having 
satisfied it at other moments has proved problematic. The formation of fatigue in this way 
could paradoxically act both as a self-inflicted punishment by ‘dying while alive’ (or a 
“death” and “life sentence” as Gail says) through various inhibitions, and a way of staying 
alive as an individual in the face of the enigmatic desire of the Other. This constitutes two 
contradictory forces working against each other, yet also in harmony. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: Putting Forth an Alternative Approach 
to Fatigue 
 
The most dominant approach to fatigue, as explored in chapter one, follows a view of the 
mind-body relation as shaped by the biomedical discourse and practice whereby the mind is 
increasingly excluded and rendered non-existent. The body is separated from the mind and 
is thought to be a mere vessel of an illness and detached from social, cultural and political 
influences. 
Through having conducted interviews with people suffering from fatigue and 
diagnosed with CFS/ME, and by carefully tracing the structure of their discourse with the 
help of techniques part of a Lacanian Discourse Analysis and with Lacanian theory, my 
analysis has illustrated that symptom formation cannot be thought of without the context of 
subjective elements; that symptom formation is inextricably linked to identity formation. 
Subjective factors involve experiences linked to various life events and physical occurrences, 
as well as the very view of the mind-body relation — as shaped by and in discourse. These 
subjective factors do not exist in an individual vacuum but within a social sphere as they are 
formed by the dominant views operating in society, and also in combination with biological 
factors since a focus on subjectivity does not exclude these. This research project has brought 
the importance of such subjective factors to the fore, as the analysis showcased in the sense 
that others’ words and beliefs — in the form of dominant, sociocultural demands — have a 
significant effect on the formation and development of fatigue. More specifically, the 
demands crucial for the emergence of fatigue stem from a dominant view of the body in the 
context of the mind-body relation, as formed not only by the scientific discourse but by the 
discourse of late capitalism. I will outline the main arguments from the analysis of this thesis 
in what follows in the context of the mind-body relation, and will thereafter discuss some 
implications of what has emerged and suggest future recommendations for a more fruitful 
and ethical approach to fatigue.  
 
Demands Dividing the Mind and the Body 
 
The two most prevailing imperatives exerting a large influence on the condition, as depicted 
in the interviews, are the commandments to ‘keep going’ and that to ‘slow down’. These 
appear to follow a mind-body divide, which is evident not only in the interviews conducted 
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in this study, but by taking into account the wider and dominant sociocultural views and the 
practices giving rise to and sustaining them. 
Starting firstly with the former, the demand to ‘keep going’ obeys one of the most 
dominant Western metaphor the ‘body as machine’, as it exists both in the discourses of 
science and capitalism. This metaphor views the subject as a constantly producing machine-
like entity, an almost automatic and manic state where subjective factors such as stress, 
emotions, symptoms, resting, and sleeping do not exist. It promotes the injunction to ‘just do 
it, don’t think about it’, whereby the mind is ignored. The demand further dismisses 
subjective factors such as individual differences through its universal characteristic 
— requiring constant productivity for everyone, and requiring it in specific ways, for instance 
to do a certain job for a specific number of hours. This ignores the fact that people have 
different preferences and/or working capacities. However, the demand to ‘keep going’ is not 
just related to work for the participants, but all aspect of life such as socialising, enjoying, 
eating, cooking, and small yet necessary tasks such as showering. I compared the 
concretisation of the subject in this manner to Lacan’s notion of a reduction to a need, as part 
of his theory of alienation. To reduce something to a need involves believing a demand can 
be satisfied. Therefore, if meeting a demand, the subject — being inextricable from elements 
of indeterminability, or lack as an absence — is reduced to a known object. This constitutes 
a strengthened version of alienation. Alienation for Lacan is inevitable since the subject is 
irreducible to a symbolic-imaginary network. However, s/he comes to be largely determined 
by it anyway and comes to be represented in the Other, but at the price of only being partially 
represented therein; there is loss and exclusions. Lack in this manner can be compared to the 
activity of resting and sleeping, insofar as the (conscious) subject is absent from societal 
obligations/activities or in the very least absent from conscious activity and effort. When this 
element of partiality is not acknowledged, when it is believed that the subject can be reduced 
to a bodily machine in constant motion, then the subject disappears. The subject is reduced 
to ‘nothing’, or rather, to nothing more than an exchangeable object part of a bigger system. 
This is expressed by the participants through references to inescapability (of their situations), 
pointing to a reductive aspect where their whole beings are caught up in certain 
representations, where they are solely serving others in the name of productivity. There is no 
space for the subject’s desire, and its absence from these activities. While the subject’s 
exclusion is strongly tied to the triggering events causing the participants to seek help from 
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the medical establishment, we find via the encounters with the medical establishment a 
perpetuation of this situation. 
It was seen how the absence of concrete biological results leads the GP to either 
explicitly or implicitly pronounce ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’. I argued that this 
statement constitutes a reinforcement of the demand to ‘keep going’, since if nothing is 
biologically wrong, there is no excuse to stop. Not being considered (biologically) ‘ill’, is 
simultaneously coterminous with a psychological condition such as stress, anxiety and/or 
depression, which is here rendered non-existent. The mind/body divide becomes an 
objective/subjective divide existing under the real/unreal split. This absence of subjectivity, 
or the absence of an absence (a lack of a lack in Lacanian terms), is linked with an absence 
of unknowability and indeterminability; elements which are today foreclosed by the 
discourse of science. The pronouncement of ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’ constitutes a 
complete answer which forecloses other potential answers. It halts any subjective 
explorations or further investigations. Uncertainty here, such as bodily symptoms unable to 
be absorbed and explained by the biomedical model, does not remain uncertain, but is turned 
into the certainty of a non-existence. Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis 
becomes the diagnosis of a nothingness. The mind and the subject, with all his/her various 
experiences and symptoms, are deemed unimportant and not worthy to even consider or pay 
attention to; they are reduced to nothing (‘there’s nothing wrong with you’). 
Conversely, the imperative to ‘slow down’ appears linked with the mind as it follows 
the belief that it is crucial to allow space, by stopping and slowing down, wherein one can 
reflect on the activity of ‘doing’, events or other occurrences in one’s life, in order to mentally 
process and understand them. The demand to ‘slow down’ is typically experienced by the 
participants as one stemming from the psychologist and is linked with the activity of ‘pacing’: 
a popular management method for fatigue. Pacing is about finding a balance between resting 
and engaging in activities, which one would achieve by first and foremost becoming aware 
of when, how, and how often to rest and when to engage in activity, for example. At a wider 
level, it is related to the principles of yoga and meditation, which have today increased in 
popularity. The latter is now widely used within the medical setting as a tool of dealing with 
a range of conditions. In combination with the imperative to ‘keep going’, the participants 
are met by contradictory and confusing demands, which arguably contribute to the worsening 
of some of the participants’ condition. For the two demands are incompatible insofar as to 
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‘slow down’ and to ‘keep going’ — if thought of in terms of the activities of sitting down 
and exercising, for instance, or working and not-working — are impossible to meet 
simultaneously. This evidently represents a mind-body divide, since the demand for exercise 
is action-focused in terms of physically ‘doing’, or rather doing without thinking, while the 
demand to ‘slow down’ involves not-doing, or rather doing less, as a way of being able to 
reflect on the activities of doing, and eventually, changing one’s relationship to those 
activities. This is reflected in the two dominant treatments for fatigue/CFS/ME: Graded 
Exercise Therapy (GET) and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). However, while the 
demand to ‘slow down’ values resting and sleeping, the mind is more often than not negated, 
reduced to nothing, insofar as it comes to take the form of the demand to ‘keep going’. 
The way in which the two commandments resemble each other is through its universal 
quality involving a reduction of a need. The subject, mainly via the medical establishment, 
is told to ‘slow down’ in a pre-determined and concrete manner: to engage in certain activities 
for a certain amount of time, which constitute ideas qua rules applied to everyone 55 . 
Furthermore, all the steps involved in the activity of slowing down, the breaks and pauses 
taken during the day and in what ways and for how long, alongside the person’s energy levels, 
are commanded to be registered in numbers through documentation. In this way, what is 
supposed to be an absence becomes yet another presence, and subjective differences are 
again ignored. It also removes factors of unknowability — subjectivity as such — by 
believing the mind and the body can be adequately captured in numbers and words, that there 
is a harmony between them. Involved in this process, particularly as part of CBT, is making 
the unconscious conscious in an attempt to master the mind through an exploration of the 
subject’s thoughts, choices, and intentions; and here staying on an individual level. Thus, 
either get rid of thinking (‘keep going’), or control it (‘slow down’). The latter also (attempts 
to) ultimately gets rid of thinking, particularly of that related to excess and the unconscious, 
through concretising, registering and fully ‘understanding’ something, and consequently 
supposedly controlling the body. This line of reasoning focuses on the imaginary aspect and 
is strongly tied to the idea of ‘the body as machine’, both in terms of thinking the body can 
be registered and controlled, as if the body can be programmed to turn on (keep going) and 
 
55 Of course, sometimes these can come to be adapted to the individual, but they still constitute pre-determined, 
universal ideas. 
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off (slow down) on demand through following specific instructions, which is in line with the 
sociocultural motto ‘mind over matter’. 
Not only that, but what is supposed to be a break from the life of demands becomes 
yet another demand, as the demand to ‘slow down’ is ultimately a demand for productivity. 
One is asked to temporarily ‘slow down’ in order to increase one’s productivity level, or as 
is commonly the goal with short-term, cost-effective, treatment, to get ‘back to work’ so that 
society does not lose too much money. I argued that a synthesis of the two injunctions is 
depicted socio-culturally through the popular British expression ‘keep calm and carry on’ — 
echoing another robotic state in that one need not be affected by life. This makes it apparent 
that it is life itself which is demanded through the imperative to ‘keep going’, and further, 
impossible life. The commandment for perpetual productivity and constant presence is thus 
one for life in various forms: to work, enjoy, learn, relax, consume — and preferably all at 
once56. The two dominant commandments thus present a paradox at the level of content, but 
that paradox dissolves at the level of structure insofar as both demand (constant) productivity 
and presence. At a structural level, both demands end up excluding the mind, and the 
unconscious Other, and further exist under the overarching imperative for endless robotic 
productivity, control and autonomy. This seems to take precedence over the imperative to 
slow down that considers the processing mind, where unknowability is allowed to exist. 
Thus, the two demands are not primarily reflective of a mind-body gap, a gap between two 
entities both equally considered to exist, but there is a negation of the mind. Alongside the 
negation of the mind we can say, in line with Schuster’s (2017: 101) thesis, that there is a 
foreclosure of impossibilities, and inversely, an injunction for possibilities. This is 
recognisable in what has been explored so far and in general in contemporary society: 
believing the body can be a perpetually producing machine and that this opens up many 
possibilities, as reflected in the omnipresent attitude governed by the ideologies of late 
capitalism: ‘you can do anything you set your mind to’. These ideas just outlined stand in 
contrast to the participants’ experiences at the onset of their conditions, where they encounter 
an accumulation of demands as an imposition of something other than themselves, an 
unpredictable and incomprehensible otherness on which they are forced to depend. There is 
either too much meaning (a reduction to a concrete, pre-determined place) or not enough 
meaning (contradictory or impossible demands). The two are highly linked as they both lead 
 
56 It is in this way the word ‘productivity’ has been used throughout the thesis. 
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to a confrontation with radical lack and anxiety, with not knowing what to do with one’s 
body and not having a stable sense of identity. It follows Lacan’s view on anxiety where the 
subject is addressed as an object but knows not what kind of object s/he is, seeing as demands 
— an expression of desire — are incomprehensible. As a consequence, and following the 
accumulation of demands, bodily tension accumulates and existence is experienced as 
overwhelming and heavy, which is expressed in the interviews through elements of 
dependency, suffocation, inescapability and impossibility. In other words, the negation of the 
mind leads to an ever-increasing mind-body divide, where the physical experience of the 
body stands in stark contrast to the ideas attached to the two dominating imperatives, existing 
under the overarching metaphor of ‘the body as machine’. 
 
The Mind-Body Divide at the Core of Symptom Formation 
 
As a response to both specific imperatives which reduce the individual to a bodily machine 
and demands which are incomprehensible and ‘too much’, the subject via the body 
unconsciously refuses to meet the demand to ‘keep going’. We witness this for the 
participants, as was relayed in chapter four, in the fact that there is an increase in bodily 
tensions in various forms (pain, vomiting, shaking) in conjunction with trying to meet the 
demand to ‘keep going’. The refusal is enacted through an increase of activity, or in the very 
least a continuation of it, since all the participants here express they ‘kept going’. It 
nevertheless leads to fatigue or less/no engagement in activities. The expression ‘I kept 
going’ showcases that the refusal is unconscious, and further the unconscious/conscious split, 
which can be compared to that of the mind-body division. To the conscious mind, one is 
attempting to meet the demand to ‘keep going’, while the body unconsciously refuses the 
demand and is that which does not keep going. Two opposite ideas — to keep going and, if 
you like, to slow down or stop — condense in the body since they cannot be worked out 
mentally. The body then becomes the place of an inscription of an impossibility. This was 
explained through the psychoanalytic theory of symptom formation, mainly through Freud’s 
concept of a conversion symptom, where an unacceptable idea to the ego (to ‘slow down’) is 
repressed from consciousness and its affect transferred onto the body. Thus, at the very core 
of symptom formation is a mind-body divide. 
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I further utilised Lacan’s notion of anorexia in order to shed light on the refusal. Since 
the subject can only emerge through lack, through not having a place, fatigue can be 
understood as refusing the demand of the Other, a demand negating the mind and closes up 
lack, in order to introduce a void, a space, wherein the subject can emerge. That is, in the 
face of being suffocated by the Other’s desire via demands, the subject refuses the Other’s 
demand in order to take distance and create a path for one’s own desire and position 
independent of the Other. In line with anorexia as ‘eating nothing’, I argued that the fatigued 
subject is ‘doing nothing’. To ‘do nothing’ consists of making room for object a as the void, 
a nothingness which is embodied by the subject via various bodily, incomprehensible, 
tensions. Also, ‘doing nothing’ — considering Lacan emphasises it is not a negation of an 
activity and the fact that there is an increase of tensions in the interviews — is arguably a 
hoarding of energy through the production of it for oneself (through the activity of ‘doing’), 
in which case it accumulates and turns into a tension. This tension is then ‘given’/’presented’ 
by the subject to the Other as something to be considered and taken seriously in the social 
order. One could say that the mind-body gap is desired here in the sense that the subject gives 
a lack of energy, paradoxically an unsymbolised tension, to the big Other. Or put differently, 
the mind-body gap, being something negated and repressed, turns into the return of the 
repressed where it comes back with a vengeance.  
The refusal of the demand to ‘keep going’ via bodily tensions would also have the 
function of self-other differentiation, which is in line with Lacan’s theory that lack is 
necessary for identity-formation, that a disintegration is crucial for an integration of identity. 
In the interviews, this is a function best accorded to pain, and can more generally be attributed 
to that of the (death) drive, which for Lacan is a constant tension arising in relation to the 
Other’s demand. I argued that the drive explains the various tensions found at this ‘initial’ 
refusal, since they are subsumed under the ‘drive to sleep’. Due to the intervention of the 
demand to ‘keep going’ on the body, and the subject refusing the demand, it turns the activity 
of sleeping — which is temporarily satisfied after each night — into an unquenchable tension, 
constantly seeking a discharge (through sleeping). Since the latter is not achieved, it is a 
tension which marks a void, and where the subject is constantly pushed towards sleeping, 
has an urge and necessity to sleep, not always necessarily sleeping more. The mind-body 
divide is here experienced as horrific and uncomfortable, insofar as this process is 
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unconscious and thus elusive to the conscious mind (the ego), who finds the drive to sleep 
unacceptable. Thus, the solution becomes the problem and vice versa. 
Other influences on the formation of fatigue was discussed in chapter four, such as 
biology, given the fact that a symptom is over-determined — several factors need to come 
together concurrently — and that most of the participants conveyed their condition starting 
with a virus, a vaccination or an operation. The topic of biology was brought up in relation 
to Freud’s theory of the actual neuroses, where the two-subcategories, neurasthenia and 
anxiety neurosis, come close to the picture of fatigue as presented by the participants of this 
study. Anxiety neurosis is especially relevant in relation to this ‘initial’ refusal, since it 
constitutes an unsymbolised, accumulation of excitation in the body. This also occurs in a 
conversion symptom belonging to the psychoneurosis, which I utilised to explain fatigue in 
this chapter, but Freud distinguishes it from anxiety neurosis on the basis of its origin: a 
conversion symptom stems from a psychical conflict, whereas anxiety neurosis is purely 
somatic. It was argued that from a Lacanian perspective, the question of cause in this manner 
is an impossible one akin to the question of ‘which came first, the chicken or the egg?’, which 
in this case would be a thought or a bodily sensation. The reason being that the mind and the 
body cannot be separated: there is no such thing as a purely physical event — stepping outside 
of one’s alienation in the symbolic — but the physical and the symbolic are always 
intertwined. That bodily tensions arise in relation to the demand to ‘keep going’, and that 
these are not linked to positive biomedical results (or that treatment for this does not help), 
suggests that the formation of fatigue goes beyond biology; it has turned into something else 
and something more.  
I thereafter argued in chapter five that a second moment of a refusal, a refusal of the 
refusal, is tied to the function normally attributed to fatigue: a shutting off and diminishment 
of tension. We can view this moment as a way of remedying the mind-body gap, to remove 
the gap between them and the loss and lack accompanying it (since the body represents a 
void). This is achieved by concretising lack into sleeping, paradoxically disappearing into 
the void as a way of removing the void. Sleep is used as a form of disappearance and escape 
from the big Other and the life of demands, as well as from the tensions of the body. It 
constitutes a merging with the object of ‘nothing’ — a numbing of the body (of language) 
into nothingness whereby one turns off the mind and the body in their excessive forms, 
instead embodying dead, numb and zombie-like objects. Here, desires, tensions, and 
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responsibilities cease to exist. The subject, in this way, says no to alienation and castration. I 
used Lacan’s theory of the desire to sleep as linked to the fantasy to elucidate this process, 
where falling asleep in the fantasy and merging with an object (of ‘nothing’) could be seen 
as a protection against the accumulation and movement of demands. This is done by 
imaginarily putting a stop to the demands, imagining a wholeness in which one forgets that 
one has a body — a defensive moment I compared to Lacan’s notion of not wanting to desire. 
Freud’s and Lacan’s concept of an inhibition was brought in here in order to shed light on 
how fatigue also constitutes a defence against the knowledge of subjective involvement. By 
arguably disguising the refusal, an ‘I don’t want to’, as an inhibition, an ‘I can’t’, the subject 
engages in the process of repression and attempts to exonerate responsibility. It keeps elusive 
and unbearable subjectivity at bay through, in a way, reducing oneself to a pure bodily, numb 
object, in line with Lacan’s theory of the paradoxical fantasy where one both is the object, 
and where the object does not exist. The second refusal qua an inhibition thus further 
strengthens the negation of the mind by refuting subjective factors — in line with reducing 
the mind to nothing as explored through the sociocultural demands — and trying to be one 
with the body, however one that is also numbed into nothingness. This chapter, in conjunction 
with the previous one, illustrate the split and ambivalence of the subject in terms of trying to 
signal the aliveness of the body through tensions, while simultaneously attempting to 
extinguish tensions and embody a disappearance. It ironically echoes the contradictory 
sociocultural commandments to ‘keep going’ and to ‘slow down’. 
 
The Failure of Separating and Uniting the Mind and the Body 
 
Chapter six subsequently explored the impossibility of escaping subjectivity and one’s 
desires and bodily tensions and excesses, considering the fact that to not desire constitutes a 
desire not to desire. We can conceptualise this as a failure of having separated the mind and 
the body and negated the mind, but also as a failure of having attempted to unite them through 
the desire to sleep, following Lacanian theory that lack, separation, is needed in order for 
identification, a unity, to occur — a unity which in this case would reduce the ambiguous 
relation between them, the gap, to nothing. 
This failure and impossibility of achieving a state of nothingness inherent in not 
desiring is traced in the interviews through the frustrating presence of a demand, bodily 
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tension, guilt, boredom, or even possibly derived enjoyment in the place of the idea of 
‘nothing’; coming to enjoy the thought of no pleasure, for instance. That is, there is something 
rather than nothing. Falling asleep in the fantasy fails as it is impossible to disappear (in or 
through it). Or put differently, reducing oneself to a bodily object, to ‘nothing’, spirals out of 
control as the subject gets lost in its unpredictable, uncontrollable, and ambiguous nature, 
where the boundary between self and other, pleasure and unpleasure, is questionable. This 
simultaneously strengthens the mind-body gap in that one is unable to have mentally 
apprehended the body. There has thus been a return to an encounter with alienation, albeit in 
a different form: the ‘nothingness’ sought after turns on itself and becomes a presence of 
nothingness, the feeling of not feeling enough. It represents an unbearable absence. Since 
fatigue is here described as a bodily heaviness, I argued that it can be described as ‘too much 
of not enough’, linked to the pain of fatigue. This was compared to the notion of the drive as 
an excess of life, as an activity towards a passivity, something which cannot stop living and 
presents itself as an obstacle to desire (for ‘nothing’). I also stated that the more one believes 
in the existence of the object of desire, here a ‘nothingness’, the more it gives force to the 
drive (to sleep) in what I termed the drive of desire. Another failure of ‘nothing’ discussed 
in this chapter is that the symbolic Other is appealed to and relied upon by the subjects in 
order to symbolise the loss of their bodies, or the state of nothingness, mainly through a 
biomedical diagnosis. To acquire a diagnosis with a medical status, as opposed to 
psychological, would validate their existence by providing recognition and an explanation 
for their conditions, to symbolise loss, and would also relinquish the subject from 
responsibility. The exoneration of responsibility here occurs on an imaginary-symbolic level 
rather than at the level of the real-imaginary linked to the desire to sleep. Through a diagnosis, 
or through references to broken gadgets, the body is symbolised as a biological and external 
entity functioning automatically without the involvement of the psyche or subjectivity. In 
other words, the body is thought to align itself with a non-functioning machine, following 
the idea of ‘the body as machine’. This, also, ironically echoes the big Other’s statement 
‘there’s nothing wrong with you’.  
Therefore, there has been a failure of separating both from the idea of ‘nothing’, and 
that of ‘the body as machine’, and more generally from the Other; however the former idea 
can be subsumed under the latter insofar as desiring nothing is akin to an impossible, robotic-
like state. This failure stems not only from negating the mind, but idealising such a negation 
 
 
227 
insofar as the idea of ‘the body as machine’ is put on a pedestal. It is thought that one can 
and should operate like a machine and be unaffected by, cut off from, subjective factors such 
as life events and affects, that one can just ‘keep going’. This was illustrated to be the case 
for the participants when describing living highly active lives before the onset of their 
conditions, that they ‘worked hard and played hard’ (which also showcases the drive of 
desire). The idealisation of the negation of the mind and ‘the body as machine’ 
simultaneously points to the impossibility of separating the mind and the body and 
particularly cutting off one’s desire, since what it shows is, as was just mentioned, the desire 
not to desire, that one’s desire (on the side of ‘mental’ factors) is inevitably caught up in the 
attempt to cut it off. Such an endorsement contributes to symptom formation in that the more 
something is repressed, the more it will return to haunt the subject and create two forces 
working against each other (to desire and not desire), the latter of which for Freud is the 
precondition for forming a (psychoneurotic) symptom. In other words, the 
appearance/strengthening of a force, to slow down, contradicts the drive and desire to ‘keep 
going’, and for this reason is attempted to be kept at bay. I argued that mourning could 
elucidate this process, insofar as all of the participants experienced a real loss or a separation 
before or around the onset of their conditions. Also, in mourning, one loses one’s identity 
and anchoring point in the Other, albeit one does not know what is lost. One thus becomes 
unable to ‘keep going’ and stuck in the image of the Other considering the circular, internal 
process involved: (unconsciously) rejecting the idea of ‘the body as machine’ ends up 
perpetuating that idea. 
The failure of mourning also presents itself in the fact that loss has not been allowed 
to enter consciousness, or linked to its proper ‘source’, since loss is attributed to a loss of 
energy instead of the loss of a loved one and the ideas linked to it, which can be understood 
more generally as the constitution of the subject and the failure of separation; that symbolic 
separation/castration has not taken place. The notion of retroactivity is crucial in 
understanding the formation of a symptom here, since an event can only be understood from 
the perspective of other events. The triggering events are linked to other usually previous 
episodes, suggesting a link between them and a displacement from one to the other. The more 
personal events involving the loved one are displaced onto the more impersonal episodes 
constituting the triggering events, circulating around work, university studies, and 
operations; thus disguising the former. This displacement represents a mind-body divide 
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which leads to an ever-greater gap between the two insofar as the loss emerges through the 
unconscious body via the return of the repressed, something cut off from consciousness. 
However, the displacement illustrates both how the mind and the body are separated, but also 
inevitably linked. If focusing on the conscious-unconscious relation as I just explained, these 
remain separated insofar as the subject is unaware of the unconscious symbolism potentially 
residing in the body; the unconscious always being the gap where consciousness is not. On 
the other hand, they are linked if comparing the relation between the unconscious and the 
body: the body becomes the place of unconsciously attempting to symbolise that which could 
not be symbolised, where certain ideas or questions are inscribed. The relation between the 
mind and the body as not-one but also as not-two is further illustrated by the way in which 
the demands become inscribed in the body. The demand to ‘keep going’ and to ‘slow down’ 
are irreconcilable and in opposition to one another in terms of the production versus the 
extinguish of tension, but compatible and inseparable when thought of as an activity towards 
passivity, or a movement towards non-movement. 
I explored the above in more depth in chapter seven through an appeal to Lacan’s 
theory of the clinical structures, where the structures of the participants’ discourses were 
compared to the logic of neurosis and psychosis. It was delineated how the discourses both 
resonate with and are dissimilar from a psychotic logic, and the ways in which they resemble 
a neurotic one. The latter was done in depth through the lens of Tom’s and Gail’s discourses, 
where one could discern a logic of the signifier at work between various events, suggesting 
a symbolic structuring of the symptom. Their discourses elucidated more details surrounding 
the process of mourning and the ambivalence of the subject, where one could trace questions 
pertaining to responsibility and one’s existence: ‘Am I to blame?’ and/or ‘Am I loved?’. This 
could be tracked in fluctuations between too much and not enough responsibility, and in 
general in the discourses, between too much and not enough disappearance, pointing to an 
uncertainty and questioning of a limit. Further, Tom’s and Gail’s discourses were linked to 
obsessional neurosis and hysteria respectively, where Tom’s logic circulated around having 
failed to complete his own lack, while Gail’s approached the idea of having failed to complete 
her (now dead) sister’s lack. It was then discussed how fatigue could constitute a self-inflicted 
punishment. 
Overall, while a symptom will be particular for a specific subject, the physical form 
of fatigue appears to lend itself well to certain functions and meanings. Apart from perhaps 
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acting as the most appropriate protest against the cultural imperative to be awake and ‘keep 
going’, it can further aptly represent an accumulation of responsibility in the body, an 
increasing heaviness, related to carrying a heavy burden, a guilt. After all, the expression 
goes that we ‘carry the weight of the world on our shoulders’ when experiencing a heavy 
burden of responsibility. Simultaneously and conversely, the physical sensation of fatigue 
appears to capture the opposite phenomenon of a release of responsibility, as it aptly depicts 
a disappearance and loss (of energy), involving a diminishment of tension. This would then 
relate to the defensive moment of fatigue as explored in this thesis, as an escape from the 
confines of society and one’s body. It would also be adept at signalling the two sides 
simultaneously, a ‘too much of not enough’, capturing the experience of being stuck in 
between the two through an inhibition of movement, or rather a movement towards a non-
movement, to keep slowing down. In this way, fatigue takes the function of a conversion 
symptom where two forces condense in the body, and a part of the body is ‘chosen’ in order 
to adequately express the two contradictory ideas concurrently. This, however, is not to say 
that fatigue cannot take other forms which it no doubt does, most notably as coloured by 
other structures (perversion and psychosis), and in the next section I will discuss how the 
structure of this research has likely encouraged subjects with certain structures to participate, 
or has allowed this structure to come to the fore. 
Nevertheless, this topic brings us to the discussion engaged in throughout this thesis 
about the structure of symptoms in comparison to contemporary Lacanian theories on modern 
symptoms, and more specifically to the argument that the findings of this thesis is 
incompatible with these theories. Therein is an increasing trend to conceptualise symptoms, 
including chronic fatigue and pain, on the basis of either Freud’s theory of actual neurosis, 
or the concept of psychosis, through the notion of ‘ordinary psychosis’. According to these 
perspectives, symptoms are considered to constitute a direct encounter with the unsymbolised 
real where a symbolic-imaginary structuring is missing: there is no formation of the 
unconscious whereby a symptom is a decipherable message in an appeal to the Other. As I 
mentioned in the reflexivity part of chapter two of this thesis, I myself was seduced by this 
viewpoint that many symptoms today are devoid of meaning early on in the analytical process 
and wanted to fit the interviews into this theoretical framework, but ultimately found this 
untenable as I returned to the interviews and closely considered their nature. The structure, 
more specifically, took the form of multiple symbolisations in various ways in an associative 
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network between different events, strongly tied to the metaphor of ‘the body as machine’ as 
argued above. These indubitably stem from and circulate around an encounter with the 
unsymbolised real, as the place of the break-down of symbolisation and an absence of 
meaning, thus arguably showing how actual neurosis may have a place here, particularly 
considering that the biological body may play a role for some and especially in the initiation 
of the condition in the form of the acquirement of viruses and bacteria, or the presence of 
physical sensations and effects due to operations. However, what this structure implies is that 
these more or less physical sensations become intertwined with symbolisations and 
subjective factors, or more accurately are always already intertwined with them as they have 
influenced the initiation and course of them. Therefore, instead of there being an incapacity 
of symbolisation, there are symbolisations present around fatigue and pain with various 
content; symbolisations which have been determined by, and also determine, the subject’s 
mode of relating to the Other. This relation comes to significantly impact the nature and 
course of the condition as this research has showed. As I argued in chapter six, however, 
these symbolisations repeatedly and ultimately fail, meaning that bodily tensions have been 
unable to be integrated into a symbolic network and thus come across as unbearable, 
unpredictable and at large enigmatic. Thus more appropriately ascribed to fatigue as 
presented on in this research is the failure of meaning/symbolisation to contain the body, but 
equally the failure of escaping meaning and the Other, highlighting the struggle between too 
much and not enough meaning, with the subject symptomatically emerging between the 
movements of these two poles, as an embodiment of the failure of having integrated the body 
into a meaningful, mental comprehension. This depicts the mind-body relation in the sense 
of showcasing, on the one hand, the impossibility of collapsing them into one unity (the 
failure of symbolisation), and on the other, the impossibility of separating them into two 
separate entities (the failure of escaping meaning). The failure of escaping meaning was 
particularly significant as this was the most unexpected — and in my subjective view 
undesirable — aspect, as it entails a determination by and dependency on the Other, or in 
simpler terms, that we are dependent on society and to a certain extent a product of it. Certain 
meanings, most particularly those surrounding the mind-body construction, come to 
inevitably influence symptom formation and the experience of it. This does not mean that 
fatigue is a pure effect of society, as if the subject passively receives ideas therefrom, but 
what appears crucial here, as read from the discourses of this study, is the subject’s 
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endorsement of the ideas linked to dominant demands, and ultimately, an idealisation of the 
impossible idea of ‘the body as machine’. This leads to the attempt to negate the mind and 
ultimately a perpetuation of the idea; something found omnipresent at a sociocultural level. 
In the light of these interpretations and considering the deceptive nature of fatigue as 
I highlighted particularly towards the end of this thesis, I presented some counterarguments 
to the popular contemporary theories within the Lacanian field in relation to chronic fatigue. 
I argued that there is a possibility that these theories confuse the defensive moment of the 
symptom (a symptom of a symptom; a refusal of the refusal) with the structure and 
appearance of the symptom. The defence, constitutive of a desire and aim for a nothingness 
which showcases the fundamental nature of desire, can mimic the appearance of being cut 
off from the symbolic Other, if persistent enough. This begs the question: do these theories 
not themselves contain the fantasy of escaping from the big Other? In other words, these 
theories arguably participate in the dominant mind-body dichotomy where the mind and the 
body are too separated and the mind is negated (in the form of a lack of symbolisation), and 
left is the body in isolation to it. While I am not generalising the findings of this research, in 
which I conducted an in-depth analysis on seven participants’ interview transcripts, to 
everyone who experiences chronic fatigue and/or pain, the lack of consideration of the 
deceptive nature of fatigue — most likely a quality shared with other dominant symptoms 
manifesting today — puts into question the conclusion stemming from some of these 
contemporary theories that the majority of symptoms today, particularly those thought of as 
‘psychosomatic’, lacking imaginary-symbolic material and ‘coating’. If anything, it would 
not be surprising if, on the contrary, symbolic elements and repeated appeals to the Other are 
today increasing, considering the omnipresent sociocultural tendency to concretise and 
externalise a person and his/her suffering into images and numbers, and attempt to eradicate 
suffering with pills and quick solutions. If symbolism has been repressed, then a return of the 
repressed is to be expected. This brings us (back) to the importance of maintaining an ethical 
position vis a vis the subject, be that either in research or in the medical or 
psychotherapeutic/analytic clinic, of maintaining a constantly critical, open-minded 
perspective which would allow a thorough investigation of fatigue/symptoms, and the space 
for a more complex view on the mind-body relation which does justice to subjective, lived 
experiences. 
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Reflections on and Recommendations for Future Directions 
 
In response to the pervasive negation of the mind promoted in modern society at the level of 
the scientific and capitalistic discourse, I propose that adopting and implementing a view of 
the mind and the body in line with Lacan’s theory will enhance the prevention and treatment 
of fatigue. This approach includes a perspective of the mind and the body wherein the two 
form not a unity, nor two separate entities, but an inseparable relation — following Lacan’s 
Möbius logic of them being ‘the same but different’. In other words, the gap between the 
mind and the body needs to be acknowledged; a gap which ultimately means they are forever 
linked, for if there were no distance, there would be no way of meaningfully relating to one 
another (the mind and the body, the subject and the Other). Adopting this approach would 
(re)establish the links between them, considering the dismissal of their relation ends up 
perpetuating subjective factors and unconscious ideas (‘the body as machine’) unbeknownst 
to a subject. Acknowledging the intricate relation between the mind and the body means, as 
argued in this thesis, recognising that the question of cause is impossible to answer — that 
of ‘is it biological or psychological?’, particularly that pertaining to a single cause. Not only 
is an answer to this impossible, but it is arguably unimportant, considering a biological and 
subjective exploration are equally important in the investigation of fatigue. The crucial aspect 
here is to refuse to reduce the condition to either sides, and consider the over-determination 
of a condition and the complex interaction between the mind and the body, and between the 
subject and the sociocultural Other.   
Regarding biological investigations, it would benefit the patient if the clinician 
recognises the limits of capturing the body within the framework of a biomedical model. For 
instance, there needs to be more flexibility in how clinicians use the idea of universally valid 
numbers, an acknowledgment that the cut-off threshold used for determining if a ‘pathology’ 
is present and a treatment is necessary, are somewhat arbitrary and will differ for each person. 
This is not to include a wider spectrum of ‘abnormality’, but to recognise that what may be 
considered a problem for one person, will not necessarily be so for another person. The same 
goes for interpreting the presence of a condition without biological testing, something that 
needs to be taken more seriously. Because the presence of biological markers should not be 
the only thing capable of conferring validity on a condition, and we should not shy away 
 
 
233 
from the fact that subjective factors will play a large, or even the main, role in some 
conditions — why should this not be taken as seriously as biology? Perhaps we can follow 
Freud’s viewpoint here on what constitutes a symptom: a symptom, according to Freud, is 
what the person complains about. This would avoid reaching the conclusion ‘there’s nothing 
wrong with you’ and instead take seriously that which cannot easily be captured and 
concretised in numbers, images, and even words; most notably the unconscious. Could the 
medical setting be a place wherein the unconscious is taken seriously? I argue that, to a 
certain extent, it can.  
The medical professional can establish a more fruitful relation with the patient by 
approaching and listening to the him/her in a way which considers lack. This would include 
staying clear of pre-conceived notions regarding what would be ‘good’ for the patient (and 
for everyone), for example through demanding him/her to exercise. However, it is not just 
specific, foreign demands the subject struggles with, but demands in general. Psychoanalysis 
recognises that a pathological symptom always involves difficulties with the Other’s demand, 
as a demand is an interpretation of desire and thus of one’s place in the world, and a symptom 
is an attempt to articulate this, thus becoming problematic when it repeatedly fails. Indeed, 
we have observed how the accumulation of demands in fatigue — the fact that one cannot 
escape the life of demands — is problematic and unbearable. In the light of this, throwing 
more demands at patients, particularly those involving a reduction to a need, will be 
counterproductive and will contribute to the perpetuation of their conditions. It can, however, 
become difficult not to, given the ambivalence found for some of the participants of this study 
in the sense that they demand an answer and a cure to their condition — in a way demand 
the demand of the practitioner in which specific instructions can be followed since it would 
do away with unknowability and anxiety — but simultaneously and unconsciously they do 
not want or tolerate an answer. The clinician could perhaps adopt a position akin to that of 
the psychoanalyst here, considering the major common thread existing between medicine 
and psychoanalysis as recognised by Lacan: they both involve responding to a patient’s 
demand (Leader & Corfield, 2008: 317). Also, as Balint (1955) identifies, psychoanalysis 
has more guidelines when it comes to handling the clinician-patient relationship. 
The analyst does not give into the demands of the analysand, but keeps the space open 
for exploring the possible unconscious meanings and functions surrounding the demand of 
the patient — a demand recognised to go beyond the immediate setting in which it is made 
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(the existence of transference). The way in which this is done, however, differs depending 
on the structure of the analysand’s speech. The main question is if it follows a neurotic or 
psychotic logic, since these can involve opposite responses of the analyst. The analysis of 
this research has focused predominantly on a neurotic logic since it has been deemed more 
appropriate in shedding light on the participant’s discourses. This is not surprising given the 
procedure of this research. People volunteer to participate, which presupposes a desire to be 
heard by anOther. It would appeal to subjects of a neurotic logic, or if viewing the structures 
as fluid, it would influence this logic to emerge. More research is therefore needed pertaining 
to subjective differences in the experience of fatigue, crucially within different settings and 
different groups of people.  
Regarding subjective differences, the area of fatigue and in general the area of health 
would benefit from further explorations into other discourses and practices attached to the 
mind-body construction and most notably the metaphor ‘the body as machine’, particularly 
those related to class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, ability etc. These are not only 
connected to current sociocultural discourses and practices, but the very materiality of the 
body. Lacanian theory aptly deals with this, which is evident in his theory on the drive and 
the mind-body relation. The drive is a force linked to and dependent on the biological 
structure of the body in terms of erogenous zones qua rims (especially important surrounding 
questions of gender), but simultaneously independent of it as it has been formed by the 
structural incompleteness of language, and thus the drive is reducible to neither biology nor 
culture. Acknowledging this complex relation between the mind and the body allows an 
ethical way of exploring various cultural factors, factors which no doubt give various 
meanings to ‘the body as machine’ and which, in turn, influence symptom formation. While 
I did not explicitly ask the participants about these aspects — since I attempted to keep the 
direction as open as possible in relation to fatigue in order for them to bring to the table the 
most important elements — they have influenced the content of the participants’ interviews, 
which is more obvious in some areas than others. For instance, Gail, who comes “from an 
Asian family” as she explains, spoke about the importance of this background on her choice 
to push herself to obtain a degree while already having obtained several others, since, as she 
relates, this culture puts much emphasis on education. In other words, her cultural 
background determined the content of the demand to ‘keep going’ (it being focused on 
obtaining degrees), while the structure of this demand remained the same in terms of it being 
 
 
235 
a reduction to a need and/or an encounter with radical lack, particularly as it contrasts to the 
demand to ‘slow down’ with which she was repeatedly confronted via the medical 
establishment. In terms of gender and sexuality, Amy illustrated, and to a similar degree Gail 
surrounding the onset events in relation to her sister, that the imperative to ‘keep going’ 
involves taking care of others in her role as a mother and a nurse, and that a focus on other 
people’s desire/lack without a goal for oneself (arguably Amy’s studies which I discussed in 
chapter three), is more significant in relation to fatigue than a high level of activity. It is 
known that more females suffer from fatigue and in general ‘psychosomatic’ conditions, 
which could very well be linked to the close focus on, or sensitivity to, the Other’s desire. 
This need not be the case though as Tom’s discourse illustrated, where arguably the attempt 
to shut out a dependency on the Other, the separation to the Other’s desire, has failed, 
resulting in the accumulation of overbearing demands, arguably more linked to the discourse 
surrounding masculinity in the sense that obsessional neurosis has been argued to be linked 
with it. This follows the idea that identity formation contains a universal structure which 
comes to be filled with different content depending on cultural and individual differences, 
differences which also, of course, influence the more specific structure pertaining to various 
clinical categories. It would have been insightful and useful to learn more about how these 
factors just mentioned come to impact symptom formation and experience. If time and space 
allowed, I would have liked to deepen the understanding surrounding this; however for a 
more productive and meaningful discussion, I would have had to ask the participants about 
them from the start. One has to wonder, too, beyond my omission, the influence of the 
biomedical discourse in giving rise to a deceivingly ‘neutral’ discourse, and thus the reason 
for the participants’ of not having stressed these factors, potentially following the (false) 
belief that a biological illness does not discriminate between cultural factors. Nevertheless, 
even within a group with a presumably shared commonality, such as a certain gender or class 
or those whose discourse follows a neurotic logic, fatigue is not manifested and experienced 
in the same manner, as I hope this research has demonstrated. Despite many similarities, 
there are different emphases on different aspects of, for example, the alienating nature of 
subjectivity and the way in which separation occurs via the body and in discourse due to the 
singularity of subjectivity. This returns us to the importance in the clinic — any clinic — to 
meet the patient with as little pre-conceived notions as possible, to constantly maintain an 
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open and critical stance, and importantly one which opens the clinician’s ears to the 
unconscious logic potentially at work in a demand. 
Paying attention to the unconscious includes appreciating the structural 
incompleteness of language; the fact that when a patient seeks help for a condition, s/he is 
not aware of the multiple influences on it or even aware for what she is seeking help, and 
further not capable of giving an ‘honest’ or ‘direct’ answer. Full self-consciousness is not 
possible; language is not transparent but needs to be interpreted. It then becomes crucial for 
the practitioner to ask fruitful questions in the right way and with the right timing. It is not 
feasible, or probably desirable, to propose that the doctor engage in psychoanalysis, given 
the time constraints of contemporary medical practices and other practical factors. Rather, 
the medical clinician could adopt some techniques used in psychoanalysis, or in the very 
least, consider some issues dealt with therein, which are also applicable to the medical field. 
These matters entail the wider implications of a patient’s demands, and the response to them, 
which are commonly discussed within a Lacanian psychoanalytic setting. 
Leader & Corfield (2008) put forward a number of fruitful and important 
considerations related to this in their discussion of the potential bridge between 
psychoanalysis and medicine. They discuss, for example, the ethics surrounding the 
biomedical goal of removing symptoms, seeing as a symptom has several protective 
functions, such as symbolising that which was not symbolised, a considered well-deserved 
punishment, or a desire to be heard and validated. Recognising that symptoms have functions 
can massively benefit medical professionals and patients. Pertaining to the desire to be 
validated, and in the light of this research, just paying serious, close attention to the patient 
in a way which makes him/her feels heard, can arguably in some cases be all it takes for a 
condition not to worsen/develop, or in the very least, to stabilise it. Recognising that 
symptoms have functions would also, as Leader & Corfield observe (Ibid.: 303), instead of 
sending the patient to a number of different specialists cut off from communication with each 
other, enable the clinician to recognise a potential link between various surface symptoms 
(considered from a biomedical perspective to constitute a different condition with a different 
cause), which would consequently inform and facilitate treatment accordingly. If, for 
example, a symptom is used as a way of dealing with loss and the guilt stemming therefrom, 
then the production of a new surface symptom — say the disappearance of fatigue and the 
appearance of anorexia as starvation — could still have the same function; hence the use in 
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psychoanalysis of the singular word ‘symptom’ as opposed to the plural ‘symptoms’ in 
biomedicine. This research has demonstrated that isolating pain from fatigue is not 
straightforward. It then becomes important to treat the symptom as a structural function 
instead of over-focusing on its content. Within the psychoanalytically oriented clinic, such a 
focus on content is known for exacerbating a symptom as it feeds it with meaning and 
identification.  
In order to recognise the potential functions of a symptom (as expressed through 
demands), one needs to pay attention to the link between various life events and the symptom. 
I argue that the clinician could at least initiate this process or make the subject aware of 
certain links by asking certain questions in certain ways. A question I asked the participants 
of this study which proved fruitful in bringing to light various events related to the condition 
was: ‘What went on more generally in your life at the onset of your condition?’. If 
recognising that there was a loss involved here, then one could entertain the idea that the 
symptom could correspond to a failure of mourning, and subsequently proceed accordingly. 
This could, however, be considered a sensitive topic for the patient since it potentially points 
to a subjective involvement, and could reinforce the defence of the subject, thus one needs to 
act in a sensitive and timely manner. 
The medical field, however, is not blind to the link between fatigue and mourning 
since there is much literature suggesting the two are strongly related. However, it appears 
that fatigue is linked to the process of mourning where it is indicative of a sign of it, and is 
not recognised as a failure of mourning; that the formation of a symptom could be a way of 
avoiding to mourn. This is critical to recognise since it constitutes the difference between 
providing an explanation and an answer (‘you’re just mourning’) which dismisses a 
subjective exploration, and facilitating the means through which the latter and the mourning 
process can be initiated. While mourning is a highly singular process in the sense that people 
will have various ways of dealing with loss, if the person does not know s/he is avoiding to 
mourn, then help and support needs to be put in place to help the person commence the 
process.  
I am not purporting to hold the answers here regarding the best way for the clinician 
to respond to the patient and what would be the best treatment if, for example, mourning is 
considered a problem. For some people, therapy could be useful, but it would probably not 
benefit everyone, particularly for those who are against talking therapies. However, regarding 
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the participants of this study, they showed an openness to this and indeed all of them 
underwent some form of counselling, with many expressing the usefulness of it in dealing 
with the losses and limits of the condition. More research and discussions are needed in this 
area, which could touch upon questions such as: given the contemporary constraints on 
medical encounters, what can the role of the clinician be? Should it include a probing into 
subjective factors? How would one go about doing so, and when should one do so; when is 
it better to leave it alone? What is the best treatment for those presenting ‘psychosomatic 
symptoms’ and a lack of openness to ‘psychological’ investigations and treatment? Is a 
treatment in terms of removing a symptom even necessary, desirable, and safe? Can 
psychoanalysis be useful in medicine? Regardless of the potential answers to these question, 
the first step is undoubtedly to listen carefully to the person in order to make an appropriate 
judgement on an individual basis, in order to ‘decide what to treat, when, and how’ (Balint, 
1955: 685). In fact, a link between psychoanalysis and medicine has already been established 
by so called Balint groups. Based on the work of the psychoanalyst Michael Balint, a Balint 
group is led by a psychoanalyst and offers a space for GPs to discuss their relationship with 
their patients, and their interventions in specific cases. This has been set up by National Balint 
Societies in different countries and has been suggested by some studies to be beneficial to 
the medical practitioner (Lipsitt, 1999; Kjeldmand & Holmström, 2008). The reader is 
recommended to turn to Balint’s (1955) early work ‘The Doctor, His Patient and his Illness’ 
where he first discusses these group seminars. 
Moving away from the context of medical practice, even those patients who would 
benefit from therapy, and those who themselves seek out therapy/psychoanalysis, can end up 
challenging the clinician and the purpose of the therapy if endorsing the view that their 
condition is strongly linked to biological/external factors. That is, there is less willingness to 
link the emergence and function of their condition with various thought processes and 
experiences around life events. How then does one work with such a resistance? It has been 
suggested by Verhaeghe (2004: 291), when working with people of an actualpathological 
position for whom analysis presents a difficulty, that there should be a focus on subject 
amplification rather than analysis. That is, the therapeutic goal should be the construction of 
meaning as opposed to a deconstruction, with a particular focus on the primary subject-Other 
relation. However, since Verhaeghe’s position is that in actualpathology there is no symbolic-
imaginary meaning — that there is ‘nothing to analyze’ (Ibid.) — and I argue, on the contrary, 
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that in this thesis we can detect a symbolically structured symptom for the participants, his 
recommendation may not be applicable here. I nevertheless suggest it still is, considering that 
a symbolic construction is always the first step in order to allow a deconstruction of it. From 
a Lacanian perspective, these two processes are strongly intertwined insofar as meaning does 
not exist a priori or is unconsciously hidden, but language is reflexive and the unconscious 
is the place of meaning (logic) and non-meaning. If there is a stubborn refusal of the Other 
present, it may be that the construction of the relation between the subject and the Other 
needs more focus and time in the beginning of the analysis, regardless of what initiated the 
symptom formation. One would perhaps need to enable the analysand to realise that the 
subject is not cut off from the Other. This could entail pointing out to the analysand that 
instead of ‘nothing’ — the analysand might repeat this nothingness as a refusal and defence, 
particularly when asked for associations — there is something. The analysand may have 
given some minimal associations or material, or in any case will have some minimal thoughts 
and impressions, which needs to be emphasised, something Freud (SE XII: 138) also suggests 
when dealing with a patient’s resistance as manifested in the utterance of ‘nothing’ at the cost 
of the thoughts it replaces. Alternatively, and if the analysand gives literally nothing, one 
could use the ‘nothing’ pronounced/implied as material and ask the analysand to associate to 
it. However, this research has not interviewed those involved in the analytic process and thus 
I tread carefully in giving recommendations here. Future research and work is needed directly 
with analysts and analysands in order to develop fruitful guidelines. 
What additionally needs to be taken into consideration in the subject’s relation to 
demands are their wider, sociocultural influences. We then move away from less 
individualistic solutions within a medical/therapeutic setting to more social solutions. In line 
with the former psychoanalytic solution of (re-)establishing links between one’s 
condition/symptoms and events, I argue, following Mark Fisher (2009: 77), that instead of 
individualising a problem and remaining blind to its larger fuel, what is needed is to link the 
effect of modern phenomena with their structural influences. In the case of fatigue, this 
process would entail connecting the condition with the ideas endorsed in the revolt against 
those ideas, the idea of ‘nothing’ as well as the idea of ‘the body as machine’, and specifically, 
to explore which ideologies and practices sustain them. The ideal of ‘the body as machine’ 
has been shaped not only by the medical discourse but in combination with the discourse of 
late capitalism, both strengthened by the advancement of technology. This has given the 
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impression that the body can and should function like a perpetual, productive machine 
— which gives rise to the drive and desire for ‘nothing’ (likewise resembling a robotic state 
existing under the idea of ‘the body as machine’). While I have referred to certain ideologies 
part of late capitalism throughout this thesis, this has not been the focus, and more research 
and theoretical considerations are needed here in relation to the experience of fatigue. More 
precisely, it would be beneficial to uncover details surrounding the societal structures and 
practices shaping the idea of ‘the body as machine’ existing under a mind-body dichotomy. 
The most invaluable insight offered in this area, to my knowledge, is the work of Anson 
Rabinbach’s (1992) ‘The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity’, 
which I recommend the reader to turn to. It is important, however, not to fall into the trap 
here of reducing a phenomenon to a sociocultural effect, but to acknowledge that links need 
to be established both to one’s singular subjective history, to one’s own responsibility, and 
to sociocultural influences, where one also bears a certain degree of responsibility.  
But would establishing links be sufficient, both or either at an individual and social 
level? Would it prevent some from experiencing debilitating fatigue? I argue that it could 
provide a solid first step, but more research into fruitful societal solutions, and their practical 
implementation, is needed. For in Lacanian practice it is well known that making the 
unconscious conscious, which this process could be said to entail (to the extent that it is 
possible) — connecting the affect back to its origin — is not enough for a ‘change’ to take 
place. Freud noticed that such conscious knowledge does not always dissipate symptoms. 
Instead, what is needed is a change at the level of jouissance, affect (Fink, 2017: 235). 
Lacanian practice aims at this at not through understanding, but on the contrary, through non-
understanding, such as punctuating the person’s speech and any ambiguities found therein. 
That is, by constantly challenging and deconstructing any fixed ideas the subject is believed 
to coincide with — which involves in every case to first and foremost identify those ideas 
and its links as I argued above — lack/loss comes to the fore as something one accepts rather 
than rejects. The more one notices, through speech which creates gaps, that one keeps on 
chasing one’s own tail, that what one is looking for does not exist and thus the ideas one held 
about oneself were ‘false’ in a way (lacking), the less desire fuels the goal of the drive, the 
goal of the drive being to get rid of lack which would also fuel less the aim of it, to circulate 
around a void (a void being necessary for extinguishing it repeatedly). Accepting lack would 
entail accepting that desire cannot be satisfied, that there will always be a surplus, which 
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simultaneously means that one cannot coincide with an image or an idea; that nature and 
culture — the body and the mind — are incompatible. In other words, it would commensurate 
to accepting the mind-body gap, that they cannot be one. Concurrently, this process involves 
accepting the presence of a bodily force seeking satisfaction, and moreover one that is an 
effect of the sociocultural Other’s discourse and practices; that lack never lacks enough and 
there is a lack of a lack, or put differently that ‘nothing’ is never empty enough, accepting 
the impossibility of separating the mind and the body. Through this process, the seeking force 
would lose some charge/not be taken so seriously (but also not disappear altogether). It is 
debatable within the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis what exactly constitutes the end of 
analysis, and we can speculate whether this is possible to occur socially. For what allows 
such a process to take place is that the subject’s speech is directed to anOther, to the analyst. 
The analyst adopts the position of object a, suspending as much as possible his/her 
subjectivity in order for the analysand’s subjectivity, and thus lack, to come forth. The 
opposite appears to occur today, where the sociocultural Other is dictating our every single 
move, telling us who we are, who we should be, what we feel and should feel etc.; in short, 
making demands which entail a reduction to a need and/or a confusing radical lack. This has 
the consequence, as I have argued in this thesis, of subjects making repeated appeals to the 
Other, for the need to both ‘create’ a lack in the Other and oneself, and to find protection 
against such lack.  
In the very least, I claim that we can start by changing our perspective on the mind 
and the body by taking seriously their gap and relation qua inseparability. If we believe less 
in the ideas put on a pedestal such as that of ‘the body as machine’, both collectively and 
individually, and the false idea that our whole worth depends on what we do and how much 
we do, then the need to revolt would allegedly diminish. It would most likely not remove 
revolting altogether, and this would probably be undesirable, but it could diminish highly 
unconscious forms of revolting. Josh Cohen (2019) in his book ‘Not Working – Why We 
Need to Stop’ discusses burnout amongst others and proposes something akin to this, in terms 
of accepting and allowing space for non-activity, or for ‘not doing’ as evidenced by his title. 
Ideally, this would be reflected in social practices, where we would create, for instance, more 
humane and reasonable working conditions. Our obsession with using benchmarks — 
considering the requirement of employees to quantitatively measure all types of 
performances for evaluation purposes (a practice which has seeped into all fields) — adds 
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tremendously to the already-heavy work load many occupations possess. Furthermore, 
universal and pre-conceived ideas of success, performance and working capacity need to be 
challenged. Some reasonable solutions in relation to the omnipresent tendency to quantify 
human nature has been proposed by Verhaeghe (2014: 219) in his book ‘What about me? 
The struggle for identity in a market-based society’. Therein, he argues for a qualitative as 
opposed to quantitative approach to labour organisation, one based on meritocracy and not 
financial incentives. That is, we are to treat and approach the subject, and any subject, not as 
an entity reducible to a number, but within its complex, social environment. The same goes 
for the activity of resting and other areas of life, which this research has showcased can align 
itself with the demand for constant productivity, thus becoming problematic. Life itself 
becomes work and one is constantly in the presence of the Other when an absence becomes 
registered as a presence through documentation and a reduction to numbers or universal 
ideas. It is therefore not enough to focus on improving working conditions as many are 
inclined to believe, because the question is if another equally consuming presence replaces 
it. 
However, by prioritising the aspect of ‘not doing’, which Cohen does in his 
aforementioned book, there is a risk of romanticising the idea of ‘nothing’ attached to it — 
something part of the fatigued subject’s unconscious fantasy and defence as argued in this 
thesis, which can subsequently end up perpetuating the condition. I propose instead that there 
should be an acceptance of the idea of doing less through the process of mourning, which 
simultaneously and equally involves an acceptance of the fact that ‘doing nothing’ is 
impossible, an acceptance of the presence and inescapability of demands, and ultimately, 
society. This would change one’s relationships with demands and society as such. For certain 
demands cannot be bypassed. The presence of the perpetual needs of our biological bodies 
means we are forever slaves to the activities of eating, drinking and sleeping if we want to 
stay alive; if we want to be part of a social order we are demanded to speak in a certain 
language, and the demand to work and earn money is something not everyone has the luxury 
to evade. We would, in other words, need to recognise our alienation and our dependency on 
something other than ourselves, that we are ultimately human, social beings unable to escape 
certain determinism and demands. At the same time, we need to acknowledge that we play a 
role in these societal structures, and thus are not fully dependent on the current ideology and 
society — that ‘we are the system that we complain about’ (Verhaeghe, Ibid.: 236). It 
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constitutes accepting the presence of both alienation and separation in our lives. I am in turn 
advocating, following Verhaeghe’s (Ibid.: 218) advice, for more of a balance between the 
two, between social organisation and autonomy, seeing as today responsibility fluctuates 
between too much responsibility put on the individual (influenced by neoliberal ideologies 
and practices), and not enough on the individual (influenced by the ideologies and practices 
of biomedicine and technology). This involves, first and foremost and alongside Fisher’s 
(2009: 78) proposal, saying goodbye to our romantic attachment to the ideas of failure, 
hopelessness, and impossibilities. These ideas, particularly that of impossibility, are 
omnipresent in contemporary society and strongly related to the metaphor of ‘the body as 
machine’, the endorsement of which, as this thesis has illustrated, exerts a large influence on 
the formation and experience of fatigue as elaborated by the participants of this study. 
In other words, the first inevitable step towards achieving a balance between 
separation and alienation — achieving a reasonable sense of responsibility — is through 
mourning. We need to start mourning. We need to mourn that which never was, never is, and 
never will be. In so doing, we can start making space for that which is really lost today, which 
is precisely loss itself. Only by losing can we create something new.  
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Appendix 1: Recruitment Poster 
 
 
 
 
LOOKING FOR VOLUNTEERS 
 
 
Do you experience fatigue?  
 
The purpose of this research study is to find out about the personal experiences of those 
who experience fatigue/ME/CFS. 
 
 
I am looking for volunteers in the central belt of Scotland who: 
 
. are 18 years or older 
. experience constant or intense fatigue that is different from everyday tiredness and that 
has affected your life negatively  
 OR 
• consider yourself to have Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome 
 OR  
• have been diagnosed with Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome 
 
 
The study involves taking part in an interview, that will take around an hour. 
 
If you are interested in taking part and/or would like more information, please contact:  
 
 
Amanda Diserholt 
Postgraduate Research Student 
Email:  
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Appendix 2: Recruitment Sheet 
 
 
Title: The Language of Fatigue 
 
My name is Amanda Diserholt and I am a postgraduate research student from the School of Life, 
Sport & Social Sciences at Edinburgh Napier University. My research project focuses on 
fatigue/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS). More specifically, this 
study will explore the personal experiences of those experiencing fatigue. 
 
I am looking for volunteers in the central belt of Scotland who: 
 
. are 18 years or older 
. experience constant or intense fatigue that is different from everyday tiredness and that has 
affected your life negatively 
 OR 
• consider yourself to have Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome 
 OR 
• have been diagnosed with Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Symptoms of fatigue and ME/CFS are not well understood. It is the intention of this research project 
to deepen the understanding of the lived experiences of those with fatigue/ME/CFS. By feeding the 
findings of this project to health professionals and the public, it is the aim to provide with knowledge 
that will aid the approach to people with fatigue/ME/CFS. 
 
What does it involve? 
Taking part in the study means that you will be asked to take part in a face-to-face interview, taking 
place at a location of your choice (for example at home, a quiet café or at my university campus in 
Sighthill) at a time of your convenience. The interview will be recorded on a tape recorder and 
should take around 60 minutes. I will ask some questions about your experience with 
fatigue/ME/CFS, when and how it started, and your experience of any contact with health 
professionals, if you have any. 
 
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any stage without giving a reason. To make sure 
enough data is gathered, I will interview a total of 15 people. However, while all interviews will be 
carefully looked at and analysed, there is a chance not all analyses will be included in the final 
thesis. There might be an opportunity to take part in follow-up interviews. 
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Will my information be kept confidential? 
All data will be anonymised, but you may be identifiable from tape recordings of your voice. 
However these will not be public and will be destroyed at the end of the project. Your name will be 
replaced with a pseudonym, and it will not be possible for you to be identified in any reporting of  
the data gathered. All data collected will be kept on a password protected computer to which only 
my supervisors and I will have access.  
If you have any concerns of questions regarding this study, you are welcome to contact me or my 
Director of Studies, Dr Calum Neill: 
 
Amanda Diserholt      Dr Calum Neill Postgraduate 
Research Student      Lecturer 
School of Life, Sport & Social Sciences School of Life, Sport & Social 
Sciences 
Edinburgh Napier University     Edinburgh Napier University 
Sighthill Campus      Sighthill Campus Sighthill Court 
        Sighthill Court 
EH11 4BN       EH11 4BN 
         
Email:     Email:  
        Tel:  
 
If you would like to contact an independent person, who knows about this project but is not involved 
in it, you are welcome to contact Dr Geraldine Jones, Senior Lecturer from the School of Life, 
Sport & Social Sciences, Edinburgh Napier University. You can contact her via email: 
, or telephone:  
 
I would greatly appreciate any time you could spare to participate in this research. If you are 
interested in taking part, please contact me by email or mail at the above address.   If you are 
unsure about taking part and/or have any questions, please don’t hesitate to get in touch. 
 
Thank you very much in anticipation.  
 
Kind regards, 
Amanda Diserholt 
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Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title: The Language of Fatigue 
 
My name is Amanda Diserholt and I am a postgraduate research student from the School of Life, 
Sport & Social Sciences at Edinburgh Napier University. My research project focuses on fatigue and 
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS)/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME). More specifically, this study will 
explore the personal experiences of those experiencing fatigue. Before deciding to take part, please 
take the time to read the following carefully. I am looking for volunteers to participate in the project 
who: 
 
. Are 18 years or older 
. Experience constant or intense fatigue that is different from everyday tiredness and that has 
affected your life negatively OR 
. Consider yourself to have Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis OR 
. Have been diagnosed with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The findings of the project will be valuable both for theoretical and practical reasons. It will 
contribute to the research and knowledge of the lived experiences of those suffering from 
fatigue/CFS/ME. The key findings will be fed to researchers, health professionals and to the public 
as the aim is to improve the approach to fatigue/CFS/ME. 
 
What does it involve? 
If you agree to participate in the study, you will be asked to take part in an interview. The interview 
will be recorded on a tape recorder and should take no longer than 60 minutes. I will ask some 
questions about your experiences with having fatigue/CFS/ME, when and how it started, and your 
experiences with any contact with health professionals, if you have any. To make sure enough data 
is gathered, I will interview a total of 15 people. However, while all interviews will be carefully looked 
at and analysed, there is a chance not all analyses will be included in the final thesis. There might 
be an opportunity to take part in follow-up interviews. 
 
Will my information be kept confidential? 
All data will be anonymised as much as possible, but you may be identifiable from tape recordings 
of your voice. Your name will be replaced with a pseudonym, and it will not be possible for you to be 
identified in any reporting of the data gathered. All data collected will be kept on a password 
protected computer to which only my supervisors and I will have access. These will be kept for ten 
years after the completion of my degree, following which all data that could identify you will be 
destroyed. The results may be published in a journal or presented at a conference. 
 
 
260 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are under no obligation to take part in the study. If you decide to volunteer to participate, you 
can still withdraw at any time during the interview without giving any reasons. If you change your 
mind after the interview and would not like your interview to be used for this study, you can contact 
me at any time to withdraw. You also have the right to skip questions and to stop the interview at 
any time.  
 
If you have any concerns of questions regarding this study, you are welcome to contact me or my 
Director of Studies , Dr Calum Neill: 
 
Amanda Diserholt      Dr Calum Neill Postgraduate 
Research Student      Lecturer 
School of Life, Sport & Social Sciences   School of Life, Sport & Social Sciences 
Edinburgh Napier University     Edinburgh Napier University 
Sighthill Campus      Sighthill Campus Sighthill Court 
        Sighthill Court 
EH11 4BN       EH11 4BN 
         
Email:     Email:  
        Tel:  
 
If you would like to contact an independent person, who knows about this project but is not involved 
in it, you are welcome to contact Dr Geraldine Jones, Senior Lecturer from the School of Life, 
Sport & Social Sciences, Edinburgh Napier University. You can contact her via email: 
, or telephone:  
 
What next? 
If you have read and understood this information sheet, any questions you had have been answered, 
and you would like to be a participant in the study, please now see the consent form. 
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Appendix 4: Consent Form 
 
 
Edinburgh Napier University Research Consent Form 
 
Edinburgh Napier University requires that all persons who participate in research studies give their 
written consent to do so. Please read the following and sign it if you agree with what it says. 
1. I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project on the topic of 
fatigue/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS)/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME) to be conducted by 
Amanda Diserholt, who is a postgraduate research student at Edinburgh Napier University.  
2. The goal of this research study is to explore the personal experience of those with fatigue. 
Specifically, I have been asked to take part in an interview, which should take around 60 
minutes to complete.  
 
3    I agree that the interview will be recorded on an audio recorder.   
4. I have been told that my responses will be anonymised. My name will not be linked with the 
research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in any report subsequently 
produced by the researcher. 
5. I also understand that if at any time during the interview I feel unable or unwilling to continue, I 
am free to leave. That is, my participation in this study is completely voluntary, and I may 
withdraw from it without negative consequences. 
6. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to 
decline. 
7. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the interview and my questions 
have been answered to my satisfaction. 
8. I have read and understand the above and consent to participate in this study. My signature is 
not a waiver of any legal rights. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to keep a copy of 
the informed consent form for my records. 
 
Participant’s Signature      Date  
 
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the respondent has 
consented to participate. Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed consent form for my 
records. 
 
Researcher’s Signature      Date 
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Appendix 5: Interview Schedule 
 
 
Introduction 
 
. Ask participant to read over information sheet 
. Go through the main points verbally (anonymity, their right to withdraw/skip 
questions/take breaks)  
. Ask if they have any questions 
. Give consent form to sign 
. Agree on a pseudonym  
 
Questions 
 
• Could you please say your pseudonym and age? So I can identify you later on.  
 
• How do you meet the requirements for taking part in this study? 
 Prompts: Can you tell me a bit about it? What is it like ((the 
fatigue/condition/symptom(s)? Do you have any other symptoms? If yes, can you 
describe them? 
  
• How does the condition influence your life? What areas of you life does it impact on 
most?  
 
• Can you tell me a bit about when you first felt your symptoms/fatigued. When did you 
first feel any symptoms? 
 Prompts: How did you experience fatigue/symptoms in the beginning? What was 
going on in your life more generally then? How did the symptom(s)/condition 
develop? What do they feel like today?  
 
• Have you ever sought the help of any health professionals (such as GP, nurses or 
alternative doctors)?  
 
 Prompts: If yes, what have your experiences been like? What happened? What did 
you find helpful? What did you find not helpful? If no, what has stopped you from 
seeking help? 
  
• If applicable: What is it like living with the name CFS/ME? 
• Prompts: What does the name mean to you? What was it like being 
diagnosed/realising you had CFS/ME? If applicable: How do you cope with issues 
of diagnosis/stigma?x  
 
• How do you think others (friends, family, society) view fatigue/your condition/ME/CFS?  
If applicable: What role does support groups play in your life? 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Appendix 6: Debrief Sheet 
 
The Language of Fatigue 
 
Thank you very much for participating in the interview - it is extremely helpful for my research. I will 
write down the conversation we just had into a document, which I will then then look at to try to 
understand your experiences living with ME/CFS/fatigue. This will be done through a method called 
‘Lacanian Discourse Analysis’. Your experiences will stand at the centre of my research and 
analysis. Your contribution to this research is valuable both for theoretical and practical reasons. 
Symptoms of fatigue and Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) are not 
well understood. It is the intention of this research project to deepen the understanding of the lived 
experiences of those with ME/CFS/fatigue. By feeding the findings of this project to health 
professionals and the public, it is the aim to provide with knowledge that will aid the approach to 
people with fatigue/ME/CFS. You are at any time free to withdraw your contribution from this 
research without giving any reason. To do so, please contact me on the details below. Similarly, if 
you have any questions at a later stage, please contact myself or my supervisor: 
 
Amanda Diserholt      Dr Calum Neill Postgraduate 
Research Student      Lecturer 
School of Life, Sport & Social Sciences School of Life, Sport & Social 
Sciences 
Edinburgh Napier University     Edinburgh Napier University 
Sighthill Campus      Sighthill Campus Sighthill Court 
        Sighthill Court 
EH11 4BN       EH11 4BN 
         
Email:     Email:  
        Tel:  
 
If you would like to contact an independent person, who knows about this project but is not involved 
in it, you are welcome to contact Dr Geraldine Jones. Her contact details are given below. 
 
Dr Geraldine Jones 
School of Life, Sport & Social Sciences  
Edinburgh Napier University 
Sighthill Campus  
Sighthill Court 
EH11 4BN 
 
 
264 
 
 
 
Email:  
Tel:  
 
Should you feel distressed after participating in this study and would like to talk to someone, you 
can contact the following helplines: 
 
Samaritans: 116 123 (open 24 hours) 
Breathing Space: 0800 83 85 87 (Open Monday-Thursday 6pm to 2am, 24 hours on weekends) 
ME Connect: 0844 576 5326 (Open everyday 10am-12pm, 2-4pm, 7-9pm) 
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Appendix 7: Interest Sheet for Follow-up Interview 
 
Title of Study: The Language of Fatigue 
 
Interested in a follow-up interview? 
 
There may be an opportunity to take part in follow-up interviews. If you are invited for a follow-up 
interview, I would contact you about 1-3 months after today to see if you are still interested. If this is 
the case, you would be invited to take part of an interview. You would have the opportunity to read 
the written version of this interview, which will be sent to you three days before the next interview. 
At the next interview you would have a chance to further explain and expand on things you said in 
this interview. Please leave your preferred contact details below if you are interested in being 
contacted to take part in this second stage:   
 
Name:  
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Contact details (email or post address): 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 8: Recruitment Sheet for Follow-up Interview 
 
 
Dear participant,  
 
About two months ago, you took part in my research study where I interviewed you about your 
experience with ME/CFS. I am contacting you to ask if you would be interested in taking part in a 
follow-up interview. 
 
If you are interested in taking part, you would be asked to take part in an interview taking place at a 
location of your choice (for example at home, a public place or at my university campus in Sighthill) 
at a time of your convenience. Before the interview you would have a chance to read over the 
written document from your first interview. This document will be sent to you three days before the 
interview, either through email or post, in order to give you time to read through it. You can ask for 
more time if you feel you need it. Please note that you can still take part in the interview without 
having read the written document. 
 
The interview will be recorded on a tape recorder and should take around 30 - 60 minutes. In this 
interview you would have the opportunity to expand on and further explain things that you said in 
the first interview, and I will ask you some questions about it. You have the right to withdraw from 
the study at any stage without giving any reason, and just like your first interview, all collected data 
will be anonymised and kept on a password protected computer to which only my supervisors and I 
will have access.If you have any concerns of questions regarding this study, you are welcome to 
contact me or my Director of Studies, Dr Calum Neill: 
 
Amanda Diserholt      Dr Calum Neill Postgraduate 
Research Student      Lecturer 
School of Life, Sport & Social Sciences School of Life, Sport & Social 
Sciences 
Edinburgh Napier University     Edinburgh Napier University 
Sighthill Campus      Sighthill Campus Sighthill Court 
        Sighthill Court 
EH11 4BN       EH11 4BN 
         
Email:    Email:  
        Tel:  
 
If you are happy to take part, please contact me on the details above. 
 
Kind regards, 
Amanda Diserholt 
Postgraduate Research Student 
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Appendix 9: Participant Information Sheet for Follow-up 
Interview 
 
Title: The Language of Fatigue 
 
My name is Amanda Diserholt and I am a postgraduate research student from the School of Life, 
Sport & Social Sciences at Edinburgh Napier University. My research project focuses on Myalgic 
Encephalomyelitis (ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS). More specifically, this study explores the 
personal experiences of those experiencing ME/CFS. Before deciding to take part, please take the 
time to read the following carefully. 
 
What does it involve? 
You have been invited to take part in the second stage of this study. If you agree to participate in 
the study, you will be asked to take part in an interview. The interview allows you the chance to 
expand on and further explain things you said in the previous interview. I will also ask you some 
questions about it. A written document of the first interview was sent to you before this interview, 
which you may refer to. However you can still participate if you have not read it. The interview will 
be recorded on a tape recorder and should take around 30 to 60 minutes.  
 
The findings of this research will be useful as they will help deepen understanding of the lived 
experiences of those suffering from ME/CFS. 
 
Will my information be kept confidential? 
All data will be anonymised as much as possible, but you may be identifiable from tape recordings 
of your voice. Your name will be replaced with a pseudonym, and it will not be possible for you to be 
identified in any reporting of the data gathered. All data collected will be kept on a password 
protected computer to which only my supervisors and I will have access. These will be kept for ten 
years after the completion of my degree, following which all data that could identify you will be 
destroyed. The results may be published in a journal or presented at a conference. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are under no obligation to take part in the study. If you decide to volunteer to participate, you 
can still withdraw at any time during the interview without giving any reasons. If you change your 
mind after the interview and would not like your interview to be used for this study, you can contact 
me at any time to withdraw. You also have the right to skip questions and to stop the interview at 
any time. 
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If you have any concerns of questions regarding this study, you are welcome to contact me or my 
Director of Studies, Dr Calum Neill:  
 
Amanda Diserholt      Dr Calum Neill Postgraduate 
Research Student      Lecturer 
School of Life, Sport & Social Sciences School of Life, Sport & Social 
Sciences 
Edinburgh Napier University     Edinburgh Napier University 
Sighthill Campus      Sighthill Campus Sighthill Court 
        Sighthill Court 
EH11 4BN       EH11 4BN 
         
Email:    Email:  
        Tel:  
 
If you would like to contact an independent person, who knows about this project but is not involved 
in it, you are welcome to contact Dr Geraldine Jones, Senior Lecturer from the School of Life, 
Sport & Social Sciences, Edinburgh Napier University. You can contact her via email: 
 or telephone:  
 
What next? 
If you have read and understood this information sheet, any questions you had have been answered, 
and you would like to be a participant in the study, please now see the consent form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
